Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948
Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 | |||||||||
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Part of the Indo-Pakistani conflicts and the decolonisation of Asia | |||||||||
Indian soldiers during the 1947–1948 war | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
1,103 army deaths [16][17][18][19] 1,990 J&K forces killed or missing presumed killed[16] 32 RIAF members[16] 3,154 wounded[17][20] Total military casualties: 6,279 |
6,000 killed [20][21][22] ~14,000 wounded[20][23] Total military casualties: 20,000 | ||||||||
Conflict began when Pashtun tribesmen and Tanoli from Pakistan invaded the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, prompting the armies of India and Pakistan to get involved shortly afterwards. |
The Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948, also known as the first Kashmir war,[24] was a war fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four Indo-Pakistani wars between the two newly independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the war a few weeks after its independence by launching tribal lashkar (militias) from Waziristan,[25] in an effort to capture Kashmir and to preempt the possibility of its ruler joining India.[26]
Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, was facing an uprising by his Muslim subjects in Poonch, and lost control in portions of the western districts. On 22 October 1947, Pakistan's Pashtun tribal militias crossed the border of the state. These local tribal militias and irregular Pakistani forces moved to take the capital city of Srinagar, but upon reaching Baramulla, they took to plunder and stalled. Maharaja Hari Singh made a plea to India for assistance, and help was offered, but it was subject to his signing of an Instrument of Accession to India.
The war was initially fought by the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces[27][28] and by militias from the frontier tribal areas adjoining the North-West Frontier Province.[29] Following the accession of the state to India on 26 October 1947, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar, the state capital. British commanding officers initially refused the entry of Pakistani troops into the conflict, citing the accession of the state to India. However, later in 1948, they relented and Pakistan's armies entered the war shortly afterwards.[29] The fronts solidified gradually along what later came to be known as the Line of Control. A formal ceasefire was declared effective 1 January 1949.[30]
Background
Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and six Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and invasions of Gorkhas, the hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh.[31]: 536
The
Partition of India
The years 1946–1947 saw the rise of
The original target date for the transfer of power to the new dominions was June 1948. However, fearing the rise of inter-communal violence, the British Viceroy
The presence of the British commanding officers on both sides made the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947 a strange war. The two commanding officers were in daily telephone contact and adopted mutually defensive positions. The attitude was that "you can hit them so hard but not too hard, otherwise there will be all kinds of repercussions."[39] Both Lockhart and Messervy were replaced in the course of war, and their successors Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey tried to exercise restraint on their respective governments. Bucher was apparently successful in doing so in India, but Gracey yielded and let British officers be used in operational roles on the side of Pakistan. One British officer even died in action.[40]
Developments in Jammu and Kashmir (August–October 1947)
With the independence of the Dominions, the
In 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had a wide range of ethnic and religious communities. The
The predominant political movement in the Kashmir Valley, the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah, believed in secular politics. It was allied with the Indian National Congress and was believed to favour joining India. On the other hand, the Muslims of the Jammu province supported the Muslim Conference, which was allied to the All-India Muslim League and favoured joining Pakistan. The Hindus of the Jammu province favoured an outright merger with India.[42] In the midst of all the diverging views, the Maharaja's decision to remain independent was apparently a judicious one.[43]
Operation Gulmarg plan
According to Indian military sources, the Pakistani Army prepared a plan called Operation Gulmarg and put it into action as early as 20 August, a few days after Pakistan's independence. The plan was accidentally revealed to an Indian officer,
The regimental records show that, by the last week of August, the
Scholars have noted considerable movement of Pashtun tribes during September–October. By 13 September, armed Pashtuns drifted into Lahore and Rawalpindi. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan noted a scheme to send tribesmen from Malakand to Sialkot, in lorries provided by the Pakistan government. Preparations for attacking Kashmir were also noted in the princely states of Swat, Dir, and Chitral. Scholar Robin James Moore states there is "little doubt" that Pashtuns were involved in border raids all along the Punjab border from the Indus to the Ravi.[50]
Pakistani sources deny the existence of any plan called Operation Gulmarg. However, Shuja Nawaz does list 22 Pashtun tribes involved in the invasion of Kashmir on 22 October.[51]
Operation Datta Khel
Operation Datta Khel was a military operation and coup planned by Major William Brown along with the Gilgit Scouts, aimed at overthrowing the rule of the Dogra dynasty of Kashmir. The operation was launched shortly after the independence of Pakistan. By 1 November, Gilgit-Baltistan had been annexed from the Dogra dynasty, and was made part of Pakistan after a brief provisional government.[52]
Rebellion in Poonch
Sometime in August 1947, the first signs of trouble broke out in
According to state government sources, the rebellious militias gathered in the Naoshera-Islamabad area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. A battalion of state troops was dispatched, which cleared the roads and dispersed the militias. By September, order was reestablished.[58] The Muslim Conference sources, on the other hand, narrate that hundreds of people were killed in Bagh during flag hoisting around 15 August and that the Maharaja unleashed a 'reign of terror' on 24 August. Local Muslims also told Richard Symonds, a British Quaker social worker, that the army fired on crowds, and burnt houses and villages indiscriminately.[59] According to the Assistant British High Commissioner in Pakistan, H. S. Stephenson, "the Poonch affair... was greatly exaggerated".[58]
Pakistan's preparations, Maharaja's manoeuvring
Scholar Prem Shankar Jha states that the Maharaja had decided, as early as April 1947, that he would accede to India if it was not possible to stay independent.[60]: 115 The rebellion in Poonch possibly unnerved the Maharaja. Accordingly, on 11 August, he dismissed his pro-Pakistan Prime Minister, Ram Chandra Kak, and appointed retired Major Janak Singh in his place.[61] On 25 August, he sent an invitation to Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of the Punjab High Court to come as the Prime Minister.[62] On the same day, the Muslim Conference wrote to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan warning him that "if, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League do not act, Kashmir might be lost to them".[63] This set the ball rolling in Pakistan.[citation needed]
Liaquat Ali Khan sent a Punjab politician Mian Iftikharuddin to explore the possibility of organising a revolt in Kashmir.[64] Meanwhile, Pakistan cut off essential supplies to the state, such as petrol, sugar and salt. It also stopped trade in timber and other products, and suspended train services to Jammu.[65][66] Iftikharuddin returned in mid-September to report that the National Conference held strong in the Kashmir Valley and ruled out the possibility of a revolt.[citation needed]
Meanwhile, Sardar Ibrahim had escaped to West Punjab, along with dozens of rebels, and established a base in Murree. From there, the rebels attempted to acquire arms and ammunition for the rebellion and smuggle them into Kashmir. Colonel Akbar Khan, one of a handful of high-ranking officers in the Pakistani Army,[e] with a keen interest in Kashmir, arrived in Murree, and got enmeshed in these efforts. He arranged 4,000 rifles for the rebellion by diverting them from the Army stores. He also wrote out a draft plan titled Armed Revolt inside Kashmir and gave it to Mian Iftikharuddin to be passed on to the Pakistan's Prime Minister.[68][69][15]
On 12 September, the Prime Minister held a meeting with Mian Iftikharuddin, Colonel Akbar Khan and another Punjab politician Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. Hayat Khan had a separate plan, involving the Muslim League National Guard and the militant Pashtun tribes from the Frontier regions. The Prime Minister approved both the plans, and despatched Khurshid Anwar, the head of the Muslim League National Guard, to mobilise the Frontier tribes.[69][15]
The Maharaja was increasingly driven to the wall with the rebellion in the western districts and the Pakistani blockade. He managed to persuade Justice Mahajan to accept the post of Prime Minister (but not to arrive for another month, for procedural reasons). He sent word to the Indian leaders through Mahajan that he was willing to accede to India but needed more time to implement political reforms. However, it was India's position that it would not accept accession from the Maharaja unless it had the people's support. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru demanded that Sheikh Abdullah should be released from prison and involved in the state's government. Accession could only be contemplated afterwards. Following further negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September.[70][71]
Nehru, foreseeing a number of disputes over princely states, formulated a policy that states
"wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be."[72][73]
The policy was communicated to Liaquat Ali Khan on 1 October at a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. Khan's eyes are said to have "sparkled" at the proposal. However, he made no response.[72][73]
Operations in Poonch and Mirpur
Armed rebellion started in the Poonch district at the beginning of October 1947.[74][75] The fighting elements consisted of "bands of deserters from the State Army, serving soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave, ex-servicemen, and other volunteers who had risen spontaneously."[76] The first clash is said to have occurred at Thorar (near Rawalakot) on 3–4 October 1947.[77] The rebels quickly gained control of almost the entire Poonch district. The State Forces garrison at the
In the
Radio communications between the fighting units were operated by the Pakistan Army.[83] Even though the Indian Navy intercepted the communications, lacking intelligence in Jammu and Kashmir, it was unable to determine immediately where the fighting was taking place.[84]
Accession of Kashmir
Following the rebellions in the Poonch and Mirpur area[85] and the Pakistan-backed[86] Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,[87][88] the Maharaja asked for Indian military assistance. India set the condition that Kashmir must accede to India for it to receive assistance. The Maharaja complied, and the Government of India recognised the accession of the princely state to India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it.[f] The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference volunteers aided the Indian Army in its campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders.[92]
Pakistan refused to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India, claiming that it was obtained by "fraud and violence."
In May 1948, the Pakistan Army officially entered the conflict, in theory to defend the Pakistan borders, but it made plans to push towards Jammu and cut the lines of communications of the Indian forces in the Mehndar Valley.[96] In Gilgit, the force of Gilgit Scouts under the command of a British officer Major William Brown mutinied and overthrew the governor Ghansara Singh. Brown prevailed on the forces to declare accession to Pakistan.[97][98] They are also believed to have received assistance from the Chitral Scouts and the Bodyguard of the state of Chitral, one of the princely states of Pakistan, which had acceded to Pakistan on 6 October 1947.[99][100]
Stages of the war
Initial invasion
On 22 October the Pashtun tribal attack was launched in the Muzaffarabad sector. The state forces stationed in the border regions around Muzaffarabad and Domel were quickly defeated by tribal forces (Muslim state forces mutinied and joined them) and the way to the capital was open. Among the raiders, there were many active Pakistani Army soldiers disguised as tribals. They were also provided logistical help by the Pakistan Army. Rather than advancing toward Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the captured cities in the border region engaging in looting and other crimes against their inhabitants.[101] In the Poonch valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.[102]
Records indicate that the Pakistani tribals beheaded many Hindu and Sikh civilians in Jammu and Kashmir.[103]
Indian operation in the Kashmir Valley
After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar under the command of Lt. Col.
In the Poonch valley, tribal forces continued to besiege state forces.[citation needed]
In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the Gilgit Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby obtained control of this northern region of the state. The tribal forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose ruler, Muzaffar ul-Mulk the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan.[105][106][107]
Attempted link-up at Poonch and fall of Mirpur
Indian forces ceased pursuit of tribal forces after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent a
Fall of Jhanger and attacks on Naoshera and Uri
The tribal forces attacked and captured
Operation Vijay: counterattack to Jhanger
The Indian forces launched a counterattack in the south recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the tribal forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north, Skardu was brought under siege by the Gilgit Scouts.[110]
Indian spring offensive
The Indians held onto Jhanger against numerous counterattacks, who were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces. In the Kashmir Valley the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The Gilgit scouts made good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring
Operations Gulab and Eraze
The Indians continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and Gurais (Operation Eraze).[111]: 308–324 They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Teetwal. In the Jammu region, the forces besieged in Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up with the outside world again. The Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the Chitral Scouts and Chitral Bodyguard under Mata ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the help of artillery were able to take Skardu. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh.[112][113]
Operation Bison
During this time the front began to settle down. The siege of Poonch continued. An unsuccessful attack was launched by
Operation Easy; Poonch link-up
The Indians now started to get the upper hand in all sectors.
At 23.59 hrs on 1 January 1949, a United Nations-mediated ceasefire came into effect, bring the war to an end.[30]
Aftermath
The terms of the cease-fire, laid out in a
Indian losses in the war totalled 1,104 killed and 3,154 wounded;[17] Pakistani, about 6,000 killed and 14,000 wounded.[20]
Numerous analysts state that the war ended in a stalemate, with neither side obtaining a clear victory.[120] Others, however, state that India emerged victorious as it successfully gained the majority of the contested territory.[121]
India gained control of about two-thirds of the Jammu and Kashmir princely state, including the
India and Pakistan signed the
The resentment over Pakistani defeat in the war resulted in a failed coup led by General Akbar Khan in 1951 against the government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Army officers thought the government's acceptance of UN mediation and ceasefire was weak and squandered an opportunity to capture the entirety of Kashmir.[128][129][130][131]
After two further wars in
Military awards
Battle honours
After the war, a total of number of 11
- Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48 (theatre honour)
- Gurais
- Kargil
- Naoshera
- Punch
- Rajouri
- Srinagar
- Teetwal
- Zoji La
Gallantry awards
For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award
- India
- Major Som Nath Sharma(Posthumous)
- Lance Naik Karam Singh
- Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane
- Jadu Nath Singh(Posthumous)
- Piru Singh Shekhawat(Posthumous)
- Pakistan
See also
- Siege of Skardu
- Rann of Kuch War
- Battle of Badgam
- Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
- Sino-Indian War
- Nathu La and Cho La clashes
- Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts
- Kargil War
- Brigadier Mohammad Usman
- Siachen conflict
- List of wars between democracies
Notes
- ^ At the beginning of 1947, all the posts above the rank of lieutenant colonel in the army were held by British officers.[34] Pakistan had only four lieutenant colonels,[35] two of whom were involved in the Kashmir conflict: Akbar Khan and Sher Khan.[36] At the beginning of the war, India had about 500 British officers and Pakistan over 1000.[37]
- ^ Auchinleck was an Indian Army officer since 1903 who had been Commander-in-Chief, India from 1943
- ^ Major Kalkat was the brigade major at the Bannu Brigade, who opened a Demi-Official letter marked "Personal/Top Secret" on 20 August 1947 signed by General Frank Messervy, the then Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army. It was addressed to Kalkat's commanding officer Brig. C. P. Murray, who happened to be away at another post. The Pakistani officials suspected Kalkat and placed him under house arrest. He escaped and made his way to New Delhi on 18 October. However, the Indian military authorities and defence minister did not believe his information. He was recalled and debriefed on 24 October after the tribal invasion of Kashmir had started.[44]
- ^ Under the Jammu and Kashmir Arms Act of 1940, the possession of all fire arms was prohibited in the state. The Dogra Rajputs were however exempted in practice.[56]
- Christine Fair, at the time of independence, Pakistan had one major general, two brigadiers, and six colonels, even though the requirements were for 13 major generals, 40 brigadiers, and 52 colonels.[67]
- ^ Accession from Kashmir was requested mainly at the insistence of the Governor General Lord Mountbatten, who was congnizant of the apprehensions of the British military officers on both the sides over the possibility of an inter-dominion war.[89] In fact, there was a Stand Down Order already issued by the Supreme Commander Claude Auchinleck that, in the event of an inter-Dominion war, all the British officers on both the sides should immediately stand down.[90] However, Mountbatten's decision has been questioned by Joseph Korbel and biographer Philip Ziegler.[91]
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Since India's independence from British colonial rule and the subsequent partition in 1947, India and Pakistan, both of which claim sovereign control over the region, have found four inconclusive wars over Kashmir.
Pakistan has fought and lost four wars with India (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999)
India won, and gained two-thirds of Kashmir, which it successfully held against another Pakistani invasion in 1965.
Indo Pakistani war of 1947: India gained two third Kashmir.
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- Bhattacharya, Brigadier Samir (2013). NOTHING BUT!: Book Three: What Price Freedom. Partridge Publishing. pp. 42–. ISBN 978-1-4828-1625-9.
- Brahma Singh, K. (1990). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820–1956: The State Force Background. Lancer International. ISBN 978-81-7062-091-4.
- Brahma Singh, K. (2010) [1990], History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820–1956: The State Force Background (PDF), brahmasingh.co.nf, ISBN 978-81-7062-091-4, archived from the original(PDF) on 6 March 2016
- Brahma Singh, K. (2010) [1990], History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820–1956: The State Force Background (PDF), brahmasingh.co.nf,
- Cheema, Brig Amar (2015). The Crimson Chinar: The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico Military Perspective. Lancer Publishers. pp. 51–. ISBN 978-81-7062-301-4.
- ISBN 978-81-321-1795-7.
- Effendi, Col. M. Y. (2007). Punjab Cavalry: Evolution, Role, Organisation and Tactical Doctrine 11 Cavalry, Frontier Force, 1849–1971. Karachi: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-547203-5.
- ISBN 978-0-330-39611-0.
- ISBN 978-0-547-66924-3.
- Hiro, Dilip (2015). The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan. Nation Books. ISBN 978-1-56858-503-1.
- Jamal, Arif (2009). Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. Melville House. ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6.
- Joshi, Manoj (2008). Kashmir, 1947–1965: A Story Retold. India Research Press. ISBN 978-81-87943-52-5.
- Hodson, H. V. (1969). The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan. London: Hutchinson. ISBN 978-0-09-097150-3.
- ISBN 978-1-4008-7523-8.
- Mahajan, Mehr Chand (1963). Looking Back: The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Former Chief Justice of India. Asia Publishing House.
- Massey, Reginald (2005). Azaadi!. Abhinav Publications. ISBN 978-81-7017-469-1.
- Moore, Robin James (1987). Making the new Commonwealth. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820112-0.
- Palit, D. K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles. Palit & Dutt.
- Prasad, Sri Nandan; Pal, Dharm (1987). Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947–48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
- Raghavan, Srinath (2010). War and Peace in Modern India. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 101–. ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7. Archived from the originalon 19 August 2019.
- Nawaz, Shuja (May 2008), "The First Kashmir War Revisited", India Review, 7 (2): 115–154, S2CID 155030407
- Nawaz, Shuja (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-547660-6.
- Sarila, Narendra Singh (2007). The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition. Constable. ISBN 978-1-84529-588-2.
- ISBN 1-86064-898-3.
- ISBN 978-9350298985.
- Zaheer, Hasan (1998). The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-577892-2.
Further reading
- Major sources
- Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–1948. (1987). Thomson Press (India) Limited, New Delhi. This is the Indian Official History.
- Lamb, Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990. (1991). Roxford Books. ISBN 0-907129-06-4.
- Praval, K.C. The Indian Army After Independence. (1993). Lancer International, ISBN 1-897829-45-0
- Sen, Maj Gen L.P. Slender Was The Thread: The Kashmir confrontation 1947–1948. (1969). Orient Longmans Ltd, New Delhi.
- Vas, Lt Gen. E. A. Without Baggage: A personal account of the Jammu and Kashmir Operations 1947–1949. (1987). Natraj Publishers Dehradun. ISBN 81-85019-09-6.
- Other sources
- Cohen, Lt Col Maurice. Thunder over Kashmir. (1955). Orient Longman Ltd. Hyderabad
- Hinds, Brig Gen SR. Battle of Zoji La. (1962). Military Digest, New Delhi.
- Sandhu, Maj Gen Gurcharan. The Indian Armour: History Of The Indian Armoured Corps 1941–1971. (1987). Vision Books Private Limited, New Delhi, ISBN 81-7094-004-4.
- Singh, Maj K Brahma. History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820–1956). (1990). Lancer International New Delhi, ISBN 81-7062-091-0.
- Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1947–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN 9780805995947.
External links
- Partition and Indo Pak War of 1947–48, Indian Army, archived 5 April 2011.