Đỗ Mậu
Đỗ Mậu | |
---|---|
Prime Minister of South Vietnam | |
In office 8 February 1964 – 30 September 1964 Serving with | |
Prime Minister | Nguyễn Khánh |
Preceded by | Position established |
Succeeded by | Nguyễn Lưu Viên |
Personal details | |
Born | 1963 South Vietnamese coup, January 1964 South Vietnamese coup | 1 July 1917
Đỗ Mậu (1 July 1917 – 11 April 2002)
Having abandoned the Communist-led Việt Minh resistance to join the
After the coup, Mậu was promoted to Major general and made one of 12 members of the ruling junta. Fearing his political skills, the leading generals tried to sideline him and placed him in the non-influential post of Information Minister, where he censored newspapers. Mậu responded by plotting his own coup, joining forces with Nguyễn Khánh, Dương Văn Đức, Trần Thiện Khiêm, Nguyễn Chánh Thi and Dương Ngọc Lắm. Three months after Diệm was deposed, the next coup was successful without needing a battle. Mậu was then made one of three deputy prime ministers, overseeing social and cultural affairs. Disillusioned with Khánh's tendency toward military dictatorship, and isolated by the young generals, Mậu retired from the military for good in 1964.
Early years and career
During the 1940s, Mậu had joined the Việt Minh resistance as a Battalion Commanding officer in the Central Vietnam, but became disillusioned by Communist cadres. He then joined the French-backed
1963 coup
The ruling Ngô family came under pressure in the Buddhist crisis of 1963, when discontent among the country's Buddhist majority towards the pro-Catholic regime erupted into civil unrest.[5] There were many conspiracies against Diệm in 1963, many of them by different cliques of military officers independent from one another. According to Ellen Hammer, there were "perhaps as many as six and possibly more" different plots,[6] and these spanned the gamut of society to include civilian politicians, union leaders, and university students.[6]
In mid-1963, one group consisted of mid-level officers such as colonels, majors, and captains. Mậu was in this group, which was coordinated by Trần Kim Tuyến, South Vietnam's director of intelligence. Tuyến had been a palace insider, but a rift had developed in recent years, and he began to plot as early as 1962.[6][7] As South Vietnam was a police state, Tuyến was an extremely powerful figure with many contacts.[8][9] Another in the group was Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo, an undetected communist agent who was deliberately fomenting infighting among the officers and mismanaging the Strategic Hamlet Program in order to destabilize the Saigon government.[10]
Tuyến's group had many officers who were members of the opposition
When Tuyến's machinations were discovered, he was exiled by Nhu.
Following the
When the coup was about to take place, Mậu helped to get to weaken loyalist forces. Mậu concocted military intelligence reports with false data claiming the
Another of Diệm's younger brothers, Ngô Đình Cẩn, began to suspect Mậu and told the palace, which told army chief General Trần Thiện Khiêm to have Mậu arrested. However, Khiêm, also part of the plot, deliberately procrastinated and Mậu remained free. In the meantime, it was too late for the brothers to bring their loyalists back into the capital.[25] Mậu helped to organise a lunchtime meeting at Joint General Staff Headquarters and invited senior officers to the event. At 13:45 on 1 November 1963, the coup was launched, and those who remained loyal to Diệm were arrested.[29]
Mậu found himself on the opposite side to his nephew and Air Force Lieutenant Đỏ Thơ, Diệm's
After the coup was successfully completed, the media learned about the conspiracy organised by Tuyến and Thảo which was more advanced than that of the generals before being integrated into the main plot. Đôn thought the younger officers had publicized their well-advanced plot in order to gain personal acclaim and distract attention from the generals' success, so he threatened to arrest them but Mậu intervened to protect them.[15] Mậu was a principal tactician of the coup. He did not explicitly command troops, but had a thorough knowledge of the backgrounds of most of the ARVN officers and their strengths and weaknesses.[2] This had allowed him to help recruit rebels, avoid loyalists and engineer the previous coup. The Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) of General Dương Văn Minh respected Mậu, but their fears about his shrewdness led them to place him in the relatively powerless post of Minister of Information, even though he was one of 12 members of the MRC. Mậu's closest aides were posted further away from any real power.[34]
Mậu was mainly responsible for stifling anti-government sentiment. Saigon newspapers, which been able to operate liberally in the post-Diệm era, reported that the junta was paralysed because all twelve generals in the MRC had equal power.[35][36] They strongly attacked Prime Minister Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, accusing his civilian government of being "tools" of the MRC.[37] They also questioned Thơ's activities under Diệm's presidency, accusing him of personally benefiting from corruption under Diệm's land policy.[37] Mậu's ministry had already circulated a long list of topics which could not be reported. Thơ could no longer tolerate what was being reported about him. He called journalists into his office and assailed them for what he regarded as inaccurate, irresponsible and disloyal reporting. Thơ accused them of lying, and claimed one of the journalists was a communist while another was a drug addict.[36] He said that his administration would "take steps to meet the situation" if the media did not behave responsibly. The next day Mậu's ministry closed down three newspapers for "disloyalty".[36] During this time, Mậu enacted the "Golden Rules" to govern media conduct: Do not promote Communism or neutralism. Do not endanger national security or the army's morale. Do not spread false news of any kind. Do not slander individuals. Do not bolster vices.[38]
1964 coup
Disgruntled, Mậu began recruiting for a coup against Minh's MRC, sounding out exiles in Cambodia and France as well as those who had returned after the overthrow of Diệm.[34] Mậu started by targeting General Khánh, who was moved from II Corps to I Corps in the far north of South Vietnam. This, it was speculated, was to keep him far away from Saigon.[2][39] This was contrary to Khánh's request for a transfer to the Mekong Delta close to Saigon. Khánh made no attempt to hide his anger at not being given a more important job by the MRC.[2] Khánh had long been regarded as an ambitious and unscrupulous officer by his colleagues,[40] and he had a reputation for switching sides in high-level disputes for personal gain.[39][41]
The most important link in Mậu's plan was Colonel
At the time, there was innuendo that some generals in the MRC would become neutralist and stop fighting the communists, and that they were plotting with French President Charles de Gaulle, who supported such a solution in order to remove the US presence. Đức used his French experience to concoct some plausible sounding and incriminating documents for Mậu, which purported to show that some junta members were French agents. Some of the documents were leaked to some senior American officials.[43] In January 1964, troops led by Khánh, Khiêm, and Thi overthrew the MRC in a bloodless coup.[44][45] Khánh assumed control of a new junta, and Mậu was one three Deputy Prime Ministers, overseeing social and cultural affairs.[46][47]
Notes
- ^ "Cựu Tướng Đỗ Mậu Từ Trần; Tt Tuệ Sỹ Gửi Thơ Tiễn" (in Vietnamese). VietBao. 2002-04-15. Retrieved 2012-10-13.
- ^ a b c d e Shaplen, p. 230.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 85-86
- ^ Karnow, pp. 237-40.
- ^ Tucker, pp. 289-94.
- ^ a b c d e f Hammer, p. 250.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 197.
- ^ Tucker, p. 407.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 158.
- ^ Tucker, p. 325.
- ^ Dommen, p. 418.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 131-33.
- ^ a b c d Shaplen, p. 198.
- ^ a b c Hammer, p. 249.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 251.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 197-98.
- ^ Karnow, p. 300.
- ^ Hammer, p. 264.
- ^ Karnow, p. 317.
- ^ a b Shaplen, p. 199.
- ^ Hammer, p. 287.
- ^ Tang, p. 52
- ^ Shaplen, p. 206.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 205.
- ^ a b c Hammer, p. 273.
- ^ Jones, pp. 370-80.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 145-55.
- ^ Karnow, p. 319.
- ^ Hammer, p. 285.
- ^ Hammer, p. 293.
- ^ Jones, p. 418.
- ^ Tucker, pp. 289-95.
- ^ Hammer, p. 294.
- ^ a b c d Shaplen, p. 231.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 221.
- ^ a b c Moyar, p. 280.
- ^ a b Shaplen, p. 223
- ^ "Golden Rules in Saigon". Time. 1964-01-24. Archived from the original on May 12, 2009.
- ^ a b Karnow, pp. 354-55.
- ^ Logevall, p. 161.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 228.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 231-32.
- ^ Shaplen, p. 232.
- ^ Karnow, p. 354.
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 331-34
- ^ Shaplen, pp. 236-37.
- ^ Karnow, p. 355.
References
- Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-33854-9.
- ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- JSTOR 2757066.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam: the war, 1954-1975. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- Logevall, Fredrik (2006). "The French recognition of China and its implications for the Vietnam War". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.). Behind the bamboo curtain: China, Vietnam, and the world beyond Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-5502-7.
- ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
- Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945-1965. London: André Deutsch.
- ISBN 0-224-02819-7.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ISBN 1-57607-040-9.