Admiralty Islands campaign
Admiralty Islands | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of World War II, Pacific War | |||||||
The first wave of US troops lands on Los Negros, Admiralty Islands, 29 February 1944 | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
United States Australia | Japan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Douglas MacArthur William C. Chase |
Hitoshi Imamura Yoshio Ezaki † | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
35,000 | 4,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
326 killed 1,190 wounded 4 missing |
3,280 killed 75 captured |
The Admiralty Islands campaign (Operation Brewer) was a series of battles in the New Guinea campaign of World War II in which the United States Army's 1st Cavalry Division took the Japanese-held Admiralty Islands.
Acting on reports from airmen that there were no signs of enemy activity and the islands might have been evacuated,
In the end,
Background
Geography
The Admiralty Islands lie 200 miles (320 km) north east of the mainland of New Guinea and 360 miles (580 km) west of Rabaul, only two degrees south of the equator. The climate is tropical, with constant high temperatures and high humidity and an annual rainfall of 154 inches (3,900 mm). Thunderstorms are common. December to May is the north west monsoon season, with prevailing winds from that direction.[1]
The largest island in the group is
The third largest island in the province, Los Negros lies to the northeast of Manus, from which it is separated by the narrow Loniu Passage. The island contains two important harbours of its own, Papitalai on the west coast, which connects with
Allied plans
In July 1942, the
At the Pacific Military Conference in March 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the latest version of General MacArthur's Elkton plan for an advance on Rabaul. Owing to a shortage of resources, particularly heavy bomber aircraft, the final stage of the plan, the capture of Rabaul itself, was postponed until 1944.[6] By July 1943, the Joint Chiefs were considering the possibility of neutralising and bypassing Rabaul, but the navy would still need a forward fleet base.[7] The Admiralty Islands, already a part of the Elkton plan, could serve this purpose, as they contained flat areas for airstrips, space for military installations, and Seeadler Harbour, which was large enough to accommodate a naval task force.[2] On 6 August 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a plan that called for the neutralisation rather than the capture of Rabaul, and scheduled the invasion of the Admiralty Islands for 1 June 1944.[8]
Task Force Brewer Assault Echelon Units[9]
Brigadier General William C. Chase
- 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment
- Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion
- 673rd Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Battery (Airborne)
- Reconnaissance Platoon, HQ Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade
- Communications Platoon, HQ Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade
- 1st Platoon, Troop B (Clearing), 1st Medical Squadron
- 30th Portable Surgical Hospital
- ANGAU Detachment
- Air Force Detachment
- Naval Gunfire Support Party
- Air Liaison Party
Throughout January 1944,
Orders went out on 24 February 1944 for a reinforced squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division to carry out a reconnaissance in force in just five days time. If the Admiralty Islands were indeed evacuated, they would be occupied and a base developed. If the enemy was unexpectedly strong, then the force could be withdrawn. General MacArthur and
Task Force Brewer Supporting Echelon Units[9]
Colonel Hugh Hoffman
- 5th Cavalry Regiment (less 2nd Squadron)
- 99th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery B)
- 1st Platoon, Troop A, 8th Engineer Squadron
- 1st Collecting Troop, 1st Medical Squadron
- Signal Detachment, 1st Signal Troop
- 40th Naval Construction Battalion
- Battery C, 168th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion (Gun)
- Battery A, 211th Coast Artillery Battalion (Anti-Aircraft) (Automatic Weapons)
- Company E, Shore Battalion, 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
This force was commanded by
Japanese defences
The Japanese defence of the Admiralties fell under the
Imamura sought reinforcements for the Admiralties in late 1943 and early 1944. In October 1943 he requested an infantry division for the islands, but none was available. A subsequent proposal to transfer the 66th Regiment from the Palaus, where it was being rebuilt after suffering heavy losses, to the Admiralties was also unsuccessful as IGHQ believed that the
At the time of the Allied landing, Imperial Japanese Army forces in the Admiralties consisted of the 51st Transport Regiment under Colonel Yoshio Ezaki, who was also the overall garrison commander; 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment; 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment; and elements of the IJN's 14th Naval Base Force.[28][29] Allied G-2 had identified the presence of all these units in the Admiralties, though their designation was not known in all instances. While the 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment was a veteran of several campaigns, it was short of equipment and lacked its battalion artillery guns. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment was led by reserve officers who had seen action in China, but most of its enlisted men were recalled reservists who had not previously been in battle.[30]
The 51st Transport Regiment had constructed an airstrip on Lorengau and commenced another, known as Momote Airstrip, at the Momote Plantation on Los Negros. Lorengau was used as a staging point for aircraft moving between Rabaul and airstrips in North East New Guinea. The importance of the Admiralty Islands to the Japanese increased as the result of Allied advances in New Guinea and New Britain which blocked off other air routes.[31] By February, both airstrips were unserviceable and the antiaircraft guns were silent to conserve ammunition and conceal their positions. Ezaki had ordered his men to neither move nor fire in daylight.[32]
Battle of Los Negros
Landing
The chosen landing site was a small beach on the south shore of Hyane Harbour near the Momote airstrip. The airstrip could be seized quickly; but the surrounding area was
The first wave landed without casualties at 08:17, but once the bombardment lifted the Japanese emerged from their dugouts and machine guns and shore batteries began firing. The landing craft, on returning, came under crossfire from enemy machine guns on both sides of the harbour. The fire became so heavy the second wave was forced to reverse course until the enemy fire was suppressed by destroyers. The third and fourth waves also came under fire.[37] A correspondent from Yank, the Army Weekly described the scene:
As we neared the channel, the Navy men in the bow hollered to us to keep our heads down or we'd get them blown off. We crouched lower, swearing, and waited. It came with a crack; machine-gun fire over our heads. Our light landing craft shuddered as the Navy gunners hammered back and answered with the .30 calibers mounted on both sides of the barge. As we made the turn for the beach, something solid plugged into us. "They got one of our guns or something," one GI said. There was a splinter the size of a half-dollar on the pack of the man in front of me. Up front a hole gaped in the middle of the landing ramp and there were no men where there had been four. Our barge headed back toward the destroyer that had carried us to the Admiralties. White splashes of water were plunging through the six-inch gap in the wooden gate. William Siebieda, S 1/c, of Wheeling, West Virginia, ducked from his position at the starboard gun and slammed his hip against the hole to plug it. He was firing a tommy gun at the shore as fast as wounded soldiers could pass him loaded clips. The water sloshed around him, running down his legs and washing the blood of the wounded into a pink frappe.[38]
Four of the twelve LCPRs had been damaged. Three were soon repaired, but they could not be risked further, for without them, the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. The emergency plan provided for an APD to enter the harbour and take troops off from a jetty but this would clearly be a desperate measure indeed. Over the next four hours, the boats continued to make trips to the beach, but only when it was believed destroyers had suppressed enemy fire. Heavy rain made it safer by reducing visibility. The last destroyer was unloaded at 12:50. By this time, the navy had lost two men dead and three wounded.[39]
For the moment it was safer ashore. The cavalrymen overran the airstrip. Sporadic opposition allowed them to set up the antiaircraft machine guns on the beach, unload supplies, and patrol inland. Two soldiers were killed and three wounded. At 16:00, General MacArthur and Admiral Kinkaid came ashore. The general inspected the position.[40] A lieutenant warned him a Japanese sniper had been killed in the vicinity just a few minutes before. "That's the best thing to do with them," the General replied.[41] He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived, then returned to Phoenix. Fechteler's force departed at 17:29, the transports having unloaded and most of the bombardment force having exhausted its ammunition. Bush and Stockton remained to provide on-call naval fire support.[40]
Battle for the beachhead
Chase pulled his troops back into a tight perimeter. There was no barbed wire, so the whole area had to be covered. The ground was hard
The Japanese were not expected to make another effort until dark but at around 16:00 a Japanese patrol was discovered that had somehow managed to infiltrate the perimeter in broad daylight and penetrate to within 35 yd (32 m) of Chase's command post. A sniper fired on the command post, and fire was directed at the patrol. Major
The next morning saw the arrival of the follow-up force, six LSTs, each towing an LCM, escorted by the destroyers
The two destroyer minesweepers were supposed to sweep the entrance to
Krueger was gravely concerned about the seriousness of the situation on Los Negros. In response to urgent request from Chase, Krueger arranged with Barbey for the movement of the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division to be expedited. At Krueger's request, the 2nd Squadron,
From the Japanese perspective, the battle was not going too well either. The Japanese had expected a landing on Seeadler Harbour, this being the logical American objective, and had concentrated their forces around the Lorengau airfield. The defence of the Momote airstrip and Hyane harbour was the responsibility of Baba Force, built around Captain Baba's 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment. Colonel Ezaki ordered Baba to attack the beachhead but a suspicion the Hyane Harbour landing was a diversion, coupled with false reports of enemy activity at Salami had him retain the 2nd (Iwakami) Battalion of the 1st Independent Infantry Regiment there instead of sending it to assist Baba Force. By 2 March, Ezaki had resolved to attack the Hyane beachhead with his whole force. The difficulties imposed by the terrain, and disruption by American artillery and Allied naval gunfire, forced a postponement of the attack to the night of 3 March.[55]
At 21:00, a lone Japanese plane dropped eight bombs, cutting telephone wires. Once it had departed, yellow flares went up and a Japanese infantry attack was launched, supported by mortar fire.
By dawn, the Japanese attack had subsided. Over 750 Japanese dead were counted in and around the American positions. No prisoners were taken. American casualties were 61 dead, and 244 wounded, including nine dead and 38 wounded Seabees.[62] The 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry and the 40th Naval Construction Battalion received Presidential Unit Citations.[63] General Chase called for an airdrop of ammunition, prodigious quantities of which had been expended during the night, and had Warramunga fire on the native skidway.[64]
Securing Seeadler Harbour
The morning of 4 March saw the arrival of the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, which relieved the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. The next day Major General Innis P. Swift, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, arrived aboard Bush and assumed command. He ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to attack across the native skidway. The 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry therefore went back into the line to relieve them. While the relief was taking place, the Japanese launched a daylight attack. This was repulsed by the cavalrymen, with the help of artillery and mortar fire, but the American attack was delayed until late afternoon. It then ran into a Japanese minefield and by dawn the advance had only reached as far as the skidway.[65]
On the morning of 6 March, another convoy arrived at Hyane Harbour: five LSTs, each towing an LCM, with the
The inhabitants of the area informed the ANGAU detachment the Japanese had retreated across Seeadler Harbour to Papitalai Mission. This, therefore, became the next objective. The 5th Cavalry would attack Papitalai Plantation from the east while the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry would attack Papitalai Mission. The 5th Cavalry captured Porlaka without opposition and crossed Lemondrol Creek in canvas and rubber boats.[70] A patrol under Captain William C. Cornelius fought an estimated 50 Japanese, who ultimately withdrew. Cornelius, who was credited with killing four, was severely wounded and died the next day. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.[71]
Because of the coral reef, conventional landing craft could not be used for the landing at Papitalai Mission. The five LVTs, one a combat type and the other four cargo-carrying, set out from Hyane Harbour to Salami Plantation but the road was so bad that only the combat and one cargo LVT were available in time. The attack went ahead anyway, preceded by an airstrike and artillery bombardment by the 271st Field Artillery Battalion. The combat LVT fired 24 M8 4.5-inch rockets. Return fire was received from Japanese mortars and machine guns, and a 75mm howitzer.[72] The first wave had to hold alone in the face of fire from Japanese bunkers for 45 minutes until the LVTs returned with the next wave. Later, they fought off a counterattack by about 30 Japanese.[73] Joined by a third LVT which had eventually managed to make it to Salami, the LVTs made 16 trips across the harbour before nightfall curtailed operations, transporting part of the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry, along with rations, water and ammunition, and evacuating the dead and wounded.[74]
Colonel Ezaki reported the American attack on Papitalai Mission to the Eighth Area Army in Rabaul, promising a night counterattack on the position; but no attack was delivered. The Japanese withdrew, and no further messages were ever received from Ezaki.[75]
The task of silencing the Japanese guns guarding Seeadler Harbour fell to Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley's Task Force 74 (TF74), consisting of the heavy cruiser HMAS Shropshire, light cruisers USS Phoenix and Nashville, and destroyers USS Bache, Beale, Daly, and Hutchins. They bombarded Hauwei Island for an hour on 4 March but on 6 March USS Nicholson was struck by a Japanese shell fired from Hauwei. With minesweepers scheduled to attempt to enter Seeadler Harbour again on 8 March, Admiral Kinkaid ordered Crutchley to try again. On the afternoon of 7 March, TF74 bombarded Hauwei, Ndrilo, Koruniat, Pityilu and northern Los Negros. Shropshire fired 64 8-inch (203 mm) and 92 4-inch (102 mm) shells, while the American cruisers and destroyers expended 1,144 5-inch (127 mm) and 6-inch (152 mm) shells.[76] The next day, two destroyers, two minesweepers, an LCM (flak) and six LCMs carrying trucks and supplies entered the Seeadler Harbour without being fired upon.[74] This cleared the way for the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to land at Salmi on 9 March.
By 7 March, the Seabees had the Momote airfield ready. Artillery spotting aircraft began operating from the strip on 6 March and a B-25 made an emergency landing the next day.
The ANGAU Detachment reached the town of Mokerang on 9 March and found fifty inhabitants. The Detachment was relieved to find islanders had not been deliberately ill-treated by the Japanese. The retreating Japanese had stripped their gardens of food, leaving the civilian population hungry, so ANGAU arranged for them to be provisioned by the Americans.[68]
Battle of Manus
Hauwei
Operations on Los Negros had now reached the mopping-up stage, but an estimated 2,700 Japanese troops remained on Manus. General Swift decided to land Brigadier General Verne D. Mudge's 2nd Brigade at Lugos Mission, west of Lorengau. Lorengau, known to be heavily fortified, was an important objective. It had an airfield, and four roads converged there. As a preliminary, the 302nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to locate sites from which the artillery could cover landings on Manus.[79] Three patrols were sent out by LCVP on 11 March. The first found Bear Point on Manus free of Japanese but lacking sites for artillery emplacements. The second scouted the Butjo Luo Islands. They found the islands apparently unoccupied, with good sites on the northern island. The third patrol, 25 officers and men of the 302nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, two officers from the 99th Field Artillery Battalion,[80] with WO2 A. L. Robinson of ANGAU and Kaihu, a native of Mokerang, as guides, set out for Hauwei in an LCVP,[68] escorted by PT 329,[81] one of the PT boats now operating from the tender USS Oyster Bay in Seeadler Harbour.[82]
As the patrol moved ashore, Major Carter S. Vaden spotted a well camouflaged
General Swift postponed the landing on Lugos and ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to capture Hauwei.[85] Once again, Robinson acted as guide, notwithstanding severe sunburn from his time in the water the previous day.[84] The landing was covered by the destroyers Arunta, Bush, Stockton and Thorn;[86] a pair of rocket-firing LCVPs and the LCM (flak), which fired 168 4.5-inch (114 mm) rockets; the guns of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion on Los Negros;[80] and six Kittyhawks of No. 76 Squadron dropped 500-pound (230 kg) bombs.[87] The assault was made from three cargo-carrying LVTs. To save wear and tear, they were towed across Seeadler Harbour by LCMs and cut loose for the final run in to shore.[83] The cavalrymen found well constructed and sited bunkers with interlocking fields of fire covering all approaches, and deadly accurate snipers. The next morning an LCM brought over a medium tank, for which the Japanese had no answer, and the cavalrymen were able to overcome the defenders at a cost of eight killed and 46 wounded; 43 dead Japanese naval personnel were counted. The 61st and 271st Field Artillery Battalions moved to Hauwei, while the 99th established itself on Butjo Luto.[88]
Lorengau
The attack on Manus got underway on 15 March. Before dawn, two troops of the
The Japanese had evidently not expected a landing at Lugos and their positions there were quickly overrun. The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry then advanced eastward until it was stopped by a Japanese bunker complex on the edge of the Lorengau airstrip. An artillery barrage was brought down, followed by an airstrike by
Although there had been plenty of fighting, the main Japanese force on Manus had not been located. Advancing inland towards Rossum, the 7th Cavalry found it on 20 March. Six days of fighting around Rossum were required before the 7th and 8th Cavalry reduced the entrenched Japanese positions there. The Japanese bunkers, actually log and earth pillboxes, proved resistant to artillery fire.[92]
Outlying islands
As the Japanese on Los Negros ran out of food and ammunition, the fight became increasingly unequal. A last stand by fifty Japanese in the Papitalai Hills on 24 March marked the end of organised Japanese resistance on Los Negros.[93] The end of organised resistance on Los Negros and Manus still left a number of islands in Japanese hands. To minimise civilian casualties, ANGAU quietly evacuated these islands in advance of the American operations.[94] Pityilu was believed occupied by about 60 Japanese. On 30 March the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry was transported there from Lorengau by 10 LCMs towing seven LVTs.[95] With the lessons of Hauwei in mind, the landing was covered by bombardment by destroyers, artillery, and two Landing Craft Support, plus an air strike by Kittyhawks and Spitfires. The landing was unopposed, but a strong Japanese position was encountered which was overcome with the aid of artillery and tanks. Some 59 Japanese were killed compared with eight Americans killed and six wounded.[96]
The same treatment was given to Ndrilo and Koruniat on 1 April but the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry found them unoccupied. This was notable for being the only amphibious operation of the war carried out by the United States in dugout canoes.[97] The final landing was on Rambutyo on 3 April by the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry. This time, six LCMs and six LCVPs were used instead of the LVTs. As a result, the first waves grounded on a reef and troopers had to wade ashore through the surf. Fortunately for them, there was no opposition.[97] The Japanese, hiding in the interior, were eventually located by ANGAU and 30 Japanese were killed and five captured.[98] Patrols continued hunting for Japanese throughout the islands. Increasingly, the cavalry followed up sightings reported by the natives. On Los Negros, the 302nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop killed 48 and captured 15 Japanese during May. On Manus, some 586 Japanese dead were counted and 47 prisoners taken.[99] General Krueger officially declared the campaign over on 18 May.[100]
Japanese perspective
A diary found on a dead Japanese soldier recounted his last days:
28 March. Last night's duty was rather quiet except for the occasional mortar and rifle fire that could be heard. According to the conference of the various unit leaders, it has been decided to abandon the present position and withdraw. The preparation for this has been made. However, it seems as though this has been cancelled and we will firmly hold this position. Ah! This is honorable defeat and I suppose we must be proud of the way we have handled ourselves. Only our names will remain, and this is something I don't altogether like. Yes, the lives of those remaining, 300 of us, are now limited to a few days.
30 March. This is the eighth day since we began the withdrawal. We have been wandering around and around the mountain roads because of the enemy. We have not yet arrived at our destination but we have completely exhausted our rations. Our bodies are becoming weaker and weaker, and this hunger is getting unbearable.
31 March. Although we are completely out of rations, the march continues. When will we reach Lorengau? Or will this unit be annihilated in the mountains? As we go along, we throw away our equipment and weapons one by one.
1 April. Arrived at native shack. According to a communication, friendly troops in Lorengau cannot help but withdraw. Hereafter there is no choice but to live as the natives do.[101]
Base development
Conflict over command
Discussions concerning the scope and nature of base development in the Admiralty Islands were held in early February between representatives of SWPA and Admiral
Admiral Nimitz recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that development and control of the base facilities be placed under SOPAC by extending its border westward to include the Admiralties.[103] MacArthur was furious; the borders of SWPA could not be changed without the consent of the Australian government.[104] Nimitz's proposal was eventually turned down by the Joint Chiefs but not before MacArthur restricted access to the facilities to ships of the United States Seventh Fleet and British Pacific Fleet. Halsey was summoned to MacArthur's headquarters in Brisbane on 3 March 1944, and the two agreed to a compromise.[105] Responsibility for the development of the base passed from Krueger's Alamo Force to Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces on 18 May 1944. It was proposed control would ultimately pass to SOPAC but it never did.[106]
Airbase development
Momote airfield was found to have been constructed on a coral subbase with an overburden of coconut palm humus, over which the Japanese had laid a thin layer of coral and coral sand. This would not withstand heavy use, so 40th Naval Construction Battalion, 8th Engineer Squadron, and Shore Battalion of the 592nd EBSR had to strip away the humus and lay a new coral surface. Just 3,600 feet (1,100 m) of runway was sufficient for the Kittyhawks and Spitfires but the runway was increased to 7,800 feet (2,400 m) by late April.[107] B-24s of 5th Bombardment Group moved in on 18 April 1944 and flew their first mission, against Woleai two days later.[108]
Plans called for a second airfield at Salami Plantation, but surveys revealed that the site was unsuitable and a new site was found in a coconut plantation near
A fighter base to provide repair and overhaul facilities for carrier aircraft was constructed by the 78th Naval Construction Battalion on Ponam Island. As half of the work area was swamp, coral was blasted and dredged from the ocean bed and used as landfill. Another facility for carrier aircraft was built on Pityilu by the 71st Naval Construction Battalion in May and June 1944, along with accommodation for 2,500 men. The eastern end of Pityilu was cleared and a fleet recreation centre was built that could accommodate up to 10,000 at a time.[111]
Construction of the naval base on Los Negros was the responsibility of the 2nd Naval Construction Regiment, with the 11th, 58th and 71st Naval Construction Battalions. Work included a bulk storage at Papitalai for 500,000 barrels (~68,000 t) of fuel oil, 100,000 barrels (~14,000 t) of distillate, 76,000 barrels (~10,000 t) of avgas and 30,000 barrels (~4,100 t) of mogas;[112] a 500-bed evacuation hospital; two Liberty ship wharves; 24 warehouses and 83 administration buildings in Quonset huts. At Lombrum Point, the Seabees built three installations: a seaplane repair base, a ship repair base, and a landing craft repair base. A 250-long-ton (250 t) pontoon drydock was provided for servicing the landing craft.[113]
Development of facilities on Manus was taken in hand by the 5th Naval Construction Regiment, with the 35th, 44th and 57th Naval Construction Battalions, which arrived in mid-April, and the 140th Naval Construction Battalion, which was attached in June. They erected 128 storage buildings and 50 refrigerators, each of 680 cubic feet (19 m3) capacity. A water supply system was developed to supply 4,000,000 US gallons (15,000,000 L) per day. Two systems were developed, one using streams in the Lombrum area that supplied 2,700,000 US gallons (10,000,000 L) per day, and another for outlying areas that used wells to produce 850,000 US gallons (3,200,000 L) per day. The system included water treatment plants, reservoirs, and pipes.[114][115][116] All construction work was completed by April 1945, with the base remaining in use until the end of the war.[117]
Casualties
In his final report on the campaign, General Krueger reported 3,280 Japanese dead had been counted and 75 had been captured. Perhaps 1,100 more were missing, and were never seen again. American casualties were 326 killed, 1,189 wounded, and four missing. Some 1,625 Americans had been evacuated for all causes, including wounds and illness.[63] One Australian was wounded. ANGAU reported one native had been killed and one wounded in action, three were killed by the Japanese, and 20 accidentally killed and 34 wounded by air, artillery, and naval bombardment.[118]
Analysis
The value of the Admiralty Islands to the Allies was enormous. Their capture saved more lives than they cost by obviating the need to capture Truk, Kavieng, Rabaul, and Hansa Bay and thereby speeding up the Allied advance by several months. As an airbase, the Admiralties' value was great, for aircraft based there ranged over Truk, Wewak, and beyond. As a naval base, their value was greater still, as they combined a fleet anchorage with major facilities.[119]
A well-known rule of thumb is that an attacking force needs a 3:1 superiority to ensure success. In the opening stages of the battle of Los Negros, the ratio was more like 1:4. In the end the Allies won, "simply because," wrote Morison, "the United States and Australia dominated that stretch of ocean and the air over it."[120] When queried about the naval support, General Chase replied, "they didn't support us; they saved our necks".[121] Chase's own defensive tactics were also a vital factor. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his part, as was MacArthur.[122]
Allied commanders, and later historians, debated whether the Admiralty Islands Campaign was the bold action of a great commander or a reckless endeavour that courted disaster. Admiral Fechteler felt, "we're damn lucky we didn't get run off the island,"[123] and Admiral Barbey, for one, believed the original plan would have resulted in over-running the islands in short order with fewer casualties.[121] It would certainly have been much less risky, but it is doubtful whether an assault on the well-defended beaches of Seeadler Harbour would have resulted in fewer casualties. Whereas, in accelerating both MacArthur and Nimitz's campaigns, it shortened the war by at least a month. Thus, in the final analysis, the campaign "had the great virtue of hastening victory while reducing the number of dead and wounded".[124]
For the Japanese, the loss of the Admiralties meant the loss of their outpost line in the South Eastern Area. Imperial Headquarters now ordered the preparation of a new line in Western New Guinea. The Admiralties operation also indicated the Allies were becoming more ambitious and might bypass Hansa Bay. Accordingly, the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea was ordered to prepare to defend Aitape and Wewak as well.[125]
See also
- Admiralty Islands campaign order of battle
- Manus Naval Base
Notes
- ^ a b Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 6–7.
- ^ a b Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 432.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 1–2.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 5–6.
- ^ Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan, pp. 312–334.
- ^ Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan, pp. 425–430.
- ^ Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan, pp. 427–430.
- ^ a b Krueger, Walter, Report on Brewer Operation, 2 August 1944, AWM54 519/1/12
- ^ Mortensen, "Rabaul and Cape Gloucester", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 350–356.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 316–317. Due to changes in plans, not all of the assigned units would actually be deployed.
- ^ Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I, p. 137.
- ^ Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 360.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 435.
- ^ Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy, pp. 145–151.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 436–437.
- ^ Hirrel, Bismarck Archipelago, p. 14.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 18–19.
- ^ Powell, The Third Force:ANGAU's New Guinea War 1942–46, p. 82.
- ^ Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy, p. 152.
- ^ Taafe, MacArthur's Jungle War, p. 61.
- ^ Reports of General MacArthur, Volume I, pp. 137–138.
- ^ Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Hayashi, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War, pp. 72–73.
- ^ a b Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, p. 99
- ^ Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, p. 100
- ^ Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, p. 101
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 319.
- ^ Jersey, Hell's Islands, pp. 360–361, 366–367. The 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment, consisting mainly of soldiers from Gifu Prefecture, Japan, had served on Guadalcanal beginning in November 1942 before being evacuated to Rabaul in February 1943. On Guadalcanal, the battalion was commanded by Major Tsuguto Tomoda but it is not clear whether he was still with the battalion in the Admiralties.
- ^ Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, pp. 102–103
- ^ Reports of General MacArthur, Volume II, part I, pp. 244–245.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 320.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 436.
- ^ Hirrel, Bismarck Archipelago, pp. 14–15.
- ^ a b Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 23.
- ^ Friedman, US Amphibious ships and craft, p. 207.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 23–27.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 28.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 29.
- ^ a b Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 31.
- ^ Manchester, American Caesar, p. 341.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 31–32.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 35.
- ^ Futrell and Mortensen, "The Admiralties", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 565.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 36.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 440.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 39, 42.
- ^ Futrell and Mortensen, "The Admiralties", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 566.
- ^ a b Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 39–41.
- ^ Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy, p. 156.
- ^ a b Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 374.
- ^ Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 232.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 336.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 52–57.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 45.
- ^ Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 375.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 45–46.
- ^ a b Dunlap, Roy F., Ordnance Went Up Front, p. 310.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 46–49.
- ^ "World War II Medal of Honor Citations". United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved 3 July 2021. McGill's citation referred to the Japanese as "drinkcrazed" but postmortems indicated this was not the case.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 50.
- ^ a b Krueger, Walter, Report on Brewer Operation, 2 August 1944, AWM54 519/1/12.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 58–60.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 338.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 61–63.
- ^ a b c Powell, The Third Force, p. 84.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 63–64.
- ^ Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 238.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 65.
- ^ Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, pp. 236–237.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 66.
- ^ a b Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 237.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 67.
- ^ Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, pp. 375–377.
- ^ Futrell and Mortensen, "The Admiralties", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 568.
- ^ Odgers, Air War Against Japan, pp. 175–177.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 76–79.
- ^ a b Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 240.
- ^ Bulkley, At Close Quarters, p. 228.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 446.
- ^ a b Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, pp. 240–241.
- ^ a b Powell, The Third Force, p. 85.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 80.
- ^ a b Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942–1945, p. 378.
- ^ Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943–1945, pp. 174–175.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 81–82.
- ^ a b Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 243.
- ^ Futrell and Mortensen, "The Admiralties", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 569.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 82–103.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 103–116.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 132–133.
- ^ Powell, The Third Force, p. 86.
- ^ Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 246.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 137–138.
- ^ a b Casey, Amphibian Engineer Operations, p. 247.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 140.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 348.
- ^ Frierson, The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, p. 133.
- ^ Casey, Airfield and Base Development, pp. 209–210.
- ^ James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, pp. 388–389.
- ^ Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan, p. 564.
- ^ Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul
- ^ Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 212.
- ^ Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 213.
- ^ Futrell, "Hollandia", in Craven and Cate (eds), Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 604.
- ^ a b Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 216.
- ^ Building the Navies Bases in World War II, p. 296.
- ^ Building the Navies Bases in World War II, pp. 301–302.
- ^ Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 220.
- ^ Building the Navies Bases in World War II, pp. 296–299.
- ^ Building the Navies Bases in World War II, pp. 296–301.
- ^ "Naval records of 140th NCB (1)" (PDF). Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved 3 July 2021.
- ^ Newbury, Down Atabrine Alley with the 140th Seabees, pp. 3, 62
- ^ Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 222.
- ^ ANGAU History of Admiralty Islands Campaign, AWM54 80/6/6.
- ^ Miller, MacArthur and the Admiralties, pp. 301–302.
- ^ Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 448.
- ^ a b Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy, p. 157.
- ^ Chase, Front Line General, p. 59.
- ^ James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, p. 387.
- ^ Miller, MacArthur and the Admiralties, p. 302.
- ^ Reports of General MacArthur, Volume II, part I, pp. 248–249.
References
- OCLC 52066.
- Bulkley, Robert J. (2003). At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the United States Navy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. from the original on 13 January 2010. Retrieved 13 February 2010.
- Casey, Hugh J., ed. (1951). Airfield and Base Development. Engineers of the Southwest Pacific. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. OCLC 220327037.
- Casey, Hugh J., ed. (1959). Amphibian Engineer Operations. Engineers of the Southwest Pacific. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. OCLC 220327009.
- OCLC 2005322.
- Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea, eds. (1950). Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. The Army Air Forces in World War II. University of Chicago Press. from the original on 26 November 2006. Retrieved 20 October 2006.
- Dexter, David (1961). The New Guinea Offensives. OCLC 2028994. Retrieved 21 November 2009.
- Drea, Edward J. (1992). MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. OCLC 23651196.
- Dunlap, Roy F. (1948). Ordnance Went Up Front. Plantersville, South Carolina: Samworth Press. OCLC 6081851.
- Friedman, Norman (2002). US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. OCLC 47971483.
- Frierson, Major William C. (1990) [1946]. The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, 29 February–18 May 1944. American Forces in Action. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. from the original on 5 March 2009. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- Futrell, Frank; Mortensen, Captain Bernhardt L. (1950). "The Admiralties". In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea (eds.). Vol. IV, The Pacific – Guadalcanal to Saipan (August 1942 to July 1944) (PDF). The Army Air Forces in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 549–574. OCLC 9828710. Archived from the original(PDF) on 26 February 2009. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. OCLC 65475. Retrieved 21 November 2009.
- Hayashi, Saburō (1959). Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Association. OCLC 1133179. ASIN B000ID3YRK.
- Hayes, Grace P. (1982). The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. OCLC 7795125.
- Hirrel, Leo (1993). Bismarck Archipelago 15 December 1943–27 November 1944. The US Army Campaigns of World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. from the original on 16 February 2009. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- James, D. Clayton (1975). The Years of MacArthur, Volume II: 1942–1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 88071.
- Jersey, Stanley Coleman (2008). Hell's Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press. OCLC 122526828.
- OCLC 1227801. Archived from the original(PDF) on 26 February 2009. Retrieved 20 February 2009.
- OCLC 5126164.
- OCLC 3844481.
- Miller, John Jr. (1959). Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Office of the Chief of Military History, US Department of the Army. from the original on 24 February 2009. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- Miller, John Jr. (1990). "11. MacArthur and the Admiralties". Command Decisions. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. from the original on 5 March 2009. Retrieved 5 March 2009.
- OCLC 10310299.
- Newbury, G. S. (1945). Down Atabrine Alley with the 140th Seabees (PDF). Baton Rouge, Louisiana: United States Navy. OCLC 31189703. Retrieved 3 July 2021.
- OCLC 1990609. Retrieved 21 November 2009.
- Powell, Alan (2003). The Third Force:ANGAU's New Guinea War. Australian Army History Series. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press. OCLC 53173145.
- Taafe, Stephen R. (1998). MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. OCLC 37107216.
- US Navy Department (1947). Building the Navy's Bases in World War II, Volume II. History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940–1946. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. OCLC 1023942.
- OCLC 187071996. Archived from the originalon 12 February 2009. Retrieved 7 October 2007.
- from the original on 7 December 2008. Retrieved 8 December 2008.