1954 Guatemalan coup d'état

1954 Guatemalan coup d'état
Part of the Guatemalan Revolution and the Cold War
U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) with U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the advocate of the coup d'état, in 1956
Date 18–27 June 1954 Location Guatemala Result Rebel/U.S. government/military victory Jacobo Árbenz overthrown Guatemalan Revolution ended Military junta assumes power
Belligerents
Guatemalan government Guatemalan military loyalists	Guatemalan rebel exiles Guatemalan military (elements) Supported by:  United States CIA
Commanders and leaders
Jacobo Árbenz Carlos Enrique Díaz	Carlos Castillo Armas Carlos Enrique Díaz Dwight D. Eisenhower Allen Dulles
Strength
5,000 soldiers 2,500 civil guards	480 rebels several aircraft
Casualties and losses
2+ killed 1+ captured 1 cargo ship destroyed	113 killed or captured 60 arrested (in El Salvador) several aircraft shot down

The 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état (Golpe de Estado en Guatemala de 1954) deposed the democratically elected Guatemalan President

The Guatemalan Revolution began in 1944, after a popular uprising toppled the military dictatorship of

Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected U.S. president in 1952, promising to take a harder line against communism, and his staff members John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had significant links to the United Fruit Company. The U.S. federal government drew exaggerated conclusions about the extent of communist influence among Árbenz's advisers, and Eisenhower authorized the CIA to carry out Operation PBSuccess in August 1953. The CIA armed, funded, and trained a force of 480 men led by Carlos Castillo Armas. After U.S. efforts to criticize and isolate Guatemala internationally, Armas' force invaded Guatemala on 18 June 1954, backed by a heavy campaign of psychological warfare, as well as air bombings of Guatemala City and a naval blockade.

The invasion force fared poorly militarily, and most of its offensives were defeated. However, psychological warfare and the fear of a U.S. invasion intimidated the Guatemalan Army, which eventually refused to fight. Árbenz unsuccessfully attempted to arm civilians to resist the invasion, before resigning on 27 June. Castillo Armas became president ten days later, following negotiations in San Salvador. Described as the definitive deathblow to democracy in Guatemala, the coup was widely criticized internationally, and strengthened the long-lasting anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America. Attempting to justify the coup, the CIA launched Operation PBHistory, which sought evidence of Soviet influence in Guatemala among documents from the Árbenz era, but found none. Castillo Armas quickly assumed dictatorial powers, banning opposition parties, executing, imprisoning and torturing political opponents, and reversing the social reforms of the revolution. In the first few months of his government, Castillo Armas rounded up and executed between three thousand and five thousand supporters of Árbenz.^[3] Nearly four decades of civil war followed, as leftist guerrillas fought the series of U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes whose brutalities include a genocide of the Maya peoples.

U.S. President

Following the Spanish–American War in 1898, this aggressive interpretation was used to create a U.S. economic empire across the Caribbean, such as with the 1903 treaty with Cuba that was heavily tilted in the U.S.' favor.^[6] U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt believed that the U.S. should be the main beneficiary of production in Central America.^[7] The U.S. enforced this hegemony with armed interventions in Nicaragua (1912–33), and Haiti (1915–34). The U.S. did not need to use its military might in Guatemala, where a series of dictators were willing to accommodate the economic interests of the U.S. in return for its support for their regimes.^[8] Guatemala was among the Central American countries of the period known as a banana republic.^[9][10] From 1890 to 1920, control of Guatemala's resources and its economy shifted away from Britain and Germany to the U.S., which became Guatemala's dominant trade partner.^[8] The Monroe Doctrine continued to be seen as relevant to Guatemala, and was used to justify the coup in 1954.^[11]

Following a surge in

By 1930 the UFC had built an operating capital of 215 million U.S. dollars,[a] and had been the largest landowner and employer in Guatemala for several years.^[28] Ubico granted it a new contract, which was immensely favorable to the company. This included 200,000 hectares (490,000 acres) of public land,^[29] an exemption from taxes,^[30] and a guarantee that no other company would receive any competing contract.^[18] Ubico requested the UFC cap the daily salary of its workers at 50 U.S. cents, so that workers in other companies would be less able to demand higher wages.^[28]

The repressive policies of the Ubico government resulted in a popular uprising led by university students and middle-class citizens in 1944.

The largely free

The official title of the agrarian reform bill was Decree 900. It expropriated all uncultivated land from landholdings that were larger than 673 acres (272 ha). If the estates were between 224 acres (91 ha) and 672 acres (272 ha), uncultivated land was to be expropriated only if less than two-thirds of it was in use. The owners were compensated with government bonds, the value of which was equal to that of the land expropriated. The value of the land itself was what the owners had declared it to be in their tax returns in 1952. Of the nearly 350,000 private landholdings, only 1,710 were affected by expropriation. The law was implemented with great speed, which resulted in some arbitrary land seizures. There was violence directed at landowners.^[52]

By June 1954, 1,400,000 acres (570,000 ha) of land had been expropriated and distributed. Approximately 500,000 individuals, or one-sixth of the population, had received land by this point. Contrary to the predictions made by detractors, the law resulted in a slight increase in Guatemalan agricultural productivity, cultivated area, and purchases of farm machinery. Overall, the law resulted in a significant improvement in living standards for thousands of peasant families, the majority of whom were Indigenous.^[52] Historian Greg Grandin sees the law as representing a fundamental power shift in favor of the hitherto marginalized.^[53]

By 1950, the United Fruit Company's (now Chiquita) annual profits were 65 million U.S. dollars,^[b] twice as large as the revenue of the government of Guatemala.^[54] The company was the largest landowner in Guatemala,^[55] and virtually owned Puerto Barrios, Guatemala's only port to the Atlantic, allowing it to profit from the flow of goods through the port.^[28] Because of its long association with Ubico's government, Guatemalan revolutionaries saw the UFC as an impediment to progress after 1944. This image was reinforced by the company's discriminatory policies against the native population.^[54][56] Owing to its size, the reforms of Arévalo's government affected the UFC more than other companies. Among other things, the new labor code allowed UFC workers to strike when their demands for higher wages and job security were not met. The company saw itself as being targeted by the reforms, and refused to negotiate with strikers, despite frequently being in violation of the new laws.^[57] The company's troubles were compounded with the passage of Decree 900 in 1952. Of the 550,000 acres (220,000 ha) that the company owned, only 15 percent was being cultivated; the rest was idle, and thus came under the scope of the agrarian reform law.^[57]

The UFC responded by intensively

As the Cold War developed and the Guatemalan government clashed with U.S. corporations on an increasing number of issues, the U.S. government grew increasingly suspicious of the Guatemalan Revolution.^[61][62] In addition, the Cold War predisposed the Truman administration to see the Guatemalan government as communist.^[61] Arévalo's support for the Caribbean Legion also worried the Truman administration, which saw it as a vehicle for communism, rather than as the anti-dictatorial force it was conceived as.^[63] Until the end of its term, the Truman administration had relied on purely diplomatic and economic means to try to reduce the perceived communist influence.^[64] The U.S. had refused to sell arms to the Guatemalan government after 1944; in 1951 it began to block all weapons purchases by Guatemala.^[65]

The U.S.'s worries over communist influence increased after the election of Árbenz in 1951 and his enactment of Decree 900 in 1952.^[62][66] In April 1952 Anastasio Somoza García, the dictator of Nicaragua, made his first state visit to the U.S.^[67] He made several public speeches praising the U.S., and was awarded a medal by the New York City government. During a meeting with Truman and his senior staff, Somoza said that if the U.S. gave him the arms, he would "clean up Guatemala".^[68] The proposal did not receive much immediate support, but Truman instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to follow up on it. The CIA contacted Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan army officer who had been exiled from the country in 1949 following a failed coup attempt against President Arévalo.^[69] Believing that Castillo Armas would lead a coup with or without their assistance, the CIA decided to supply him with weapons and 225,000 U.S. dollars.^[d][67] The CIA considered Castillo Armas sufficiently corrupt and authoritarian to be well suited to lead the coup.^[70]

The coup was planned in detail over the next few weeks by the CIA, the UFC, and Somoza. The CIA also contacted

The CIA put the plan into motion in late 1952. A freighter that had been borrowed from the UFC was specially refitted in New Orleans and loaded with weapons under the guise of agricultural machinery, and set sail for Nicaragua.^[73] However, the plan was terminated soon after: accounts of its termination vary. Some sources state that the State Department discovered the plan when a senior official was asked to sign a certain document, while others suggest that Somoza was indiscreet. The eventual outcome was that Secretary of State Dean Acheson called off the operation. The CIA continued to support Castillo Armas; it paid him a monthly retainer of 3000 U.S. dollars,^[e] and gave him the resources to maintain his rebel force.^[67][71]

During his successful campaign for the U.S. presidency, Dwight Eisenhower pledged to pursue a more proactive anti-communist policy, promising to roll back communism, rather than contain it. Working in an atmosphere of increasing McCarthyism in government circles, Eisenhower was more willing than Truman to use the CIA to depose governments the U.S. disliked.^[74][75] Although PBFortune had been quickly aborted, tension between the U.S. and Guatemala continued to rise, especially with the legalization of the communist PGT, and its inclusion in the government coalition for the elections of January 1953.^[76] Articles published in the U.S. press often reflected this predisposition to see communist influence; for example, a New York Times article about the visit to Guatemala by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda highlighted his communist beliefs, but neglected to mention his reputation as the greatest living poet in Latin America.^[77]

Several figures in Eisenhower's administration, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother CIA Director Allen Dulles, had close ties to the United Fruit Company. The Dulles brothers had been partners of the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, and in that capacity had arranged several deals for the UFC. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith would later become a director of the company, while Eisenhower's personal assistant Ann C. Whitman was the wife of UFC public relations director Edmund S. Whitman. These personal connections meant that the Eisenhower administration tended to conflate the interests of the UFC with that of U.S. national security interests, and made it more willing to overthrow the Guatemalan government.^[78][79] The success of the 1953 CIA operation to overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran also strengthened Eisenhower's belief in using the agency to effect political change overseas.^[74]

Historians and authors writing about the 1954 coup have debated the relative importance of the role of the United Fruit Company and the worries about communist influence (whether or not these were grounded in reality) in the U.S.'s decision to instigate the coup in 1954.^[80][81][82] Several historians have maintained that the lobbying of the UFC, and the expropriation of its lands, were the chief motivation for the U.S., strengthened by the financial ties of individuals within the Eisenhower administration to the UFC.^{[82][83][84][85]} Others have argued that the overthrow was motivated primarily by U.S. strategic interest; the knowledge of the presence of a small number of communists close to Árbenz led the U.S. to reach incorrect conclusions about the extent of communist influence.^[80][81][82] Yet others have argued that the overthrow was part of a larger tendency within the U.S. to oppose nationalist movements in the Third World.^[86] Some assert that Washington didn't believe Guatemala to be an immediate communist threat, citing declassified documents from the U.S. Policy Planning Staff, which state the real risk was the example of independence of the U.S. that Guatemala might offer to nationalists wanting social reform throughout Latin America.^[2] Both the role of the UFC and that of the perception of communist influence continue to be cited as motivations for the U.S.'s actions today.^{[80][81][83][84][87]}

Eisenhower authorized the CIA operation to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz, code-named Operation PBSuccess, in August 1953. The operation was granted a budget of 2.7 million U.S. dollars^[f] for "psychological warfare and political action".^[88] The total budget has been estimated at between 5 and 7 million dollars, and the planning employed over 100 CIA agents.^[89] In addition, the operation recruited scores of individuals from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of the surrounding countries.^[89] The plans included drawing up lists of people within Árbenz's government to be assassinated if the coup were to be carried out. Manuals of assassination techniques were compiled, and lists were also made of people whom the junta would dispose of.^[88] These were the CIA's first known assassination manuals, and were reused in subsequent CIA actions.^[90]

The State Department created a team of diplomats who would support PBSuccess. It was led by

The CIA operation was complicated by a premature coup on 29 March 1953, with a futile raid against the army garrison at Salamá, in the central Guatemalan department of Baja Verapaz. The rebellion was swiftly crushed, and a number of participants were arrested. Several CIA agents and allies were imprisoned, weakening the coup effort. Thus the CIA came to rely more heavily on the Guatemalan exile groups and their anti-democratic allies in Guatemala.^[99] The CIA considered several candidates to lead the coup. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, the conservative candidate who had lost the 1950 election to Árbenz, held favor with the Guatemalan opposition but was rejected for his role in the Ubico regime, as well as his European appearance, which was unlikely to appeal to the majority mixed-race mestizo population.^[100] Another popular candidate was the coffee planter Juan Córdova Cerna, who had briefly served in Arévalo's cabinet before becoming the legal adviser to the UFC. The death of his son in an anti-government uprising in 1950 turned him against the government, and he had planned the unsuccessful Salamá coup in 1953 before fleeing to join Castillo Armas in exile. Although his status as a civilian gave him an advantage over Castillo Armas, he was diagnosed with throat cancer in 1954, taking him out of the reckoning.^[101] Thus it was Castillo Armas, in exile since the failed 1949 coup and on the CIA's payroll since the aborted PBFortune in 1951, who was to lead the coming coup.^[67]

Castillo Armas was given enough money to recruit a small force of mercenaries from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of nearby countries. This band was called the Army of Liberation. The CIA established training camps in Nicaragua and

While preparations for Operation PBSuccess were underway, Washington issued a series of statements denouncing the Guatemalan government, alleging that it had been infiltrated by communists.[104] The State Department also asked the Organization of American States to modify the agenda of the Inter-American Conference, which was scheduled to be held in Caracas in March 1954, requesting the addition of an item titled "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics", which was widely seen as a move targeting Guatemala.^[104] On 29 and 30 January 1954, the Guatemalan government published documents containing information leaked to it by a member of Castillo Armas' team who had turned against him. Lacking in original documents, the government had engaged in poor forgery to enhance the information it possessed, undermining the credibility of its charges.^[105] A spate of arrests followed of allies of Castillo Armas within Guatemala, and the government issued statements implicating a "Government of the North" in a plot to overthrow Árbenz. Washington denied these allegations, and the U.S. media uniformly took the side of their government; even publications which had until then provided relatively balanced coverage of Guatemala, such as The Christian Science Monitor, suggested that Árbenz had succumbed to communist propaganda.^[106] Several Congressmen also pointed to the allegations from the Guatemalan government as proof that it had become communist.^[107]

At the conference in Caracas, the various Latin American governments sought economic aid from the U.S., as well as its continuing non-intervention in their internal affairs.^[108] The U.S. government's aim was to pass a resolution condemning the supposed spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The Guatemalan foreign minister Guillermo Toriello argued strongly against the resolution, stating that it represented the "internationalization of McCarthyism". Despite support among the delegates for Toriello's views, the anti-communist resolution passed with only Guatemala voting against, because of the votes of dictatorships dependent on the U.S. and the threat of economic pressure applied by John Dulles.^[109] Although support among the delegates for Dulles' strident anti-communism was less strong than he and Eisenhower had hoped for,^[108] the conference marked a victory for the U.S., which was able to make concrete Latin American views on communism.^[109]

The U.S. had stopped selling arms to Guatemala in 1951 while signing bilateral defense agreements and increasing arms shipments to neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua. The U.S. promised the Guatemalan military that it too could obtain arms—if Árbenz were deposed. In 1953, the State Department aggravated the U.S. arms embargo by thwarting the Árbenz government's arms purchases from Canada, Germany, and

U.S. rhetoric abroad also had an effect on the Guatemalan military. The military had always been anti-communist, and Ambassador Peurifoy had applied pressure on senior officers since his arrival in Guatemala in October 1953.[117] Árbenz had intended the secret shipment of weapons from the Alfhem to be used to bolster peasant militias, in the event of army disloyalty, but the U.S. informed army chiefs of the shipment, forcing Árbenz to hand them over to the military, and deepening the rift between him and his top generals.^[117]

Castillo Armas' army of 480 men was not large enough to defeat the Guatemalan military, even with U.S.-supplied aircraft. Therefore, the plans for Operation PBSuccess called for a campaign of

Alfhem's success in evading the quarantine led to Washington escalating its intimidation of Guatemala through its navy. On 24 May, the U.S. launched Operation Hardrock Baker, a naval blockade of Guatemala. Ships and submarines patrolled the Guatemalan coasts, and all approaching ships were stopped and searched; these included ships from Britain and France, violating international law.^[124] However Britain and France did not protest very strongly, hoping that in return the U.S. would not interfere with their efforts to subdue rebellious colonies in the Middle East. The intimidation was not solely naval; on 26 May one of Castillo Armas' planes flew over the capital, dropping leaflets that exhorted people to struggle against communism and support Castillo Armas.^[124]

The most wide-reaching psychological weapon was the radio station Voice of Liberation, La Voz de la Liberación. E. Howard Hunt's deputy, David Atlee Phillips, directed the radio station.^[125] It began broadcasting on 1 May 1954, carrying anti-communist propaganda, telling its listeners to resist the Árbenz government and support the liberating forces of Castillo Armas. The station claimed to be broadcasting from deep within the jungles of the Guatemalan hinterland, a message which many listeners believed. This belief extended outside of Guatemala itself, with foreign correspondents from publications such as The New York Times believing it to be the most authentic source of information.^[126] In actuality, the broadcasts were concocted in Miami by Guatemalan exiles, flown to Central America, and broadcast through a mobile transmitter. The Voice of Liberation made an initial broadcast that was repeated four times, after which it took to transmitting two-hour bulletins twice a day. The transmissions were initially only heard intermittently in Guatemala City; a week later, the CIA significantly increased their transmitting power, allowing clear reception in the Guatemalan capital. The radio broadcasts have been given a lot of credit by historians for the success of the coup, owing to the unrest they created throughout the country. They were unexpectedly assisted by the outage of the government-run radio station, which stopped transmitting for three weeks while a new antenna was being fitted.^[127] The Voice of Liberation transmissions continued throughout the conflict, broadcasting exaggerated news of rebel troops converging on the capital, and contributing to massive demoralization among both the army and the civilian population.^[128]

Castillo Armas' force of 480 men had been split into four teams, ranging in size from 60 to 198. On 15 June 1954 these four forces left their bases in Honduras and

Árbenz instead told Díaz to select officers to lead a counter-attack. Díaz chose a corps of officers who were all regarded to be men of personal integrity, and who were loyal to Árbenz.[138] On the night of 19 June, most of the Guatemalan troops in the capital region left for Zacapa, joined by smaller detachments from other garrisons. Árbenz stated that "the invasion was a farce", but worried that if it was defeated on the Honduran border, Honduras would use it as an excuse to declare war on Guatemala, which would lead to a U.S. invasion. Because of the rumours spread by the Voice of Liberation, there were worries throughout the countryside that a fifth column attack was imminent; large numbers of peasants went to the government and asked for weapons to defend their country. They were repeatedly told that the army was "successfully defending our country".^[139] Nonetheless, peasant volunteers assisted the government war effort, manning roadblocks and donating supplies to the army. Weapons shipments dropped by rebel planes were intercepted and turned over to the government.^[139]

The Árbenz government also pursued diplomatic means to try to end the invasion. It sought support from El Salvador and Mexico; Mexico declined to get involved, and the Salvadoran government merely reported the Guatemalan effort to Peurifoy. Árbenz's largest diplomatic initiative was in taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council. On 18 June the Guatemalan foreign minister petitioned the council to "take measures necessary ... to put a stop to the aggression", which he said Nicaragua and Honduras were responsible for, along with "certain foreign monopolies which have been affected by the progressive policy of my government".^[140] The Security Council looked at Guatemala's complaint at an emergency session on 20 June. The debate was lengthy and heated, with Nicaragua and Honduras denying any wrongdoing, and the U.S. stating that Eisenhower's role as a general in World War II demonstrated that he was against imperialism. The Soviet Union was the only country to support Guatemala. When the U.S. and its allies proposed referring the matter to the Organization of American States, the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal. Guatemala continued to press for a Security Council investigation; the proposal received the support of Britain and France, but on 24 June it was vetoed by the U.S., the first time it did so against its allies. The U.S. accompanied this with threats to the foreign offices of both countries that the U.S. would stop supporting their other initiatives.^[141] UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld called the U.S. position "the most serious blow so far aimed at the [United Nations]".^[142] A fact-finding mission was set up by the Inter-American Peace Committee; Washington used its influence to delay the entry of the committee until the coup was complete and a military dictatorship installed.^[141]

Árbenz was initially confident that his army would quickly dispatch the rebel force. The victory of a small garrison of 30 soldiers over the 180 strong rebel force outside Zacapa strengthened his belief. By 21 June, Guatemalan soldiers had gathered at Zacapa under the command of Colonel Víctor M. León, who was believed to be loyal to Árbenz. León told Árbenz that the counter-attack would be delayed for logistical reasons, but assured him not to worry, as Castillo Armas would be defeated very soon. Other members of the government were not so certain. Army Chief of Staff Parinello inspected the troops at Zacapa on 23 June, and returned to the capital believing that the army would not fight. Afraid of a U.S. intervention in Castillo Armas' favor, he did not tell Árbenz of his suspicions.^[140] PGT leaders also began to have their suspicions; acting secretary general Alvarado Monzón sent a member of the central committee to Zacapa to investigate. He returned on 25 June, reporting that the army was highly demoralized, and would not fight. Monzón reported this to Árbenz, who quickly sent another investigator. He too returned the same report, carrying an additional message for Árbenz from the officers at Zacapa—asking the President to resign. The officers believed that given U.S. support for the rebels, defeat was inevitable, and Árbenz was to blame for it. He stated that if Árbenz did not resign, the army was likely to strike a deal with Castillo Armas, and march on the capital with him.^[143][144]

During this period, Castillo Armas had begun to intensify his aerial attacks with the extra planes that Eisenhower had approved. They had limited material success; many of their bombs were surplus material from World War II, and failed to explode. Nonetheless, they had a significant psychological impact.^[145] On 25 June, the same day that he received the army's ultimatum, Árbenz learned that Castillo Armas had scored what later proved to be his only military victory, defeating the Guatemalan garrison at Chiquimula.^[143] Historian Piero Gleijeses has stated that if it were not for U.S. support for the rebellion, the officer corps of the Guatemalan army would have remained loyal to Árbenz because, although they were not uniformly his supporters, they were more wary of Castillo Armas, and also had strong nationalist views. As it was, they believed that the U.S. would intervene militarily, leading to a battle they could not win.^[143]

On the night of 25 June, Árbenz called a meeting of the senior leaders of the government, the political parties, and the labor unions. Colonel Díaz was also present. The President told them that the army at Zacapa had abandoned the government, and that the civilian population needed to be armed to defend the country. Díaz raised no objections, and the unions pledged several thousand troops. When the troops were mustered the next day, only a few hundred showed up. The civilian population of the capital had fought alongside the Guatemalan Revolution twice before—during the popular uprising of 1944, and during the attempted coup of 1949—but on this occasion the army, intimidated by the U.S., refused to fight. The union members were reluctant to fight both the invasion and their own military.^[128][146] Seeing this, Díaz reneged on his support of the President, and began plotting to overthrow Árbenz with the assistance of other senior army officers. They informed Peurifoy of this plan, asking him to stop the hostilities in return for Árbenz's resignation. Peurifoy promised to arrange a truce, and the plotters went to Árbenz and informed him of their decision. Árbenz, utterly exhausted and seeking to preserve at least a measure of the democratic reforms that he had brought, agreed without demur. After informing his cabinet of his decision, he left the presidential palace at 8 pm on 27 June 1954, having taped a resignation speech that was broadcast an hour later. In it, he stated that he was resigning to eliminate the "pretext for the invasion", and that he wished to preserve the gains of the October Revolution of 1944.^[147] He walked to the nearby Mexican Embassy, seeking political asylum.^[148] Two months later he was granted safe passage out of the country, and flew to exile in Mexico.^[149]

Some 120 Árbenz loyalists or communists were also allowed to leave, and the CIA stated that none of the assassination plans contemplated by the CIA were actually implemented.^[150] On June 30, 1954 the CIA began a comprehensive destruction process of documents related to Operation PBSuccess. When an oversight committee of the United States Senate in 1975 investigated the history of the CIA's assassinations program and requested information about the CIA's assassination program as part of Operation PBSuccess, the CIA stated it had lost all such records.^[151] Journalist Annie Jacobsen states that the CIA claim of no assassinations having taken place is doubtful. In May 1997, the CIA stated it had rediscovered some of its documents that it had said were lost. The names of assassination targets had all been redacted, which made it impossible to verify whether any of the people on the CIA assassination list were actually killed as part of the operation.^[151]

Immediately after the President announced his resignation, Díaz announced on the radio that he was taking over the presidency, and that the army would continue to fight against the invasion of Castillo Armas.^[152][153] He headed a military junta which also consisted of Colonels Elfego Hernán Monzón Aguirre and Jose Angel Sánchez.^{[153][154][155][156]} Two days later Ambassador Peurifoy told Díaz that he had to resign because, in the words of a CIA officer who spoke to Díaz, he was "not convenient for American foreign policy".^[156][157] Peurifoy castigated Díaz for allowing Árbenz to criticize the United States in his resignation speech; meanwhile, a U.S.-trained pilot dropped a bomb on the army's main powder magazine to intimidate the colonel.^[153][158] Soon after, Díaz was overthrown by a rapid bloodless coup led by Colonel Monzón, who was more pliable to U.S. interests.^[156] Díaz later stated that Peurifoy had presented him with a list of names of communists, and demanded that all of them be shot by the next day; Díaz had refused, turning Peurifoy further against him.^[159] On 17 June, the army leaders at Zacapa had begun to negotiate with Castillo Armas. They signed a pact, the Pacto de Las Tunas, three days later, which placed the army at Zacapa under Castillo Armas, in return for a general amnesty. The army returned to its barracks a few days later, "despondent, with a terrible sense of defeat".^[156]

Although Monzón was staunchly anti-communist and repeatedly spoke of his loyalty to the U.S., he was unwilling to hand over power to Castillo Armas. The fall of Díaz led Peurifoy to believe that the CIA should let the State Department play the lead role in negotiating with the new government.^[160] The State Department asked Óscar Osorio, the dictator of El Salvador, to invite all players for talks in San Salvador. Osorio agreed, and Monzón and Castillo Armas arrived in the Salvadoran capital on 30 June.^[156] Peurifoy initially remained in Guatemala City, to avoid the appearance of a heavy U.S. role but was forced to travel to San Salvador when the negotiations came close to breaking down on the first day.^[156][161] In the words of John Dulles, Peurifoy's role was to "crack some heads together".^[161] Neither Monzón nor Castillo Armas could have remained in power without U.S. support, so Peurifoy was able to force an agreement, which was announced at 4:45 am on 2 July. Castillo Armas and his subordinate Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva joined the three-person junta headed by Monzón, who remained president.^[42][156] On 7 July Colonels Dubois and Cruz Salazar, Monzón's supporters on the junta, resigned, according to the secret agreement they had made without Monzón's knowledge. Outnumbered, Monzón also resigned, allowing Castillo Armas to be unanimously elected president of the junta.^[156] The two colonels were paid 100,000 U.S. dollars apiece for their cooperation.^[h][156] The U.S. promptly recognized the new government on 13 July.^[162] Soon after taking office, Castillo Armas faced a coup from young army cadets, who were unhappy with the army's surrender. The coup was crushed, leaving 29 dead and 91 wounded.^[163] Elections were held in early October, from which all political parties were barred. Castillo Armas was the only candidate; he won the election with 99% of the vote.^[164][165]

The Guatemalan coup d'état was reviled internationally.

The coup had broad support among U.S. politicians. Historian Piero Gleijeses writes that the foreign policy of both Republican and Democratic parties expressed an intransigent assertion of U.S. hegemony over Central America, making them predisposed to seeing communist threats where none existed. Thus Eisenhower's continuation of the Monroe Doctrine had bipartisan support.^[168] The coup met with strong negative reactions in Latin America; a wave of anti-United States protests followed. These sentiments persisted for several decades; historians have pointed to the coup as a reason for the hostile reception given to U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon when he visited Latin America four years later.^[169] A State Department study found that negative public reactions to the coup had occurred in eleven Latin American countries, including a few that were otherwise pro-American.^[170] Historian John Lewis Gaddis states that knowledge of the CIA's role in coups in Iran and Guatemala gave the agency "an almost mythic reputation throughout Latin America and the Middle East as an instrument with which the United States could depose governments it disliked, whenever it wished to do so".^[171]

Aftermath

Operation PBHistory

Main article: Operation PBHistory

Operation PBHistory was an effort by the CIA to analyze documents from the Árbenz government to justify the 1954 coup after the fact, in particular by finding evidence that Guatemalan communists had been under the influence of the Soviet Union.^[172] Because of the quick overthrow of the Árbenz government, the CIA believed that the administration would not have been able to destroy any incriminating documents, and that these could be analyzed to demonstrate Árbenz's supposed Soviet ties. The CIA also believed this would help it better understand the workings of Latin American communist parties, on which subject the CIA had very little real information.^[173] A final motivation was that international responses to the coup had been very negative, even among allies of the U.S., and the CIA wished to counteract this anti-U.S. sentiment.^[174] The operation began on 4 July 1954 with the arrival of four CIA agents in Guatemala City, led by a specialist in the structure of communist parties. Their targets included Árbenz's personal belongings, police documents, and the headquarters of the Guatemalan Party of Labour.^[175]

Although the initial search failed to find any links to the Soviet Union, the CIA decided to extend the operation, and on 4 August a much larger team was deployed, with members from many government departments, including the State Department and the USIA. The task force was given the cover name Social Research Group.^[176] To avoid confrontation with Guatemalan nationalists, the CIA opted to leave the documents in Guatemalan possession, instead funding the creation of a Guatemalan intelligence agency that would try to dismantle the communist organizations. Thus the National Committee of Defense Against Communism (Comité de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo) was created on 20 July, and granted a great deal of power over military and police functions.^[177] The personnel of the new agency were also put to work analyzing the same documents.^[178] The document-processing phase of the operation was terminated on 28 September 1954, having examined 500,000 documents.^[178] There was tension between the different U.S. government agencies about using the information; the CIA wished to use it to subvert communists, the USIA for propaganda. The CIA's leadership of the operation allowed it to retain control over any documents deemed necessary for clandestine operations.^[179]

In the subsequent decade, the documents gathered were used by the authors of several books, most frequently with covert CIA assistance, which described the Guatemalan Revolution and the 1954 coup in terms favorable to the CIA.^[180] Despite the efforts of the CIA, both international and academic reaction to U.S. policy remained highly negative. Even books partially funded by the CIA were somewhat critical of its role.^[181] PBHistory failed in its chief objective of finding convincing evidence that the PGT had been instruments of the Soviet Union,^[181] or even that it had any connection to Moscow whatsoever.^[182] The Soviet description of the coup, that the U.S. had crushed a democratic revolution to protect the United Fruit Company's control over the Guatemalan economy, became much more widely accepted.^[183] Historian Mark Hove stated that "Operation PBHistory proved ineffective because of 'a new, smoldering resentment' that had emerged in Latin America over US intervention in Guatemala."^[184]

Political legacy

The 1954 coup had significant political fallout both inside and outside Guatemala. The relatively easy overthrow of Árbenz, coming soon after the similar overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953, made the CIA overconfident in its abilities, which led to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion to overthrow the Cuban government in 1961.^[185][186] Throughout the years of the Guatemalan Revolution, both United States policy makers and the U.S. media had tended to believe the theory of a communist threat. When Árbenz had announced that he had evidence of U.S. complicity in the Salamá incident, it had been dismissed, and virtually the entire U.S. press portrayed Castillo Armas' invasion as a dramatic victory against communism.^[187] The press in Latin America were less restrained in their criticism of the U.S., and the coup resulted in lasting anti-United States sentiment in the region.^[188][189] Outside of the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Union were pushing to force the Guatemalan issue into the discussion of the UN security council. Allies of the United States, such as the United Kingdom, came very close to joining the Soviet Union's side in this argument, backing out at the last minute.^[190]

Among the civilians in Guatemala City during the coup was a 25-year-old Che Guevara. After a couple of abortive attempts to fight on the side of the government, Guevara took shelter at the embassy of Argentina, before eventually being granted safe passage to Mexico, where he would join the Cuban Revolution. His experience of the Guatemalan coup was a large factor in convincing him "of the necessity for armed struggle ... against imperialism", and would inform his successful military strategy during the Cuban Revolution.^[191] Árbenz's experience during the Guatemalan coup also helped Fidel Castro's Cuban regime in thwarting the CIA invasion.^[192]

Within Guatemala, Castillo Armas worried that he lacked popular support, and thus tried to eliminate all opposition. He promptly arrested several thousand opposition leaders, branding them communists, repealed the constitution of 1945, and granted himself virtually unbridled power.

disappeared"; tortured; or maimed.^[193][151] At Finca Jocatán, in the vicinity of Tiquisate, where the first private sector union in the country had been founded at the start of the revolution in 1944, an estimated 1000 United Fruit workers were executed in the immediate aftermath of the coup.^[194] Castillo Armas outlawed all labor unions, peasant organizations, and political parties,^[195] except for his own, the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN), which was the ruling party until 1957,^[196] and remained influential for decades after.^[42]

Castillo Armas' dependence on the officer corps and the mercenaries who had put him in power led to widespread corruption, and the Eisenhower administration was soon subsidizing the Guatemalan government with many millions of U.S. dollars.

assassinated in 1957.^[199] The UFC did not profit from the coup; although it regained most of its privileges, its profits continued to decline, and it was eventually merged with another company to save itself from bankruptcy.^[200] Despite the influence which some of the local Catholic Church leaders had in the coup, anti-Catholic restrictions which had been enforced under previous governments in Guatemala resumed by the 1960s, as many anti-communist governments felt the Church had too much sympathy towards socialist parties.^[201]

Civil War

Further information: Guatemalan Civil War

The rolling-back of progressive policies resulted in a series of leftist insurgencies in the countryside, beginning in 1960. This triggered the 36-year

Maya population in the 1980s.^{[202][205][206]} The violence was particularly severe during the presidencies of Ríos Montt and Lucas García.^[207]

Other human rights violations committed included massacres of civilian populations, rape,

counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the government.^[202][207] The ideological narrative that the 1954 coup had represented a battle against communism was often used to justify the violence in the 1980s.^[210] Historians have attributed the violence of the civil war to the 1954 coup and the "anti-communist paranoia" that it generated.^[211] The civil war ended in 1996, with a peace accord between the guerrillas and the government, which included an amnesty for fighters on both sides.^[207] The civil war killed an estimated 200,000 civilians.^[202][i]

Apologies

U.S. President Bill Clinton apologized to Guatemala in 1999 for the atrocities committed by the U.S.-backed dictatorships.^[214] The apology came soon after the release of a truth commission report that documented U.S. support for the military forces that committed genocide.^[214]

In 2011, the Guatemalan government signed an agreement with Árbenz's surviving family to restore his legacy and publicly apologize for the government's role in ousting him. This included a financial settlement to the family. The formal apology was made at the National Palace by Guatemalan President Álvaro Colom on 20 October 2011, to Jacobo Árbenz Villanova, the son of the former president.^[215] Colom stated, "It was a crime to Guatemalan society and it was an act of aggression to a government starting its democratic spring."^[215] The agreement established several forms of reparation for Árbenz's family.^[215]

See also

• History of the Central Intelligence Agency
• Operation Kufire
• Operation Kugown
• Operation Washtub
• United States involvement in regime change
• 1953 Iranian coup d'état

Notes and references

Footnotes

1. ^ equivalent to $4,047,000,000 in 2024
2. ^ equivalent to $849,000,000 in 2024
3. ^ equivalent to $86.85 in 2024
4. ^ equivalent to $2,970,000 in 2024
5. ^ equivalent to $36,000 in 2024
6. ^ equivalent to $31,600,000 in 2024
7. ^ equivalent to $11,700,000 in 2024
8. ^ equivalent to $1,170,000 in 2024
9. ^ The figure of 200,000 is not universally accepted; historian Carlos Sabina argues for a much lower total of 37,000 civil war deaths, while a 2008 study in The BMJ gave an estimate of 20,000.^[212][213]

Citations

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3. ^ Grandin 2004, pp. 66–67.
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5. ^ Gilderhus 2006, pp. 6–9.
6. ^ ^{a b} Gilderhus 2006, pp. 10–12.
7. ^ LaFeber 1993, p. 34.
8. ^ ^{a b} Streeter 2000, pp. 8–10.
9. ^ Forster 2001, p. 117.
10. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, p. xii.
11. ^ Smith 1995, p. 6.
12. ^ ^{a b} Forster 2001, pp. 12–15.
13. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 10–11.
14. ^ Chapman 2007, p. 83.
15. ^ Immerman 1982, pp. 68–70.
16. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 65–68.
17. ^ ^{a b} LaFeber 1993, pp. 76–77.
18. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 68–72.
19. ^ Blum 2003, p. 75.
20. ^ LaFeber 1993, p. 77.
21. ^ ^{a b} Streeter 2000, pp. 10–11.
22. ^ Forster 2001, p. 29.
23. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 13.
24. ^ ^{a b c} Streeter 2000, pp. 11–12.
25. ^ LaFeber 1993, p. 79.
26. ^ Immerman 1982, pp. 34–37.
27. ^ Cullather 2006, pp. 9–10.
28. ^ ^{a b c} Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 67–71.
29. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 22.
30. ^ Streeter 2000, p. 12.
31. ^ ^{a b} Streeter 2000, pp. 12–13.
32. ^ ^{a b} Streeter 2000, pp. 14–15.
33. ^ Jiménez 1985, p. 149.
34. ^ ^{a b} Forster 2001, pp. 98–99.
35. ^ Forster 2001, pp. 99–101.
36. ^ Streeter 2000, pp. 15–16.
37. ^ Cullather 2006, pp. 35–36.
38. ^ Streeter 2000, pp. 13–14.
39. ^ Streeter 2000, pp. 16–17.
40. ^ Castañeda 2005, pp. 94–96.
41. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 50–69.
42. ^ ^{a b c} Castañeda 2005, p. 93.
43. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 73–84.
44. ^ Castañeda 2005, p. 91.
45. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 134–148.
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47. ^ Streeter 2000, pp. 18–19.
48. ^ Figueroa Ibarra 2006, p. 397.
49. ^ Figueroa Ibarra 2006, pp. 397–398.
50. ^ ^{a b c} Immerman 1982, pp. 64–67.
51. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 144–146.
52. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 149–164.
53. ^ Grandin 2000, pp. 200–201.
54. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 73–76.
55. ^ Jacobsen 2019, p. 67.
56. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, p. 71.
57. ^ ^{a b c} Immerman 1982, pp. 75–82.
58. ^ ^{a b c} Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 72–77.
59. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 78–90.
60. ^ ^{a b} Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 90–97.
61. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 82–100.
62. ^ ^{a b} Cullather 2006, pp. 14–28.
63. ^ Immerman 1982, p. 95.
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66. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 228.
67. ^ ^{a b c d} Cullather 2006, pp. 28–35.
68. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 228–229.
69. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 59–69.
70. ^ Jacobsen 2019, p. 68.
71. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 229–230.
72. ^ ^{a b} Haines 1995.
73. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 230.
74. ^ ^{a b} Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 100–101.
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76. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 231.
77. ^ Immerman 1982, p. 96.
78. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 106–107.
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80. ^ ^{a b c} Fraser 2005, p. 489.
81. ^ ^{a b c} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 2–5.
82. ^ ^{a b c} Jiménez 1985, pp. 149–151.
83. ^ ^{a b} McCleary 1999, p. 10.
84. ^ ^{a b} Streeter 2000, p. 1.
85. ^ Figueroa Ibarra 2006, p. 400.
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89. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 138–143.
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103. ^ Jacobsen 2019, p. 74.
104. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 256–257.
105. ^ Cullather 2006, p. 55.
106. ISSN 1536-1837
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107. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 259–262.
108. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 267–278.
109. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 146–150.
110. ^ Immerman 1982, pp. 144–150.
111. ^ Cullather 1994, p. 36.
112. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 280–285.
113. ^ ^{a b c} Immerman 1982, pp. 155–160.
114. ^ Jiménez 1985, p. 152.
115. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 310–316.
116. ^ Gruson 1954.
117. ^ ^{a b} Gleijeses 1991, pp. 300–311.
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126. JSTOR 2150608
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128. ^ ^{a b} Cullather 2006, pp. 100–101.
129. ^ ^{a b c d} Cullather 2006, pp. 87–89.
130. JSTOR 24912032
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131. ^ Jacobsen 2019, p. 75.
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133. ^ ^{a b} Cullather 2006, pp. 90–93.
134. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 166–167.
135. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 340.
136. ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3
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184. ^ Hove 2007, p. 40.
185. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 370–377.
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187. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 366–370.
188. ^ Gleijeses 1991, pp. 370–371.
189. ^ Cullather 2006, p. 112.
190. JSTOR 26926192
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191. ^ Schlesinger & Kinzer 1999, pp. 184–185.
192. ^ Immerman 1982, pp. 194–195.
193. ^ ^{a b} Immerman 1982, pp. 198–201.
194. ^ Grandin 2000, p. 300.
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198. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 382.
199. ^ Lentz 2014, pp. 342–343.
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201. ^ Pew 2006.
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203. ^ Mikaberidze 2013, p. 216.
204. ^ Harbury 2005, p. 35.
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206. ^ Navarro 1999.
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208. ^ Bartrop & Jacobs 2015, p. 963.
209. ^ Gleijeses 1991, p. 383.
210. ^ Castañeda 2005, pp. 89–92.
211. ^ Figueroa Ibarra 1990, p. 113.
212. ^ Nelson 2015, pp. 63–64.
213. ^ Obermeyer, Murray & Gakidou 2008.
214. ^ ^{a b} Broder 1999.
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Further reading

• Moulton, Aaron Coy (2022). "'We Are Meddlin': Anti-Colonialism and the British Cold War Against the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944–1954". The International History Review. 44 (5: Gender and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Period): 1108–1126.
  doi:10.1080/07075332.2021.1994444
  .
• Shea, Maureen E (2001). Standish, Peter (ed.). Culture and Customs of Guatemala. Culture and Customs of Latin American and the Caribbean. London: Greenwood Press.
  ISBN 0-313-30596-X
  .
• Shillington, John (2002). Grappling with Atrocity: Guatemalan Theater in the 1990s.
  ISBN 978-0-8386-3930-6
  .

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état.

• "Guatemala Collection". CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. Archived from the original on 3 July 2016. – CIA's declassified documents on Guatemala, including documents chronicling the 1954 coup.
• U.S. State Department site – Foreign Relations, 1952–1954: Guatemala
• "American Accountability Project: The Guatemala Genocide". Nova Southeastern University. Archived from the original on 30 October 2005. Retrieved 16 September 2024.
• The Guatemala Documentation Project – Provided by the National Security Archive.
• Video: Devils Don't Dream! Analysis of the CIA-sponsored 1954 coup in Guatemala.
• CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents – Provided by the National Security Archive.
• The short film U.S. Warns Russia to Keep Hands off in Guatemala Crisis (1955) is available for free viewing and download at the Internet Archive.
• U.S. Congressional involvement in the coup
• Contemporary news and analyses of the coup at
  marxists.org
• The Original Fake News Network
• Documents pertaining to Operation PBSuccess