17 July Revolution
17 July Revolution | |
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Ba'ath Party
Iraqi Armed Forces
- Iraqi Army
- Iraqi Navy
- Iraqi Air Force
Tahir Yahya
Jihaz Haneen
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Ba'athism |
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The 17 July Revolution (
The Ba'ath Party ruled from the 17 July Revolution until 2003, when it was removed from power by an
Background
Under the
In May 1968, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced a report titled "The Stagnant Revolution," stating that radicals in the Iraqi military posed a threat to the Arif government, and while "the balance of forces is such that no group feels power enough to take decisive steps," the ensuing gridlock had created "a situation in which many important political and economic matters are simply ignored."[11] In June 1968, Belgian officials relayed a message from the U.S. State Department to Iraqi officials, offering to resume normal relations if Iraq agreed to provide compensation for damage to the U.S. embassy and consulate incurred during an earlier protest and met other conditions, including an end to the Iraqi boycott of U.S. goods and services imposed after Israel's 1967 victory; although U.S. officials were hoping to prevent a coup, there is no indication of any Iraqi response to this overture.[12]
From at least mid-1965,
The coup
Planning for a coup against Arif and Yahya was underway at least from March 1968, when the topic was discussed at an "officer's convention" held at the home of prominent Ba'athist general
Many details of the coup remain unclear to historians. The U.S. embassy in Beirut (which became the major American source for intelligence on Iraq after the U.S. embassy in Baghdad was closed) speculated that Naif and Dawud—who were, respectively, in charge of President Arif's military intelligence and personal security—initiated the plot, and that Ba'athist conspirators including al-Bakr, Hardan al-Tikriti, and Salih Mahdi Ammash were only asked to participate in order to establish a broader coalition of support for a new government. However, Wolfe-Hunnicutt states: "Though executed by Nayef, the coup was organised by Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein."[5] Both the Naif and Bakr factions were motivated by opposition to Yahya. After his ouster, Arif was exiled to the U.K., and even Yahya was not executed (although he endured brutal torture in prison), possibly to avoid the negative international attention that had resulted from the bloodletting that accompanied other changes of government in Iraq's contemporaneous history. In the ensuing years, Wolfe-Hunnicutt states that Saddam "succeeded in consolidating a formidable political regime ... where so many others had failed," including co-opting Yahya's intention to nationalize the IPC with the help of the Soviet Union.[5][18]
Aftermath
Estimates on the size of the crowds that came to view the dangling corpses spread seventy meters apart in Liberation Square—increasing the area of sensual contact between mutilated body and mass—vary from 150,000 to 500,000. Peasants streamed in from the surrounding countryside to hear the speeches. The proceedings, along with the bodies, continued for twenty-four hours, during which the President, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, and a host of other luminaries gave speeches and orchestrated the carnival-like atmosphere.
—Kanan Makiya describing the 1969 Baghdad hangings.[22]
On 2 August 1968, Iraqi Foreign Minister Abdul Karim Sheikhli stated that Iraq would seek close ties "with the socialist camp, particularly the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic." By late November, the U.S. embassy in Beirut reported that Iraq had released many leftist and communist dissidents, although "there [was] no indication ... [they had] been given any major role in the regime." As the previous government had recently signed a major oil deal with the Soviets, the Ba'ath Party's rapid attempts to improve relations with Moscow were not a shock to U.S. policymakers, but they "provided a glimpse at a strategic alliance that would soon emerge."[23] Behind the scenes, Tikriti (now Iraqi minister of defence) attempted to open a discreet line of communication with the U.S. government through a representative of the American oil company Mobil, but this overture was rebuffed by the Johnson administration as it had come to perceive the Ba'ath Party, in both Iraq and Syria, as too closely associated with the Soviet Union.[5]
For its part, the ruling Ba'ath Party in Syria did not welcome—or initially even acknowledge—the formation of a government by the rival Ba'ath Party in neighboring Iraq. In a press release, the Syrians mentioned that al-Bakr had been appointed president, but did not mention his party's affiliation, instead referring to the incident as a military coup.[24] The Iraqis were more conciliatory, with al-Bakr stating "They are Ba'athists, we are Ba'athists" shortly after the coup.[25] When Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria in 1970, this did not lead to improved relations; to the contrary, the Syrians denounced the Iraqi branch of the party as a "rightist clique".[26]
In December, Iraqi troops based in Jordan "made international headlines" when they began shelling Israeli settlers in the Jordan Valley, which led to a strong response by the Israeli Air Force.[27] al-Bakr claimed that a "fifth column of agents of Israel and the U.S. was striking from behind," and, on 14 December, the Iraqi government alleged it had discovered "an Israeli spy network" plotting to "bring about a change in the Iraqi regime," arresting dozens of individuals and eventually publicly executing 14 people including 9 Iraqi Jews on fabricated espionage charges in January 1969.[28] The executions led to international criticism, with U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers calling them "repugnant to the conscience of the world"[29] and Egypt's Al-Ahram cautioning: "The hanging of fourteen people in the public square is certainly not a heart-warming sight, nor is it the occasion for organizing a spectacle."[22] Makiya credits the hangings with helping the Ba'athist government consolidate control of Iraq, stating: "The terror that, from a Ba'thist viewpoint, was premature and badly handled in 1963, worked and was skillfully deployed the second time around."[22] Makiya recounts how the Ba'athist purge quickly expanded far beyond Iraq's marginalized Jewish community: "In 1969 alone, official executions of convicted spies (or announcements of such executions) took place at least on the following days: February 20, April 14, April 30, May 15, August 21, August 25, September 8, and November 26. The victims now were Muslim or Christian Iraqis with the occasional Jew thrown in for good measure."[22] In total, an estimated 150 people were publicly executed in Liberation Square, Baghdad from 1969–1970.[18]
The plans, concepts, views, internal forces, and reserves we used up to the 1st of March 1973, the day on which the monopolistic companies knelt down and recognized our nationalization, are no longer enough to confront imperialism with its newly conceived and developed plans. ... Thus we prepared additional forces for which imperialism had not allowed in its plans. We can assure our patriotic brothers ... they will not make an Allende of us.—Saddam Hussein reflecting on the IPC nationalization in light of the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, 24 September 1973.[30]
On 1 June 1972, under the direction of Saddam and oil minister Sa'dun Hammadi, Iraq announced Law 69: The nationalization of the Anglo-American shares of the IPC and their transfer to the INOC.[3][5] (The French and Gulbenkian shares of the consortium followed in 1973.[5]) This followed the April 1972 signing of the 15-year Iraqi–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation by al-Bakr and Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin.[31] According to historian Charles R. H. Tripp, the Iraqi–Soviet Treaty upset "the U.S.-sponsored security system established as part of the Cold War in the Middle East," leading the U.S. to finance Mustafa Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) rebels during the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War.[32] From October 1972 until the abrupt end of the Kurdish intervention after March 1975, Gibson states that the CIA "provided the Kurds with nearly $20 million in assistance," including 1,250 tons of non-attributable weaponry.[33]
While most studies credit the nationalization measures pursued by
Bibliography
- Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7.
- Kienle, Eberhard (1991). Ba'th versus Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968–1989. ISBN 1-85043-192-2.
References
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 96, 98–99, 101–102.
- ISBN 9780195333381.
- ^ a b Gibson 2015, p. 137.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 94–98.
- ^ S2CID 157328042.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 98–99.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 99, 102.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 99.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 100.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 101–105, 111.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 111.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 104, 112.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 84–94, 101–102, 110.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 92.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 94, 97, 111.
- ISBN 9780520921245.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 94, 97, 105, 110–111.
- ^ a b c d e f Wolfe-Hunnicutt, Brandon (March 2011). "The End of the Concessionary Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958–1972". pp. 2, 21–22, 146–147, 149–154, 182, 187, 194–196, 200–202, 209–262. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
- ISBN 9780520921245.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 112–113.
- ISBN 978-0-8021-3978-8.
- ^ ISBN 9780520921245.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 111, 113.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 39.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 40.
- ^ Kienle 1991, p. 42.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 113.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 114, 119.
- ^ Gibson 2015, p. 119.
- ISBN 9780520921245.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 134–135.
- ISBN 9780521529006.
- ^ Gibson 2015, pp. 140, 144–145, 148, 181.
External links
- See Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow): The Iraqi Coup and Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow): A Clearer Picture of the Iraqi Coup from the Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS) for early U.S. reactions to the coup.
- For contrasting British and American assessments of the new government, see Saddam Hussain and Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: Some Notes on Iraqi Politics from the National Security Archive and FRUS.
- Gibson, Bryan R. (April 2013). "U.S. Foreign Policy, Iraq, and the Cold War 1958–1975" (PDF). briefly discusses the completely false claim that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the coup in a footnote on page 169.