Al-Awasim

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
(Redirected from
Al-ʿAwāṣim
)
Thughur and Awasim
اَلـثُّـغُـوْر وَالْـعَـوَاصِـم
al-thughūr wa-l-ʿawāṣim
Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt
In usec. 750sc. 962s, 14th century–1514
Garrison information
Garrison25,000 in c. 780[1]

Al-ʿAwāṣim (

Caliphates in Cilicia, northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia.[2] It was established in the early 8th century, once the first wave of the Muslim conquests ebbed, and lasted until the mid-10th century, when it was overrun by the Byzantine advance. It comprised the forward marches, comprising a chain of fortified strongholds, known as al-thughūr (اَلـثُّـغُـوْر; sing. al-thagr, اَلـثَّـغْـر, "cleft, opening"), and the rear or inner regions of the frontier zone, which was known as al-ʿawāṣim proper. On the Byzantine side, the Muslim marches were mirrored by the institution of the kleisourai districts and the akritai
border guards.

The term thughūr was also used in the marches of

Egyptian Mamluks in the 14th century, when the areas traditionally comprising the 'ʿawāṣim and thughūr in northern Syria and the northern Euphrates region came under their control.[3]

Arab–Byzantine frontier zone

Creation of the frontier zone

Already from late 630s, after the rapid

Second Arab Siege of Constantinople in 717–718 that forced a revision of this strategic objective: although raids into Anatolia continued, the goal of conquest was abandoned, and the border between the two powers began to acquire more permanent features. For the next two centuries, border fortresses might change hands between Byzantines and Arabs, but the basic outline of the Arab–Byzantine border remained essentially unaltered.[5][6][7] Thus the term al-thughūr, which initially meant "fissures, clefts" (cf. their Greek name ta Stomia, τὰ Στόμια, "the mouths/openings") and designated the actual borderlands, came to mean "boundaries", employed in phrases like Thughūr al-Islām (ثُـغُـوْر الْإِسْـلَام, "Boundary of Islam") or Thughūr al-Rūmīya (الثُّغُور الرُّومِيَّة, "Boundary of the Rūm").[2][8][9]

Asia Minor
, with the major fortresses

This process was marked by a gradual consolidation of the previously deserted zone and its transformation into a settled and fortified borderland, especially after the Byzantines abandoned Cilicia during the reign of Caliph

choke points, located at the intersections of major roads or at the mouths of important passes.[13]

Administrative organization and settlements

The entire frontier zone was initially part of the

Amanus mountains. There was no overall governor or administrative centre for the Thughūr, although Tarsus and Malatya emerged as the most important towns in Cilicia and the Mesopotamian sector respectively. The towns of the Thughūr came variously under the administrative control of the jund al-ʿAwāṣim or functioned as separate districts; the situation is complicated by the fact that by the 10th century, the terms Thughūr and al-ʿAwāṣim were often used interchangeably in the sources.[2][15][16] In addition, from the early 10th century, with the Byzantine advance into Armenia, the frontier around Diyār Bakr became a third sector, al-Thughūr al-Bakrīya (الـثُّـغُـوْر الـبَـكْـرِيَّـة).[17]

In the Cilician sector,

Ḥiṣn Ziyad. Some of the northern fortresses of the al-ʿAwāṣim province, like Dulūk or Cyrrhus, were also sometimes included in it. Further north, the relatively isolated fortress towns of Qālīqalā (Gr. Theodosiopolis, modern Erzurum) and Kamacha formed the northernmost outposts of Muslim rule.[17][18][19] The Thughūr al-Bakrīya included, according to Qudama ibn Ja'far, Sumaisaṭ, Ḥānī, Malikyan, Gamah, Ḥaurān and al-Kilis.[17]

The caliphs repopulated the area by bringing in colonists and regular soldiers from Syria but also

ʿushr instead of the kharāj land tax), higher pay and small land grants (qaṭā'i). In early Abbasid times these troops numbered some 25,000, half of them drawn from Khurasan and the rest from Syria and Upper Mesopotamia. They were complemented by volunteers, drawn by the religious motivation of jihad against the Byzantines but often paid a salary by the state as well.[18][23][24] All this entailed a heavy financial burden on the Abbasid government. Under Harun al-Rashid, taxation from the Cilician sector brought in 100,000 gold dinars every year, which were all spent locally for public works, salaries, espionage etc. In addition, the costs of cross-border expeditions typically ranged between 200,000 and 300,000 dinars annually. The Mesopotamian sector's revenue amounted to some 70,000 dinars, to which the central government added 120,000–170,000 dinars each year for the upkeep of the fortifications and the salary of the frontier troops.[25]

Military operations

By the 9th century, the Arab raiding expeditions launched against Byzantium from the frontier zone had gradually assumed an almost ritual character and were strictly organized. According to Qudama ibn Ja'far, the conventional pattern of Arab incursions included a first expedition in spring (10 May–10 June), when horses could find abundant fodder, followed after about a month's rest by a summer raid (10 July–8 September), usually the main campaign of the year, and sometimes by a winter raid in February–March.[10][26][27] The importance of these raids is summarized by Islamic scholar Hugh N. Kennedy: "the ṣāʿifa (summer raid) was as much a part of the symbolic and ritual functions of the Caliph as was organising and providing leadership for the annual hajj to Mecca".[28]

The frontier zone was

fiercely contested between the Arabs and the Byzantines. Raids and counter-raids were a permanent fixture of this type of warfare. Forts on either side of the notional frontier were captured and razed, or sometimes occupied, but never for long. As a result, the region was often depopulated, necessitating repeated resettlement. There is nevertheless evidence of some prosperity, based on agriculture and commerce, especially during the second half of the 9th century, when the borderlands became a node in a commercial route linking Basra with northern Syria and even Constantinople.[21][29] After 842 and for most of the later 9th century, the decline of Abbasid power meant that control over the Thughūr gradually devolved to semi-independent border emirates, chiefly Tarsus, Malatya and Qālīqalā, which were left largely to fend on their own against a resurgent Byzantium. The Battle of Lalakaon in 863 broke the power of Malatya, altering the balance of power in the region, and signalled the beginning of a gradual Byzantine encroachment on the Arab borderlands.[30][31][32]

With the onset of the Abbasid Caliphate's terminal period of crisis after 928, control of the Muslim frontier cities shifted to the

emir of Aleppo, Sayf al-Dawla (r. 946–967), managed to stem the Byzantine advance, his success was only temporary: in 964–965, Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963–969) captured Cilicia, followed soon after by Antioch, while the Hamdanids of Aleppo became a tributary state.[30][33][34][35]

Mamluk–Turkmen frontier zone

After their conquest of Syria in the late 13th century, the

niyābāt) of the Mamluk thughūr as follows: eight for the Syrian sector (Malatya, Divriği, Darende, Elbistan, Ayas, Tarsus and Adana, Serfendikar and Sis) and three on the Euphrates sector (al-Bira, Qal'at Ja'bar and al-Ruha).[3][37]

See also

References

  1. ^ Kennedy (2001), pp. 97–98
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Streck (1987), p. 515
  3. ^ a b Honigmann (1987), p. 739
  4. ^ Kaegi (1995), pp. 236–244
  5. ^ Kaegi (1995), pp. 246–247
  6. ^ Toynbee (1973), pp. 108–109
  7. ^ a b Whittow (1996), p. 212
  8. ^ El-Cheikh (2004), p. 84
  9. ^ Honigmann (1987), p. 738
  10. ^ a b c El-Cheikh (2004), p. 83
  11. ^ a b Wheatley (2000), pp. 260–261
  12. ^ Vasiliev (1935), pp. 94–96
  13. ^ a b Kazhdan (1991), p. 238
  14. ^ Wheatley (2000), p. 116
  15. ^ Honigmann (1987), pp. 738–739
  16. ^ Wheatley (2000), pp. 116, 260
  17. ^ a b c d Honigmann (1935), pp. 42–43
  18. ^ a b c Kennedy (2001), pp. 82, 98
  19. ^ Wheatley (2000), p. 261
  20. ^ Toynbee (1973), pp. 114–115
  21. ^ a b Streck (1987), pp. 515–516
  22. ^ Wheatley (2000), pp. 116–117, 261
  23. ^ Wheatley (2000), p. 262
  24. ^ Toynbee (1973), p. 113
  25. ^ Vasiliev (1935), pp. 96–97
  26. ^ Toynbee (1973), p. 115
  27. ^ Whittow (1996), pp. 212–213
  28. ^ Kennedy (2001), p. 106
  29. ^ Wheatley (2000), pp. 116–117, 262–263
  30. ^ a b Streck (1987), p. 516
  31. ^ Toynbee (1973), pp. 110–111, 113–114
  32. ^ Whittow (1996), pp. 310–311
  33. ^ Kazhdan (1991), p. 1479
  34. ^ Wheatley (2000), pp. 116, 261
  35. ^ Whittow (1996), pp. 317–318, 326–329
  36. ^ Har-El (1995), pp. 43–47
  37. ^ Har-El (1995), p. 44

Sources

Further reading