1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing
1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing | |
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Ngô Đình Diệm | |
Attack type | Airstrike |
Weapons | 2 A-1 Skyraiders |
Injured | 3 killed, 30 injured |
Perpetrator | Nguyễn Văn Cử Phạm Phú Quốc |
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Prime Minister of the
State of Vietnam (1954–1955) President of South Vietnam (1955–1963)Policies and theories
Major events
Elections
Diplomatic activities
Family
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On 27 February 1962, the
The pilots later said they attempted the assassination in response to Diệm's
One bomb penetrated a room in the western wing where Diệm was reading but failed to detonate, leading the president to claim that he had "divine" protection. Except for Diệm's sister-in-law Madame Nhu, who suffered minor injuries, the Ngô family was unscathed. Three palace staff died, and 30 were injured. Afterward, Cử escaped to Cambodia, but Quốc was arrested and imprisoned.
In the wake of the airstrike, Diệm became hostile towards the
Planning
Cử was the second son of
Quốc had more subordinates but was unsure of their loyalty, so he did not try to recruit them for the attack on the palace.
Attack
Quốc and Cử, who were trained in France and the United States, respectively, were given orders to fly their
At around 07:00, the deer on the expansive lawns of the French colonial-era palace were frightened off as Quốc, and Cử's planes flew low over their target to inspect the ruling family's residence.[9] On their second run, they attacked with bombs and napalm before strafing the presidential compound with rocket and machine-gun fire. The duo continued their runs for 30 minutes before units loyal to the president arrived and fought back.[3][4] Taking advantage of poor weather and low cloud cover, the two pilots circled the palace at altitudes of around 150 m (490 ft), periodically diving out of the clouds to re-attack before darting back into them. The airstrike caught the Presidential Guard by surprise, and, in confusion, they were unable to determine whether the aircraft were acting alone or with ground forces. Loyalist tanks and armored personnel carriers rushed to their battle stations. Anti-aircraft batteries opened fire, nearly hitting the loyalist aircraft from Bien Hoa Air Base in pursuit of the two rebel planes.[4] Two tanks and a number of jeeps armed with .50-calibre machine guns patrolled the smoke-filled streets as a precaution.[10]
The first 500 lb (230 kg) bomb penetrated a room in the western wing where Diệm was reading a biography of
Aftermath
In a brief radio address, after order had been restored, Diệm dismissed the attack as an "isolated act" and attributed his escape to "divine protection".[1] He visited the soldiers wounded in the attacks and also promised the rebel pilots' colleagues that they would not bear any responsibility for the bombing. American President John F. Kennedy promptly sent a message denouncing the attack as a "destructive and vicious act" and expressed relief that Diệm was "safe and unharmed".[4] US ambassador Frederick Nolting determined that the attack had been the result of "two isolated cases" and opined that the incident did not represent widespread dissatisfaction with the regime.[11] The absence of a VC reaction led Nolting to label the bombing as a "limited scope, anti-Communist assassination attempt".[12] Diệm was praised for outwardly projecting a calm demeanor following the attack, and he moved to temporary government accommodation usually used for foreign dignitaries and visited Bien Hoa Air Base.[8]
The National Assembly, Diệm's rubber stamp legislative body, urged the president to "take drastic measures against irresponsible elements".[4] The day after the attack, the National Assembly's Steering Committee passed a resolution calling on Diệm to end "the policy of clemency" against dissidents and to "continue the struggle to protect the nation's destiny".[8] They also called for punishments to be handed out to people who took advantage of the disorder by hoarding goods or speculating on food.[13]
General
The RVNAF reacted to the two pilots' actions by sending a resolution to Diệm, saying that the attack was an "absolutely isolated and foolish" event that "impaired the prestige of the air force" and was "detrimental to the national effort in the present struggle and is profitable to the Communists in their work of subversion".[6] The RVNAF was regarded as being a highly loyal branch of the armed forces, and its commander, Colonel Nguyen Quang Vinh had claimed the year before, that all of the RVNAF's officer corps had voted for Diệm in the 1961 presidential election. Upon hearing of the attack, Vinh, who had been in Taiwan attending a conference, boarded a specially chartered airplane provided by Taiwanese President Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan to return to Saigon to make a statement on the situation and the political reliability of the RVNAF.[8]
The
As a result of the attack, Diệm ordered that all RVNAF aircraft be grounded and all aerial combat missions be suspended. At the same time, his security officials investigated fighter pilots for any possible anti-regime tendencies. This was achieved by placing tanks on the Bien Hoa Air Base runway. Without assistance from accompanying fighter craft, it was deemed too risky for American helicopters to operate in the jungles against the VC.[6] On 2 March, three days after the attack, Diệm allowed the air force to resume combat operations,[6] having concluded that Cử and Quốc's sentiments were not representative of the air force.[5] For a few days after the attack, the areas around the palace were cordoned off, and tanks were stationed at prominent streets in the capital.[9]
Quốc was imprisoned for his actions, while Cử remained in exile in Cambodia, where he worked as a language teacher.
In the meantime, Diệm's police sought to track down Cử's father, who had gone into hiding following the assassination attempt.[5] After Diệm's assassination in November 1963, Quốc was released from prison, and Cử returned from exile on 16 November, and they resumed their service in the RVNAF.[1][16] Quốc advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 18 months before being killed in an air raid over North Vietnam on 20 April 1965.[17]
Diệm reaction
On 4 March, Diệm held a review of the RVNAF in central Saigon. Large crowds flocked to the Saigon River's banks to watch RVNAF aircraft formations on aerial parade. However, every day civilians were not allowed within a block of the presidential box, where Diệm was accompanied by Nolting and General Paul D. Harkins, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The display included 29 of the A-1 aircraft used to attack Independence Palace. Diệm spoke about the events of 27 February and noted that he was "not unaware" of the supportive reaction of the various segments of society to "the foolish act perpetrated by some treacherous elements" that had "tried to rouse bloody troubles which would have profited only enemies of the fatherland".[18] He said that the bombing was "merely an isolated action of a few insane traitors to the fatherland and to the people, while the entire air force, like the rest of the armed forces, demonstrated unfaltering loyalty and an unwavering spirit of national unity by rapidly and effectively countering the aggression of two criminals".[18] He described that attack as "the odious act of renegades" and called upon the RVNAF "to remain always vigilant, to turn away from all temptations, to scorn all perfidious schemes and to place the higher interest of the fatherland above personal interest".[18] In response, the RVNAF chief Vinh, asked Diệm for "forgiveness and clemency" and presented a plaque inscribed with a resolution from the RVNAF condemning the attack.[18]
During Nolting's first meeting with Diệm after the assassination attempt, the president adamantly asserted that the media was responsible for the bombing. He pointed to the Newsweek article and other "derogatory articles in the press", using them to justify his claim that "the Americans were supporting the revolution".[11] Diệm declared that while some journalists were portraying the bombing as a wake-up call, he saw it as "a warning to them—an indicator of the danger of their irresponsibility in fomenting disorder".[11]
In a later meeting with General Harkins, Diệm joked: "I shouldn't have put him in the air force, because I had put his father in jail years ago". Diệm predicted that "sometime I'm going to get shot right in the back of the neck. Sometime they'll get me that way". (He and Nhu were deposed and shot dead during the
U.S. reaction
The attack sparked conjecture that the United States might deploy combat troops in South Vietnam, even though, at the time, US military personnel were officially serving in solely advisory roles. In response to media concerns about the stability of the Diệm government,
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g h Karnow, pp. 280–281.
- ^ Tucker, p. 302.
- ^ a b c Langguth, pp. 163–164.
- ^ a b c d e f g h "Durable Diem". Time. 9 March 1962. Archived from the original on 18 November 2007. Retrieved 9 April 2008.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bigart, Homer (3 March 1962). "Vietnamese win in stab at reds". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bigart, Homer (2 March 1962). "Vietnam's planes return to battle". The New York Times.
- ^ Langguth, p. 99.
- ^ a b c d e Bigart, Homer (1 March 1962). "Broad Plot Hinted In Attack on Diem". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c Bigart, Homer (28 February 1962). "Saigon discounts pilots' raid on Presidential Palace". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c d e f g Jones, pp. 162–163.
- ^ a b c Jacobs, pp. 131–132.
- ^ a b c Hammer, p. 137.
- ^ a b c d e Bigart, Homer (4 March 1962). "Diem in Unshaken After a Bad Week". The New York Times.
- ^ Osborne, pp. 106–112.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 128–132.
- ^ "Unsuccessful foes of Diệm end exile". The New York Times. 17 November 1963.
- ^ Langguth, Jack (21 April 1965). "U.S. bombs roads in North Vietnam". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c d Bigart, Homer (5 March 1962). "Diem Hails Fliers After Air Review". The New York Times.
- ^ Tucker, p. 405.
- ^ Warner, p. 92.
References
- ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York: ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- ISBN 1-86373-642-5.
- ISBN 1-57607-040-9.
- Angus and Robertson.