40th Infantry Division Slavonska
| 40th Infantry Division Slavonska | |
|---|---|
| Country |  Yugoslavia |
| Branch | Royal Yugoslav Army |
| Type | Infantry |
| Size | Division |
| Part of | 4th Army |
| Engagements | Invasion of Yugoslavia (1941) |
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | Ratko Raketić |
The 40th Infantry Division Slavonska was an
The preliminary attacks launched across the Drava by the Germans on 6 April were enough to spark revolts within the units of the division. One of its three infantry regiments rebelled the following day, and by 8 April the rebels had taken over Bjelovar. The division continued to disintegrate over the following days, then crumbled in the face of the combined arms assault of the 8th Panzer Division when it broke out of its bridgehead at Barcs on 10 April. A few mainly Serb remnants of the division continued to withdraw into Bosnia over the next week until a ceasefire was negotiated on 15 April. The Yugoslav Army surrendered on 18 April.
Background
The
The army's development was hampered by the kingdom's poor economy, and this continued during the 1920s. In 1929, King
The weaknesses of the VKJ in strategy, structure, equipment, mobility and supply were exacerbated by serious ethnic disunity within Yugoslavia, resulting from two decades of Serb hegemony and the attendant lack of political legitimacy achieved by the central government.[9][10] Attempts to address the disunity came too late to ensure that the VKJ was a cohesive force. Fifth column activity was also a serious concern, not only from the Croatian nationalist Ustaše but also from the country's Slovene and ethnic German minorities.[9]
Structure
Peacetime organisation
According to regulations issued by the VKJ in 1935, the headquarters of the 40th Infantry Division Slavonska (40th ID) would be created at the time of
Wartime organisation
The wartime organisation of the VKJ was laid down by regulations issued in 1936–37,[12] which set the strength of an infantry division at 26,000–27,000 men.[4] A total of 11,200 horses and other pack and draught animals were required to provide mobility for each infantry division. The theoretical wartime organisation of a fully mobilised Yugoslav infantry division was:[13][14]
- headquarters
- divisional infantry headquarters, with three or four infantry regiments
- divisional artillery headquarters, with one or two artillery regiments
- a cavalry battalion with two squadrons, a bicycle squadron and a machine gun platoon
- a pioneer battalion of three companies
- an anti-tank company, equipped with twelve 37 mm (1.5 in) or 47 mm (1.9 in) anti-tank guns
- a machine gun company
- an anti-aircraft machine gun company
- a signals company
- logistics units
Each infantry regiment was to consist of three to four infantry battalions, a machine gun company,[15] and the divisional artillery regiments were animal-drawn and largely equipped with World War I-vintage pieces.[16] An artillery regiment consisted of four battalions, one of 100 mm (3.9 in) light howitzers, one of 65 mm (2.6 in) or 75 mm (3.0 in) mountain guns, and two of 75 mm (3.0 in) or 80 mm (3.1 in) field guns.[17] In September 1939, after the German invasion of Poland, the 40th ID underwent a trial mobilisation which included a large proportion of its units.[18]
The 40th ID was included on the wartime order of battle in "Defence Plan S", which was developed by the Yugoslav General Staff in 1938–1939. It was to be formed using mainly Croat-manned units. These comprised the Bjelovar-based 42nd Infantry Regiment from the Osijecka divisional district, and the 43rd and 108th Infantry Regiments and 40th Artillery Regiment from the VJK reserve.[13][19]
Planned deployment
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The 40th ID was a component of the
Operations
Mobilisation
After unrelenting pressure from
As the Axis invasion began, the 40th ID was partially mobilised,[29] with some elements of the division still mobilising, some in concentration areas, and only a small proportion actually deployed in their planned positions:[21]
- the divisional commander Brigadni đeneral[b] Ratko Raketić and his headquarters staff were mobilising in Bjelovar
- the 42nd Infantry Regiment with two battalions was marching towards their positions near Daruvar, while the rest of the regiment was mobilising in Bjelovar and could not move due to lack of draught animals
- the 43rd Infantry Regiment, with about 75–80 percent of its troops and 30 percent of its animals, was marching from its mobilisation centre in Požega towards Našice, but had only reached Jakšić, 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) northeast of Požega
- the 108th Infantry Regiment was marching from Bjelovar but had only reached Severin
- the 40th Artillery Regiment was still mobilising with the headquarters and one battalion in Osijek and two battalions in Varaždin
- the divisional cavalry battalion and machine gun battalion were unable to deploy from Virovitica due to lack of animals, although on 5 April, Nedeljković had requisitioned private cars for the machine gun battalion and ordered it to concentrate at Lukač northeast of Virovitica
- the remainder of the divisional units were at their mobilisation centres in and around Bjelovar
The 43rd Infantry Regiment was ordered to march east to join the 17th ID, which was part of the 2nd Army Group's 2nd Army. The 89th Infantry Regiment, originally allocated to the 17th ID, was ordered to march from its mobilisation location in Sisak and join the 40th ID to replace the 43rd Infantry Regiment. The divisional cavalry battalion did not receive sufficient horses, and had to deploy on foot as infantry. The division was without artillery support throughout the fighting because the 40th Artillery Regiment did not complete mobilisation.[30]
6 April
The continuing mobilisation and concentration of the 4th Army was hampered by escalating fifth column activities and propaganda fomented by the Ustaše. Some units stopped mobilising, or began returning to their mobilisation centres from their concentration areas.[34] The Yugoslav radio network linking the division with the 4th Army and flanking divisions was sabotaged by the Ustaše on 6 April, and radio communications within the 4th Army remained poor throughout the fighting.[35]
7 April
About 19:00 on 7 April, German units in regimental strength with a few tanks began to cross the Drava near Barcs in the divisional sector. They quickly overcame the resistance of the 2nd Battalion of the 393rd Reserve Regiment, which was influenced by Ustaše propaganda. The border guards abandoned their positions and weapons and retreated to Virovitica.[36] The 108th Infantry Regiment of the division had mobilised in Bjelovar and on 7 April was marching towards Virovitica to take up positions. That night, Croat members of the regiment revolted, arresting the Serb officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The regiment then marched back to Bjelovar, where it joined up with other rebellious units about noon on 8 April.[37]
As the 108th Infantry Regiment was responsible for the right sector of the divisional defence, this meant that the 42nd Infantry Regiment, which was originally responsible only for the left sector, had to extend across the entire divisional frontage.[22] During the night, the commander of the divisional cavalry battalion sent patrols towards the German bridgehead, but local Ustaše sympathisers misled them into believing the Germans were already across the Drava at Barcs in strength.[36] The Germans were subsequently able to consolidate their bridgehead at Barcs overnight.[37]
8 April
On 8 April, the German XXXXVI Motorised Corps continued with its limited objective attacks to expand their bridgehead at Barcs. A German regiment broke through the border troops and approached Virovitica. At this point, the entire divisional sector was defended by a single unit, the divisional cavalry battalion, which had been transported there in requisitioned cars due to the lack of horses. Two understrength and wavering battalions of the 42nd Infantry Regiment arrived at Pčelić, 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) southwest of Virovitica.[38]
By noon, the rebels of the 108th Infantry Regiment were approaching Bjelovar, and were joined by elements of the 42nd Infantry Regiment and other units of the division. The leader of the rebels in Bjelovar was Kapetan
Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, then located in Zagreb, along with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, sent a delegation to 4th Army headquarters in Bjelovar urging them to issue arms to workers to help defend Zagreb. Pavle Gregorić, who was a member of both Central Committees, went to the headquarters twice, and was able to speak briefly with Nedeljković, but could not convince him to do so. On the same day, Maček, who had returned to Zagreb after briefly joining the post-Yugoslav coup d'état government of Dušan Simović, agreed to send an emissary to the 108th Infantry Regiment urging them to obey their officers, but they did not respond to his appeal.[41]
Later in the day, two trucks of rebels arrived at 4th Army headquarters with the intention of killing the staff. The headquarters guard force prevented this, but the operations staff immediately withdrew from Bjelovar to Popovača.[39] After the rebels issued several unanswered ultimatums, around 8,000 rebels attacked Bjelovar, assisted by fifth-columnists within the city. The city then surrendered, and many Yugoslav officers and soldiers were captured by the rebels. When Nedeljković heard of the fall of the city, he called the Mayor of Bjelovar, Julije Makanec and threatened to bomb the city if the prisoners were not immediately released. Detained officers from 4th Army headquarters and the 108th Infantry Regiment were then sent to Zagreb. About 16:00, Nedeljković informed the Ban of Croatia, Ivan Šubašić, of the revolt, but Šubašić was powerless to influence events. About 18:00, Makanec proclaimed that Bjelovar was part of an independent Croatian state.[42]
9 April
On the morning of 9 April, the German bridgehead at Barcs had expanded to Lukač, 7 kilometres (4.3 mi) north of Virovitica.[43] Following up the withdrawal of the divisional cavalry battalion, the Germans seized Suho Polje, west of Virovitica, cutting the main road to Slatina,[43] and the rebel Croat troops at Bjelovar made contact with them.[37] By 11:00, the divisional front line consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 42nd Infantry Regiment and a company of the divisional cavalry battalion on the right, and the 4th Battalion of the 42nd Infantry Regiment and a company of the divisional cavalry battalion on the left. The 3rd Battalion of the 42nd Infantry Regiment was held in depth. The left flank was screened by the rest of the divisional cavalry battalion deployed around Pitomača.[43] The 89th Infantry Regiment, marching from its concentration area in Sisak, arrived at divisional headquarters at Pivnica Slavonska,[43] to replace the 43rd Infantry Regiment, which had been transferred to the 17th ID.[22]
Other reinforcements included elements of the 4th Army anti-aircraft units sent from Lipik, but the divisional artillery regiment had not completed mobilisation.[43] The rebels in Bjelovar issued false orders to the 1st Battalion of the 42nd Infantry Regiment, directing it to fall back to Bjelovar.[44] At 11:15, Nedeljković arrived at divisional headquarters and shortly afterwards ordered Raketić to launch a counterattack on the German bridgehead at Barcs at dawn the following day. Nedeljković also visited Divizijski đeneral[f] Dragoslav Milosavljević, the commander of the 17th ID on the right flank of the 4th Army, to arrange support from that division during the pending attack.[43] However, because the majority of that division's troops had yet to arrive from Bosnia, all it was able to do was advance its left flank, stationing battalions in Čačinci and Crnac west of Slatina.[45] The 40th ID spent the remainder of the day preparing for the counterattack, but were hindered by German artillery and air attacks. In an indication of the state of his division, during a visit to the front line, Raketić and his chief of staff were fired at by troops of the 42nd Infantry Regiment.[43]
Elements of the 4th Army began to withdraw southwards on 9 April.[46] On the night of 9/10 April, those Croats that had remained with their units also began to desert or turn on their commanders,[47] and in the 40th ID, almost all the remaining troops were Serbs.[43] Due to the increasing momentum of the revolt, the commander of the 1st Army Group, Armijski đeneral Milorad Petrović concluded that the 4th Army was no longer an effective formation and could not resist the Germans.[44] Maček issued a further ineffectual plea to calm the rebellion.[48] On the evening of 9 April, Weichs was ready to launch major offensive operations from the bridgeheads on the following day.[49] His plan involved two main thrusts. The first would be spearheaded by the 14th Panzer Division of Generalmajor[g] Friedrich Kühn breaking out of the Zákány bridgehead and drive towards Zagreb.[51] The second would see Generalmajor Walter Neumann-Silkow's 8th Panzer Division break out of the Barcs bridgehead and turn east between the Drava and Sava rivers to attack towards Belgrade.[52]
10 April
The 40th ID was battered by German artillery fire during the night 9/10 April. Seriously depleted by desertion and weakened by revolt, it was unable to mount the ordered counterattack against the Barcs bridgehead on the morning of 10 April. The 42nd Infantry Regiment could only muster 600 men, and the 89th Infantry Regiment only slightly more. The divisional cavalry battalion was also heavily reduced in strength, and divisional artillery amounted to one anti-aircraft battery. The border units, responsible for demolition tasks on the line from Bjelovar south to Čazma, refused to follow orders. Having abandoned the counterattack, Raketić decided to establish a defensive line at Pćelić to hinder German movement east towards Slatina.[53]
Soon after dawn, the main thrust of the XXXXVI Motorised Corps, consisting of the 8th Panzer Division crossed the Drava at Barcs, leading the 16th Motorised Infantry Division of Generalmajor Sigfrid Henrici.[52] Anti-tank fire destroyed a few of the lead tanks, but after the Germans reinforced their vanguard, the resistance of the 40th ID had been broken by noon. The remaining troops of the 42nd Infantry Regiment were either captured or fled into the hills to the south. Units of the 89th Infantry Regiment, which had been providing depth to the defensive position, began retreating south towards Slavonska Požega. Ustaše sympathisers and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche (ethnic German) troops either ran away or surrendered.[53] By 13:30, the hard-pressed divisional cavalry battalion began to withdraw south towards Daruvar, attacking rebelling troops along their route. Raketić himself fled to Nova Gradiška via Voćin and Slavonska Požega, during which his car was again fired on by rebel troops.[54] The 8th Panzer Division continued southeast between the Drava and Sava rivers, and meeting almost no further resistance, had reached Slatina by evening.[52] Right flank elements of the 8th Panzer Division penetrated south into the Bilogora range, reaching Daruvar and Voćin by evening.[53]
Late in the day, as the situation was becoming increasingly desperate throughout the country, Simović, who was both the Prime Minister and Yugoslav Chief of the General Staff, broadcast the following message:[52]
All troops must engage the enemy wherever encountered and with every means at their disposal. Don't wait for direct orders from above, but act on your own and be guided by your judgement, initiative, and conscience.
The XXXXVI Motorised Corps encountered little resistance from the 40th ID, and by the evening of 10 April the whole 4th Army was disintegrating.[55] About 23:00, German 2nd Army headquarters directed the 8th Panzer and 16th Motorised Infantry Divisions to drive to the north of Belgrade to link up with the First Panzer Group which was thrusting to towards Belgrade from the east. At midnight, 2nd Army headquarters declared that the Yugoslav northern front had been decisively defeated, and tasked corps engineer units to consolidate bridging across the major rivers. The main body units of the XXXXVI Motorised Corps moved forward to Virovitica and Slatina. At midnight, Vietinghoff issued orders for the 8th Panzer Division to continue towards Belgrade via Osijek, but directed the 16th Motorised Infantry Division to thrust west as far as Sremska Mitrovica then turn south to drive towards Sarajevo via Zvornik.[55]
11 April
On 11 April, the rear area staff of 4th Army headquarters were captured by Ustaše at
Fate
The following day, the northern column of the 14th Panzer Division drove via Glina and crossed the Una at both Bosanska Kostajnica and Bosanski Novi before continuing its push east. Elements of the LI Corps also pushed east, establishing bridgeheads over the Kupa. A fragment of the 40th ID, numbering around 300 troops, which had been holding a position on the Sava at Bosanska Gradiška, retreated to Jajce via Banja Luka. When they arrived at Jajce, Nedeljković ordered them to take up blocking positions in the narrow Vrbas valley at Krupa on the road between Banja Luka and Mrkonjić Grad. The rear area units of the 17th ID were ordered to block the road from Kotor Varoš to Doboj.[59]
In response to Nedeljković's request for reinforcements, Simović had sent a number of units by rail via Tuzla. These included a cadet battalion and a company of the 27th Infantry Regiment, detached from the 1st Infantry Division Cerska. By the time the reinforcements arrived, Banja Luka had been evacuated in the face of German tanks and an Ustaše-led revolt. The cadet battalion was redirected to Ključ to block the road Ključ – Mrkonjić Grad – Jajce. Nedeljković did not have the option of withdrawing via Bugojno or Prozor as those towns had been taken over by the Ustaše.[59]
On 14 April, under pressure from the 14th Panzer Division, remnants of the 4th Army continued to withdraw towards Sarajevo via Jajce and Travnik. The cadet battalion at Ključ managed to briefly delay the German advance through Mrkonjić Grad, but were overcome by tanks and air attacks. The bridge at Jajce was demolished at 23:15, and Nedeljković withdrew his headquarters to Travnik. The remaining units of the 4th Army continued to disintegrate.[60] The vanguard of the northern column of 14th Panzer Division surged forward to Teslić, with the central column only reaching Jajce.[61]
Early on 15 April, the northern column of the 14th Panzer Division closed on Doboj, and after overcoming resistance around that town, arrived in Sarajevo at 20:45. Before noon, Nedeljković received orders that a ceasefire had been agreed, and that all 4th Army troops were to remain in place and not fire on German personnel.
Notes
- U.S. Army lieutenant general.[25]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army brigadier general.[25]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army general.[31]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army lieutenant general.[31]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army captain.[25]
- ^ Equivalent to a U.S. Army major general.[25]
- U.S. Army brigadier general.[50]
Footnotes
- ^ Figa 2004, p. 235.
- ^ Hoptner 1963, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 60.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 58.
- ^ Brayley & Chappell 2001, p. 17.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 58–59.
- ^ Hoptner 1963, p. 161.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 57.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 63.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 111.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 99–102.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 104.
- ^ a b Niehorster 2018b.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 104, 106–107.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 104–106.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 107, 119.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 202.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 101, 155, 226.
- ^ Geografski institut JNA 1952.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 256.
- ^ a b c Terzić 1982, p. 257.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 37.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 256–258.
- ^ a b c d Niehorster 2018a.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 34–43.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 64.
- ^ Trevor-Roper 1964, pp. 108–109.
- ^ Barefield 1993, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 256–257.
- ^ a b Stein 1984, p. 295.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 52.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, pp. 52–53.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 293.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 265.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 312.
- ^ a b c Krzak 2006, p. 583.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 329.
- ^ a b c Terzić 1982, p. 330.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 215.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, pp. 50–52.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 331.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Terzić 1982, p. 346.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 345.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 347.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 68.
- ^ Krzak 2006, pp. 583–584.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 348.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 361.
- ^ Niehorster 2018c.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 58.
- ^ a b c d U.S. Army 1986, p. 53.
- ^ a b c Terzić 1982, p. 366.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 367.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 364.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 386.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 386–387.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 388.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 415.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 430.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 431.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 444–445.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, pp. 63–64.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 89–95.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 73–74.
References
Books
- Brayley, Martin; Chappell, Mike (2001). British Army 1939–45 (1): North-West Europe. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-052-0.
- Figa, Jozef (2004). "Framing the Conflict: Slovenia in Search of Her Army". Civil-Military Relations, Nation Building, and National Identity: Comparative Perspectives. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-313-04645-2.
- Geografski institut JNA (1952). "Napad na Jugoslaviju 6 Aprila 1941 godine" [The Attack on Yugoslavia of 6 April 1941]. Istorijski atlas oslobodilačkog rata naroda Jugoslavije [Historical Atlas of the Yugoslav Peoples Liberation War]. Belgrade, Yugoslavia: Vojnoistorijskog instituta JNA [Military History Institute of the JNA]. Archived from the original on 20 April 2013.
- Hoptner, J.B. (1963). Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941. New York: Columbia University Press. OCLC 422318009.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005. ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- Shores, Christopher F.; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-0-948817-07-6.
- Stein, George H. (1984). The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–45. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-9275-4.
- Terzić, Velimir (1982). Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941 : uzroci i posledice poraza [The Collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941: Causes and Consequences of Defeat] (in Serbo-Croatian). Vol. 2. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga. OCLC 10276738.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-3615-2.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1964). Hitler's War Directives: 1939–1945. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. OCLC 852024357.
- U.S. Army (1986) [1953]. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941). Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 16940402. CMH Pub 104-4. Archived from the originalon 19 June 2009. Retrieved 14 December 2015.
- Barefield, Michael R. (May 1993). Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941 (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2017.
Journals and papers
- Krzak, Andrzej (2006). "Operation "Marita": The Attack Against Yugoslavia in 1941". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 19 (3): 543–600. S2CID 219625930.
Websites
- Niehorster, Leo (2018a). "Royal Yugoslav Armed Forces Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018b). "Royal Yugoslavian Army Infantry Division 6th April 1941". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018c). "German Army and Waffen-SS Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 20 July 2018.