Able Archer 83
Able Archer 83 was a
The 1983 exercise, which began on November 7, 1983, introduced several new elements not seen in previous years, including a new, unique format of coded communication,
The exercise attracted public attention in 2015 when the
Prelude to NATO exercise
Operation RYAN
The greatest catalyst to the Able Archer war scare occurred more than two years earlier. In a May 1981 closed-session meeting of senior
To combat this threat, Andropov announced, the KGB and
The exact impetus for the implementation of Operation RYaN is not known for sure.
In his report, Fischer also writes that another CIA source was, at least partially, corroborating Gordievsky's reporting. This Czechoslovak intelligence officer—who worked closely with the KGB on RYaN—"noted that his counterparts were obsessed with the historical parallel between 1941 and 1983. He believed this feeling was almost visceral, not intellectual, and deeply affected Soviet thinking."[24]
Psychological operations
Psychological operations by the United States began in mid-February 1981 and continued intermittently until 1983. These included a series of clandestine naval operations that stealthily accessed Soviet territorial waters in the
"It really got to them," said Dr.
William Schneider, [former] undersecretary of state for military assistance and technology, who saw classified "after-action reports" that indicated U.S. flight activity. "They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would light up and units would go on alert. Then at the last minute the squadron would peel off and return home."[26]
FleetEx '83
In April 1983, the
Korean Air Lines Flight 007
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007) was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor over the Sea of Japan near Moneron Island (just west of Sakhalin island) while flying over prohibited Soviet airspace. All 269 passengers and crew aboard were killed, including Larry McDonald, a sitting member of the United States House of Representatives from Georgia and president of the anti-communist John Birch Society.
Weapons buildup
From the start, the
On March 23, 1983, Reagan announced one of the most ambitious and controversial components to this strategy, the
Despite the Soviet outcry over the Strategic Defense Initiative, the weapons plan that generated the most alarm among the Soviet Union's leadership during Able Archer 83 was NATO's planned deployment of intermediate-range
The missiles could be emplaced in and launched from any surveyed site in minutes, and because the
False alarm from the Soviet missile early warning system
On the night of September 26, 1983, the Soviet orbital missile early warning system (SPRN), code-named Oko, reported a single intercontinental ballistic missile launch from the territory of the United States.[36] Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, who was on duty during the incident, dismissed the warning as a computer error when ground early warning radars did not detect any launches. Part of his reasoning was that the system was new and known to have malfunctioned previously; also, a full-scale nuclear attack from the United States would involve thousands of simultaneous launches, not a single missile.
Later, the system reported four more ICBM launches headed to the Soviet Union, but Petrov again dismissed the reports as false. The investigation that followed revealed that the system indeed malfunctioned and the false alarms were caused by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds underneath the satellites' orbits.
Exercise Able Archer 83
A scenario released by NATO details the hypothetical lead-up to the Able Archer exercise, which was used by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., and the British Ministry of Defence in London.[37] The war game was intended to be "Blue" forces representing NATO and "Orange" forces representing the Warsaw Pact. The scenario envisioned proxy conflicts in Syria, South Yemen, and Iran escalating after Yugoslavia shifted to the Blue bloc with Orange forces invading Finland, Norway, and West Germany.[38] Dr. Gregory Pedlow, a SHAPE historian, explains the war game:
The exercise scenario began with Orange (the hypothetical opponent) opening hostilities in all regions of ACE [
SACEUR requested political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons early on Day 1 of the exercise (7 November 1983).[39]
Thus, on November 7, 1983, as Soviet intelligence services were attempting to detect the early signs of a nuclear attack, NATO began to simulate one. The exercise, codenamed Able Archer, involved numerous NATO allies and simulated NATO's Command, Control, and Communications (C³) procedures during a nuclear war. Some Soviet leaders, because of the preceding world events and the exercise's particularly realistic nature, feared that the exercise was a cover for an actual attack.[40][41] A KGB telegram of February 17 described one likely scenario:
In view of the fact that the measures involved in State Orange [a nuclear attack within 36 hours] have to be carried out with the utmost secrecy (under the guise of maneuvers, training etc.) in the shortest possible time, without disclosing the content of operational plans, it is highly probable that the battle alarm system may be used to prepare a surprise RYaN [nuclear attack] in peacetime.[42]
Also on February 17, KGB Permanent Operational Assignment assigned its agents to monitor several possible indicators of a nuclear attack. These included actions by "A cadre of people associated with preparing and implementing decisions about RYaN, and also a group of people, including service and technical personnel ... those working in the operating services of installations connected with processing and implementing the decision about RYaN, and communication staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations."[43]
Because Able Archer 83 simulated an actual release of nuclear weapons, it is likely that the service and technical personnel mentioned in the memo were active in the exercise. More conspicuously, British Prime Minister
Another illusory indicator likely noticed by Soviet analysts was a high rate of ciphered communications between the United Kingdom and the United States. Soviet intelligence was informed that "so-called nuclear consultations in NATO are probably one of the stages of immediate preparation by the adversary for RYaN".[45] To the Soviet analysts, this burst of secret communications between the US and the UK one month before the beginning of Able Archer may have appeared to be this "consultation". In reality, the burst of communication was about the US invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, which caused a great deal of diplomatic traffic as the sovereign of the island was Elizabeth II.[46]
A further startling aspect reported by KGB agents concerned the NATO communications used during the exercise. According to Moscow Centre's February 17 memo,
It [is] of the highest importance to keep a watch on the functioning of communications networks and systems since through them information is passed about the adversary's intentions and, above all, about his plans to use nuclear weapons and practical implementation of these. In addition, changes in the method of operating communications systems and the level of manning may in themselves indicate the state of preparation for RYaN.[47]
Soviet intelligence appeared to substantiate these suspicions by reporting that NATO was indeed using unique, never-before-seen procedures as well as message formats more sophisticated than previous exercises, which possibly indicated the proximity of nuclear attack.[48]
Finally, during Able Archer 83, NATO forces simulated a move through all alert phases, from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 1. While these phases were simulated, alarmist KGB agents mistakenly reported them as real. According to Soviet intelligence, NATO doctrine stated, "Operational readiness No. 1 is declared when there are obvious indications of preparation to begin military operations. It is considered that war is inevitable and may start at any moment."[49]
According to a 2013 analysis by the National Security Archive:[50]
The Able Archer controversy has featured numerous descriptions of the exercise as so "routine" that it could not have alarmed the Soviet military and political leadership. Today's posting reveals multiple non-routine elements, including: a 170-flight, radio-silent air lift of 19,000 US soldiers to Europe, the shifting of commands from "Permanent War Headquarters to the Alternate War Headquarters," the practice of "new nuclear weapons release procedures," including consultations with cells in Washington and London, and the "sensitive, political issue" of numerous "slips of the tongue" in which B-52 sorties were referred to as nuclear "strikes." These variations, seen through "the fog of nuclear exercises," did in fact match official Soviet intelligence-defined indicators for "possible operations by the US and its allies on British territory in preparation for RYaN"—the KGB code name for a feared Western nuclear missile attack.
Upon learning that US nuclear activity mirrored its hypothesized first strike activity, Moscow Centre sent its residencies a flash telegram on November 8 or 9 (Oleg Gordievsky cannot recall which), incorrectly reporting an alert on American bases and frantically asking for further information regarding an American first strike. The alert precisely coincided with the seven- to ten-day period estimated between NATO's preliminary decision and an actual strike.[51]
The Soviet Union, believing its only chance of surviving a NATO strike was to preempt it, readied its nuclear arsenal. The CIA reported activity in the Baltic Military District and in Czechoslovakia, and it determined that nuclear-capable aircraft in Poland and East Germany were placed "on high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces".[11][52] A 1989 US memorandum said that Soviet commanders ordered nuclear warheads to be placed on 4th Air Army bombers and for Group of Soviet Forces in Germany fighter-bombers to placed on a 30-minute alert.[53] Former CIA analyst Peter Vincent Pry goes further, saying he suspects that the aircraft were merely the tip of the iceberg. He hypothesizes that in accordance with Soviet military procedure and history, ICBM silos, easily readied and difficult for the United States to detect the readiness status of, were also prepared for a launch.[54]
Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, the assistant chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, is credited with the decision not to place NATO forces on increased alert despite increased Soviet readiness. He informed his superior, General Billy M. Minter, of "unusual activity" in the Eastern Bloc but suggested that they wait until the end of the exercise to see if the behavior was caused by it, thereby reducing the possibility of a nuclear exchange.[55][56]
Soviet fears of the attack ended as the Able Archer exercise finished on November 11. Upon learning of the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 by way of the
Soviet reaction
The
American reaction
In May 1984, CIA Soviet specialist Ethan J. Done drafted "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities", which concluded: "we believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict with the United States."[8] Robert Gates, deputy director for Intelligence during Able Archer 83, has published thoughts on the exercise that dispute this conclusion:
Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of the Soviet leaders during those times that has emerged since the
collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think there is a good chance—with all of the other events in 1983—that they really felt a NATO attack was at least possible and that they took a number of measures to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. After going through the experience at the time, then through the postmortems, and now through the documents, I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack was imminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous. And US intelligence [SNIE 11–9–84 and SNIE 11–10–84] had failed to grasp the true extent of their anxiety.[62]
A report written by Nina Stewart for the President's Foreign Advisory Board concurs with Gates and refutes the previous CIA reports, concluding that further analysis shows that the Soviets were, in fact, genuinely fearful of US aggression. The decision of Gen. Perroots was described as "fortuitous", noting "[he] acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance", suggesting that had the depth of Soviet fear been fully realized, NATO may have responded differently.[55]
Some historians, including Beth A. Fischer in her book The Reagan Reversal, pin Able Archer 83 as profoundly affecting President Reagan and his turn from a policy of confrontation towards the Soviet Union to a policy of rapprochement. The thoughts of Reagan and those around him provide important insight upon the nuclear scare and its subsequent ripples. On October 10, 1983, just over a month before Able Archer 83, President Reagan viewed a television film about Lawrence, Kansas, being destroyed by a nuclear attack titled The Day After. In his diary, the president wrote that the film "left me greatly depressed".[63]
Later in October, Reagan attended a Pentagon briefing on nuclear war. During his first two years in office, he had refused to take part in such briefings, feeling it irrelevant to rehearse a nuclear apocalypse; finally, he consented to the Pentagon official requests. According to officials present, the briefing "chastened" Reagan. Weinberger said, "[Reagan] had a very deep revulsion to the whole idea of nuclear weapons ... These war games brought home to anybody the fantastically horrible events that would surround such a scenario." Reagan described the briefing in his own words: "A most sobering experience with [
These two glimpses of nuclear war primed Reagan for Able Archer 83, giving him a very specific picture of what would occur had the situation further developed. After receiving intelligence reports from sources including Gordievsky, it was clear that the Soviets were unnerved. While officials were concerned with the Soviet panic, they were hesitant about believing the proximity of a Soviet attack. Secretary of State
We had many contingency plans for responding to a nuclear attack. But everything would happen so fast that I wondered how much planning or reason could be applied in such a crisis ... Six minutes to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon! How could anyone apply reason at a time like that?[66]
According to McFarlane, the president responded with "genuine anxiety" in disbelief that a regular NATO exercise could have led to an armed attack. To the ailing
Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians: Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did ... During my first years in
first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike ... Well, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us.[69]
Reagan eventually met Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in 1985 and at subsequent summits, leading to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and later treaties.
When retiring from the Defense Intelligence Agency in January 1989, Perroots wrote a memorandum about the crisis to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1990 the board released a report commending Perroots for his actions and confirming the hazards of the exercise. After a 12-year legal battle, the National Security Archive succeeded in having the report declassified under the Freedom of Information Act request in 2015. In 2017, the National Security Archive additionally requested the Perroots memorandum from the DIA but the organization claimed that the letter was lost, leading to a 2019 lawsuit. However, in February 2021 the Historian's Office of the U.S. State Department declassified and released the document as part of its Foreign Relations of the United States collection. The document confirmed for the first time that the Soviet military loaded nuclear warheads onto bombers and indicated that it had gotten closer to nuclear war than previously thought, with Perroots claiming that "a precautionary generation of forces" by NATO could have instigated a nuclear conflict.[70]
Opposing views
Research by Simon Miles, an assistant professor of Public Policy and Russian and Eurasian Studies at Duke University’s Sanford School writing in 2020 – prior to the publication of previously classified documents, has disputed that Able Archer 83 almost led to nuclear war. With many individuals associating the Able Archer incident that occurred in 1983 as an event that nearly started a nuclear war, it is no surprise that there are a plethora of myths that surround the event. Many academic scholars have gone back and forth on whether or not this event was enough to trigger a nuclear war.[71]
Individuals like Gordon Barras, Raymond Garthoof, Beatrice Heuser, Mark Kramer, and Votjech Mastny challenge the narrative surrounding the incident that occurred in 1983. Academic scholars like Barras, Garthoof, Heuser, Kramer, and Mastny argue that Soviet individuals do not believe that tensions ever got to the point that the USSR prepared for a nuclear attack, nor were they anticipating an attack. In 2016, the re-opened investigation into a classified report covering Able Archer re-sparked interest in the event. This newfound interest sparked curiosity, and with it, narratives surrounding the exercise that could have caused a nuclear war. That is not to say that the narrative surrounding the event does not have some merit in its core, as a survey conducted by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1989 confirmed that there was a belief that the US sought to have military superiority over the USSR. However, the PFIAB did not confirm that individuals believed the exercise brought us closer to a war with the USSR; rather, they only confirm what everyone knew. The PFIAB concluded that the event merely increased tensions, but never led to any confirmed belief in an attack on any nation's behalf; rather, the PFIAB only could confirm that it was probable the USSR believed the exercise could have been interpreted as an attack.
As of right now, scholars who adhere to Western narratives surrounding the exercise find themselves leaning towards the belief that this event could have triggered a war. However, individuals who cling to Eastern narratives are less inclined to buy into the same narrative. The Scholars who adhere to the Eastern narratives are found to be the individuals to most forcibly contest the belief of a potential nuclear war as a result of the exercise.
Those with an opposing view may argue that the Able Archer exercise was not the potential start of a nuclear war, but rather, it was the attack on a plane three months prior. Some scholars point to the attack that occurred on Korean Airlines Flight 007 as the closest point of a nuclear war.[72] With beliefs on the USSR's behalf that this plane was acting out of reconnaissance, individuals can argue that this was in fact the closest event of the year 1983.
The true conditions at the time of the Able Archer exercise of 1983 may never be known, as many of the records from the Soviet period remain inaccessible. Relationships between various intelligence agencies and the KGB during the period in question can best be interpreted as mistrustful, as the information-sharing protocols themselves were an issue.[73]
See also
- Deutschland 83, a 2015 German-American television series, in which Able Archer 83 is a plot point
- Doomsday Clock, a symbol representing the likelihood of man-made global catastrophe
- Rainer Rupp, an East German spy, working in NATO headquarters, 1977–1989
Footnotes
Citations
- ISBN 9780275973872.
- ^ Nate Jones. "The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook". National Security Archive.
- ^ a b Benjamin B. Fischer (March 17, 2007). "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare". Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on January 14, 2009. Retrieved January 13, 2009.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 85–7.
- ^ Beth Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 123, 131.
- ^ Pry, War Scare, 37–9.
- ^ Oberdorfer, A New Era, p. 66.
- ^ a b SNIE 11–10–84, "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities", Central Intelligence Agency, May 18, 1984.
- ^ a b Kaplan, Fred (April 27, 2022). "The World Came Much Closer to Nuclear War Than We Ever Realized". Slate Magazine. Retrieved April 27, 2022.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 87–8.
- ^ a b Pry, War Scare, 43–4.
- ^ "Andøyrakett satte Russland i krigsberedskap" [Andøyrakett put Russia in war preparedness] (in Norwegian). Archived from the original on October 25, 2014.
- ^ "The Week the World Almost Ended". Slate Magazine. June 7, 2017. Archived from the original on June 27, 2017. Retrieved April 27, 2022.
- ^ Roberts, Sam (November 9, 2015). "NATO War Games Unwittingly Put Soviets and U.S. on 'Hair Trigger' in '83, Analysis Suggests". The New York Times. Retrieved April 27, 2022.
- ^ Nichols, Tom (August 9, 2014). "Five Ways Nuclear Armageddon Was Almost Unleashed". The National Interest.
- S2CID 221117442.
- ^ "H-Diplo Article Review 1024- "The War Scare That Wasn't" | H-Diplo | H-Net". networks.h-net.org. Retrieved March 17, 2021.
- ^ From the National Security Archive.
- ^ a b c d Fischer, Benjamin B. (1997). A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare – Phase II: A New Sense of Urgency Archived January 14, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. CIA.
- ^ a b Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 74–76, 86.
- ^ Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Appendix A: RYAN and the Decline of the KGB Archived August 2, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ a b Testimony of Oleg Gordievsky to Congress.
- ^ Reagan, Ronald (June 8, 1982). "Address to Members of the British Parliament". University of Texas archives. Archived from the original on March 5, 2016. Retrieved December 29, 2005.
- ^ Fischer, Ben B. "The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations" (PDF). National Security Archive. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 28, 2015. Retrieved November 21, 2015.
- ^ a b c "1983 Revisited". USNI Blog. Retrieved February 19, 2021.
- ^ a b Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 8, as quoted at Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum" (CIA Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 2007)[1] Archived January 14, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved on May 18, 2013.
- ^ Johnson, p. 55
- ^ Richelson, p. 385
- ^ Network, Warfare History (September 26, 2019). "These Wargames Nearly Caused Nuclear War in 1983". The National Interest. Retrieved February 21, 2021.
- ^ a b 1983: The most dangerous year by Andrew R. Garland, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- ^ "Ash Heap of History: President Reagan's Westminster Address 20 Years Later – Remarks by Dr. Richard Pipes". reagansheritage.org. June 3, 2002. Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. Retrieved November 23, 2012.
- ^ Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: "Star Wars" Archived January 14, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Pry, p. 34
- ^ a b Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 74–76.
- ^ a b White, Andrew (1983). Symbols of War: Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe. London: Merlin Press. pp. 25–9.
- ^ Schmalz, pp. 28–29
- ^ "Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83: Information from SHAPE Historical Files" (PDF). National Security Archive. March 28, 2013. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 16, 2013.
- ^ "The 1983 War Scare: 'The Last Paroxysm' of the Cold War Part II". nsarchive2.gwu.edu. Retrieved February 19, 2021.
- ^ "Exercise Scenario" (PDF). National Security Archive. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 16, 2013.
- ^ Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 123.
- ^ Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Able Archer 83 Archived August 2, 2006, at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 78.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 72.
- ^ Oberdorfer, A New Era, 65.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 76.
- ISBN 9780805031904.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 80–81.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 599–600.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 79.
- ^ "The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part II". nsarchive.gwu.edu.
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 600.
- ^ Gates, From the Shadows, 271, 272.
- ^ "Able Archer War Scare "Potentially Disastrous"". National Security Archive. February 17, 2021. Retrieved February 19, 2021.
- ^ Pry, War Scare, 44.
- ^ a b "The 1983 War Scare Declassified and For Real". National Security Archive. Retrieved December 6, 2015.
- ^ Kaplan, Fred (February 18, 2021). "The World Came Much Closer to Nuclear War Than We Ever Realized". Slate Magazine. Retrieved February 19, 2021.
- ^ Oberdorfer, A New Era, 67.
- ^ Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Appendix B: The Gordievsky File Archived February 13, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 69.
- ^ DiCico, Jonathan M. (August 2017). "DiCicco on Jones, 'Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War'". H-Net.
Trapped in an intelligence cycle that reinforced fears of susceptibility to surprise nuclear attack, Soviet leaders took steps toward an anticipatory counterattack.
- ^ Ermarth, Fritz W. (November 11, 2003). "Observations on the 'War Scare' of 1983 From an Intelligence Perch" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on July 24, 2006. Retrieved May 21, 2006.
- ^ Gates, From the Shadows, 273.
- ^ a b Reagan, An American Life, p. 585.
- ^ Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 120–122.
- ^ Shultz, George P. (1993). Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. p. 464.
- ^ Reagan, An American Life, 257.
- ^ Nina Stewart, in a report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1990, as cited in Oberdorfer, A New Era, 67.
- ^ Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 134.
- ^ Reagan, An American Life, 585, 588–89.
- ^ "Able Archer War Scare 'Potentially Disastrous'". National Security Archive. February 17, 2021. Retrieved February 19, 2021.
- ^ Callum McKelvie (April 13, 2022). "Able Archer: The NATO exercise that almost went nuclear". livescience.com. Retrieved April 25, 2023.
- ^ "Nuclear Close Calls: Able Archer 83". Atomic Heritage Foundation. June 15, 2018.
- S2CID 221117442.
References
- Ambinder, Marc; The Brink, Simon & Schuster, 2018. ISBN 1-4767-6037-3.
- Andrew, Christopher; Gordievsky, Oleg (1992). KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. Harpercollins. ISBN 0-06-016605-3.
- Andrew, Christopher; Gordievsky, Oleg, eds. (1993). Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985. Stanford UP. ISBN 0-8047-2228-5.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. (2001). Russia and armed persuasion. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-0962-1.
- Downing, Taylor; 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink, Da Capo, 2018. ISBN 0-3069-2172-3.
- Fischer, Benjamin B (1997). "A Cold War Conundrum". Center for the Study of Intelligence. Archived from the original on January 9, 2008. Retrieved January 8, 2008.
- Fischer, Beth A (2000). The Reagan Reversal Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. University of Missouri Press. ISBN 0-8262-1287-5.
- Gates, Robert M (1996). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 1-4165-4336-8.
- Johnson, Richard William (1986). Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection. Viking. ISBN 0-670-81209-9.
- )
- Oberdorfer, Don (1998). From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. ISBN 0-8018-5922-0.
- Powaski, Ronald E. (2003). Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 0-19-516098-3.
- Pry, Peter Vincent (1999). War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink. ISBN 0-275-96643-7.
- ISBN 0-671-69198-8.
- Schmalz, Roman (2007). My Life in Stalin's Russia. Tate Publishing. ISBN 978-1-59886-570-7.
- Testimony of Oleg Gordievsky to Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee of Military Research and Development, Hearing on Russian Threat Perceptions and Plans for U.S. Sabotage, 106th cong., 1st sess., 1999-10-26.
- Steven Rosefielde; Daniel Quinn Mills (2004). Masters of Illusions: American Leadership in the Media Age. Cambridge University Press. p. 253. ISBN 0-521-85744-9.
Further reading
- 1983: The Brink of Apocalypse – Channel 4, January 5, 2008
- Peter Scoblic, The U.S. versus Them, 2008
- Taylor Downing, 1983: The World at the Brink, 2018
External links
- UK blocks release of a report on the crisis
- "The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
- Countdown to Declassification: Finding Answers to a 1983 War Scare by Nate Jones for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
- "The 1983 War Scare Soviet 'Huffing and Puffing?' 'Crying Wolf?' 'Rattling Pots and Pans?' or 'A Real Worry That We Could Come into Conflict through Miscalculation?'" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
- "'Blue's use of nuclear weapons did not stop Orange's aggression.' Able Archer 83 Declassified" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
- "'Rather Stunning Array of Indicators' of the Soviet Reaction to Able Archer 83 had 'A Dimension of Genuineness ... Often Not Reflected in Intelligence Issuances.'" by Nate Jones at the National Security Archive
- "One Misstep Could Trigger a Great War": Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and the 1983 War Scare by Nate Jones
- "Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and Miscalculation: The War Scare of 1983" by Nate Jones.
- "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities", a declassified CIApublication from October 1984 that describes Soviet fears of a US attack.
- Did East German Spies Prevent A Nuclear War? by Vojtech Mastny.
- CNN Cold War – Spotlight: War games
- NATO First Strike Doctrine – The NATO nuclear policy at the time of Able Archer
- The Straight Dope: Operation Able Archer: Were the United States and the Soviet Union on the brink of nuclear war? Archived November 20, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- "The Presidency in the Nuclear Age, Panel 3". C-SPAN. October 12, 2009. Retrieved March 28, 2015.; Panel discussion hosted by Caroline Kennedy with Kenneth Adelman, Thomas Graham Jr., Marvin Kalb, Richard Rhodes, and Nicholas Thompson
- CIA official page on the Able Archer exercise Archived January 14, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
- 1983: The most dangerous year by Andrew R. Garland, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- The Soviet War Scare by PFIAB, Washington, DC