1964 Brinks Hotel bombing
1964 Brinks Hotel bombing | |
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Saigon, South Vietnam | |
Coordinates | 10°46′10″N 106°40′55″E / 10.76944°N 106.68194°E |
Date | Thursday, December 24, 1964 |
Attack type | Bombing |
Deaths | 2 |
Injured | 53–63 |
Perpetrators | Viet Cong |
History of Ho Chi Minh City |
|
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Attack on USNS Card (2 May 1964) | |
1964 Brinks Hotel bombing (24 December 1964) | |
1965 United States embassy bombing (30 March 1965) | |
1965 Saigon bombing (25 June 1965) | |
Operation Jackstay (26 March – 6 April 1966) | |
Operation Fairfax (November 1966 - 15 December 1967) | |
Viet Cong attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base (4–5 December 1966) | |
Tet offensive battle of Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack (31 January-11 February 1968) | |
Tet offensive attack on Joint General Staff Compound (31 January-1 February 1968) | |
Tet offensive attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base (31 January 1968) | |
Tet offensive attack on US Embassy (31 January 1968) | |
Battle of West Saigon (5–12 May 1968) | |
Battle of South Saigon (7–12 May 1968) | |
Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 841 (2 July 1972) | |
Bombing of Tan Son Nhut Air Base (28 April 1975) | |
Operation Frequent Wind (29–30 April 1975) | |
Fall of Saigon (30 April 1975) |
The Brinks Hotel in
The Viet Cong commanders had planned the venture with two objectives in mind. Firstly, by attacking an American installation in the center of the heavily guarded capital, the Viet Cong intended to demonstrate their ability to strike in South Vietnam should the United States decide to launch air raids against North Vietnam. Secondly, the bombing would demonstrate to the South Vietnamese that the Americans were vulnerable and could not be relied upon for protection.[1][2]
The bombing prompted debate within the administration of United States President Lyndon B. Johnson. Most of his advisers favored retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of American combat troops, while Johnson preferred the existing strategy of training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to protect South Vietnam from the Vietcong. In the end, Johnson decided not to take retaliatory action.
Background and planning
Following World War II, the communist-dominated
The bombing was planned and performed by two Vietcong agents who escaped uninjured and were never captured. Nguyen Thanh Xuan recollected his involvement to historian Stanley Karnow after the war had ended. In late-November, Xuan and his comrade received orders from a Vietcong intermediary to bomb the Brinks Hotel.[1] The building housed United States Army officers, including lieutenant colonels and majors,[9] and attracted off-duty personnel with its highly regarded food and drink, rooftop seating areas and movie screenings.[10] It also hosted a few officers who were members of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam.[11] The building was named after Brigadier General Francis. G. Brink, who had served as the first commander of MAAG Indochina during the First Indochina War and had been used by American personnel for about four years. A rooftop dinner had been planned for Christmas Eve.[8]
According to the historian Mark Moyar, it was a six-story building and had 193 bedrooms,[12] although The New York Times reported that the building had eight stories[8] and had 60 bedrooms that housed two people each.[11] The building was L-shaped.[8] The building was surrounded by a 4.5 m concrete wall, which provided a buffer zone of 15 m from the wall of the actual hotel. The buffer zone was used as a carpark and the streets adjoining the hotel were heavily lit and guarded by Vietnamese personnel at all times.[8] However, the sentries had a reputation for being lax patrollers, as US journalists often entered the compound late in the evenings without being checked.[11]
The Vietcong duo observed their target over the next month, mixing with the crowds in the busy street outside. Noting that South Vietnamese officers mingled freely with Americans, they obtained ARVN uniforms from Saigon's black market, enabling them to get closer. Xuan disguised himself as a military chauffeur, while his partner dressed as a South Vietnamese major. They mingled with the real officers so that they could copy their mannerisms, speaking style and even their way of smoking. The Vietcong pair then procured the two cars and explosives needed for the operation.[1][2]
The Vietcong commanders had planned the venture with two aims in mind. Firstly, by attacking an American institution in the heart of the heavily guarded capital, the bombing would demonstrate the Vietcong's ability to strike against the Americans in Vietnam, should the United States decide to launch air raids against North Vietnam. Secondly, the attack would demonstrate to the South Vietnamese public that the Americans were vulnerable and could not be relied upon for protection.[1][2] Xuan added that "all the crimes committed by the Americans were directed from this nerve center".[13] In the month leading up to the attack, South Vietnamese military intelligence had seized communist documents indicating a strategy of attacking US military targets in urban areas during the Christmas period in order to lower the morale of the US public and therefore turn opinion against intervention in Vietnam. He recalled that the number of American officers at the Brinks Hotel had swelled on Christmas Eve because they were using the building to coordinate their celebrations, and that the attack would therefore cause more casualties than on a normal day.[13]
Explosion
The bombers stashed explosives weighing approximately 90 kilograms (200 lb)[12] in the trunk of one of the cars, and set a timing device to trigger the bomb at 17:45, during the happy hour in the officers' bar at the hotel. The pair drove their vehicles into the hotel's grounds. Knowing from their intelligence that a certain American colonel had returned to the US, the "major" lied and told the hotel clerk that he had an appointment with the American officer, claiming that the colonel would be coming from Da Lat. The clerk correctly replied that the colonel had left the country, but the "major" insisted that the clerk was mistaken. The "major" then parked his vehicle in the car park beneath the hotel, before ordering his chauffeur to leave and fetch the American with the other vehicle. He then left the hotel grounds, asking the guard to tell the American colonel to wait for him. The "major" claimed that he had not eaten all day and was going to a nearby café.[1][2]
While the "major" was at the eatery, the bomb detonated, killing two American officers.
The injury reports are conflicting. Karnow reported that 58 people (military and civilian) were injured,[1] Mark Moyar reported that 38 American officers were wounded along with 25 Vietnamese civilians,[12] who worked inside the building,[8] while journalist A. J. Langguth reported that 10 Americans and 43 Vietnamese were injured.[2] A report in The New York Times the day after the attack reported 98 injuries, including 61 US military personnel, 2 US civilians, 34 Vietnamese and an Australian serviceman.[11] Many of the US officers were still on their way back to the Brinks and arrived a few minutes after the blast occurred; there would have been more casualties if the explosion had occurred later.[8] Most of the injured suffered from lacerations or concussions and were not badly hurt, as all but 20 were released from hospital within five hours and those who remained did not suffer life-threatening injuries.[8] However, many mid-level officers, including lieutenant colonels and majors, were injured, but after one day in hospital, only seven lieutenant colonels, one major and three captains were yet to be discharged.[8][11]
Apart from the steel girders, which supported the building, the explosion completely destroyed the ground floor. The bottom four floors were all punctured by the blast and sustained significant damage. The damage was accentuated because several trucks were in the underground car park, with gas canisters ready for delivery. As a result, the explosion detonated the gas, creating a fireball,
The blast destroyed the studios of the Armed Forces Radio Service, which were located on the ground floor of the hotel, but the station returned to the airwaves two hours later, using an emergency transmitter.[8] The explosion forced the US to fly in more bomb-detection equipment, as most of the devices already in Vietnam were stored inside the hotel and were destroyed in the attack.[11]
At the time, American entertainers, including Bob Hope, were in Saigon to perform for US personnel. It is unclear whether Hope was a target; Moyar reported that Hope was targeted, but was delayed at the airport due to a luggage mishap,[12] while Lawrence J. Quirk reported that the comedian and his troupe were staying in a hotel across the street and were not in range of the blast.[15]
Reaction
The attack surprised American officials and policymakers on Vietnam, who were confident that the South Vietnamese government was in control in Saigon and that the Vietcong were only a threat in rural areas.
The Americans responded to the ground-level situation by organizing urgent security meetings with Saigon officials with a view to increasing safety standards. This led to an increase in military patrols around all US military accommodation in Saigon, which were also exhaustively searched for explosives. An additional 65 US Navy personnel were deployed for this purpose and, passers-by in the streets were stopped and checked for weapons.[11]
General William Westmoreland, who was the U.S. Army commander in South Vietnam, Taylor, and other senior U.S. officers in Saigon and Washington, D.C. urged President Lyndon B. Johnson to authorize reprisal bombings against North Vietnam. Taylor messaged Washington on Christmas Day,[2][22] saying, "Hanoi will get the word that, despite our present tribulations, there is still bite in the tiger they call paper, and the U.S. stock in this part of the world will take sharp rise. Some of our local squabbles will probably disappear in enthusiasm which our action would generate."[2] Taylor recommended that the US take unilateral action, citing the animosity between himself and Khanh's junta.[2]
Johnson called his U.S.-based advisers to his Texas ranch for discussions on Christmas Day.
In January 1965, the Vietcong secretly held their 3rd Conference in South Vietnam and concluded that in failing to retaliate, "the Americans lacked the will to strike North Vietnam or shield South Vietnam from the mortal blow".
The attack fomented feelings of insecurity among American policymakers about communist attacks. Johnson hoped that the continuing presence of American military advisers would be sufficient to strengthen the ARVN so that it could stabilize the Saigon government, but many of his defense department advisers felt that American combat troops were needed on the ground.[16] This increased the tension between the president's civilian and military officials,[26] before the Americans became directly involved in fighting in 1965. David Tucker of the United States Army War College said that the bombing was "insignificant for the conventional military balance but important for the political struggle that was the primary focus of the enemy [Vietcong]".[27] The facility was repaired and American officers continued to stay there until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, when the communists overran South Vietnam and reunified the country under their rule.[28]
Today, the site is a Park Hyatt hotel built along
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Karnow, p. 423.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Langguth, pp. 326–327.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 40–56.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 210–214.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 90–100.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 102–104.
- ISBN 0-521-80111-7.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Grose, Peter (25 December 1963). "Terrorists Bomb Saigon Quarters of U.S. Officers". The New York Times. p. 1.
- ISBN 1-4120-6057-5.
- ISBN 1-55750-549-7.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i "Saigon Security Tightened by U.S. After Explosion". The New York Times. 26 December 1963. p. 1.
- ^ a b c d e f g Moyar, p. 347.
- ^ Public Broadcasting Service. 1983. Archivedfrom the original on 14 April 2009. Retrieved 2009-03-04.
- ^ "James Robert Hagen". Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Retrieved 2009-04-03.
- ISBN 1-55783-353-2.
- ^ ISBN 0-313-29271-X.
- ^ ISBN 0-7735-1392-2.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 344–345.
- ^ a b c Karnow, p. 399.
- ^ a b c Langguth, pp. 322–325.
- ^ a b Moyar, p. 346.
- ^ a b c d e f Moyar, p. 348.
- ^ Moyar, p. 485.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 346–347, 378–379.
- ^ Moyar, p. 334.
- ISBN 0-520-25004-4.
- ISBN 1-58487-254-3.
- ISBN 0-19-513787-6.
- ^ "Park Hyatt, Saigon – review by Rusty Compass". Rustycompass.com. Retrieved 2012-08-24.
References
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- ISBN 0-521-86911-0.