1962 Ceylonese coup attempt

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1962 Ceylonese coup d'état attempt
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Attempted coup d'état of 1962 in Ceylon
Date27 January 1962
Location
Ceylon
Result Coup aborted/abandoned
Belligerents
Government of Ceylon Ceylonese Colonels
Commanders and leaders
Sirima Bandaranaike
Felix Dias Bandaranaike
S. A. Dissanayake
Cyril Cyrus Dissanayake
Maurice de Mel
Royce de Mel
Sydney de Zoysa
Units involved
1st Battalion, Ceylon Light Infantry,
Royal Ceylon Air Force		 3rd Field Artillery Regiment,
2nd Volunteer Signals
Strength
Government-loyal
Ceylon Police Force
 Elements in the armed forces and the Ceylon Police Force
Casualties and losses
1 died in prison

The 1962 Ceylonese coup d'état attempt (also known as the Colonels' coup ) was a failed military

Douglas Liyanage (deputy director of Land Development), it was to take place in the night of 27 January 1962, but was called off as the government gained information in the afternoon and initiated arrests of the suspected coup leaders before the coup was carried out.[1][2]

The arrested conspirators were tried under a special law, convicted and jailed. Their sentences were overruled later on appeal as it found the new law violated the Ceylon constitution and denied fair trial. During the trial it was revealed that the coup had the backing of several former statesmen,[3][4] and brought out the brewing conflict between the entrenched elites and the newly emerging elites in post-independence Sri Lanka.[5]

Background

Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranayaka
Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike
Brigadier James Sinclair, Earl of Caithness inspecting a guard of honour of the Ceylon Army wearing khaki drill in 1950.

Ceylon gained independence from Britain in 1948 as the Dominion of Ceylon, marking the beginning of self-rule for the local population. However, much of the political, governmental and military leadership of the country was passed down from the British to the Ceylonese Christian elite, who had risen to positions of power largely owing to their education and religion during the British colonial period.[5] As a result, all of the high offices of state were held by these elites.[5]

In 1956

socialist form of economy, nationalizing several private business and implemented controversial language policeis.[7]

Prior to these changes, the officer corps of the army were composed of three-fifths Christian, one-fifth

Buddhist Sinhalese officers. After sending the serving Inspector General of Police (IGP) Osmund de Silva on compulsorily retirement for refusing to carryout Bandaranaike's orders which de Silva considered to be unlawful, Bandaranaike appointed a Buddhist civil servant, M. Walter F. Abeykoon from the Lands Settlement Department, over three other senior Christian police officers. This caused much resentment among these senior police officers, who tendered their resignations, which were later withdrawn.[6]

In 1959,

Sirima Bandaranaike emerging as the leader of his party and gaining a majority in parliament, resulting in her becoming the first female prime minister in the world in 1960. She continued her husband's policies, with Felix Dias Bandaranaike and N. Q. Dias
serving as her close advisers.

By 1961 resentment was building up among the Christians, who felt that they were systematically being eliminated. The regime appear to have targeted minority communities by taking over and renaming

Ayub Khan in Pakistan inspired a group of disenchanted officers to take action.[12]

In February 1961, the

Minister of External Affairs issued an order to the service commanders to prepare for a series of strikes and rioting by Leftist and trade unions. The government at this stage delayed implementation of wage revisions based on the P. O. Fernando Committee Report on port labor, and the Wilmot Perera Report on the Public Service. This resulted in several strike action by port workers and the Ceylon Transport Board in November and December 1961, which was followed by a general strike. The Ceylon Volunteer Force was deployed and restored much of the operations. On 13 December 1961, Dr N. M. Perera said in parliament that Felix Dias Bandaranaike was making arrangements to rule the country with the army and navy. On 9 January 1962 Pieter Keuneman stated that there a situation was developing to create the basis for permanent military rule in the island; and on 12 January 1962 a statement by Wijeyananda Dahanayake
claimed that someone in the government was preparing to set up a military dictatorship.

Events

27 January 1962

The first indications of a threat to overthrow the government came on Saturday 27 January 1962, when the IGP Walter Abeykoon, who was at the

Temple Trees with the two CID officers.[1]

The information took the Prime Minister by shock, however under the directions of Felix Dias Bandaranaike, all service commanders,

Captain Nimal Jayakody and Captain Tony Anghie of 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Ceylon Artillery, members of the first batch of officer cadets of the Ceylon Army who had been trained at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.[13]

At this time, the first and only arrest of the coup was to be effected at 9.30pm when

Royal Ceylon Air Force were connected to the coup, a security cordon around Temple Trees was deployed from airforce personnel, since no one was sure how deeply the conspiracy had penetrated the ranks of the army, navy and police. The prime minister ordered the arrest of Dissanayake and J. F. Bede Johnpillai (ASP Traffic). They were arrested that night by teams made up personnel from all three services and the police.[15]

28 January 1962

The following day arrest warrants were issued for Colonel F. C. de Saram, Colonel Maurice de Mel and Rear Admiral Royce de Mel. Colonel de Saram drove to Temple Trees where he was arrested, Colonel de Mel was arrested at home and Admiral de Mel went into hiding. In the Sunday afternoon of 28 January 1962, Radio Ceylon aired a special news bulletin interrupting its scheduled programs, announcing that a conspiracy by a group of senior police and armed services officers to stage a coup d'état had been foiled and seven police and army officers had been arrested. News then broke-out in the evening editions. The initial detainees were housed in an annex at Temple Trees, while CID and Special Branch carried out investigations to identify other conspirators. Felix Dias Bandaranaike's continued personal involvement in the investigation was termed by some as an inquisition.[16]

Operation Holdfast

The plan of the coupe which was code-named Operation Holdfast, came to light based on the statements given the arrested officers and was published in a parliamentary white paper on 13 February 1962. The plan called for quick deployment of troops to seize strategic positions and installations, cordon off Colombo preventing troops from the Panagoda Cantonment reaching Colombo. In the process detain the Prime Minister and government leaders. The service commanders and the IGP were kept unaware of the plan. It would be initiated by C. C. Dissanayake at 10:00pm on the 27 January 1962 by issuing a take post order to his men. Thereafter ASP Johnpillai, ASP Traffic would have all main roads and highways cleared within 30 mins. This will facilitate the rapid movement of troop convoys from their barracks to predetermined destinations under the command of de Saram and de Mel starting at 11:00pm and to be completed by 1:00am on the 28 January 1962.[17] Lieutenant Colonel Wilmot Abrahams leading the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment was tasked with the capture of Temple Trees and detailing the Prime Minister assisted by ASP Lionel Jirasinhe.[18]

In this move, the Prime Minister was to be placed under house arrest. Senior Ministers, government officials and key advisers, were to be arrested and taken to

Sravasti, the hostel for MPs, while others were to be detained at their homes. Selected members of parliament living out of Colombo were to be arrested and detained at the local police stations.[17]

Key to the success of the coup would be to prevent, troops loyal to the government from staging a counter-coup. To this end, it was deemed that troops from the Panagoda Cantonment, were to be prevented from entering Colombo at all cost. The primary threat the coup leaders feared was the 1st Battalion,

Ceylon Light Infantry, which was based at the cantonment. The other infantry regiment of the army, the 1st Battalion, Ceylon Sinha Regiment was deployed in Jaffna at the time. Therefore, troops from the coup with armored cars were to be stationed at the two Kelani river bridges, the Wellawatte-Dehiwela bridge and the Kirillapone bridge.[17]

Soon after midnight police cars equipped with loud hailers were to be sent out to announce an immediate curfew in Colombo city limits. The Central Telegraph Office and other city telephone exchanges were to be taken over and put out of operation. Shortly after mid-night Police Headquarters and the CID office in fort were to be taken over. Newspaper office buildings of the Lake House and Times of Ceylon were to be taken over and publications to be stopped for several days. Signals Corps despatch riders, fully armed on motorcycles, were standing by from about 11pm at Torrington (Independence) Square to storm Radio Ceylon once the password 'Holdfast' was given. A special direct telephone line had been laid the previous day, from Army Headquarters at Lower Lake Road to the Echelon Barracks, for use by army personnel.[17]

Colonel Maurice de Mel would command operations from Army headquarters, while Colonel de Saram would position himself at Temple Trees and direct operations from there. The password would be British Grenadier. C. C. Dissanayake would take up position at Queens House and direct operations from there till police headquarters was taken over. The password would be Dowbiggin.[17]

Once the corp was complete the coup leaders with Major General de Saram as

Wijayananda Dahanayake also invited to join. The coup leaders had intended to send Sirima Bandaranaike to the United Kingdom by plan with her family to join her daughter who was studying at Oxford at the time.[17][18]

Aftermath

Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Governor-General (1954 – 1962)

Internal security

The government's concern was to understand the depth of the conspiracy and identify conspirators. This task was led by Felix Dias Bandaranaike with the CID undertaking the investigations. Security of the Prime Minister and Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike were increased by police and armed forces, while their country seats in their constituencies were supplemented by local party volunteers. Felix Dias Bandaranaike called for regular security briefings for the prime minister which were held at Temple Trees, Horagolla Walauwa and at Weke Walawwa.[19]

Changes in government

Dr

Permanent Secretary
to the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs. In this capacity Dias began a program of recruitment of Sinhalese Buddhist officers to the army, while recruitment in the navy was stopped.

Changes in the armed forces and police

Colonel

Temporary Commodore Rajan Kadiragamar remained Captain of the Navy with his appointed confirmed in 1964.[17]

Both General Winston Wijekoon and Colonel Heyn were not aware of the coup and their regiment, the 1st Battalion, Ceylon Light Infantry, based in Panagoda, was the unit the plotters had wanted to prevent coming to the aid of the Government.[17]

A restructuring followed with officers and men linked to the coup being discharged. The 1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (the primary unit involved in the coup), the 2nd (V) Anti-aircraft Regiment and the 3rd Field Regiment of the

Ceylon Engineers and the 2nd (V) Signal Regiment of the Ceylon Signals Corps were also disbanded in disgrace and the remaining men of the latter were brought to form the Ceylon National Guard.[17] In 1999, the 2nd (V) Sri Lanka Signals Corps was formed, but none of the other regiments were reformed even during the height of the Sri Lankan Civil War
when the Sri Lankan Army saw a major expansion.

Arrests and detentions

In all 31 persons were arrested, these included officers from the Army and the Navy,

Ceylon Light Infantry with Major A. Hulangamuwa in charge. The officers were held in solitary confinement in the hope of getting confessions. The conditions were improved later.[16]
Extensive interviews were carried out among the small officer coupe of the Ceylon Army to gain evidence against the accused. One officer, Captain Poulier took his own life with his service revolver.

Criminal Law Special Provision Act of 1962

In the meantime the government passed a new law called Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No. 1 of 1962 which gave additional provisions for prosecution beyond the limitations of the Evidence Ordinance, such as the use of hearsay as evidence; to bring the coup case under the new law it was given retrospective effect from January 1, 1962. The law was opposed in parliament by the United National Party and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, but the latter was convinced by the government to support the bill by an assurance that it would be used only for the prosecution of the members of the coup.[21]

Trial

… whether a criminal act is done or not, the agreement, and not the act, is what is penalized. ‘The conspirators may repent and stop or they may either have no opportunity or may be prevented, or may even fail. Nevertheless, the crime is complete and was complete when they agreed.

Excerpt from judgment - Queen v. Liyanage- 67-NLR:203/204, [16]

In June 1962, the

QC
filed charges against 24 on three counts of attempting to

  1. wage war against the Queen,
  2. overthrow by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force the Government of Ceylon,
  3. overthrow otherwise than by lawful means the Government of Ceylon by law established.

The

Minister of Justice, under the new law, appointed a Trial-at-Bar made up of three Supreme Court Judges. Of the 24 charged, all were Christians; in terms of ethnicity, there were 12 Sinhalese, six Tamils and six Burghers among them. The remaining five were not prosecuted due to lack of evidence or having turned Crown witness.[16]

In the trial of Queen v. Liyanage and others, the accused were defended by some of the top lawyers of the time including

QC, in his earlier post as Attorney General, had assisted the investigation of the case.[citation needed
]

A Third Court sat for 324 days from 3 June 1963, and convicted 11 of the 24 accused including De Saram, De Mel brothers, Douglas Liyanage, Sidney de Zoysa, Wilmot Abraham, B. I. Loyola, Wilton White, Nimal Jayakody, Noel Matthysz, Victor Joseph, Basil Jesudason, John Felix, David Tambyah and Samuel Jackson. The sentence was ten years in jail and confiscation of property. Wilmot Abraham later died in prison in 1964.

Involvement of former prime ministers

The names of Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, and former Prime Ministers Dudley Senanayake and Colonel Sir John Kotelawala had come up in the investigation and trial. Goonetilleke was removed from his position as Governor General and replaced by William Gopallawa on 20 March 1962 and went into exile in London. He was tried and sentenced in absentia for exchange control offences by the Criminal Justice Commission in 1972 and was pardoned following the repeal of the Criminal Justice Commissions Act in 1977. No moves against Senanayake or Kotelawala were made, but years later J. R. Jayewardene stated that at a meeting on 13 April 1966 he was told by Colonel Sir John Kotelawala that he and Dudley Senanayake had been aware of the coup.[3][4]

Appeal to the Privy Council

The Acts offended against the Constitution in that they amounted to a direction to convict the men or to a legislative plan to secure their conviction and severe punishment and thus constituted an unjustifiable assumption of judicial power, by the legislature, or an interference with judicial power, which was outside the legislature's competence and was inconsistent with the severance of power between legislature, executive and judiciary which the constitution ordained.

Lord Pearce, Daily News

However, the condemned appealed to the Judicial Committee of the

remand.[21]

Of the accused, De Saram returned to his family law firm and legal practice, Douglas Liyanage was appointed Secretary to the Ministry of State in the early 1980s, Capt. John Felix went on to become the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue and Lt. Col. Basil Jesudasan became the Chairman of Carson Cumberbatch PLC.[citation needed]

Impact and effects of the coup

The primary result of the coup attempt was that it led Sirima Bandaranaike to develop a distrust of the military. Senior appointments in the armed services and the police were made from officers trusted by the government and not on seniority as such as in the case of the IGP and the Army Commander. In the latter,

B. R. Heyn was overlooked in favor of Richard Udugama
.

This practice was continued by successive governments and had a negative effect on the professionalism and impartiality of the armed forces and the police. Funding for the services were cut drastically in the immediate aftermath, greatly affecting its growth and disabling its ability of defending Ceylon in the long term.

Military hardware procurements were limited. The Navy was hardest hit, with many of its ships were sold and its blue water capability lost, it would not regain it former ability until the 2000s, having rebuilt its brown water capability over the 1980's and 1990's. Inter service cooperation in the form of joint operations were suspended.

Following the Bandaranaike government's electoral defeat in 1965,

Ceylon Police Force charged with internal security
.

Sirima Bandaranaike's distrust continued into her second term in 1970, fearful of another military coup, she had the police units such as the Special Branch reorganized and appointed her cousin Anuruddha Ratwatte as commanding officer of the Army's Field Security Detachment tasked with identifying leaders of a potential coup.

As a result, the military was under strength and ill-equipped to deal with the

1971 JVP Insurrection
, which took the Bandaranaike government by complete surprise and almost defeated. To overcome the perilous situation Ceylon had to rely on help from other countries.

Finally when Bandaranaike government introduced a new constitution in 1972, it declared Sri Lanka as a republic breaking the last remaining links to the British Empire, including the final level of judicial appeal to the Privy Council.[17]

Accused conspirators of the coup attempt

Military
Police
  • Cyril Cyrus "Jungle" Dissanayake
    - Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), Range I.
  • Sidney Godfrey de Zoysa - former Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) (found guilty)
  • Vithanage Elster Perera - Superintendent of Police (West)
  • William Ernest Chelliah Jebanesan - Superintendent of Police (Colombo)
  • Terrence "Terry" Victor Wijesinghe - Assistant Superintendent of Police, Personal Assistant to DIG Range I
  • Lionel Christopher Stanley Jirasinghe - Assistant Superintendent of Police
  • David Senadirajah Thambyah - Assistant Superintendent of Police (found guilty)
Civilians

Others arrested as conspirators

See also

  • Coup d'état
  • List of coups d'état and coup attempts
  • 1966 alleged Ceylonese coup d'état attempt

References

  1. ^ a b "How the British press saw Mrs Bandaranaike". The Sunday Times. October 22, 2000.
  2. ^ "The Kataragama factor and the 1962 coup". The Sunday Times. August 13, 2000.
  3. ^ a b Perera, K.K.S. (January 29, 2012). "Two Prime Ministers and the Governor General – did they have a role?". The Sunday Times. Retrieved 5 September 2015.
  4. ^
    ISBN 9780850524307
  5. ^
    The Daily News (Sri Lanka)
    . Retrieved 17 November 2015.
  6. ^ a b "Bandaranaikes: the bane of Lanka". The Sunday Leader. November 9, 2003. Archived from the original on October 9, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2016.
  7. ^ The RAF and RCyAF - A parting of the ways
  8. ^ Catholics Protest Ceylon Plan To Take Over Church Schools, The Blade (Toledo Blade), Accessed 05-09-2015
  9. ISBN 9780691615608
  10. Sunday Times
    Retrieved 05 October 2015
  11. ^ Amerasekera, Dr. Nihal D. (4 January 2014). "Cedric James Oorloff - A tribute to a great educationist of the 20th Century". The Island. Archived from the original on 11 December 2014. Retrieved 3 December 2014.
  12. ^ "Delayed Revolt". Time. March 3, 1961. Archived from the original on January 14, 2009.
  13. ^ Another reunion
  14. ^ "1962 Coup-de-ta" (PDF). Island. Retrieved 15 August 2019.
  15. ^ Perera, K.K.S. "Burma and Ceylon in 1962: Why military succeeded there and failed here?". Daily Mirror. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  16. ^ a b c d Jeyaraj, DBS. "50th ANNIVERSARY OF ABORTIVE COUP D'ETAT CONSPIRACY IN JANUARY 1962". Daily Mirror. Retrieved 16 August 2019.
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h i j “Operation holdfast”: The attempted coup d’etat of Jan 1962 Archived 2016-05-28 at the Wayback Machine by D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Accessed 05-09-2015
  18. ^ a b Perera, K.K.S. "Luck or Destiny; Sirimavo Escapes: Prime Minister and 1962 Coup d'é Tat". Daily Mirror. Retrieved 22 November 2021.
  19. ^ GUNAWARDENA, EDWARD. "The National Security Council and police intelligence". Island. Retrieved 15 August 2019.
  20. ^ The Kataragama factor and the 1962 coup
  21. ^ a b Perera, K. K. S. "Judicial competence of Privy Council". Daily News. Retrieved 16 August 2019.
  22. ^ "Court Jester: Lakshman Kadirgamar". Jestforkicks.blogspot.com. 2008-02-19. Retrieved 2010-09-20.

External links

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