Afghan Civil War (1989–1992)
| First Afghan Civil War | |
|---|---|
| Part of the Afghanistan (with some spillover into Pakistan ) | |
| Result |
Interim Afghan Government victory
|
Supported by:
Soviet Union (until 1991)
Commonwealth of Independent States (from 1991)[1]
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Russia (until January 1992)
India
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (until July 1989)[2]
Jamiat-e Islami
National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
Ittehad-e Islami
Hezb-i Islami Khalis- Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami[4]
Foreign Mujahideen:
Al Qaeda[3]- Maktab al-Khidamat
Various factions also fought among each other
Supported by:
Pakistan
United States
Saudi Arabia 
United Kingdom
China
Germany
Iran
Israel Mohammad Aslam Watanjar Mohammad Nabi Azimi Nur ul-Haq Ulumi Abdul Jabar Qahraman General Barakzai †[3] Khushal Peroz Ismatullah Muslim # Fazal Haq Khaliqyar Makhmut Gareev
Ahmad Shah Massoud
Burhanuddin Rabbani
Ahmad Zia Massoud
Din Mohammad Jurat
Atta Muhammad Nur
Abdullah Abdullah
Naqib Alikozai
Ismail Khan Bibi Ayesha Saleh Registani 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Fazal Haq Mujahid Benazir Bhutto
Osama bin Laden Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Amin Wardak Abdul Haq Haji Abdul Qadeer Jalaluddin Haqqani 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf Mohammad Nabi Sibghatullah Mojaddedi 
Ahmed Gailani Abdul Rahim Wardak 
Abdul Ali Mazari
Shahnawaz Tanai (from 1990)[5]
Abdul Rashid Dostum (from 1992)Afghan Army:
150,000 (1990)[6]
Afghan Air Force:
20,000 (1989)
National Guard:
- Presidential Guard: 10,000 (1989)[6]
All forces under the control of the Republic Of Afghanistan:
Around 515,000 (1990),[7] including paramilitary Sarandoy, and KHAD
up to 170,000 (1991)[7]
The 1989–1992 Afghan Civil War, also known as the First Afghan Civil War, took place between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Soviet–Afghan War on 15 February 1989 until 27 April 1992, ending the day after the proclamation of the Peshawar Accords proclaiming a new interim Afghan government which was supposed to start serving on 28 April 1992.
In March 1991, a mujahideen coalition quickly conquered the city of
Background (1978–89)
In October 1978, opponents of the reforms of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government, including modernizing traditional Islamic civil and marriage laws, changing the national flag to a Soviet-style red flag, and forcing land reform, started a revolt, and called themselves 'mujahideen'.
The Soviet Union, that had been supporting Afghanistan economically and militarily since 1919 (see Soviet–Afghan War#Soviet–Afghan relations post-1920s) and early 1979 had sent hundreds of military and civilian advisers into Afghanistan after a request from President Nur Muhammad Taraki, in December 1979 intervened in Afghanistan with its 40th Army, around 75,000 strong, killing the new President Hafizullah Amin with the help with Parchamites and Taraki loyalist Khalqists, and installed Soviet loyalist Babrak Karmal as president of a Soviet-organised and –backed PDPA-regime.[citation needed]
In spite of a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the 1979 USSR invasion and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation demanding immediate Soviet withdrawal, the Russians stayed until early 1989. They managed to take control of major cities and strategic installations, thus acerbating nationalistic feelings among rebels who drew Soviet troops into war with urban uprisings and tribal armies. The Soviets leveled villages, destroyed irrigation ditches and laid millions of mines in an attempt to root out the mujahideen rebels. In those nine years, between 1⁄2 and 2 million Afghans were killed and millions were displaced, and in large numbers fled into neighboring countries. The new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, taking charge in 1985, pressured by the People's Republic of China, in 1987 announced his intention to withdraw from Afghanistan, which withdrawal took place between May 1988 and February 1989.[citation needed]
The mujahideen resistance movement had started chaotically in 1978 and had always stayed highly segmented along regional, ethnic, tribal and religious lines: after four years the mujahideen operated from an estimated 4,000 bases, a typical commander leading a few hundred men. In 1985, seven larger Sunni Islamic rebel groups had coordinated their fight against the Soviets, who were also known as the Pakistani backed Peshawar 7 Mujahideen Alliance. After the Soviets had left Afghanistan in February 1989, some smaller groups put down arms or joined the government however the larger mujahideen groups continued their fight against the PDPA-government of President Mohammad Najibullah, who was still massively supported by the Soviet Union,[9][8] and establish a Islamist government. Many of these larger Mujahedeen groups such as Jamiat had existed years before the PDPA seized power. Leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Jalaluddin Haqqani attempted uprisings (with Pakistani support) in 1974 against the government of Daoud Khan. These uprisings failed and many of these groups fled to Pakistan to be trained by the ISI in a future insurgency against the Daoud Khan government, which would be overthrown by PDPA military officers only 4 years later.[10]
Attacks between mujahideen groups (1987–89)
According to published reports during the 1980s, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin developed a reputation for attacking other resistance forces, especially those of Ahmad Shah Massoud, and raiding or blocking their food and arms supplies as well as caravans of relief organizations.[11] According to author Steve Coll, Hekmatyar attacked Ahmad Shah Massoud so often that Washington (who was supporting him through Pakistan) "feared he might be a secret KGB plant whose mission was to sow disruption within the anti-communist resistance."[11] Reports suggest that Hekmatyar's commanders were saving their men and weapons to establish Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin as the dominant organization once the Soviets departed.[11]
In 1989, Hekmatyar's forces once again conducted an attack on forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, this time targeting Massoud and the senior leadership of Shura-e Nazar – Massoud's military and political alliance of 130 northern commanders.[12] While they were not able to kill or injure Massoud, Hekmatyar's forces tortured to death 30 of Massoud's men, some of whom were close friends of Massoud.[12] Survivors describe the torture as pulling their eyes out, cutting their ears and noses off, and cutting their stomachs open.[12] Massoud consequently ordered an operation to hunt down the murderers. Shura-e Nazar were able to capture the assassins, but instead of revenge killings, Massoud sent them to Peshawar to have them tried before a court.[12] The courts sentenced them to death. Ahmad Shah Massoud for the sake of Afghan unity declared: "My message to Hekmatyar's people is that without a united front we cannot succeed, we cannot achieve anything in Afghanistan."[12] Roy Gutman of the United States Institute of Peace considered Massoud "the only Afghan leader with an integrated vision".[13]
Through this period (1987–89) both Massoud and Hekmatyar had been frequently fighting each other and killing each other's officers, and Massoud's rhetoric was rarely matched by action. In 1988, for instance, Massoud's forces attacked Hekmatyar loyalists in
However, Hekmatyar's supporters accused Massoud of having killed these commandants to centralize his authority in Jamaat's ranks and framed Jamal, whom they claimed had good relations with the victims. This was stated by Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin supporter Mohammad Tanwir Halim in his book published in 2013. However, this version of the story is uncorroborated and Hekmatyar was widely unpopular in any case for his vicious murders, though this was not necessarily true of his commanders some of whom like Abdul-Rauf Safi, Abdul-Sabour Farid and perhaps Jamal enjoyed decent relations with other groups. Massoud later appointed Abdul-Rauf Safi as Kabul commandant. Hekmatyar's supporters also accused Massoud of treachery because of his ceasefires with Soviet forces and in this they had the support of Jamaat leader Mohammad Eshaq who also criticized Massoud for his ceasefire with the Soviets during the second half of the occupation. It appears that Massoud was trying to form a base independent of Pakistan, and in this endeavour he did make deals with governments traditionally hostile to the mujahideen, including India and the Soviets however the Soviet forces by request of Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah attacked Massoud's forces before withdrawing during Operation Typhoon, killing over 600 members of Jamiat.
However, accusations of treachery by both sides seem far-fetched. The Pakistani coordinator, Mohammed Yousaf, does not challenge Massoud's version of Jamal story despite Pakistan's hostility towards Massoud, and in any case it has become a fait accompli. Similarly, Palestinian mujahideen leader
Main participants
Republic of Afghanistan
PDPA/DRA government
After the Soviet withdrawal on 15 February 1989, the government of President Mohammad Najibullah and his People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was on its own. The U.S. intelligence agencies expected the regime to collapse within three to six months.[14]
However, this estimation did not take into account several assets available to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) government. The first of these was the large quantities of military hardware donated by the Soviet Union. In 1989, the army and pro-government militias still had 1568 tanks, 828 armoured personnel carriers, 4880 artillery pieces, 126 modern fighter-bombers and 14 attack helicopters. Also, the DRA continued to receive massive aid from the Soviet Union, valued between two and six billion dollars a year, and Soviet military advisors were still present in Afghanistan.[9] The government forces also came to rely on the use of large quantities of Scud missiles: between 1988 and 1992 more than 2000 of these were fired by the 99th Missile Brigade of the Afghan Armed Forces. It was the largest amount of ballistic missiles used since World War II. This considerable amount of firepower was sufficient to keep the mujahideen at bay. The DRA/ROA heavily relied on keeping the Salang Pass open to supply its troops.[15]
99th Missile Brigade: The 99th Missile Brigade was responsible for Kabul's Scud Missile arsenal; the Brigade consisted of Afghans as well as five Soviet volunteers. The Brigade launched around 2,000 missiles between 1989 and 1992.[16][17][18][19] The brigade was founded in the 1980s during the Soviet–Afghan War, with resources to the brigade increasing drastically following the Soviet withdrawal. Members of the 99th participated in the Battle of Jalalabad, the Siege of Khost as well as a few retaliatory strikes against Pakistan for violating the Afghan airspace.[16][17]
Abdul Rashid Dostum (Jowzjani militia)
Mujahideen
Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-e Islami)
The U.S. provided Ahmad Shah Massoud with little to no support despite The Wall Street Journal calling him "the Afghan who won the Cold War", and the one ego was primarily responsible for the mujahideen victory. Massoud instead did get support from the United Kingdom specifically MI6 and direct support with the SAS. Part of the reason why he still got only minor support was that the U.S. permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan which favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who considered himself the archenemy of Massoud. Massoud was also seen as "too independent". The Pakistanis did however grant a base of operations in Pakistan and assisted Jamiat forces militarly during the Badaber Uprising. Primary advocates for still supporting Massoud instead were State Department's Edmund McWilliams and Peter Tomsen, who were on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others included two Heritage Foundation neoconservative foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of U.S. support under the Reagan Doctrine.[21][22]
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin)
During the anti-Soviet war (1979–89), the United States had allowed Pakistan to funnel much American military aid to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's party Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin.[21] The U.S. permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan, which favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[21][22]
According to the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan in 1989–1992, Peter Tomsen, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was hired in 1990 by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to conquer and rule Afghanistan in the benefit of Pakistani interests, a plan which was delayed until 1992 as a result of US pressure to cancel it.[23]
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Ittehad-e Islami)
One of the beneficiaries of Saudi Arabian support, especially financial, was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his army Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, also called Ittehad-e Islami.[21][22]
Jalaluddin Haqqani (Haqqani network)
Another beneficiary of Saudi Arabian support, especially financial, was Jalaluddin Haqqani who had had strong contacts to Arab fighters in the war against the Soviets.[21][22]
Battle of Jalalabad
| Date | 5 March – end of June 1989[8] |
|---|---|
| Location | Jalalabad and the Salang Pass , Republic Of Afghanistan |
| Result |
Decisive Afghan Government victory[26]
|
Soviet Union
- CIA
Mohammad Najibullah
Shahnawaz Tanai[3]
Nur ul-Haq Ulumi
General Barakzai †
Mohammad Sardar Bajauri
Khushal Peroz
Abdul Rashid Dostum Ahmed Gailani Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
Osama bin Laden Hamid Gul[27][28][29] Mirza Aslam Beg[30] Commander Nasir Khan[3]Afghan National Army[3]
- 9th Infantry Division
- 55th Motorized Infantry Brigade
- 10th Engineer-Sapper Regiment
- 11th Infantry Division
- 66th Motorized Infantry Brigades
- 71st Motorized Infantry Brigades
- 81st Motorized Infantry Brigade
- 11th Tactical Ballistic MissileBattalion
- 91st Artillery Regiment
- Unknown Mechanized battalion
- Unknown Howitzer battalion
- 99th Missile Brigade
Ministry of Interior:[3]
- 7th Operative Regiment (Sarandoy)
- 12th Mountain Battalion (Sarandoy)
- 8th Border Guard Brigade
- 10th Border Guard Brigade
WAD:
- 904th Battalion
Afghan National Guard:[3]
- 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade
- 37th Commando Brigade
- 88th Heavy Artillery Regiment
- 355th Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment
- 377th Helicopter Regiment
- 373rd Air Transport Regiment
- 12th Squadron
Pakistan:
Khyber Rifles[3]
Pakistani Volunteers
Interim Afghan Government:
- 5 Divisions including a mechanized division (during the First Battle of Jalalabad Airport)[3]
Afghanistan:
- 15,000
Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin:[3]
- 3,300
- 11 T-54Ms
- 3 BMPs
- 2 BTR-60PB
- 2 BRDM-2
- 55 mortars
- 12 howitzers
- 79 rocket launchers
Hezb-i Islami Khalis:[3]
- 500
Jamiat-e Islami:[3]
- 500
National Islamic Front of Afghanistan:[3]
- 1,700
Ittihad-i Islami:[3]
- 1,300
Al Qaeda:[3]
- 1,300
Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli:
- 1,300
Harakat-i-Enqelab-i-Islami:
- 1,500
Pakistan:
- 5,000[31]
Republic Of Afghanistan
- 3,000 killed[25]
- 1 Antonov An-26 transport plane destroyed
- 2 airport employees killed
Al Qaeda:
- 300 killed
Pakistan:
- unknown number killed, at least 1 captured
Civilian casualties:
In the spring of 1989, the Seven-Party (Afghanistan mujahideen) Union in Peshawar[8] supported by the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI attacked Jalalabad.[8][27] The ISI's Director Gul wanted to see a mujahideen government over Afghanistan,[27] led by Hekmatyar.[28]
Analysts disagree as to whether
Battle begins
Involved in the operation were forces of Hekmatyar's
By the middle of May, they had made no headway against the defences of Jalalabad, and were running low on ammunition. In July, they were unable to prevent the Afghan Army from recapturing the army base Samarkhel, Jalalabad was still firmly in the hands of Najibullah's government. The mujahideen suffered an estimated 3,000 casualties during this battle, 300 of which were Arab fighters.[33] An estimated 12,000–15,000 civilians were killed, while 10,000 had fled the fighting.[13] The Afghan Army suffered around 1,500 casualties during the battle.[37]
Aftermath
Contrary to American and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government.[38] The failure of the Battle can be attributed to the failure of Ahmad Shah Masoud's forces to close the Salang Pass allowing Kabul to supply their forces.[15] In the words of Brigadier-General Mohammed Yousaf, an officer of the ISI, "the jihad never recovered from Jalalabad".[36] In particular of course Pakistan's plans to promote Hekmatyar were also harmed. Both the Pakistani and the American governments were frustrated with the outcome. As a result of this failure, General Hamid Gul was immediately sacked by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and replaced with General Shamsur Rahman Kallu as the Director-General of the ISI. Kallu pursued a more classical policy of support to the Afghan guerillas.[36] In this respect he cut off the barrier that his predecessors, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul had placed between the mujahideen and the American secret service, which for the first time had direct access to the mujahedeen. The former Pakistani spies, such as Gul, had argued that this gave the United States an opportunity to both undercut Pakistan's interests as well as to weave discord among the mujahideen (something which Pakistan's promotion of Hekmatyar had of course done as well).[citation needed]
Indeed, with direct American access to the mujahideen – in particular that of the envoy
Domestic criticism
The Jalalabad operation was seen as a grave mistake by some mujahideen leaders such as
Enmity Jamiat-e Islami vs Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
In June 1990, battles between Ahmad Shah Massoud's Jamiat-e Islami and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in Logar and Parwan caused hundreds of casualties on each side.[41]
Mujahideen's conquest of Khost (1991)
In two weeks' time (14–31 March 1991), mujahideen forces conquered the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan on the Kabul DRA Government. The battle was organized by the National Commanders' Shura (NCS) led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and with representatives from all parties of the Seven-Party (mujahideen) Union, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. One reason why the mujahideen succeeded here, was that once the Soviet Army had left the country, supplying the Government forces in Khost through the air had become too difficult. When the Government's garrison had run out of supplies, the DRA troops massively surrendered to the mujahidin.[8]
After an eleven-year siege, Khost fell to Jalaluddin Haqqani's troops, that were in east Afghanistan, on 11 April 1991, following a negotiated surrender of the communist garrison. This was a coordinated effort where the final push came in an assault with Ibrahim Haqqani acting as stand-in for Jalaluddin, who had been abroad at the time to raise funds and links. The commandant Gul Aqa was captured. It was claimed that much of the garrison had switched sides because the mujahidin fighters were offering amnesty and lenient treatment, partly an indication of Haqqani's skilful diplomacy. There was considerable irritation by Haqqani's forces when some Pakistani outlets claimed that Hekmatyar had acted as leader, in spite of the similarly close relationship between Haqqani and Pakistani soldiers. At this time Pakistan were strongly in favour of Hekmatyar, who would be their primary proxy until 1994 when they switched to Taliban movement. However, the veteran Pakistani reporter Rahimulah Yusufzai confirmed that it had been a coordinated effort with Jalaluddin Haqqani as overall leader. Haqqani also offered to mediate between the bitter opponents Massoud and Hekmatyar, though this came to nought.[42]
Najibullah government weakens (March 1990–January 1992)
Internal dissensions
| 1990 Afghan coup d'état attempt | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Afghan Civil War (1989–1992) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
|
Military faction Supported by: Khalq Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Mohammad Najibullah Mohammad Aslam Watanjar |
Shahnawaz Tanai Assadullah Sarwari Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy Bacha Gul Wafadar Mohammad Hasan Sharq Mohammed Nazar Gulbuddin Hekmatyar | ||||||
| Military support | |||||||
| Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan |
Defectors from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:
| ||||||
Despite its military successes, the communist regime of President Mohammad Najibullah was still plagued by its traditional internal divisions, namely the opposition between the Khalq and Parcham factions. The DRA defense minister, Shahnawaz Tanai, disagreed with Najibullah's policy of National Reconciliation with the mujahideen and was in favor of turning Kabul's Scud Launchers at Islamabad. He had also become convinced that his Khalq faction was losing its share of power in favour of Najibullah's Parcham. For these reasons he entered in secret negotiations with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and plotted against Najibullah. Launched on 6 March 1990, his coup failed, despite almost killing Najibullah, and Tanai was forced to flee to Pakistan, where he joined Hekmatyar. A severe repression followed, as Najibullah ordered the army to be purged of Tanai's supporters. In the ensuing fighting, several airports were bombarded, damaging 46 military aircraft.[43] This episode reinforced Najibullah's suspicions and led him to govern through his personal allies rather than the government apparatus, further deepening the rift between Khalqis and Parchamis.
Economic crisis
By 1992, Afghanistan was in dire straits. Reserves of natural gas, Afghanistan's only export, had dried out since 1989, rendering the country completely dependent on Soviet aid. This amounted to 230,000 tons of food per year, but by 1991, the Soviet economy was itself faltering, preventing the Soviets from fulfilling their commitments.
In August 1991, following his
The pro-government militias that had grown to replace the army in many of its assignments, were faithful to the regime only so long as it could deliver enough weapons to enable them to conserve their power. With the end of the Soviet aid, the government could no longer satisfy these demands, and the loyalty of the militias began to waver.
Finally, after negotiations between communist General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Junbish militia defected to the mujahideen. This reversal of fortunes effectively turned the tables in favor of the resistance, and forced Najibullah to resign.[44]
Najibullah waning, mujahideen pursue coalition (March 1992)
The Soviet Union having dissolved in late 1991 and Russia having decided to end fuel shipments to Afghanistan, by 1992 the Afghan regime of President Mohammad Najibullah began to collapse.[45]
On 18 March 1992, Najibullah announced his willingness to resign in order to make way for a neutral interim government. This step made him lose internal control; his government broke into several factions.[44] General
At some point, the UN and senior leaders of several Afghan
Armies creep up to Kabul (1–14 April)
On 10 April 1992, the UN presented a plan to the mujahideen parties—of which they approved—to form a pre-interim council on 15 April to accept formal sovereignty from President Mohammad Najibullah.[46] The plan was for the UN to fly that pre-interim council of community and tribal leaders into Kabul on 15 April and then fly Najibullah out of Kabul and out of Afghanistan.[46] Throughout the process, mujahideen forces would remain outside Kabul.[46]
But on 14 April, Ahmad Shah Massoud with his Jamiat-e Islami forces had conquered parts of Parwan Province just north of Kabul and had approximately 20,000 troops stationed around Kabul.[45] By mid-April, Massoud's forces (Jamiat)[46][44] along with forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum (Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami),[46] Harakat,[51] and some Ismaili troops led by Sayyid Mansor[51] took control of Bagram airbase, 70 km north of Kabul.[46][51]
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin troops moved up to the southern limits of Kabul.[46] Defecting government forces chose sides with those three mujahideen parties: Jamiat-e Islami, Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, offering them their support in case they'd decide to enter Kabul.[46]
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin invades Kabul (15–23 April)
On 15 April 1992, President Mohammad Najibullah was ready to fulfill his role in the plan of 10 April (see above), but the mujahideen parties weren't any longer: some of them now objected against that 10 April agreement.[46] The UN on 15 April did not, as scheduled, fly a pre-interim council into Kabul; apparently, negotiations in Pakistan over such a council were still dragging.[46]
On 16 April, Najibullah was toppled by a coalition of four ethnic
Militias fight in Kabul (24–27 April)
By 24 April 1992, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, seemed on the verge of taking control of Kabul, which prompted Ahmad Shah Massoud's and Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces to also enter the town, to prevent the establishment of a Hekmatyar dictatorship.[46][55]
On 25 April, Hekmatyar with Khalqi allies attempted to overtake Kabul.[56] But Massoud's and Dostum's forces were stronger and forced Hekmatyar with hard fighting out of Kabul by 27 April.[56][45] Hastily now, the mujahideen parties discussing in Peshawar (Pakistan) -- which did not include Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin—agreed[56] on their Peshawar Accords which they announced on 26 April,[46] proclaiming a leadership council assuring residual powers for the party leaders under an interim President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Mujaddidi (a religious leader) serving from 28 April to 28 June 1992.[56] Jamiat's leader Burhanuddin Rabbani would then succeed him as interim President until 28 October, and also in 1992 a national shura was to ratify a provisional constitution[56] and choose an interim government for eighteen months, followed by elections.[46] In these Peshawar Accords, Ahmad Shah Massoud was appointed as interim minister of defense for the Mujaddidi government.[46]
By 27 April 1992, Hekmatyar's
Aftermath
The rest of April, and May–June 1992, civil war flared up over the control of
The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan until October 2001 when they were dethroned by a coalition of the
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- ^ a b c Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for. "Refworld | Afghanistan: The Forgotten War: Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War Since the Soviet Withdrawal". Refworld. Retrieved 12 July 2023.
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- ^ Goodson 2011, p. 189.
- ^ a b Coll, Steve (28 November 2012). "In Afghanistan, Dinner and Then a Coup". The New Yorker – via www.newyorker.com.
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- ^ a b Jefferson 2010, p. 245.
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It also is a setback to the U.S.-Pakistani policy that supports the guerrillas in their fight against the Kabul government of President Najibullah.
- ^ a b c "The Lessons Of Jalalabad; Afghan Guerrillas See Weaknesses Exposed". The New York Times. 13 April 1989.
Casualties have been high on both sides. Government troops have been reduced by heavy guerrilla shelling and rocketing from 12,000 to 9,000, Western diplomats say....The Afghan Air Force is said to be taking advantage of the fact that, probably for the first time in the war, guerrilla forces are concentrated in static positions, which make them easier bombing targets.
- ^ "A Tale of Two Afghan Armies | Small Wars Journal". smallwarsjournal.com. Retrieved 28 June 2023.
- ^ a b c d Nasir, Abbas (18 August 2015). "The legacy of Pakistan's loved and loathed Hamid Gul". Al-Jazeera. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
His commitment to jihad – to an Islamic revolution transcending national boundaries, was such that he dreamed one day the "green Islamic flag" would flutter not just over Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also over territories represented by the (former Soviet Union) Central Asian republics. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as the director-general of the Pakistan's intelligence organisation, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, an impatient Gul wanted to establish a government of the so-called Mujahideen on Afghan soil. He then ordered an assault using non-state actors on Jalalabad, the first major urban centre across the Khyber Pass from Pakistan, with the aim capturing it and declaring it as the seat of the new administration. This was the spring of 1989 and a furious prime minister, Benazir Bhutto – who was kept in the dark by ... Gul and ... Mirza Aslam Beg – demanded that Gul be removed from the ISI.
- ^ a b c d Kaplan, p. 178
- ^ Battle of Jalalabad - Operation Jalalabad - Pak-Afg war, 1989, retrieved 6 July 2023
- ^ Battle of Jalalabad - Operation Jalalabad - Pak-Afg war, 1989, retrieved 6 July 2023
- ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6.[page needed]
- ISBN 9781598847604.
- ^ a b c Marshall, p. 7
- ^ Battle of Jalalabad - Operation Jalalabad - Pak-Afg war, 1989, retrieved 20 May 2023
- ^ ISBN 9780375414862.
- ^ a b c Yousaf, Mohammad; Adkin, Mark. "Afghanistan – The bear trap – Defeat of a superpower". sovietsdefeatinafghanistan.com. Archived from the original on 8 October 2007. Retrieved 27 July 2007.
- ^ Oliker, Olga (13 October 2011). Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience.
- PBS. 29 August 1989. Archived from the originalon 10 November 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2007.
- ISBN 1-4000-3025-0, p. 166
- ^ Afghanistan: The Squandered Victory (1989), retrieved 20 May 2023
- ISBN 9781780761220. Retrieved 2 November 2014.
- ^ [dead link] The Demise of the Soviet Union, 1991 - Library of Congress country studies – Retrieved on 2007-08-21.
- ^ a b Marshall, p. 8
- ^ a b c d e [dead link] The Fall of Kabul, April 1992 – Library of Congress country studies.
- ^ a b c Corwin, Phillip. "Doomed in Afghanistan: A U.N. Officer's memoir of the Fall of Kabul and Najibullah's Failed Escape." 1992. Rutgers University Press. (2003), 70–71
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Sifton, John (6 July 2005). Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity (chapter II, Historical background) (Report). Human Rights Watch.
- ^ Saikal (2004), p. 214–215, 352.
- ^ Saikal (2004), p. 215.
- ISBN 978-0-9821615-0-0.
- ^ Gutman (2008), p. 37.
- ^ a b c "The Fall of Kabul, April 1992". Library of Congress.
- ^ Gutman (2008), p. 34.
- ^ a b c 'Afghan guerrillas order Kabul Army to surrender city'. The New York Times, 18 April 1992. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
- ^ "ВАТАНДЖАР Мохаммад Аслам" (in Russian). База персоналий "Кто есть кто в Центральной Азии". Archived from the original on 23 September 2016. Retrieved 5 April 2011.
- PBS. Archived from the originalon 9 July 2007. Retrieved 27 July 2007.
- ^ a b c d e f 'The Peshawar Accord, 25 April 1992'. Website photius.com. Text from 1997, purportedly sourced on The Library of Congress Country Studies (USA) and CIA World Factbook. Retrieved 22 December 2017.
Bibliography
- Goodson, Larry P. (2011). Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press. OCLC 1026403863.
- Gutman, Roy (2008). How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 978-1-60127-024-5.
- Jefferson, Thomas (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. ISBN 978-0-691-14568-6.
- ISBN 1-4000-3025-0.
- Saikal, Amin (2004). Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-0-85771-478-7.
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