al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi

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al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi
Vizier of the Fatimid Caliphate
In office
12 December 1121 (de facto)
13 February 1122 (formal appointment) – 3 October 1125
Monarchal-Amir bi-Ahkam Allah
Preceded byal-Afdal Shahanshah
Succeeded byNone (post vacant until 1130)
Personal details
Died19/20 July 1128
Cairo
ChildrenMusa and three other sons
Parent
  • Fatak (father)

Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn Fatak, better known as al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi (

Crusaders failed, with the loss of Tyre and a naval defeat at the hands of the Venetian Crusade. These failures, coupled with al-Bata'ihi's power, led to his dismissal and imprisonment by al-Amir in 1125. He was then kept imprisoned until July 1128, when al-Amir ordered his execution. His son, Musa
, wrote a biography that survives in fragments and is a key source for al-Bata'ihi's career.

Biography

Al-Ma'mun al-Bata'ihi was born in

Iraq,[9] but a rags to riches story circulated about al-Bata'ihi being son of a Fatimid agent in Iraq who came to Cairo after being orphaned and worked himself upwards[3] is nothing more than a pious legend.[10] Al-Bata'ihi had two brothers, Haydara and Ja'far, who became his deputies and chief aides,[11] and four sons.[12]

Service under al-Afdal

At the time, the Fatimid Caliphate was de facto ruled not by the underage caliph al-Amir, but by al-Afdal, with the titles of vizier, commander-in-chief, chief

al-Qa'id ('the Commander').[11][8]

Administrative reforms

Old black-and-white map of Cairo
A plan of Fatimid-era Cairo, as reconstructed by Stanley Lane-Poole, showing the approximate layout of the city and the location of the palaces

Increasingly ill and indisposed, al-Afdal came to rely greatly on al-Bata'ihi,

solar year, which determined the actual harvest time and was longer by eleven days. The discrepancy meant that every 33 years, an entire nominal year's harvest was missing as the lunar year was ahead of the solar one. In August/September 1107 al-Bata'ihi ordered a tahwil ('conversion'), which brought the accounting year AH 499 in line with the actual year AH 501—the multi-year gap indicating that this necessary adjustment had been neglected for considerable time in the past.[9][15]

At the same time, al-Bata'ihi ordered a new cadastral survey (rawk), which likewise was supposed to take place every thirty years, in order to bring the assessed land tax (

tax farmers for the government. As land value changed over time, many of the lower-ranking soldiers, with lower-value grants, had seen their income reduced over time, while the senior commanders' higher-value estates were usually generating much more income than they were sending as taxes to the fisc, attracting more cultivators as well as benefiting from improvements and investments by their wealthier holders. Al-Bata'ihi's reform annulled all previous land grants, got the lower-ranking soldiers to bid high sums for the lands previously held by the senior-ranking ones, and even convinced the latter to bid for the lower-value grants by allowing them to pay only according to their own valuation, thus far below the original assessment. Al-Bata'ihi's son, writing about it a few decades later, maintains that it was a resounding success that was concluded to general satisfaction, and increased state income by 50,000 gold dinars.[16][17]

New Nile canal and observatory

Related to his reform of the tax system were two major infrastructure projects undertaken by al-Bata'ihi: a new canal in the eastern Nile Delta and a new observatory near Cairo.[18] Following complaints by the local tax-farmer, the Jew Ibn al-Munajja,[a] that the province of Sharqiyya was suffering from lack of water, which reduced its tax yields, a new canal was constructed in 1113–1115, after al-Afdal and al-Bata'ihi inspected the area in person. The enterprise proved very costly, which led to the imprisonment of Ibn al-Munajja, but the canal's opening was celebrated with much pomp, with caliph al-Amir taking part in the ceremonies in person.[18][19]

The observatory project was related to the precise calculation of the calendar; two different

Muqattam Hills actually blocked the view of the sun during sunrise; the whole apparatus had to be transported to a new site on the Muqattam itself.[21] Several scholars were involved with the project, including the Andalusi Abu Ja'far ibn Hasday, the qadi and geometer Ibn Abi'l-Ish of Tripoli, the instrument-maker Abu'l-Naja ibn Sind of Alexandria, and the geometer Abu Muhammad Abd al-Karim of Sicily.[3] Construction was interrupted by al-Afdal's death in 1121, and when al-Bata'ihi, upon being appointed to the vizierate, ordered it resumed, the apparatus was laboriously moved to the Bab al-Nasr gate.[22] This too would remain unfinished: after al-Bata'ihi's downfall in 1125, Caliph al-Amir ordered the materials dismantled and the workers and scholars dispersed.[3][22]

Vizierate

Rise to power

AH
514 (1119/20 CE)

Al-Afdal was murdered by unknown assailants on 11 December 1121, on the eve of the

Nizari Isma'ili branch and its Order of Assassins,[b][25] but both medieval historians[c] and modern scholars are skeptical: given his own resentment at the subordinate figurehead role to which al-Afdal had relegated him, al-Amir is suspected of having been the true instigator of the assassination.[23] The sources that blame al-Amir for al-Afdal's murder also implicate the ambitious al-Bata'ihi in the deed, or at least in concealing al-Afdal's death until al-Amir could arrive at the vizieral palace to designate al-Bata'ihi as al-Afdal's successor.[27]

After supervising the transfer of al-Afdal's enormous treasures to the

Friday sermon to his vizier.[32]

Nevertheless, al-Bata'ihi's position was much weaker vis-à-vis the caliph than his old master's. Under al-Afdal, al-Amir and his father, al-Musta'li (r. 1094–1101), before him had been confined in the caliphal palaces, while al-Afdal arrogated most public caliphal functions to himself. After al-Afdal's death, al-Amir now enjoyed a far more prominent public role, and he henceforth had a voice in government.[23][33] Most importantly, al-Amir ensured that all tax income and precious textiles would be kept in the caliphal palace, and distributed from there.[34] As the historian Michael Brett writes, "The relationship itself was one of alliance, in which the minister was entrusted as before with the responsibilities of government, in return for bringing the monarch out from his seclusion into the public eye".[35] The changed balance of power was apparent to al-Bata'ihi, who sought to safeguard his position. According to his son Musa, the vizier had al-Amir sign a document pledging to communicate any denunciations or accusations directly to him. The document was to be valid until al-Bata'ihi's death, and the caliph furthermore undertook to look after the vizier's offspring after that.[34]

Domestic policies

Under al-Bata'ihi, the number and splendor of public festivals and ceremonial occasions, much curtailed by al-Afdal, increased again, with the frequent and active participation of the caliph and the court.

Alid legacy in an attempt to "renew its image as the champion of Islam", and a political one, as many of the festivals now were celebrated in Fustat as well as Cairo, serving to integrate the more populous metropolis with the Fatimid palace-city, which in recent decades had been colonized by people from Fustat.[35]

All this entailed an enormous cost, and despite his reforms while serving under al-Afdal, it appears that tax collection was still problematic, and much uncultivated land remained so. Thus, in 1122 al-Bata'ihi remitted all tax arrears, conditioned upon a full payment of the owed sums in the future; and prohibited the re-sale of tax farms before the expiration of their contracts.[38] Al-Bata'ihi is portrayed in the sources as a generous, just, and kind ruler, especially towards the non-Muslim population.[39] He was a patron of scholars,[40] and commissioned a history of the Fatimid vizierate by Ibn al-Sayrafi.[41]

Building activity

Tulunid capital, al-Qata'i. The sprawling metropolis of Fustat was given new open spaces and a shipyard, and Cairo received a new caravanserai for merchants, a new mint (dar al-darb), and a new vizieral palace, the Dar al-Ma'muniya. In addition, several caliphal pavilions on the banks of the Nile were restored.[35][42]

As part of the policy of Alid legitimism, al-Bata'ihi is recorded as having built or restored several smaller mausolea dedicated to members of the Alid family, and specifically the

Isma'il who gave his name to the Isma'ili Shi'a), al-Qasim Abu Tayyib (a grandson of al-Sadiq), and al-Qasim's daughter, Kulthum. Two further mausolea belonged to a Sayyida Atika, whose exact identity is uncertain, but possibly was a 7th-century Meccan noblewoman, and to a Sayyida Zaynab.[43][44] Al-Bata'ihi is also known to have built several smaller and larger mosques across Egypt, although, as the art historian Jonathan M. Bloom writes, "it is unclear whether the number represents an absolute increase or simply an increase in the quality and quantity of information" available about his activities, as more, and more detailed, sources survive about his tenure than for his immediate predecessors.[7]

The only surviving of the mosques commissioned by al-Bata'ihi was the Aqmar Mosque, constructed on the main north-south thoroughfare of Cairo, near the caliphal palace, in 1122–1125.[7][45] It is notable particularly for its lavish and unusual façade, "perhaps the most beautiful ensemble of Fatimid stonework to survive", according to Bloom.[46] The mosque's prime location, elaborate decoration, and the prominent foundation inscriptions that mention not only the reigning caliph (al-Amir) and his vizier (al-Bata'ihi), but also al-Amir's father, al-Musta'li, have led to various modern interpretations of the decorative motifs and inscriptions as an intentional political and religious statement of Fatimid-Ismai'ili orthodoxy.[47] Due to its small size, the Aqmar Mosque was likely intended to be used mostly by the caliphal court; it does not seem to have otherwise played a particular role in Fatimid ceremonies.[44]

Anti-Nizari measures

In the aftermath of the assassination of al-Afdal, the Nizari threat was a paramount concern. The Nizaris, adherents of al-Amir's uncle Nizar, who had been killed after an unsuccessful revolt in 1095, were implacably hostile to the regime in Cairo, and had established a widespread network of agents.[23][48] Reports received in Cairo claimed that the chief Nizari leader, Hasan-i Sabbah, celebrated al-Afdal's murder and awaited the same fate for al-Amir and al-Bata'ihi.[49] In response, the vizier ordered background checks for provincial officials, merchants, and residents of Cairo and Ascalon (the last major Fatimid stronghold in the Levant and main entrepot for Egypt); a further ban on moving residence was enacted in Cairo, and an extensive network of spies was recruited, including many women. The measures bore fruit: Nizari agents were arrested and crucified, and several couriers bearing money sent by Hassan-i Sabbah to fund his network in Egypt were intercepted.[50][51]

To further undermine the Nizari cause, in December 1122 a meeting of officials was convened in Cairo in which the Nizari claims were publicly denounced, and the legitimacy of the succession of al-Musta'li affirmed, by none other than a woman (presented sitting behind a veil) identified as Nizar's only sister. A proclamation to that effect, the al-Hidaya al-Amiriyya, was issued on this occasion, publicly read from the pulpits of the mosques, and then sent to the Nizari communities in Persia.[23][52][53]

Foreign policy

Immediately after coming to power, in 1122, al-Bata'ihi scored a major success, with the peaceful recovery of the Levantine port city of

Luwata Berbers from the west. The Fatimids managed to defeat them and force them to pay tribute.[26][56]

Under al-Bata'ihi, the Fatimids became more actively involved in

Musta'li Isma'ili community outside Egypt.[23] Already in 1119 an envoy, Ali ibn Ibrahim ibn Najib al-Dawla, had been sent to bring the Yemeni Isma'ilis into closer alignment with Cairo; after al-Afdal's death and the rise of al-Bata'ihi, the Fatimid engagement in Yemen intensified further, with the dispatch of military forces. With their backing, Ibn Najib al-Dawla began to pursue his own policies, increasingly ignoring Queen Arwa and the local chieftains allied to the Fatimids. This led to suspicion and then resistance from the Yemeni magnates, which came into the open after the loss of most of the Fatimid army in a failed attempt to capture Zabid in 1124. The magnates began to conspire against Ibn Najib al-Dawla, besieged him at the fortress of al-Janad, and warned Cairo that he was engaged in Nizari propaganda and was even minting coins with the name of Nizar instead of al-Amir; fake coins to that effect were even sent to the Fatimid court. The affair ended after the downfall of al-Bata'ihi, with the deposition of Ibn Najib al-Dawla and his forcible return to Cairo, where he was publicly humiliated and then thrown in prison.[58][59]

Downfall and death

On 3 October 1125 al-Amir suddenly ordered al-Bata'ihi, his brother Haydara al-Mu'taman, and his chief aides arrested.[23][60] Various reasons were put forward for this: that al-Amir did not forgive al-Bata'ihi the loss of Tyre; that the secretary Ibn Abi Usama convinced al-Amri that the vizier conspired with Ja'far, al-Amir's only full brother, to depose him; or that al-Bata'ihi was the true instigator of the fake Nizari coinage struck in Yemen.[60][61] The truth is rather that al-Amir had begun resenting the power of his over-mighty vizier,[23][60] whose self-aggrandizing tendencies were evident in his zeal to name things after himself rather than the reigning caliph.[62] This was especially so with the observatory begun by al-Afdal: rumours circulated that al-Bata'ihi wanted to use it to predict the future or perform magics, and his ambition to name it after himself was considered proof that he aspired to rulership.[3][22] The vizier was also a victim of his own policies: unlike Badr and al-Afdal, al-Bata'ihi lacked a power base of his own in the army, and relied on the caliph as his patron;[61] and the revival of al-Amir's public role, lavishly orchestrated by al-Bata'ihi himself, only served to strengthen the caliph's authority and self-confidence.[33][61] Finally, the pledge extracted by al-Ma'mun from the caliph, intended to safeguard him, may have backfired as al-Amir perceived it as a personal humiliation.[32] Indeed, al-Amir would rule for the remainder of his life without a vizier.[63] Haydara died in prison, but al-Ma'mun was executed along with Ibn Najib al-Dawla on the night of 19/20 July 1128.[60][63]

Footnotes

  1. ^ Despite al-Afdal's orders to name it 'al-Afdali' after himself, already at its completion it was known as the canal of Ibn al-Munajja; it still appears as 'Abou el-Meneggueh' in the Description de l'Égypte.[19]
  2. ^ A list of Nizari assassination victims from Alamut also claims responsibility for al-Afdal's death.[25]
  3. ^ The contemporary Syrian chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi directly accuses al-Amir,[25] while the 15th-century historian Ibn Taghribirdi claims that al-Amir ordered the assassination in response to al-Afdal attempting to poison him.[26]

References

  1. ^ Halm 2014, p. 373 (note 52).
  2. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 132, 163.
  3. ^ a b c d e Dunlop 1960, p. 1091.
  4. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 133, 164, 165.
  5. ^ Kaptein 1993, pp. 7–8.
  6. ^ a b c Halm 2014, pp. 164–165.
  7. ^ a b c Bloom 2007, p. 139.
  8. ^ a b Brett 2017, p. 237.
  9. ^ a b c d Halm 2014, p. 133.
  10. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 132–133.
  11. ^ a b c Halm 2014, p. 132.
  12. ^ Halm 2014, p. 150.
  13. ^ Brett 2017, pp. 207–209, 228, 237.
  14. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 131–132.
  15. ^ a b Brett 2017, p. 238.
  16. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 134–135.
  17. ^ Brett 2017, pp. 238–239.
  18. ^ a b Brett 2017, p. 239.
  19. ^ a b Halm 2014, pp. 135–136.
  20. ^ Halm 2014, p. 136.
  21. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 135–138.
  22. ^ a b c Halm 2014, p. 138.
  23. ^ a b c d e f g h i Walker 2011.
  24. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 140–141.
  25. ^ a b c Halm 2014, p. 141.
  26. ^ a b Sajjadi 2015.
  27. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 141–143.
  28. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 144–145.
  29. ^ Halm 2014, p. 146.
  30. ^ al-Imad 1990, pp. 169, 190.
  31. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 146–147.
  32. ^ a b Behrens-Abouseif 1992, p. 35.
  33. ^ a b c Halm 2014, p. 164.
  34. ^ a b Halm 2014, p. 147.
  35. ^ a b c d Brett 2017, p. 253.
  36. ^ Kaptein 1993, pp. 10, 20–25.
  37. ^ Behrens-Abouseif 1992, p. 32.
  38. ^ Brett 2017, p. 254.
  39. ^ al-Imad 1990, pp. 190–191.
  40. ^ al-Imad 1990, p. 190.
  41. ^ al-Imad 1990, p. 191.
  42. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 172–173.
  43. ^ Williams 1985, pp. 39–44.
  44. ^ a b Halm 2014, p. 172.
  45. ^ Williams 1983, pp. 48–49.
  46. ^ Bloom 2007, p. 140.
  47. ^ cf. Williams 1983, pp. 43–48 and Behrens-Abouseif 1992, pp. 32–37; more skeptical views are espoused by Bloom 2007, pp. 139–144 and Halm 2014, pp. 170–172.
  48. ^ Halm 2014, p. 153.
  49. ^ Halm 2014, p. 152.
  50. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 152–153.
  51. ^ Brett 2017, p. 255.
  52. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 154–156.
  53. ^ Brett 2017, pp. 255–256.
  54. ^ Halm 2014, p. 159.
  55. ^ Brett 2017, p. 256.
  56. ^ a b Halm 2014, pp. 159–160.
  57. ^ Brett 2017, pp. 256–257.
  58. ^ Brett 2017, pp. 256, 257–258.
  59. ^ Halm 2014, pp. 161–163.
  60. ^ a b c d Halm 2014, p. 165.
  61. ^ a b c Brett 2017, p. 257.
  62. ^ Behrens-Abouseif 1992, pp. 35–36.
  63. ^ a b Brett 2017, p. 258.

Sources

Preceded by Vizier of the Fatimid Caliphate
12 December 1121 – 3 October 1125
Vacant
Personal rule by Caliph al-Amir
Title next held by
Hizar al-Mulk Hazarmard