History of the Backward Caste movement in Bihar

The Backward Caste movement in

Kaeth kichhu lelen delen, Brahaman khiyaulen
Dhan, pan paniyaulen, au rar jati latiyaulen
(A Kayasth does what you want on payment, a Brahman on being fed
paddy and betel on being watered
But a low caste man on being kicked.)[4]

However, the "untouchables" or the Dalits were the worst sufferers in this hierarchy, as they were in kamia-malik (labourer-landlord) relationship with the landlords. Under this system, the landlords hired them to work off small debts given them in time of need. The condition for repayment was such that the interest increased and the debt of the father ended up being passed on to the son. In this way, the landless labourers become fully dependent on their master and a kind of "bondage" or "serfdom" prevailed.^[4]

History of peasant struggle in Bihar

In the 19th century, the peasants of Bihar were involved in individual heroic struggles against the intermediaries in isolated events like the

By claiming a noble Kshatriya past, these peasant communities challenged the socio-economic dominance of the elites. This drew antipathy from elite caste groups towards the Kshatriya reform movements, which were portrayed as a question of dignity and self-respect by the reformers. The first instance of this antipathy was the work of Kunwar Chheda Sinha who wrote a book on the anti-Kshatriya reform movement. It avoided the social and cultural transformation going on in contemporary society and connected the movement to the aspirations of Jati activists seeking employment in higher government posts and the rising concern with caste pedigree that was tied to the policy of hierarchical ranking in the census office. The book, published by Sinha in 1907, was circulated widely by the Rajput Anglo-Oriental Press to check the pace of upward mobility of the peasant communities in caste hierarchy.^[7]

This antipathy of the

The Yadavs, who claimed lineage from the mythological

The Bhumihars were yet another caste seeking upliftment in their social status long before the OBC castes like the Yadav and the Kushwaha. They were referred to as "Babhan" in Bihar and were concentrated prominently there and in some parts of Uttar Pradesh. The Bhumihars were classified in the colonial censuses as Shudra along with the scribe caste, the Kayastha who were educationally equivalent to upper-castes.^[10] Before the formation of Bhumihar Brahmin Mahasabha in 1889 to seek the upliftment of socio-cultural status, there were several theories regarding the origin of Bhumihars. According to Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, they belonged to some "lower caste" and were promoted to the status of a Brahmin by order of a Raja who wanted the presence of a large number of Brahmins to celebrate his religious festivals. The other popular narrative featured them as belonging to a tribe called the Bhuyans who gained land and claimed Brahmin status. According to another theory, a group of them were descendants of Rati Raut, a goala (a herder),^[11] or an offshoot of mixed marriages between Rajputs and Brahmins.^[12]

By the 1930s, the great depression had swept over India and income from agricultural land was dwindling. It became clear that as independence proceeded the zamindari would soon end. Caste associations began to manoeuvre community support for

The Kurmis were another agricultural caste present in Bihar and made up around three to four per cent of its population in the 1930s. They claimed kshatriya status like the Yadavs. The Ramanandi Sampraday, a socio-cultural movement launched to bring Shudra castes into the fold of monastic order, prepared the ground for this. By the late 19th century, the Kurmi leaders were the first among the low castes' leaders to claim a Kshatriya past by propagating stories through printed bulletins. These stories argued that the Kurmi and the Koeris (also called Kushwaha), a similar caste, were the descendants of the twin sons of Rama and his wife Sita, Lav and Kush. The various Koeris' subcastes, like the Kachhi and the Murao, also claimed descent from Kusha, but no attempt to merge these two groups (Kurmi and Koeri) ever occurred.^[13]

The first Kurmi caste association was formed in

...the Kurmis historically enjoyed the reputation of a violent caste and ruthless Kulak, that attempted to impose feudal dominance and consideration of hierarchy over Dalits. In fact, one of the early caste army in Bihar is directly attributed to the social ascendency of Kurmis in state.[14]

In contrast, the Koeris, according to Kumar, are a horticulturist caste generally considered non-aggressive and disinterested in caste riots. They also attempted to seek Kshatriya status and formed the Kushwaha Kshatriya Mahasabha as their nodal caste association in 1922. Historically, Koeris have participated in increasing horizontal mobilisation of caste association of the backward castes in Bihar.

The lower backwards and the Dalits

The agrarian society of Bihar also consisted of a large section of unprivileged people who belonged to the lower backwards castes or the Dalit castes. Unlike the upper backwards— the Koeris, Kurmis and Yadavs, these caste groups hailed primarily from artisan backgrounds and had remained associated with a variety of low scale non-agricultural activities in the past. Prominent among them were the

Unlike artisan groups which were less discriminated against, other communities such as the Dalits have faced historical discrimination by the upper-castes. They were

Gaya, Nawada, Kishanganj, Aurangabad and Kaimur districts. The Indian National Congress in the Bihar provided mileage to Dalit politics in the pre-Mandal [1990] period. Leaders like Jagjivan Ram, who hailed from the Chamar caste, were the tallest leaders at the national level in Congress. The Dalits were the worst sufferers of routine caste massacres, which were a post-independence (1947) phenomenon in rural Bihar. They were later mobilised by the Maoist groups and asserted their rights in an agrarian setup. With the beginning of Mandal politics, the Dalits started supporting Lalu Yadav's politics of social justice but shifted to the Lok Janshakti Party after the emergence of Ram Vilas Paswan, a politically astute Socialist leader.^[14]

Emergence of a new class in the peasantry

The changing agrarian relations and the zeal of the aspiring peasant castes to improve their cultural status resulted in face-offs between them and the elite "upper caste". The most common form of antipathy was a social boycott of the

Backward Castes vowing to attain a Kshatriya identity, which was witnessed by the attempts of the "twice born" caste groups to make it difficult for the Yadavs to perform their necessary rituals. Later, this antipathy started turning into violence and caste riots, as witnessed in the Lakhochak riots (1925), where Bhumihars brutally attacked a Jāti conference of Yadavs.^[18]

On the morning of the 27th, before the arrival of the armed police at Lakho Chak, a large body of rioters advanced upon the village. The local police intervened to expostulate and were at once surrounded, the Sub-Inspector and Chaukidar [village watchman] received grievous injuries and the other constables of the party were hurt. After ill-treating the local police, the rioters retired temporarily but returned to the attack soon after the arrival of the S.P. [Superintendent of Police] with his force. The Superintendent and S.D.O [Subdivisional District Officer] went out to meet the advancing rioters and attempted to parley with them. The attacking party, however, to the number of about 3000 armed with lathis [heavy, metal tipped bamboo truncheons], axes, and spears continued to advance and the police were forced to fire to protect themselves and the Goalas. Although temporarily checked by the fire, the Babhan party continued to advance as they outflanked the police on both sides, the police were forced to retire fighting to the village site three or four hundred yards to their rear. The retirement was effected in good order and after the defending party reached the village the rioters withdrew.

-William Pinch
(Peasants and Monk in British India.)[18]

Similarly, the

Janeu movement, which urged the OBC castes to wear 'sacred thread', also met with the same fate and antipathy by the upper castes. The Janeu refers to a sacred thread won by the upper castes after the Upanayana ceremony, which allots the "twice born" status to them. When the Goalas of Bihar initiated the Janeu movement and started wearing the thread to uplift their cultural status in the first decade of the 20th century, they encountered strong resistance from the Bhumihars and the Thakurs.^[19]

Meanwhile, the economic prosperity of the upper caste was waning as they could hardly farm a productive yield on their large plots of land without the help of sharecroppers or hired labourers. In contrast, the peasant castes used the labour of their family members to extract more and more from their holdings. There also existed the notion of high 'ritual status' which forbade the upper caste from touching the plow in the period under consideration which is observed by revenue specialists like Denzil Ibbetson and mentioned by Susan Bayly, who blames them for being responsible for their own decline. Praising the peasant castes for their skill and hard work, Bayly argues that if they become indebted, it was not because of their deeds but because of the money lending Bania caste. Bayly observes that the Rajputs and the Brahmins who took pride in shunning the plough and secluding their womenfolk ended up selling their unproductive holdings.^[20]

Post Independence

The rural Bihar witnessed a remarkable shift owing to the liquidation of the Zamindari in the post-independence period. As a result, the big landlords and the Maharajas began losing control over their tenants, and the legal ways to keep tabs on them became ineffective. Growing Naxalite pressure and the Ceiling laws which made the possession of land above a set acreage an offence, forced upper caste landlords to sell off some of their vulnerable holdings, which were increasingly bought by the middle caste peasants. The Koeri, Kurmi and the Yadav peasantry pushed ahead of others. There also existed a bond between these peasant castes and their land, which they treated as their most productive asset. Arun Sinha mentions the variety of causes for the upper castes to sell their lands. While most of them were forced to sell by leftist 'land grab campaigns' and were happy with whatever prices they got, many of them sold their land it to pay for lavish weddings or the professional education of their children.^[21]

The reduction in landholdings of the upper-castes synchronised with their rapid urbanisation. By the 1970s, the standards of judging individual progress by urbanisation brought them more frequently to towns than the backward castes. Since the upper-castes hardly engaged in agriculture themselves in those days, their descendants (according to Sinha) chose to live in cities while the backwards remained deeply rooted in their villages.^[21]

Backward caste politics after 1990

1990-2005 : Premiership of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Rabri Devi

See also: Politics of Bihar

Lalu Prasad with the U.S. Financial Services Industry Study Group delegation led by Mr. David Blair when they called on him in New Delhi (Left) ; A delegation from Bihar led by the Union Railway Minister, Shri Lalu Prasad calling on the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in New Delhi in connection with the prevailing flood situation in Bihar, on August 26, 2008 (Right).

Lalu Prasad Yadav was a product of student politics of the 1970s.^[22] Mathew and Moore classified the steps taken by Yadav after assuming power with the terminology "politics of state incapacity". The quota for the Other Backward and the and Extremely Backward classes was increased from the earlier ceiling. Violating reservation rules was made a punishable offence, and the statutes were passed to reserve 50% of the seats in the senate and syndicate of the universities. Apart from this, the selection of most of the

vice-chancellors and the directors of the higher educational institutions was made overwhelmingly from the OBCs. In case of a dearth of qualified people from the OBCs to assume the position, the government chose to keep the position vacant rather than appointing a person belonging to an upper caste. This step transformed the nature and composition of educational institutions which the forward caste had monopolised until then. The three-percent quota for the economically weaker section irrespective of castes, which could have benefitted poor from the upper caste, was also abolished.^[23]

The minority upper caste had dominated the state's

toddy to the benefit of the Pasi and proclaimed that fisherman (Mallah) would have the right to fish from the river which had earlier depended on the will of the village strongmen.^[23]

The Charwaha Schools, established for the children of the cattle herders, drew widespread criticism from political circles, with some claiming it to be a mockery of elementary education and a hub of third-rate primary education. In the latter half of the 1990s, when Lalu was facing charges for his implicit involvement in the Fodder Scam, he was successful in convincing his core electorate, the backwards, that the "system", which is controlled by the upper castes, was hatching a conspiracy to finish him. The stringent action by the Chief Election Commissioner and the threat by the Bharatiya Janata Party to impose president's rule on the state, were linked as part of bigger conspiracy against him.^[23]

Lalu Prasad's governing style was a triumph of the backward castes. The backwards or the OBCs were encouraged to assert themselves in politics and local community relations, often resorting to violence, illegality and crime.^[23]

Confrontation with the upper-caste dominated bureaucracy

The Yadav's tenure also witnessed the emergence of a wide rift between the Dalits, the

Scheduled Caste and the forward caste who were earlier aligned together against the rising Upper-Backward peasantry in political circles. A newly founded, armed militia, the Ranvir Sena of the Bhumihar caste was the prime reason behind this rift. The Sena had perpetrated ghastly massacres of the Scheduled Castes including those in Laxmanpur Bathe, where nearly 50 Dalits including women and children were murdered. Such an incident gave mileage to the Yadav's politics as the slogan, "Vikas nahi samman chahiy" (we need dignity not development) served as a guiding light for these capital scarce, downtrodden communities.^[24]

The retaliatory killings of the landlords by the Naxalites also took place, but these killings were less frequent than those of the past, due to the weakening of the organisational structure of the erstwhile Naxal groups. In the past, many militants from the Koeri, Yadav and the Kurmi landed caste were also attracted to these armed groups. For instance, the CPI (ML) drew its support largely from the Koeri and Yadav castes, but after the foundation of Rashtriya Janata Dal, the successor of Lalu's Janata Dal, the Koeri and Yadav militants were attracted to it being enamoured by the electoral politics. Similarly, according to a report by the Asian Development Research Institute the Kurmi caste used to held sway in People's War group while Yadavs were dominant in the Maoist Communist Centre. The infatuation of these castes with democratic politics left a leadership vacuum in the Naxal groups, which were now controlled from the top by leaders of upper castes while its local level workers belonged to Scheduled Castes.^[24]

Meanwhile, the massacres perpetrated by the Ranvir Sena and the support of some of the

SCs. In response to occasional demands for roads and physical infrastructure, the Yadav explained to the masses that development of infrastructure would benefit the contractors, the rich and the capitalists and for them 'dignity' is the real panacea.^[24]

A study done at the Jitwarpur village in the Araria district of Bihar explains the conception of 'dignity' and what it meant for the lower castes. 31% of the village's population belonged to the Brahmin caste who exercised control over most of the village's orchards and productive land. The upper-OBCs were five per cent and rest of the population was composed of the lower OBCs and the SCs. Prior to 1990, the Brahmin landlords were also dominant politically. They used to use foul language and accused the lower castes working in their fields of being lazy and greedy. Sometimes, public humiliation and physical intimidation were perpetrated against them but the lower castes were accustomed to it, as they depended on the Brahimns' lands for their livelihoods.of the Brahmins.^[24]

By 1990, during the Yadav's tenure, it was impossible in a normal situation for the Brahmins to win even a

Independence and Republic day.^[24]

The bureaucracy was drastically undermined during the Yadav's rule because of the dominance of upper caste in it. Because of a lack of backward caste officers for appointment to important offices, the Yadav had to rely upon existing officers who had ferocious attitudes towards them. Hence, steps were taken to centralise the power of bureaucracy and subject it to the rigid control of democratically elected backward caste leaders. Many times, public humiliation of the officers also took place. One positive aspect of this step was the consolidation of self confidence of the poor and vulnerable who were harassed earlier by officialdom in situations involving "conflict with law". The political leaders were more easily approachable by the poor than the officials and were also close to them. Hence, a poor person coming from the lower caste benefitted from the de-elitisation of the administration. They could now approach their leaders to deal with the administration, which was still under the control of the elites.[25] It was reported that many petitioners who visited the Yadav chief minister with their pleas witnessed the chief secretary of Bihar acting like a servant and passing the bowl for him to spit

Paan and Khaini which was his custom.^[26] There also used to be a spitting bowl wherever he visited, not only for him but for other Paan-loving leaders of his party.^[27]

Surge in crime, and the criminal-politician nexus

The Yadav's rule also resulted in marginalisation of upper caste criminals from the high-value organised criminal activities formerly monopolised in the erstwhile governments by them. During 1990 to 1995, backward caste gangsters belonging primarily to the

Organised crimes like kidnapping, timber-logging, ransom-killing and vehicle theft could thrive under political patronage, which was enjoyed by the upper castes during Congress's regime. But with the advent of Janata Dal patronage shifted to backward-caste criminals.^[28]

In most cases big merchants were the target and several incidents revealed the implicit involvement of the state machinery in the crimes. In one incident which took place in 1995, India Today reported that the personal physician of Lalu Prasad was accosted by a gang of youths when he was driving to his workplace. He was pulled from his car and the criminals fled with it. When the physician approached the chief minister's residence, he saw his car parked in front of it. To his surprise, one of the culprits was also sitting in the drawing room. After he complained, the Yadav allegedly advised him to pay the youths a sum of ₹ 50,000 for the return of his car, which he did.^[29]

Socio-economic condition of backward castes under Yadav and Kumar

Umesh Kushwaha, the party claims to represent non-Yadav OBCs, primary the Koeri and Kurmi caste, which were the core vote base of party.^[30]; Narendra Modi being received by the Chief Minister of Bihar, Shri Nitish Kumar and the Deputy Chief Minister of Bihar, Shri Sushil Modi, on his arrival, at Purnea, Bihar on August 26, 2017 & The Vice President, Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu being bid farewell by the Governor of Bihar, Shri Satya Pal Malik

and the Chief Minister of Bihar, Shri Nitish Kumar, on his departure, in Patna, Bihar on March 22, 2018 (From left to Right).

Despite populist measures like the abolition of the zamindari and positive discrimination in the form of reservation for lower castes, the upper-caste retained their socio-economic dominance by exploiting loopholes in the existing legislation. For a long time, the Congress was backed by these upper-caste members who still managed to dominate the block, the bank and the thana (police stations)—the tripod of rural India which determines the hierarchy of status in their feudal society. The cultivation of association with these institutions was an important feature of the dominance enjoyed by the upper caste in rural agrarian society. With Mandal politics stirring up the state and the ascendency of OBC leaders like Lalu, the upper-caste lost their importance in state level politics. As ascertained through reports, the upper-caste made up 46% of the membership of the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 1952, a highly disproportionate number compared to their actual population in the state. With the rise of OBCs, they were reduced to 23% in 2000. But, they again managed to represent 30% of the membership of the assembly in 2010, when the Bharatiya Janata Party emerged as a significant player in the state's politics in alliance with Nitish Kumar. It is reported that while Lalu's policies affected the twice-born castes at the upper level of the state's administration and politics, the steps taken by Nitish to extend the caste-based quota to the local institutions and Panchayats, marginalised them at the grassroots level. Earlier, because of their influence in grassroot level institutions, the upper-caste managed to make the lower castes vote for the parties and candidates of their choice. In the absence of this, the upper caste depended totally upon the brokers—the lower-caste people, who manned these institutions—to assert themselves, making it a costly affair.^[31]

According to a 2018 report in

Bhim Rao Ambedkar^[32] popularised Lalu amongst the untouchables and the poor meanwhile alienating the upper-caste bastion in the state who dominated the bureaucracy and the media. Journalist Dilip Mandal argues that the upper-caste dominated media demonised Lalu, because of his robust stand on the enforcement of the quota for the lower castes, but it did not help to destroy his political strength in the state. In the 2015 assembly elections, the RJD and the Janata Dal (United) alliance humbled the Bharatiya Janata Party which won only 53 seats in the 243-member Bihar legislative assembly.^[33]

Even after the initial success of the Nitish Kumar government in bringing some Bihari expatriates to reinvest in the state following his apparent control of crime, private sector investment in the state remained far from satisfactory taking a downturn because of a host of factors including an uncooperative bureaucracy. John Albert Rorabacher in his book Bihar and Mithila: The historical roots of backwardness writes:

The state has failed to attract private investors; although many Bihar expatriates at one time, began to reinvest in Bihar based on the apparent elimination of street crimes and the rapid increase in infrastructural development projects. This temporary euphoria quickly faded as private investors were faced with non availability of land for industries, power shortages and a lackadaisical and uncooperative bureaucracy.[34]

In the period before Yadav's Janata Dal assumed power, industrial development was at a precarious stage compared to India's more developed states. According to reports, the share of the manufacturing sector was only 13.4% of the state's net domestic product in 1984-85.^[35]

References

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Further reading

• Sankarshan Thakur (2015). The Brothers Bihari. Harper Collins.
  ISBN 978-9351774815
  .
• Sankarshan Thakur (2014). Single Man : The Life and Time of Nitish Kumar of Bihar. HarperCollins.
  ISBN 978-9350297780
  .
• Corbridge, Stuart; Williams, Glyn; Srivastava, Manoj; Véron, René (22 September 2005). Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India. Cambridge University Press.
  ISBN 978-1-139-44575-7
  .
• Pararia mass rape: After it shocked India, judgement doubts character of the women
• Andrew Byrnes; Jane Frances Connors; Lum Bik (1997). Advancing the Human Rights of Women: Using International Human Rights Standards in Domestic Litigation. Commonwealth Secretariat.
  ISBN 0850925150
  .
• Srivastava, Sumit Saurabh. “EMERGENCE OF BACKWARD CASTE POLITICS IN BIHAR: COALITION, ALIGNMENT AND DOMINANCE.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 75, no. 4, 2014, pp. 675–86. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26575546.

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