2nd Ranger Infantry Company (United States)

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2nd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne)
Pusan, South Korea
Nickname(s)"Buffalo Rangers"
Motto(s)"Buffalo"
EngagementsKorean War
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Warren E. Allen

The 2nd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) was a

segregated
unit, all of its personnel, including its officers, were African-Americans.

Activated and trained as a successor organization to the

U.S. 7th Infantry Division. In this role, the company undertook several major operations against the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, including Operation Tomahawk
in early 1951.

Even though racial politics often resulted in the company receiving untrained replacements, it performed well in many small-scale engagements during this time. In the summer of 1951, the company was employed along the front line as an advance force to push back Chinese attacks as the front lines became more static. The company was highly regarded for its actions capturing and holding Hill 581 during the Battle of the Soyang River, in which the company inflicted hundreds of casualties on the Chinese without a single Ranger being killed.

Disbanded in August 1951 along with all the other Ranger companies, the unit's soldiers accrued several awards in its 10-month existence. These included four

Purple Heart Medals. Subsequent research has focused on the economy of force
of how the Rangers were employed and how their performance was impacted by the racist policies of their time.

Origins

The 1st Ranger Company graduates from Ranger training in November 1950.

On 25 June 1950 the

Pusan Perimeter by August.[3] At the same time, North Korean agents began to infiltrate behind UN lines and attack military targets and cities.[4]

UN units, spread out along the Pusan Perimeter, had a difficult time repelling these units as they were untrained in combating

Organization

With the successful development of the Eighth Army Ranger Company, the establishment of additional Ranger

The troops for the Ranger company were to be

Ranger Tab and the Rangers adopted a black, red and white scroll similar to that unofficially worn by Ranger Battalions in World War II.[13]

Soon after arriving in Korea, the unit took to the nickname "Buffalo Rangers," which U.S. newspapers had applied to the unit as a homage to the

Buffalo Soldiers. "Buffalo" subsequently became both the division's motto as well as its password for patrols upon their return to company lines.[14] The 2nd Ranger Company was the only Ranger company in the history of the U.S. Army to consist entirely of African-Americans.[15][16]

History

Formation and training

The U.S. Army, which up until that point typically did not allow African-American soldiers to serve in special forces units, authorized African-Americans to apply to become Rangers. However, in spite of

Of a pool of 5,000 applicants, on 2 October the Ranger Training School selected 22 officers and 314 enlisted men for the first three Ranger companies, which were entirely white. A fourth, all African-American company was organized several days later.

Second Lieutenant James C. Queen, executive officer.[20] Originally it had been designated the 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), but the two companies switched designations, apparently to prevent accusations of racial discrimination.[21] The unit was formally activated on 25 October 1950 at Fort Benning.[22]

The 2nd Ranger Company on a ferry in San Francisco, en route to Korea in 1950.

The Rangers trained extensively in reconnaissance, long-range patrols, motorized scouting, setting up

Taegu five days later.[25]

Korea

Arriving in Korea at 11:15 on 30 December, the 2nd Ranger Company was attached to the

Sergeant First Class Isaac Baker, as well as three wounded. The North Koreans had 50 killed.[28] At 09:00 9 January, 3rd Platoon conducted a patrol to Changnim where they ambushed an advance North Korean patrol, killing 11 while suffering one wounded in a six-hour firefight from 09:00 to 14:45.[30] The company soon created a "curfew," attacking anyone they encountered after dark, a move which effectively disrupted communications and resupply to the local Chinese guerrilla unit, which instead opted to move out of the Rangers' area of operation.[28]

On 14 January, the Rangers formed the armored spearhead of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry attack on the village of Majori-ri, as part of an offensive to push Chinese forces back from the Tanyang area.[28] The company entered the village at 07:30 and was ambushed by a battalion of Chinese troops entrenched there in fortified positions.[30] The Rangers were able to capture the village and fend off a counterattack with their heavy weapons, suffering five killed and five wounded while killing 100 Chinese soldiers.[28][30] However, as it moved to reinforce another U.S. infantry company advancing north, the 2nd Ranger Company was hit by a strong Chinese counterattack, and was forced to withdraw after running out of ammunition. It suffered another six killed and three wounded.[31]

"Colored troops who arrive in this division, if they have the proper MOS, will be assigned to the 2nd Ranger Company. Others who are assigned by error will be returned to the Eighth Army Replacement Battalion. Personnel will not be mixed within units. If Ranger Company becomes overstrength, another company will be formed."

Ned Almond's controversial order to keep the 2nd Ranger Company segregated by assigning non-Ranger black troops and blocking white Ranger replacements.[27]

Continued patrols and skirmishes in the Tanyang area, as well as non-battle casualties to

Ned Almond ordered all black replacements to be sent to the Ranger company, even though they had not been trained as Rangers.[27] This action, seen as a racist move by historians, was done to keep Almond's troops segregated. Although Ranger replacements were in short supply and the order effectively ensured that the company was brought back to at full strength, it nevertheless reduced the company's effectiveness.[32] Reinforcements from many career fields, including many non-combat troops, joined the company and had to be retrained.[28]

The 7th Infantry Division reached full strength and saw action around

fixed bayonets even when it became apparent that the Chinese force was larger than anticipated. The Chinese were routed in heavy fighting.[14] A few days later, field commanders reported to The Pentagon that the company was performing extremely well, and it was pulled from the lines for a new mission.[36]

Operation Tomahawk

command post
at Tanyang Pass in 1951.

On 28 February 1951,

187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT),[37] alongside the 4th Ranger Infantry Company, and began unit training jumps and tactical exercises in preparation for a combat parachute drop. These exercises continued throughout March 1951, as much of the UN force conducted the aggressive Operation Ripper as a large-scale counteroffensive against the Chinese and North Korean forces.[14] To follow-up this attack, Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, commander of the Eighth Army, planned Operation Tomahawk, a mission to insert the 187th RCT and the Rangers behind the Chinese lines[23] to cut off Chinese supplies and force them to retreat north of Seoul. During the three weeks of training, the Rangers were reinforced by another platoon of African-American Rangers directly from Ranger school under Lieutenant Antonio Anthony.[14]

On 23 March, the 187th and attached Rangers were dropped around

The Rangers massed and moved south to a terrain feature known as Hill 151, the linkup point with the 6th Tank Battalion. The company surprised and overwhelmed a Chinese platoon in a village 1 mile (1.6 km) north of the hill, killing six and capturing twenty. They then took the hill despite North Korean resistance, killing eleven and capturing one, and forcing two platoons of North Koreans to retreat from the hill. The Rangers suffered one killed and two wounded. By 18:00 they had linked up with the advancing

U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. Over the next five days, the Rangers commenced mopping up North Korean and Chinese resistance, advancing 20 miles (32 km) north.[38]

Retraining and lull

In April, the 2nd Ranger Infantry Company was reattached to the 7th Infantry Division, this time to the 31st Regimental Combat Team. The company spent the month training replacements, with up to 400 enlisted men filtering into the company. By May, the process of transferring these men to other units began as U.S. Army units throughout Korea, driven by necessity, began slowly desegregating. The Rangers eventually settled at a force of 123 men, among them the first white member of the unit, medic Joe Russo.[38]

By May, the Rangers were emplaced at Hill 258, on the front lines between the 31st RCT and the

rest and recuperation rotations. Allen, Pryor, and Freeman left on one such rotation with a number of men, leaving Queen and only 80 enlisted men on the hill.[38]

Hill 581

Shortly after this, however, Chinese infiltrators began appearing regularly in the undermanned 2nd Company's area, and by 15 May, Queen discovered the Chinese were moving in force to Hill 581, several miles from their position, from which the Chinese could fortify and attack Hill 258.

double envelopment supported by continued artillery fire. By 17:00, the Rangers secured Hill 581 from the Chinese, who suffered 50 killed and 90 wounded in the attack.[39]

Chinese troops counterattacked in force at 23:00, with two battalions of infantry supported by snipers and mortar fire. Aided by 7th Division artillery fire, the Rangers held the hill against Chinese resistance. The Rangers repulsed four successive Chinese assaults by one of the battalions, expending all of their grenades by 02:00 on 18 May, and running short on ammunition by 03:00. At that point, the second Chinese battalion commenced its assault, surprising the Rangers and driving them from the peak of Hill 581. Queen counterattacked and retook the hill by 05:00. At 06:45, the Chinese gave up the attack, having been severely mauled. In the unsuccessful attempt to take Hill 581, Chinese losses amounted to at least 120 killed and several hundred injured. The Rangers, having relied on tight interlocking crossfire and well dug-in positions, suffered only 10 wounded in the battle. Commanders in the 7th Infantry Division were stunned by the 2nd Ranger Company's effectiveness in the fight, and as a result of the action, the company came to be considered a model unit.[39]

The 2nd Ranger Company then moved east to help relieve the 7th Marines, which was reeling from Chinese attacks. In three days of intermittent fighting, the company conducted a number of search and destroy missions. This culminated in an attack on Hill 545, where an estimated company of Chinese troops, who had previously pushed the Marines back, were themselves surprised by the Rangers and forced to withdraw, losing 15 killed to the Rangers' two wounded.[39]

Final battles and disbandment

In June 1951, with peace talks underway in

P-51 Mustangs. Chinese forces resisted sporadically but withdrew at the end of the day having lost eight men killed and another thirty wounded. Against this the Rangers had lost only seven wounded. On 11 July, the Rangers continued the attack, backed by the 31st RCT who seized high ground near Sanying-ni and forced Chinese troops to retreat further. In this attack, one Ranger was killed and eight were wounded.[40]

Following this, another lull in fighting along the 38th parallel occurred, during which both sides took time to fortify their positions and conduct fewer patrols. As the need for offensive action diminished, on 10 July, the U.S. Army ordered the deactivation of all of its Ranger companies.[40] In doing so, the Army noted that the establishment of the Ranger companies had only been a trial directed by The Pentagon, which had been completed.[41] The decision was further clarified in relation to the 2nd Ranger Company, with the Army stating that "racial differences" had prevented the company from being used effectively in offensive operations.[40]

As a result of the decision to disband the Ranger units, the 2nd Ranger Company was deactivated on 1 August 1951 while it was still in Korea.[42][43] Like many of the other Ranger units, most of the 2nd Ranger Company veterans were folded into the 187th RCT. As an airborne unit, it was believed that by sending the men to the 187th, their airborne skills could be used. Nevertheless, in the end it turned out that Operation Tomahawk was the last airborne jump of the war and as a result, the former Rangers did not get a chance to exercise these skills again.[16]

Awards and decorations

The 2nd Ranger Infantry Company was awarded four campaign streamers for its service in the Korean War. In 1955, the unit was again designated A Company of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and that unit carries on the 2nd Ranger Company's lineage.[22]

Conflict Streamer Inscription Year(s)
Korean Service Campaign Streamer CCF Intervention 1950
First UN Counteroffensive (with Arrowhead device) 1950
CCF Spring Offensive 1951
UN Summer-Fall Offensive 1951

Rangers of the company also received numerous individual decorations. Nine Rangers received

Purple Heart Medals were awarded to 84 members of the company, with 11 Rangers receiving two Purple Hearts and four Rangers receiving three.[46]

Analysis

Veterans of the 2nd Ranger Company reunited during a Memorial Day parade in 2011.

The 2nd Ranger Infantry Company was one of sixteen Ranger companies formed in 1950, and one of seven to see combat in Korea.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that Rangers in Korea were misused and ineffective.[48] Chae contended that the Ranger formations' lack of support personnel made them a logistical and administrative liability,[n 1] as they had to be attached to conventional units for support.[49] Furthermore, Chae argued that the small size of the Ranger units[n 3] meant they lacked the manpower to conduct basic tactical maneuvers,[50] and their employment with divisional elements meant they did not have the necessary intelligence information to conduct effective infiltration operations.[51] He concluded that these problems were due to "lack of understanding of Ranger capabilities, limitations inherent in Rangers' force structure, and basic distrust of elite forces."[48]

In his own 2003 thesis, Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Bond said the 2nd Ranger Company's performance in Korea had been exemplary, in spite of racial discrimination against it. The troops, who had already been well trained members of airborne units before joining the company, quickly gained cohesion and were exceptional soldiers.

U.S. Presidential Unit Citation even though units to which they were attached were decorated. Bond also said many of the accomplishments of the company were attributed to white units, due in part to the command climate precipitated by Almond.[53]

Finnigan's War

The 2nd Ranger Infantry Company was honored in the 2013 Korean War documentary "Finnigan's War" directed by Conor Timmis. Members of the 2nd Ranger Infantry Company interviewed in the film include Herculano Dias, Donald Allen and Paul T. Lyles. Ranger Herculano Dias recalls the unit's unique combat accomplishments. Ranger Paul T. Lyles recalls his harrowing encounter with a North Korean tree sniper. Ranger Donald Allen recalls caring for a wounded white soldier and ends his interview with the line "when the bullets start to fly, everyone is the same color".[54][55]

References

Notes

  1. ^ a b The Ranger company was assigned no mess, medical, or transportation assets, and so had to be attached to a battalion at all times, as no independent Ranger battalion headquarters was activated in Korea. (Veritas Part 1 2010, p. 44)
  2. ^ These Rangers were: Warren E. Allen, Norman Collins, Curtis Courts, James Freeman , John A. Jones, James Peteress, Edward Posey, James C. Queen, and George Rankins. (Posey 2009, p. 194)
  3. ^ The Ranger companies were allowed a strength of 112 to 122 men, as compared to the standard infantry company strength of 211. (Veritas Part 2 2010, p. 3)

Citations

  1. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 2
  2. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 3
  3. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 4
  4. ^ a b Veritas Part 1 2010, p. 35
  5. ^ a b c Taylor 1996, p. 98
  6. ^ Veritas Part 2 2010, p. 2
  7. ^ a b c d Dilley & Zedric 1999, p. 201
  8. ^ a b Sizer 2009, p. 234
  9. ^ Veritas Part 1 2010, p. 34
  10. ^ Taylor 1996, p. 103
  11. ^ a b Black 2002, p. 2 (Ch. 4)
  12. ^ a b c Taylor 1996, p. 102
  13. ^ Black 2002, p. 1 (Appendix B)
  14. ^ a b c d e f g Taylor 1996, p. 112
  15. ^ Hagerman 1990, p. 65
  16. ^ a b Varhola 2000, p. 114
  17. ^ a b Bond 2003, p. 13
  18. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 113
  19. ^ Hagerman 1990, p. 430
  20. ^ Posey 2009, p. 11
  21. ^ Bond 2003, p. 14
  22. ^ a b Dalessandro, Robert J. (31 January 2012), Lineage and Honors Information: 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, retrieved 5 July 2012
  23. ^ a b c Dilley & Zedric 1999, p. 202
  24. ^ Sizer 2009, p. 235
  25. ^ Bond 2003, p. 20
  26. ^ a b Bond 2003, p. 21
  27. ^ a b c Taylor 1996, p. 110
  28. ^ a b c d e f g Taylor 1996, p. 111
  29. ^ Bond 2003, p. 22
  30. ^ a b c Bond 2003, p. 23
  31. ^ Bond 2003, p. 24
  32. ^ Bond 2003, p. 25
  33. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 19
  34. ^ Alexander 2003, p. 382
  35. ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 114
  36. ^ a b Bond 2003, p. 26
  37. ^ Hagerman 1990, p. 64
  38. ^ a b c d Taylor 1996, p. 113
  39. ^ a b c d Taylor 1996, p. 114
  40. ^ a b c Taylor 1996, p. 15
  41. ^ Taylor 1996, p. 118
  42. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 96
  43. ^ Hagerman 1990, p. 432
  44. ^ Posey 2009, p. 194
  45. ^ Posey 2009, p. 195
  46. ^ Posey 2009, pp. 196–197
  47. ^ Taylor 1996, p. 104
  48. ^ a b Chae 1996, p. 7
  49. ^ Chae 1996, p. 51
  50. ^ Chae 1996, p. 53
  51. ^ Chae 1996, p. 54
  52. ^ Bond 2003, p. 44
  53. ^ Bond 2003, pp. 45–46
  54. ^ Patton, Kerry. "Documentary Review: Finnigan's War". SOFREP.com.
  55. ^ Lee, Noah S. (24 January 2014). "Documentary on Korean War breaks silence for veterans". The Coast News. Archived from the original on 12 March 2014. Retrieved 12 March 2014.

Sources