15th Tank Corps

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

15th Tank Corps
Active
  • 1938–1940 (1st formation)
  • 1942–1943 (2nd formation)
CountrySoviet Union
BranchRed Army
Engagements1st formation: Soviet invasion of Poland

2nd formation: German-Soviet War

Commanders
Notable
commanders

The 15th Tank Corps (Russian: 15-й танковый корпус, 15-y tankoviy korpus) was a tank corps of the Soviet Union's Red Army. It formed in 1938 from a mechanized corps and fought in the Soviet invasion of Poland, during which it participated in the capture of the Grodno and Augustów Forest from Poland. The corps was disbanded in January 1940 at Vilnius and Šalčininkai in Lithuania.

In 1942, the corps was reformed under the command of

Don River
.

In February 1943, the unit fought in

7th Guards Tank Corps
.

First formation

The 15th Tank Corps formed in 1938 from the

U-2 biplanes.[3]

Soviet invasion of Poland

Initial advance

Corps movements during the invasion of Poland between 17 and 24 September 1939

The corps fought in the

Shchara River, the 2nd Brigade entered Slonim and disarmed 80 policemen. On 19 September, the brigade reached Vawkavysk, and the corps was ordered to take Grodno and Sokółka by the end of the day, in conjunction with the motorcycle units of the 4th and 13th Rifle Divisions. At the same time the 27th Brigade captured Dvorets, disarming 400 people and capturing 300 rifles,[3] but fuel shortages kept the corps stretched out along the Slonim–Vawkavysk road awaiting refueling. The 20th Brigade approached Slonim from the east, further clogging the roads and delaying the arrival of supply units.[5][3]

Battle of Grodno

After receiving fuel from 07:00 on 20 September, the units of the corps began to advance on Grodno in multiple waves. At 13:00, 50 tanks from the 27th Brigade reached the southern outskirts of the city, beginning the

Neman. The 27th Brigade's reconnaissance battalion launched the first attack with 12 tanks and an armored car, and was later joined by two tank battalions with a total of 36 tanks. By 19:00, two battalions of the 13th Rifle Division's 119th Rifle Regiment had arrived at Grodno, and on the morning of 21 September they were reinforced by two battalions of the 4th Rifle Division's 101st Rifle Regiment and the motorized detachment of the 16th Rifle Corps, the latter of which was subordinated to the corps for the duration of the battle. By the end of 20 September, the combined forces had captured the southern part of Grodno.[2][3][7]

At 07:00 on 21 September, the artillery batteries of the two rifle regiments and the 20th Brigade commenced firing from the southern bank of the Niemen, demolishing the main Polish strongpoints—barracks, churches, and trenches—on the northern bank of the Niemen. The 119th Regiment then crossed to the north bank and rebuilt a bridge for the tanks to use. After defeating a group of Polish officers in the Poniemuń district, the regiment captured the eastern part of the city. Meanwhile, the 101st Regiment and a tank company from the 27th Brigade, which crossed the river behind the 119th, destroyed a group of about 250 officers defending the wooded hills 1.5 kilometers (0.93 mi) east of the city, then advanced northeast and captured the railway station by the end of the day. The 20th Brigade captured the southwestern part of the city, but was unable to advance northward because of strong Polish resistance in the houses and trenches near the bridge and the tobacco factory. The Soviet advances on 21 September resulted in the suppression of large pockets of resistance, and during the night, remnants of the Polish defenders retreated in the direction of Sapotskin and Suwałki.[2][3][7]

Grodno was cleared of Polish troops on 22 September. The 27th Brigade lost two burned and 12 damaged BT-7 light tanks in the battle, some to

anti-aircraft gun.[3][2][7]

Mopping up operations and disbandment

One detachment from the 2nd Brigade, under the command of Major F.P. Chuvakin, was composed of a machine gun and rifle battalion and 45 tanks, 37 of which were from the brigade and the rest from the KMG. It was attached to the KMG to mop up remaining resistance in the Augustów Forest and to prevent the Poles fleeing to Lithuania.[2][7] On 22 September, in the area of Sapotskin, the detachment engaged units of the Polish 101st and 102nd Uhlan Regiments, as well as the 110th Reserve Uhlan Regiment, and other units retreating from Grodno. Most of the Polish troops escaped into the forest because of the slow advance of the detachment. Around three companies of Polish troops were dispersed and several officers were killed, among them the Grodno defense commander, Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński. The retreating Polish forces left mines, which blew up four BT-7 tanks. Chuvakin's troops also lost 11 killed and 14 wounded.[3]

The detachment advanced to Sejny and on 23 September reached the Augustów Canal at Vulka, where it was stopped by Polish troops on the left bank, who had burned the bridge over the canal. A tank company forded the canal and forced the defenders to retreat, leaving nine dead. In the fighting of 22 and 23 September, the detachment killed about 40 officers and many soldiers, and captured more than 500 troops, 300 rifles, and 12 machine guns. On 23 September, the 20th Brigade moved to Dąbrowa, where it eliminated remnants of Polish units in the Augustów Forest.[3][7] Two days later, 15 armored cars were detached from the brigade to relieve German troops garrisoning the Osowiec Fortress, which fell in the Soviet sphere of influence under the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Between 23 and 26 September, a detachment of 20 tanks and armored cars from the 27th Brigade and a rifle battalion moved along the road from Grodno to Augustów, and back again, capturing 300 prisoners along the way. During the campaign, the corps killed 78 officers, 133 non-commissioned officers, and 2,337 soldiers. It captured 322 officers, 30 non-commissioned officers, and 352 soldiers, as well as 814 rifles, 153 machine guns, a mortar, two cannons, and 15 cars.[3]

By 2 October, the KMG was disbanded and the corps was subordinated to the 3rd Army.[8] On 10 October, the corps headquarters and the tank brigades were stationed in Vilnius, and the 20th Brigade was in Šalčininkai. The 15th was disbanded along with the other tank corps in January 1940;[2] the Main Military Council considered the tank corps' performance in Poland unsatisfactory, believing them to be unwieldy and difficult to control.[4][9]

Second formation

Corps commander Vasily Koptsov, c. 1940

The corps was re-formed in May 1942 at the Moscow Armored Training Center, nearly a year after Germany had abandoned the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and

T-60 light tanks.[13] The corps concentrated in the Tula area with the rest of the army, conducting intensive training exercises.[14] After Axis forces launched the Case Blue summer offensive in southern Russia in late June, Stavka believed that an attack by Army Group Centre on the Oryol axis was possible, and ordered the army to concentrate in the Yefremov area. On 6 July, the army was ordered to concentrate to the west in the Chern area, moving closer to the front. The relocation was completed by 9 July, and the 15th Tank Corps was positioned in the area of the Agnichnoye State Farm, Dupny, Bolshoy Kon, Gremyachevo, Yasnyy Lug, and Korotky, where it engaged in combat training and created a defensive line in readiness to repulse a German attack.[15] Late that month, the 96th Brigade was transferred to the Bryansk Front, and it was replaced by the 195th Tank Brigade between 10 and 12 August.[16][17]

Kozelsk Offensive

In early August, the

Kozelsk Offensive was launched by the 3rd Tank Army on the eastern flank of the salient.[18] On 14 August, the order was given to relocate to the Kozelsk area in preparation for the attack; the army began moving the following night, the tanks being transported by rail. The offensive was scheduled to begin on 19 August, but was postponed to 22 August after rains turned the roads to mud, delaying the arrival of the motorized infantry and vehicles from the morning of 16 August to late on 17 August. Railway logistical difficulties resulted in the transfer of personnel and equipment being completed only on 21 August, and cargo only by the end of 24 August.[19] Soviet preparations for the attack were detected by German intelligence, and the German troops in the salient were reinforced and began preparing strong defensive lines.[20] At the beginning of the offensive, the corps was at full strength, with 24 KV tanks, 87 T-34s, and 48 T-60 and 21 T-70 light tanks, a total of 180 tanks.[21]

Actions of the 3rd Tank Army in the Kozelsk Offensive, 22 August 1942

For the attack, Koptsov was placed in command of a group consisting of the 15th Tank Corps and the

minefields.[18][24]

Actions of the 3rd Tank Army in the Kozelsk Offensive, 23–27 August 1942

The delays in the advance caused the armor to lag behind the infantry, and the tank columns came under heavy German air attack before reaching the fight on 23 August.[18] For the next two days, the corps advanced slowly alongside other units, overcoming stubborn German resistance, before finally clearing the forests east of the Vytebet River of German troops on 25 August. The corps was unable to cross the river due to the firm German defenses on the other side. The next day, to end German resistance on the left flank, where the attacks of the 12th Tank Corps and 154th Rifle Division were unsuccessful, the corps was ordered to withdraw from the front in the Zhukovo area and reconcentrate in the forest 3 kilometers (1.9 mi) west of Myzin. It was then to capture Sorokino in conjunction with the 12th Tank Corps and 154th Rifle Division. After moving 15 kilometers (9.3 mi) to its new starting positions, the corps attacked at dawn on 26 August, but was again stymied by the forest terrain.[25]

Actions of the 3rd Tank Army in the Kozelsk Offensive, 27–31 August 1942

The same day, the 12th Tank Corps and 264th Rifle Division came under heavy pressure from German tank counterattacks. On 27 August, army commander

anti-tank ditch protected by minefields and artillery. During the night, sappers and motorized infantry managed to create passages through the ditch, but when the offensive was resumed the next morning, the 15th had advanced only 200–300 meters (660–980 ft) before it was stopped by a second anti-tank ditch. It tried to break through during the day, but could not cross the ditch.[26]

On the night of 29/30 August, the corps was pulled out of the line and concentrated in the forest a kilometer south of Meshalkino to carry out an attack on Sorokino in conjunction with the 154th Rifle Division and 12th Tank Corps. The attack was cancelled due to the heavy losses suffered by both the 12th Tank Corps and 154th Rifle Division in the previous fighting, and the 15th also required time to reorganize.[26] During the day the corps' 195th Tank Brigade conducted the only combat action, a successful operation to relieve two encircled battalions of the 61st Army's 156th Rifle Division. While the main forces of the 3rd Tank Army had been fighting at Sorokino, the 3rd Tank Corps had achieved a measure of success, crossed the Vytebet River, and begun fighting to capture Volosovo. As a result, the 15th Corps and the 154th were relocated to the Kumovo area on the right flank, and the 15th was tasked with exploiting the breakthrough to capture Perestryazh.[27]

The renewed attack began on 2 September but was delayed by German air attacks. Meanwhile, a regiment from the 264th Rifle Division proved unable to cross the Vytebet River and capture the village of Ozhigovo, which was necessary for the 15th Corps to exploit the breakthrough. This forced Koptsov to commit the 17th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 113th and 195th Brigades' motor rifle battalions to the battle. The motor rifle units crossed the Vytebet River after a short artillery barrage and captured Ozhigovo by the end of the day. The 195th Brigade's tank battalions moved across the Vytebet River and attacked Perestryazh the next day, but were unable to capture the village because they were first halted by a ravine covered by German artillery, and were then counterattacked on their left flank by 40 German tanks. Although they repulsed the counterattack and destroyed 13 tanks, the 195th's advance was stopped.[28] On 4 September, after the 3rd Tank Corps was pulled out of the line due to losses and the main forces of the 264th arrived to hold Ozhigovo, the 15th's 17th and 113th Brigades were moved to the Volosovo area, having received orders to advance on Trostyanka alongside the 342nd Rifle Division. From 5 to 9 September, the corps attempted to advance, but was repeatedly repulsed, sustaining casualties and suffering fuel and ammunition shortages.[29] The Kozelsk Offensive ended on 9 September with the combined Soviet tank units from all three armies left with only 200 tanks out of the 700 they originally fielded.[18][30]

Interlude

The corps was relocated to the forests west of

Upper Don. From 29 December to 13 January 1943, the corps was unloaded at the Kalach railway station.[33] The relocation of the entire army was completed only on 15 January, due to a shortage of trains and railway congestion.[34]

Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh Offensive

For the offensive, the corps was reinforced by the 368th Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, the 71st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment, and the 47th Engineer Battalion. They were to make a breakthrough on the first day in the area between the advance of the

184th Rifle Divisions, seizing Yekaterinovka and advancing on Varvarovka and Alexeyevka by the end of the day. The attack was scheduled to begin on 12 January 1943, but was moved back two days owing to railroad delays. By 13 January, 122 tanks from the army—most belonging to the corps' 113th and 195th Brigades—were still delayed by maintenance issues. This was because the Voronezh Front's initial offensive planning mandating that only the 12th Tank Corps would fight in the first attack, which resulted in the new tanks of the 15th being transferred to the 12th and the 12th's worn-out tanks to the 15th, although it was later decided that the entire army would fight in the operation. The 15th therefore had much less time to reorganize in preparation for the assault, and as a result of the 113th and 195th Brigades arriving in the concentration areas on 13 January with only 10 to 12 tanks due to the delays, all of the serviceable tanks were transferred to the 88th Tank Brigade, which was brought up to a strength of 74 tanks. This single brigade constituted the entirety of the corps' armored troops involved in the first day's attack,[34] as the 113th and 195th were placed in army reserve until their tanks arrived.[35]

The corps fought in the offensive from 14 January, tasked with advancing into the Axis rear and linking up with the

Italian Alpini Corps and thousands of Hungarian and German troops.[37] During the action, it reported killing 6,506 Axis troops, capturing 11,168, and capturing or destroying large amounts of artillery, weapons, equipment and transport, while losing 132 killed, 212 wounded, 39 missing, 14 tanks, six guns, two mortars, three armored vehicles, 10 motor vehicles, and six machine guns.[32] Until the end of 25 January, the corps fought in the reduction of the Axis pocket north of Alexeyevka and began reconcentrating on the morning of 29 January. After marching 120 kilometers (75 mi) in two days, it concentrated in the Valuyki area.[38]

Operation Star

Initial Soviet advance during Operation Star between 2 and 10 February 1943

The corps continued its advance towards

Rogan only 10 kilometers (6.2 mi) east of Kharkov.[43]

Soviet advance during Operation Star between 10 and 14 February

On 12 February, Rybalko began a new attack with the 15th Corps, 48th Guards Rifle Division, and the 160th attacking the eastern part of Kharkov. They pushed the LSSAH back to the inner defensive line of the city and reached the factory district in the city's eastern suburbs.[44] Two days later, front commander Colonel General Filipp Golikov ordered a final assault, and the corps together with the 160th renewed the attack from the east. They entered eastern Kharkov itself late on 15 February, participating in heavy street fighting with the forces of the Das Reich Division. The city was recaptured the next day, the 88th Tank Brigade taking Dzerzhinsky Square and linking up with the 40th Army's 183rd Rifle Division.[45]

Soviet advance in Operation Star from 14 to 23 February

The 15th then pursued retreating German forces in the direction of

Grossdeutschland Division, but became bogged down in heavy fighting for the city. The corps' 195th Tank Brigade and the 160th Division were ordered to bypass the city and attempt to capture Staryi Merchik. On 21 February, they advanced on Liubotyn from the west, and the Grossdeutschland Division began its retreat from the city on the next day.[47] In the battle for Liubotyn between 21 and 22 February, the corps reported killing 400 German soldiers and destroying 12 tanks, while suffering losses of 360 killed and wounded and six tanks.[48]

Third Battle of Kharkov

The German advance and Soviet retreat during the Third Battle of Kharkov

On 23 February 1943, German troops from the

111th Rifle Division, the 15th captured Novaya Vodolaga and on 26 February resumed its advance south,[49] leaving the 195th Brigade to hold Novaya Vodolaga.[50]

By the end of 28 February, in conjunction with the

Lozovaya. Koptsov ordered the corps to defend the area around Kegichevka, the location of its headquarters. The 3rd Tank Army was completely surrounded and could not be relieved as it comprised most of the front's troops. Koptsov ordered a breakout, and a small number of troops with light weapons escaped the encirclement, all of the corps' 25 remaining tanks being lost.[52] Koptsov himself was briefly captured on 2 March before dying of the wound he had received four days earlier.[48]

Meanwhile, the 195th Tank Brigade's commander took command of 32 repaired and recovered tanks from the 12th and 15th Corps at Novaya Vodolaga,

SS-Totenkopf Division.[53] During the next few days the brigade retreated north of the Mzha River to Rakitnoye, which was given up on 9 March. The 195th then took up defensive positions in the Ozeryanka area.[54]

Operation Kutuzov

According to a report by the 3rd Tank Army's headquarters, the 15th Tanks Corps' strength on 14 March 1943 was only 1,000 men.

Soviet and German positions during Operation Kutuzov

On 13 July, the corps became part of the Bryansk Front along with its army, and was ordered to concentrate in the Novosil area by the end of 15 July, in preparation for Operation Kutuzov, the Soviet counteroffensive after the Battle of Kursk.[61] After completing a march to its jumping-off point, the corps attacked on the morning of 19 July. The 12th and 15th Tank Corps crossed the Oleshen River in the first echelon of the assault[62] and advanced 12 kilometers (7.5 mi) by the end of the day, aided by artillery and air support. In the evening, the 15th's advance was stopped by the 8th Panzer Division. During the fighting on 19 July, the commander of the 113th Tank Brigade, Leonid Chigin, was killed in action.[63] The strong German resistance during the day reduced the corps to 32 T-34 and 42 T-70 tanks from a strength of 129 T-34s and 68 T-70s at the start of the day.[64]

The following day, the corps shifted northwest to capture

Oka River, capturing a bridgehead near Novaya Slobodka.[66] By the end of 21 July, the corps arrived to assist the 12th Tank Corps and the 91st Separate Tank Brigade in the crossing of the Optushka River, delayed by intense German air attacks and tank counterattacks.[67] The next morning, all three units began crossing the river.[68] The 195th Tank Brigade's commander, Vasily Lomakin, was killed in action leading his unit on 22 July. Both Chigin and Lomakin were posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.[69][63] On 23 July, the German defenses on the Optushka were broken, and the pursuit began. By the end of the day, the corps had reached the line of Semendyaevsky, Karpovsky, Aleksandrovka, Safonovo, and Neplyuevo.[70]

The actions of the offensive had still failed to produce a decisive breakthrough for the army, and on 23 July the attack was shifted south, the 15th being ordered to march to concentration points at Zarya and in the Petrovo area. The march took place on the night of 23/24 July, the troops arriving on the morning of 24 July. The advance was renewed the next day, the 15th in the second echelon behind the 12th Corps. On 26 July 1943, the corps was converted into the

Soviet Guards, in recognition of the "courage and bravery" of its actions in the offensive.[71][72][73]

Commanders

The corps' first formation was commanded by the following officer:[2]

  • Komdiv
    Mikhail Petrovich Petrov
    (1938 – January 1940)

The corps' second formation was commanded by the following officers:[11]

Bibliography

Citations

  1. ^ Habeck 2003, p. 95.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Drig.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Magnuski & Kolomiets 1994, pp. 70–71.
  4. ^ a b Zaloga & Ness 1998, p. 62.
  5. ^ a b Meltyukhov 2001, p. 309.
  6. ^ Meltyukhov 2001, pp. 310–311.
  7. ^ a b c d e Pavlov, Pavlov & Zheltov 1999, pp. 36–37.
  8. ^ Meltyukhov 2001, p. 350.
  9. ^ Drig 2005, p. 14.
  10. People's Commissariat for Defense
    Directive 724486 (Stamped "Secret"), 9 May 1942
  11. ^ a b c d Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union 1964, p. 73.
  12. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 10.
  13. TsAMO
    , fond 38, opus 11373, file 150
  14. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 11.
  15. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 13.
  16. ^ Shein 2007, p. 9.
  17. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 14.
  18. ^ a b c d Forczyk 2014, pp. 216–218.
  19. ^ Zvartsev 1982, pp. 15–17.
  20. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 17.
  21. ^ Shein 2007, p. 11.
  22. ^ Zvartsev 1982, pp. 17–18.
  23. ^ Goncharov 2007, p. 290.
  24. ^ Zvartsev 1982, pp. 20–21.
  25. ^ a b Zvartsev 1982, p. 22.
  26. ^ a b Zvartsev 1982, p. 23.
  27. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 24.
  28. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 25.
  29. ^ a b Zvartsev 1982, p. 26.
  30. ^ Dunn 2009, p. 125.
  31. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 28.
  32. ^ a b Maslov 2001, pp. 206–207.
  33. ^ Shein 2007, p. 42.
  34. ^ a b Zvartsev 1982, pp. 29–33.
  35. ^ Shein 2007, p. 44.
  36. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 34.
  37. ^ Forczyk 2016, pp. 61–63.
  38. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 40.
  39. ^ Glantz 2014, pp. 158–159.
  40. ^ Glantz 2014, pp. 161–162.
  41. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 166.
  42. ^ Maslov 2001, p. 207.
  43. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 172.
  44. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 176.
  45. ^ Glantz 2014, pp. 178–179.
  46. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 180.
  47. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 185.
  48. ^ a b c d Maslov 2001, pp. 207–210.
  49. ^ Glantz 2014, p. 188.
  50. ^ Shein 2007, p. 79.
  51. ^ Isaev 2004, p. 58.
  52. ^ a b Shein 2007, p. 85.
  53. ^ Zvartsev 1982, pp. 53–54.
  54. ^ Shein 2007, pp. 89–90.
  55. ^ Shein 2007, p. 93.
  56. ^ Maslov 2001, p. 210.
  57. ^ Zolotaryov 1999, p. 110.
  58. ^ Gurkin et al. 1972, p. 123.
  59. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 63.
  60. ^ Glantz & House 1999, p. 332.
  61. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 66.
  62. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 67.
  63. ^ a b Shkadov 1987, pp. 886–887.
  64. ^ Shein 2007, p. 103.
  65. ^ Glantz & House 1999, p. 236.
  66. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 73.
  67. ^ Shein 2007, p. 107.
  68. ^ Zvartsev 1982, pp. 74–75.
  69. ^ Shkadov 1988, p. 733.
  70. ^ Shein 2007, p. 108.
  71. ^ Zvartsev 1982, p. 76.
  72. ^ Glantz & House 1999, p. 237.
  73. ^ Shein 2007, pp. 109–111.

References