Afghanistan–United Kingdom relations
Afghanistan |
United Kingdom |
---|---|
Diplomatic mission | |
Afghan Embassy, London | British Embassy, Kabul (closed) |
Bilateral relations of
History
The Great Game (1800–1839)
The 19th century was a period of diplomatic competition between the British and Russian empires for spheres of influence in Asia known as the "
In 1832, the First Reform Bill lowering the franchise requirements to vote and hold office in Britain was passed, which the ultra-conservative Emperor Nicholas I of Russia openly disapproved of, setting the stage for an Anglo-Russian "cold war", with many believing that Russian autocracy and British democracy were bound to clash.[5] In 1837, Lord Palmerston and John Hobhouse, fearing the instability of Afghanistan, the Sindh, and the increasing power of the Sikh kingdom to the northwest, raised the spectre of a possible Russian invasion of British India through Afghanistan. The Russian Empire was slowly extending its domain into Central Asia, and this was seen by the East India Company as a possible threat to their interests in India. In 19th century Russia, there was the ideology of Russia's "special mission in the East", namely Russia had the "duty" to conquer much of Asia, though this was more directed against the nations of Central Asia and the alleged "Yellow Peril" of China than India.[6] The British tended to misunderstand the foreign policy of the Emperor Nicholas I as anti-British and intent upon an expansionary policy in Asia; whereas in fact though Nicholas disliked Britain as a liberal democratic state that he considered to be rather "strange", he always believed it was possible to reach an understanding with Britain on spheres of influence in Asia, believing that the essentially conservative nature of British society would retard the advent of liberalism.[7] The main goal of Nicholas's foreign policy was not the conquest of Asia, but rather upholding the status quo in Europe, especially by co-operating with Prussia and Austria, and in isolating France, as Louis Philippe I, the King of the French was a man who Nicholas hated as an "usurper".[8] The duc d'Orleans had once been Nicholas's friend, but when he assumed the throne of France after the revolution of 1830, Nicholas was consumed with hatred for his former friend who, as he saw it, had gone over to what he perceived as the dark side of liberalism.[9]
The Company sent an envoy to
Alexander Burnes, the Scotsman who served as the East India Company's chief political officer in Afghanistan wrote home after having dinner with Count Witkiewicz and Dost Mohammad in late December 1837: "We are in a mess home. The emperor of Russia has sent an envoy to Kabul to offer...money [to the Afghans] to fight Rajeet Singh!!! I could not believe my own eyes or ears."[12] On 20 January 1838, Lord Auckland sent an ultimatum to Dost Mohammad telling him: "You must desist from all correspondence with Russia. You must never receive agents from them, or have aught to do with them without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Viktevitch [Witkiewicz] with courtesy; you must surrender all claims to Peshawar".[15] Burnes himself had complained that Lord Auckland's letter was "so dictatorial and supercilious as to indicate the writer's intention that it should give offense", and tried to avoid delivering it for long as possible.[16] Dost Mohammad was indeed offended by the letter, but in order to avoid a war, he had his special military advisor, the American adventurer Josiah Harlan engage in talks with Burnes to see if some compromise could be arranged.[17] Burnes in fact had no power to negotiate anything, and Harlan complained that Burnes was just stalling, which led to Dost Mohammad expelling the British diplomatic mission on 26 April 1838.[17]
British fears of a Russian invasion of India took one step closer to becoming a reality when negotiations between the Afghans and Russians broke down in 1838. The
On 1 October 1838, Lord Auckland issued the Simla Declaration, attacking Dost Mohammed Khan for making "an unprovoked attack" on the empire of "our ancient ally, Maharaja Ranjeet Singh". Auckland went on to declare that Suja Shah was "popular throughout Afghanistan" and would enter his former realm "surrounded by his own troops and [...] supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by the British Army".[20] As the Persians had broken off the siege of Herat and the Emperor Nicholas I of Russia had ordered Count Vitkevich home (he would commit suicide upon reaching St. Petersburg), the reasons for attempting to put Shuja Shah back on the Afghan throne had vanished.[3] The British historian Sir John William Kaye wrote that the failure of the Persians to take Herat "cut from under the feet of Lord Auckland all ground of justification and rendered the expedition across the Indus at once a folly and a crime".[20] Still, at this point Auckland was committed to putting Afghanistan into the British sphere of influence, and nothing would stop him from going ahead with the invasion.[20]
On 25 November 1838, the two most powerful armies on the Indian subcontinent assembled in a grand review at Ferozepore as Ranjit Singh, the Maharajah of the Punjab brought out the Dal Khalsa to march alongside the sepoy troops of the East India Company and the British troops in India. Lord Auckland himself was present, amid much colorful pageantry and music as men dressed in brightly colored uniforms together with horses and elephants marched in an impressive demonstration of military might.[21] Lord Auckland declared that the "Grand Army of the Indus" would now start the march on Kabul to depose Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Shah back on the Afghan throne, ostensibly because the latter was the rightful emir, but in reality to place Afghanistan into the British sphere of influence.[3] The Duke of Wellington speaking in the House of Lords condemned the invasion, saying that the real difficulties would only begin after the invasion's success. He predicted that the Anglo-Indian force would rout the Afghan tribal levy, but then find themselves struggling to hold on due to the terrain of the Hindu Kush mountains and the fact that Afghanistan had no modern roads. He called the entire operation "stupid", given that Afghanistan was a land of "rocks, sands, deserts, ice and snow".[20]
First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842)
The First Anglo-Afghan War (
Treaty of Peshawar and buildup to the second war (1839–1878)
After months of chaos in Kabul, Mohammad Akbar Khan secured local control and in April 1843 his father Dost Mohammad, who had been released by the British, returned to the throne in Afghanistan. In the following decade, Dost Mohammad concentrated his efforts on reconquering Mazari Sharif, Konduz, Badakhshan, and Kandahar. Mohammad Akbar Khan died in 1845. During the
By 1854, the British wanted to resume relations with Dost Mohammad, whom they had essentially ignored in the intervening twelve years. The 1855 Treaty of Peshawar reopened diplomatic relations, proclaimed respect for each side's territorial integrity, and pledged both sides as friends of each other's friends and enemies of each other's enemies.
In 1857 an addendum to the 1855 treaty permitted a British military mission to become a presence in Kandahar (but not Kabul) during a conflict with the Persians, who had attacked Herat in 1856. During the Indian Rebellion of 1857, some British officials suggested restoring Peshawar to Dost Mohammad, in return for his support against the rebellious sepoys of the Bengal Army, but this view was rejected by British political officers on the North West frontier, who believed that Dost Mohammad would see this as a sign of weakness and turn against the British.[23]
In 1863 Dost Mohammad retook Herat with British acquiescence. A few weeks later, he died. Sher Ali Khan, his third son, and proclaimed successor, failed to recapture Kabul from his older brother, Mohammad Afzal (whose troops were led by his son, Abdur Rahman) until 1868, after which Abdur Rahman retreated across the Amu Darya and bided his time.
In the years immediately following the First Anglo-Afghan War, and especially after the Indian rebellion of 1857 against the British in India,
Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880)
The Second Anglo-Afghan War (
After tension between Russia and Britain in Europe ended with the June 1878
The emir not only refused to receive a British mission under
The war was split into two campaigns – the first began in November 1878 with the
The second campaign ended in September 1880 when the British decisively defeated Ayub Khan outside Kandahar. A new emir selected by the British, Abdur Rahman Khan, ratified and confirmed the Gandamak treaty once more. When the British and Indian soldiers had withdrawn, the Afghans agreed to let the British attain all of their geopolitical objectives, as well as create a buffer between the British Raj and the Russian Empire.[26]
40 years of good relations (1880–1919)
The end of the Second Afghan War in 1880 marked the beginning of almost 40 years of good relations between Britain and Afghanistan under the leadership of Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan, during which time the British attempted to manage Afghan foreign policy through the payment of a large subsidy.[27] While ostensibly the country remained independent, under the Treaty of Gandumak (1879) it accepted that in external matters it would "...have no windows looking on the outside world, except towards India".[27]
The death in 1901 of emir Abdur Rahman Khan led indirectly to the war that began 18 years later. His successor, Habibullah, was a pragmatic leader who sided with Britain or Russia, depending on Afghan interests.
Despite remaining neutral in the conflict, Habibullah did in fact accept a Turkish-German mission in Kabul and military assistance from the
A Turco-German mission left Kabul in 1916. By that time, however, it had successfully convinced Habibullah that Afghanistan was an independent nation and that it should be beholden to no one. With the end of the First World War, Habibullah sought to obtain reward from the
This resulted in a power struggle, as Habibullah's brother Nasrullah Khan proclaimed himself as Habibullah's successor, while Amanullah, Habibullah's third son, had also proclaimed himself emir. The Afghan army suspected Amanullah's complicity in the death of his father. Needing a way of cementing his power, upon seizing the throne in April 1919 Amanullah posed as a man of democratic ideals, promising reforms in the system of government. He stated that there should be no forced labour, tyranny or oppression, and that Afghanistan should be free and independent and no longer bound by the Treaty of Gandamak.[27]
Amanullah had his uncle Nasrullah arrested for Habibullah's murder and had him sentenced to life imprisonment. Nasrullah had been the leader of a more conservative element in Afghanistan and his treatment rendered Amanullah's position as emir somewhat tenuous. By April 1919 he realised that if he could not find a way to placate the conservatives, he would be unlikely to maintain his hold on power. Looking for a diversion from the internal strife in the Afghan court and sensing advantage in the rising civil unrest in India following the
Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919)
The Third Anglo-Afghan War (
Alleged British involvement in the Khost rebellion (1924)
The Khost rebellion,
During the rebellion, The Afghan government portrayed rebel leaders as traitors seeking to serve British interests, and that the campaigns against the rebels were undertaken in the defense of Afghanistan against British influence. In British Raj however, it was generally suspected that the Soviet Union was responsible for providing financial and military aid to the rebels, while in the Soviet Union, the blame was put on Britain. Senzil Nawid writes that despite claims of British involvement by Afghan historians and the contemporary Afghan press, "neither the press reports nor Afghan historians have provided corroborating evidence for this theory".[48] The British Library website claims that Britain supported the Afghan government.[49]
British role in the Afghan Civil War (1929)
The Afghan Civil War was fought from 14 November 1928 to 13 October 1929. Rebelling, and subsequently governing
According to a later British ambassador in Afghanistan, William Kerr Fraser-Tytler, the British empire, though officially neutral, was very concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and they "made up a set of rules to govern the situation. It was unneutral to refuse an Afghan entry into Afghanistan, but once he was in he became a contestant, and it would be unneutral to allow him to recross the border, seeking a brief asylum before plunging again into the fray. And so in a mixture of the rules of cricket and football it was ordained that a player might go on the field once, and play for the crown. But if he was forced into touch, and recrossed the line, whether voluntarily or not, he was 'out' and the referee would not let him back into the game."[50]
Many commentators in Afghanistan and elsewhere hold the belief that Britain played a part in the fall of Amanullah in January 1929, and this is supported by Soviet Historiography.[51] According to Encyclopædia Iranica, "While it can not be dismissed out of hand, the fact remains that no evidence to support it can be found in the copious British Indian archives pertaining to this period. There can be no doubt, however, that behind the stance of official neutrality which the British maintained throughout the crisis of 1929 lay an unwillingness to help Amān-Allāh to reconquer his throne and a benevolence toward the moves of Nāder Khan. While the Soviet authorities favored Amān-Allāh (though reluctantly) and aided a foray on his behalf by Ḡolām Nabī Čarḵī in the Balḵ region, the British authorities allowed Nāder Khan to reenter Afghanistan through India and to obtain a decisive addition of strength through his recruitment of thousands of armed Wazīr and Masʿūd frontier tribesmen. Also helpful was their decision to lift a restriction order, imposing residence at a fixed address in India, on Fażl ʿOmar Mojaddedī, who was to play an apparently decisive role in persuading the Naqšbandī mollās of Afghanistan to change sides and later was to become Nāder Shah's first minister of justice. In short, while all the evidence indicates that Bačča-ye Saqqā (Kalakani)’s rise was due solely to the internal disintegration of King Amān-Allāh's régime, there can be no doubt that British policy, tacit rather than explicit, helped to bring about Bačča-ye Saqqā’s fall".[51]
British role in the Afghan tribal revolts of 1944–1947
Britain cooperated with the Afghan government in suppressing the tribal revolts of 1944–1947, via blockade, weapons sales and aerial bombardment.[citation needed]
British role in the Afghanistan conflict (1978–2021)
The United Kingdom did not contribute nor actively oppose the communist-led
In 2001–2014, British combat forces served with NATO in Afghanistan when
On 28 January 2010,
During the fall of Kabul, on August 16, 2021, the U.K. sent 200 additional troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total number of U.K troops in the country to 900, in order to assist with evacuation.[56]
Diplomatic missions
See also
- The Great Game, Russia and Britain manoeuvre for influence
- First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842)
- Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1881)
- Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919)
- Fourth Anglo-Afghan War(November 2001 – October 2014) part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Notes
- ^ Following a similar trend to what was happening in Afghanistan, there had been a rising nationalist movement in India at the same time, culminating in riots and disorder in Punjab. On 13 April 1919, Dyer learnt that a large political meeting was taking place at the Jallianwala Bagh, an enclosed area in Amritsar. Fearing that the agitators would incite the crowd to violence and murder and that he had a very small force to protect the European community, Dyer marched 50 men into the Bagh and subsequently opened fire, killing 379 and wounding a further 1,500.Collett 2007
References
- ^ SHIREEN M. MAZARI (1979). THE DURAND LINE: EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER.
- ^ a b "A Brief History of the Embassy and Ambassadors of Afghanistan in London". 5 December 2013.
- ^ a b c d Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 110.
- ^ Fromkin, David "The Great Game in Asia" pp. 936–51 from Foreign Affairs, Volume 58, Issue 4, Spring 1980 pp. 937–38
- ^ Fromkin, David "The Great Game in Asia" pp. 936–51 from Foreign Affairs, Volume 58, Issue 4, Spring 1980 p. 938
- ^ Eskridge-Kosmach, Alena "The Russian Press and the Ideas of Russia's ‘Special Mission in the East’ and ‘Yellow Peril’" pp. 661–75 from Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 27, November 2014 pp. 661–62.
- ^ Riasanovsky, Nicholas Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 p. 255.
- ^ Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855, (1959) pp. 257–58.
- ^ Riasanovsky, p. 258.
- ^ L. W. Adamec/J. A. Norris, Anglo-Afghan Wars, in Encyclopædia Iranica, online ed., 2010
- ^ J.A. Norris, Anglo-Afghan Relations Archived 2013-05-17 at the Wayback Machine, in Encyclopædia Iranica, online ed., 2010
- ^ a b c d e Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 111.
- ISBN 978-0-8021-4558-1.
- ^ a b Macintyre, Ben The Man Who Would Be King, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 p. 205
- ^ Macintyre, Ben The Man Who Would Be King, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 pp. 205–06
- ^ Macintyre, Ben The Man Who Would Be King, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 p. 206
- ^ a b Macintyre, Ben The Man Who Would Be King, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 pp. 206–07
- ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 pp. 110–11.
- ^ Macintyre, Ben The Man Who Would Be King, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 p. 32
- ^ a b c d e Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 112.
- ^ Perry, James Arrogant Armies, Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 pp. 109–10.
- ^ Antoinette Burton, "On the First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839–42: Spectacle of Disaster"
- ISBN 0-349-11456-0.
- ^ a b Barthorp 2002, pp. 66–67
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 28 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 898.
- ^ Barfield p. 145
- ^ a b c Sidebotham, Herbert (16 August 1919). "The Third Afghan War". New Statesman. Archived from the original on 5 June 2011. Retrieved 17 January 2009.
- ^ a b Wilkinson-Latham 1998, p. 22
- ^ a b Molesworth 1962, p. 20
- ^ a b c d Barthorp 2002, p. 149
- ^ Wilkinson-Latham 1998, p. 23
- ^ Molesworth 1962, p. 22
- ^ Molesworth 1962, pp. 22–23
- ^ Barthorp 2002, pp. 150–151
- ^ Collett 2007
- ^ ISBN 9781558761544.
- ISBN 9781135923105.
- ISBN 9780810878150.
- ^ Pazhvāk, ʻabd al-Raḥmān (1959). Aryana, ancient Afghanistan.
- ISBN 9788186420003.
- ^ "Anglo Afghan Wars". Encyclopaedia Iranica. Retrieved 30 May 2016.
- ^ Barthorp 2002, p. 157
- ^ Arwin Rahi. "Why the Durand Line Matters". The Diplomat.
In contrast to many historical accounts, Afghanistan did recognize the Durand Line as an international border. Abdur Rahman Khan's successor, Amir Habibullah Khan, in 1905 signed a new agreement with Britain confirming the legality of the Durand Line. More importantly, article 5 of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919, on the basis of which Afghanistan reclaimed its independence, says that Afghanistan accepted all previously agreed border arrangements with India.
- ISBN 978-1-85109-402-8. Retrieved 1 April 2011.
- ISBN 9781558761551.
- ISBN 9780801407727.
- ISBN 9780810879577.
- ^ Nawid, Senzil. "The Khost Rebellion. The Reaction of Afghan Clerical and Tribal Forces to Social Change" (PDF). opar.unior.it. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 December 2018. Retrieved 25 December 2018.
- ^ "Afghanistan 1919–1928: Sources in the India Office Records". vll-minos.bl.uk. Retrieved 6 November 2019.
1925 Jan: Khost rebellion finally put down with British support.
- ISBN 9781558761544.
- ^ a b "BAČČA-YE SAQQĀ – Encyclopaedia Iranica". www.iranicaonline.org. Retrieved 2019-07-07.
- ^ Edgar O'Ballance, Afghan wars 1839–1992: what Britain gave up and the Soviet Union lost (Brassey's, 1993).
- ^ BBC News, "Inside Camp Bastion" 24 September 2012 online
- ^ See BBC News, "UK troops 'to leave Afghanistan as planned" (27 May 2014)
- ^ "Afghanistan: The London Conference 28 January 2010 Communiqué Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership" (PDF).
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(help) - ^ Morton, Becky (16 August 2021). "UK confident it can get Britons out of Afghanistan, Ben Wallace says". BBC News. Retrieved 16 August 2021.
Sources
- Barthorp, Michael (2002) [1982]. Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839–1947. London: Cassell. ISBN 0-304-36294-8.
- Collett, Nigel (2007). The Butcher of Amritsar. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-85285-575-8.
- Molesworth, George (1962). Afghanistan 1919—An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War. New York: Asia Publishing House. OCLC 7233999.
- Wilkinson-Latham, Robert (1998) [1977]. North-West Frontier 1837–1947. Men-at-Arms Series # 72. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 0-85045-275-9.
Further reading
- Adamec, Ludwig W. Afghanistan's foreign affairs to the mid-twentieth century: relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (University of Arizona Press, 1974).
- Finlan, Alastair. Contemporary Military Strategy and the Global War on Terror: US and UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001–2012 (2014)
- Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839–1919 (2014)
- Nawid, Senzil. 1997. “The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan During the 19th and Early 20th Centuries”. International Journal of Middle East Studies (1997) 29#4.: 581–605. in JSTOR
- Tripodi, Christian. "Grand Strategy and the Graveyard of Assumptions: Britain and Afghanistan, 1839–1919." Journal of Strategic Studies 33.5 (2010): 701–725. online