American transportation in the Siegfried Line campaign
American transportation played a crucial part in the
The Germans attempted to delay the Allied advance until the onset of bad weather by denying access to ports and demolishing communications infrastructure in order to give their own forces time to recover. Between September and November, the American forces in Europe suffered from severe transportation problems. In September, Cherbourg was the only deep-water port in northwest Europe in Allied hands capable of handling Liberty ships, but it had been badly damaged, and took a long time to restore. Smaller ports could handle only small, shallow-draft coastal trading vessels known as "coasters". Two-thirds of the British coaster fleet, on which critical industries depended, was dedicated to the campaign. Over time, rough seas, enemy action and continuous use laid up a quarter of the coaster fleet for repairs. From September onwards, an increasing volume of supplies came directly from the United States. These were stowed in Liberty ships so as to make optimal use of their cargo space. The shipments frequently included heavy and bulky items that required dockside cranes to unload. The available port capacity was insufficient to unload the ships arriving. As the number of ships awaiting discharge in European waters climbed, turnaround times increased, and fewer ships reported back to port in the United States, precipitating a widespread shipping crisis.
Additional port capacity was obtained through the opening of Rouen and Le Havre in September and October respectively, and of Antwerp in November. Antwerp was capable of handling all the Allies' needs, but before the war it had been a transit port, and did not possess large amounts of covered storage space. The Americans were allocated only a small amount of this, all uncovered, on the assumption that American supplies would immediately be moved to the depots around Liège. The limiting factor then shifted to port clearance. Initially, motor transport was widely used, but as the railways were brought back into service, they shouldered the burden of moving supplies from the ports to the depots. Inland water transport was developed to relieve pressure on the railways. Four waterways were rehabilitated for military use: the Seine, Oise and Rhône rivers, and the Albert Canal. Air transport was the least economic form of transport, but in September and October, with road and rail transport unable to supply even the minimum daily requirements of the armies, it was called upon to supplement them.
Although logistical difficulties constituted a brake on combat operations, they were not the only factors that brought the Allied advance to a halt. The American forces also had to contend with rugged terrain, worsening weather and, above all, with stubborn German resistance. The German recovery was sufficient to mount the Ardennes offensive in December. This threatened Antwerp and the depot areas around Liège, which also came under attack from German
Background
In the first seven weeks after the commencement of
British
Bradley had previously exercised control over the Advance Section (ADSEC) of COMZ as the senior American commander on the continent. As such, he had prescribed stock levels in the depots and priorities for the delivery of supplies, and apportioned service units between the armies and the Communications Zone. Bradley believed that as the senior operational commander he should exercise such authority, as was the case in the British forces.[7] Under the American organization, COMZ headquarters also functioned as the headquarters of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA).[6]
The Allied commanders pushed their forces to the limits logistically to take advantage of the chaotic German retreat.[3] By 3 August Patton's Third Army was advancing into Brittany. Bradley ordered Patton to turn east, leaving only minimal forces behind.[8] This decision entailed grave risk, for under the Operation Overlord plan, the ports of Lorient and Quiberon Bay were to be developed for the logistical support of the American forces under the codename Operation Chastity.[9][10] This was the first in a series of critical decisions that subordinated logistical considerations to short-term operational advantage.[8]
In mid-August, Eisenhower decided to continue the pursuit of the retreating German forces beyond the Seine. This stretched the logistical system.[11][12] Between 25 August and 12 September the Allied armies advanced from the D plus 90 phase line, the position the Operation Overlord plan expected to be reached 90 days after D-Day, to the D plus 350 phase line, moving through 260 phase lines in just 19 days. Although the planners had estimated that no more than twelve divisions could be maintained beyond the Seine, by September sixteen were, albeit on reduced scales of rations and supplies.[13] Logistical forecasts were repeatedly shown to be overly pessimistic, imbuing a sense of confidence that difficulties could be overcome.[14]
The advance came to a halt in September.[15] This was not a result of inadequate supplies or port capacity – there were still some 600,000 long tons (610,000 t) of supplies stockpiled in the Normandy lodgment area in November – nor solely by a shortage of fuel. Rather, the problem was the inability to deliver fuel and supplies to the armies.[16] Railways could not be repaired and pipelines could not be constructed quickly enough.[17]
Motor transport was used as a stopgap, but there was a shortage of suitable vehicles. There was political interference by the Truman Committee, which considered the production of heavy-duty vehicles to be wasteful and unnecessarily reducing the number of civilian vehicles that could be built, and production difficulties arising from a shortage of forgings and castings for heavy-duty axles, engines and transmissions.[18] The insufficient numbers of heavy trucks compelled the Army to use the smaller general purpose 2½-ton 6×6 trucks for long hauls, for which they were unsuited.[19] Overloading, overuse, accidents and poor maintenance practices took their toll.[20] The pursuit resulted in large quantities of equipment being damaged, worn out, and written off. In November, SHAEF reported to the War Department that each month 375 medium and 125 light tanks, 900 2½-ton trucks, 1,500 jeeps, 700 mortars and 100 artillery pieces had been written off. Tank losses in August and September respectively had been 25.3 percent and 16.5 percent of establishment, and the reserves were exhausted. More than 15,000 vehicles were unserviceable, awaiting repairs or parts.[21] While the American soldier was reputed to have more mechanical aptitude and experience than any other soldiers in the world, this was seldom on display. A Bill Mauldin cartoon depicted a mechanic standing atop a pile of wrecked vehicles and commenting: "I'll be derned. Here's one what wuz wrecked in combat."[22]
Failure to follow proper procedures contributed to the waste and disorder. Dumps established by the armies were frequently turned over to COMZ with little or no paperwork, so supplies were unrecorded, unidentified and unlocatable, resulting in duplicate requisitions. This was exacerbated by the dispatch of filler cargoes of unwanted goods shipped solely to make maximum use of the available transport. The indenting system itself was imperfect and slow in responding to urgent demands. Logisticians at all levels strove to improvise, adapt and overcome difficulties, with considerable success, but short-term solutions frequently created longer-term problems. Hoarding, bartering, over-requisitioning, and cannibalizing vehicles for spare parts degraded the effectiveness of the supply system.[23]
The German strategy was to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the Siegfried Line (which they called the Westwall) while holding the ports as long as possible and conducting a scorched earth program to deny or destroy as much of the transportation infrastructure as possible. The hope was that these measures would restrict the Allies' operational capabilities, which relied heavily on logistical support, and thereby gain sufficient time to reconstitute the German forces. If six to eight weeks could be gained, then bad autumn weather would set in, further restricting the Allies' mobility, air operations and logistical support, and the German forces might be able to take the offensive again.[24]
Shipping
Under the Operation Overlord plan US forces would be supported over the
On 11 July Cherbourg's target was raised from 8,500 to 20,000 long tons (8,600 to 20,300 t) per day by the end of September,[27] but this could not be met. Delays in removing mines and underwater obstacles caused the rehabilitation of the port to fall far behind schedule,[29] and discharges actually fell during September because the port had to handle troop movements with their organizational equipment, which had originally been planned to land at Brest.[30] SHAEF decided on 7 September that Nantes, Saint-Nazaire, Lorient and Quiberon Bay would not be developed,[31] and by the time the Battle for Brest ended on 25 September, the port was so badly damaged that plans to use it were shelved indefinitely.[30]
The Overlord planners had identified a need for shallow-draft vessels, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had allocated 625,000 deadweight tons (635,000 deadweight tonnes) of coasters for the first six weeks of the operation. This represented about two-thirds of the British coaster fleet, on which critical industries depended for the transport of iron, coal and other commodities. The allocation of so much coastal shipping to Overlord entailed temporarily shutting down a quarter of the UK's blast furnaces. The British therefore wanted the shipping returned as soon as possible. It was planned that after the first six weeks, the allocation to Overlord would be reduced to 250,000 deadweight tons (254,000 deadweight tonnes).[32]
Under the circumstances, the coasters could not be released. Some 560,000 deadweight tons (570,000 deadweight tonnes) of coasters were still engaged in the cross-Channel run in September, and this actually rose to over 600,000 deadweight tons (610,000 deadweight tonnes) in November. The crux of the problem was slow turnaround times. A survey of coaster movements in late October and early November found that 63 round trip voyages had required 1,422 ship-days instead of the planned 606. Diversions to alternate ports, increasingly bad weather, and vessels being laid up for repairs all contributed to this situation. Between 20 and 25 percent of the coaster fleet was laid up for repairs in November and December. Not until December, after the opening of the port of Antwerp, was it possible to release 50,000 deadweight tons (51,000 deadweight tonnes) of coasters, but that was from support of the 21st Army Group; the American allocation actually increased.[33]
It was planned that an increasing volume of supplies would come directly from the United States from September onwards. These ships were not
COMZ believed that it could receive 250 ocean-going ships in September, of which 175 would be discharged on the continent and the rest in the UK.[37][38] It estimated that the available port capacity on the continent would be 27,000 long tons (27,000 t) per day, which was expected to rise to 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) per day in October.[38] By the end of September, 219 ships would require discharge on the continent, which was 44 more than the theater said it needed for its current requirements, the additional supplies being to build up stocks for the future.[37] The forecasts of unloading capacity proved optimistic: in the third week of September, the tonnage of American cargo discharged on the continent was 37,000 long tons (38,000 t) per day, but it dipped to 28,000 long tons (28,000 t) per day in the last week of September, and averaged 25,000 long tons (25,000 t) per day in October.[30] Only 95 ships were discharged on the continent in September.[38]
Keeping ships at anchor was not just wasteful; in a war zone it was also dangerous. An accumulation of idle shipping invited enemy attacks and would subject the ships to damage from the autumn gales. The War Department saw no reason for commodity-loaded vessels (ships loaded with a single
Over 200 ships were in European waters awaiting discharge in early October, and
Unloadings averaged 25,000 long tons (25,000 t) per day in October,[30] and by 20 October the number of vessels awaiting discharge had risen to over 240, of which 140 were commodity loaded. The Chief of ASF, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, informed Lee that he could expect no more commodity-loaded ships with rations, vehicles or ammunition until he made headway with reducing the backlogs. Somervell dispatched Brigadier General John M. Franklin, the Assistant Chief of Transportation for water transportation, and a former president of the United States Lines, to advise the ETO on improving turnaround time and developing more realistic estimates of port capacity.[40] He arrived in France on 28 October and was appointed the Assistant Chief of Transportation of COMZ and ETOUSA.[41]
The shipping crisis in the ETO escalated into a global one. Merchant ship construction was lagging behind schedule, mainly due to a deficit of 35,000 skilled workers in the shipyards, as they were being lured away to work on the higher-priority
Drastic measures were required. On 18 November the
COMZ managed to unload 115 ships in November. The port commanders improved the discharge rate from 327 long tons (332 t) per ship per day in October to 457 long tons (464 t) per ship per day in November by offering incentives such as extra
The opening of the port of Antwerp on 28 November promised to solve the port capacity problem, but the German Ardennes offensive caused a halt to the movement of supplies to the threatened depots around Liège, and they piled up at the ports. Unloading had to be curtailed, and on 23 December ETOUSA requested that 24 ships be cut from the next convoys. Only 130 ships were unloaded in December, and based on Franklin's sanguine assessment of capacity, the War Department cut the number of sailings to 175 in January and February 1945. By the end of January 1945 116 vessels lay idle awaiting discharge, and on 3 February ETOUSA recommended that March 1945 sailings be cut from 233 to 203. The War Department went even further and reduced it to 172. However, February 1945 saw a steady increase in the discharge rate, which rose to over 50,000 long tons (51,000 t) per day, an increase of 20,000 long tons (20,000 t) per day over what had been achieved in December 1944 and January 1945, and the shipping crisis finally appeared to be resolved.[52]
Ports
Minor ports
When hopes that Brest and Quiberon Bay would soon be opened faded, COMZ decided to compensate by developing the minor ports in Normandy and Brittany.[25] The minor Brittany ports proved uneconomical to operate; their capacity was small, they had no deep-water berths, and by the time many of them were repaired they were hundreds of miles from the front. However, they met a critical need at a time when bad weather threatened to close the Normandy beaches.[53] They were operated by the 16th Major Port, which was relieved by the 5th Major Port in September.[54] The rehabilitation of the Normandy port of Granville was undertaken by the 1055th and 1058th Port Construction and Repair Groups. Granville had been subject to systematic demolition, with quays cratered, cranes tipped into the water, and the harbor blocked with sunken craft. It was operated solely as a coal port, and averaged 1,244 long tons (1,264 t) per day from when it was opened on 18 September until it closed on 21 April 1945.[55]
The task of rehabilitating the Brittany ports of Cancale, Saint-Brieuc and Saint-Malo was carried out by the 1053rd Port Construction and Repair Group and the 360th Engineer General Service Regiment, but work on Saint-Malo was abandoned as it neared completion because the task of opening the inland waterways serving it was not considered worth the effort.[56] It was handed over to the French on 21 November.[57] Tidal conditions at Cancale proved unfavorable, and it was never used. Saint-Brieuc was opened in mid-September but discharges averaged only 317 long tons (322 t) per day, mostly coal for local railways and power stations,[56] and it was handed over to the French on 9 November.[53]
Another minor port in Brittany, Morlaix, was not badly damaged, and it was quickly restored by the 1057th Port Construction and Repair Group.[55] The first convoy of two Liberty ships and ten LSTs arrived on 25 August. Nearby Roscoff was also opened.[58] Between them, they had anchorages for up to six Liberty ships, which were discharged using Army lighters, Navy landing craft and civilian boats, and handled an average of 2,105 long tons (2,139 t) per day until they were closed on 14 December.[59][55] The opening of the Seine ports of Rouen and Le Havre permitted the closure of shallow-draft minor ports, and the small Normandy ports of Saint-Brieuc, Barfleur, Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue, Carentan, Grandcamp and Isigny were handed over to the French in November.[60]
Cherbourg
The rehabilitation of Cherbourg fell behind schedule. The first
A Liberty ship was able to berth at the Digue du Homet on 9 August,[63] nineteen days later than planned. Another month passed before berths were available in the Bassin Napoléon III, and it was 21 September before the Bassin Charles X was opened. The Darse Transatlantique was not cleared of mines until 21 August and the access channel was not cleared until 18 September. The first Liberty ship did not berth there until 8 October. The rehabilitation effort was reported as 75 percent complete in mid-September, but only five of the planned twenty-eight deep-water berths were operational by then. Not until 15 December was the rehabilitation work completed.[64][65]
The port of Cherbourg was operated by the 4th Port, under the command of Colonel Cleland C. Sibley, which was augmented by Colonel August H. Schroeder's 12th Port.
Problems arose when ships arrived unexpectedly and there were no preparations to receive them. Advance warning of ship arrivals was necessary because unloading a ship was a complicated business. Sufficient
Month | Discharged | Cleared by rail | Cleared by road | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
July | 31,627 long tons | 32,135 t | 1,212 long tons | 1,231 t | 27,257 long tons | 27,694 t |
August | 266,444 long tons | 270,720 t | 94,692 long tons | 96,212 t | 152,731 long tons | 155,182 t |
September | 314,431 long tons | 319,477 t | 162,021 long tons | 164,621 t | 166,118 long tons | 168,784 t |
October | 365,592 long tons | 371,459 t | 191,307 long tons | 194,377 t | 161,814 long tons | 164,411 t |
November | 433,301 long tons | 440,254 t | 242,004 long tons | 245,887 t | 150,026 long tons | 152,433 t |
December | 250,112 long tons | 254,126 t | 155,797 long tons | 158,297 t | 97,202 long tons | 98,762 t |
Of the 439,660 long tons (446,720 t) of Army cargo discharged at Cherbourg by 13 September, just 38.4 percent was unloaded at quayside berths or over LST ramps; the rest was unloaded by DUKWs and lighters.
The 4th Port was handicapped by the slow arrival of its unit equipment, which had been brought from the UK on twelve ships but unloaded at Utah Beach instead of Cherbourg. The hatch crew found themselves lacking basic gear such as ropes, slings and cargo nets, and three DUKWs went around collecting gear from ships in the harbor. Cranes were also in short supply, and this was exacerbated by a dearth of well-trained crane operators. In the UK, where the 4th Port had worked the docks along the River Mersey, crane operating had been mostly carried out by experienced civilians. A training program was initiated at Cherbourg, where crane operators were instructed by a pair of sergeants who had learned crane operation in the UK. In the meantime, inexperienced operators caused avoidable damage both to cranes and to cargo. Insufficient numbers of skilled mechanics were available to repair the cranes, and there was a shortage of spare parts as well. The result was that at times half the cranes were out of action.[68]
Disappointing discharge figures led to Sibley being relieved of command. He was succeeded by Colonel James A. Crothers on 29 September.
Whenever there were a few days running of good weather, cargo built up at the port. SHAEF was dissatisfied with how the port was being run, and on 30 October Wyman was relieved of command of the Normandy Base Section and replaced by Major General
Le Havre
The Seine ports had figured prominently in the Overlord plan, but for the supply of the 21st Army Group, not the American forces.
Le Havre had been the second largest port in France before the war, but it had been heavily damaged by German demolitions and Allied land, sea and aerial bombardment.[55] Lee directed that Le Havre would be developed as an interim port capable of handling 8,000 to 10,000 long tons (8,100 to 10,200 t) per day. This was to be done as rapidly as possible, with the minimum amount of reconstruction effort.[74] The rehabilitation of Le Havre and Rouen was assigned to a task force under the command of Colonel Frank F. Bell, the commander of the 373rd Engineer General Service Regiment. In addition to his own regiment, he ultimately also had the 1055th and 1061st Engineer Port Construction and Repair Groups, the 392nd Engineer General Service Regiment, the 1071st Engineer Port Repair Ship Crew, the 1044th Engineer Gas Generating Unit, the 971st Engineer Maintenance Company, the 577th Engineer Dump Truck Company and two Royal Navy parties.[55] The Seabees of the 28th Naval Construction Battalion also worked there.[75]
The first Liberty ships entered the inner harbor of Le Havre on 19 September,[58] but mines and obstructions limited the docks to landing craft and coasters.[55] USS Miantonomah brought port clearance supplies from Cherbourg to Le Havre on 21 September, but on departure on 25 September it navigated the inner and outer harbors and cleared the blockships only to strike a mine and sink.[76] Not until 13 October was the first Liberty ship able to dock.[55]
The Seabees built a 60-by-1,000-foot (18 by 305 m)
Le Havre was operated by the 16th Major Port, under the command of Brigadier General
The use of DUKWs had its drawbacks in the multiple handling of cargo and interruptions to operations occasioned by bad weather. DUKWs had never been intended to operate for long periods of time, but one company reported that its DUKWs had over 70,000 miles (110,000 km) on the clock. By November, about 76 percent of the DUKWs were inoperable. Chronic shortages of spare parts forced a resort to cannibalizing inoperable vehicles, and improvisations such as making propeller shaft strut bearings from applewood and replacement rudders from scrap metal.[78] Nonetheless, the port exceeded COMZ's expectations, handling 9,500 long tons (9,700 t) per day by the end of December.[55]
In that month, the port dispatched 92 trains carrying ammunition to the forward areas in response to the German Ardennes offensive, and rockets were rushed to Liège to help defend the threatened base area there. By the year's end, the 16th Major Port and some 4,000 French civilian stevedores had unloaded 434,920 long tons (441,900 t) of cargo. In 1945 the work force was augmented with 6,000 German prisoners of war. The port set a record of 198,768 long tons (201,958 t) in January 1945, and by the end of May had unloaded 1,254,129 long tons (1,274,254 t).[59]
In addition to handling cargo Le Havre also became an important
Rouen
Rouen was not as badly damaged as Le Havre. The Germans had demolished the cargo handling facilities and blocked the river channel with toppled cranes and sunken boats and barges, but 14,000 feet (4,300 m) of the quays were still in good condition. The nearby marshalling yards had been heavily damaged by Allied bombing, but another yard 12 miles (19 km) away was easily accessible by road. The rehabilitation task was undertaken by elements of the Le Havre engineering task force consisting of the 1061st Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group, a Royal Navy party, and a platoon of the 37th Engineer Combat Battalion. The more difficult task of clearing away the mines and removing sunken vessels obstructing the river channel was handled by the US Navy with the help of French authorities.[55]
Rouen was operated by a detachment of the 16th Major Port until the 11th Port took over on 20 October. The first ships to arrive were a pair of coasters from the UK carrying petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) on 15 October. At this point nine berths were available, and the port's rehabilitation was estimated to be 20 percent completed. During the month it handled 23,844 long tons (24,227 t) from 48 different vessels, most of which were coasters. Larger vessels could be accommodated, but they first had to be partially unloaded in Le Havre in order to negotiate the shallow channel between Le Havre and Rouen.
The port was so successful that on 8 November COMZ ordered all coasters except those carrying coal to unload at Rouen.[81] Discharges rose to 127,569 long tons (129,616 t) in November and 132,433 long tons (134,558 t) in December. The port's main problem was not a shortage of berths, but of labor and road and railway resources for port clearance.[59] Clearance by barge over the inland waterways commenced on 22 November and was mainly used to meet civilian needs.[55] Troops began debarking at Rouen, starting with a landing ship, infantry (LSI) on 10 November, and 51,111 troops passed through that port by the end of the year. In the same period 22,078 vehicles arrived on LSTs, coasters and MT ships. The port's peak of activity was in March 1945, when 15 Liberty ship and 26 coaster berths were available and it handled 268,174 long tons (272,477 t) of cargo; 9,000 US Army troops, 5,000 French civilians, and 9,000 prisoners of war were working the port.[59]
Antwerp
Before the war Antwerp had been one of the world's busiest ports, handling 12,000 vessels and nearly 60,000,000 long tons (61,000,000 t) of freight in 1938. It was situated on the
Antwerp was captured on 4 September,[84] with its port facilities largely intact thanks to the British Army's rapid advance, and the efforts of the Belgian Resistance, which assisted the British 11th Armoured Division in finding the least heavily defended route into the city and forestalled the German demolition of the port facilities.[85] Antwerp was just 65 miles (105 km) from the depots around Liège supporting the First Army, and even though the Third Army depots around Nancy were 250 miles (400 km) from Antwerp, this was closer than Cherbourg, which was more than 400 miles (640 km) from the depots. It was estimated that 21 divisions could be supported from Cherbourg, of which 6 would be by road and 15 by rail, but 54 divisions could be supported by rail from Antwerp.[31] However, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay,[86] noted on 3 September that the entrances to Antwerp and Rotterdam could be blocked and mined, and it could not be predicted how long it would take to open them.[31] Operations to clear the Scheldt estuary were initiated by the First Canadian Army in October, and completed in the first week of November.[87]
Both COMZ and the 12th Army Group urged SHAEF to allocate a portion of Antwerp's capacity to the support of the American forces. On considering the matter SHAEF concluded that Antwerp was indeed sufficiently large to serve the needs of both the British and the American forces.
The American forces would use the basins to the north of a line drawn through the Bassin Albert (Albertdok), and the British would use those to the south.[89] The Americans were guaranteed a minimum of 62 berths. The basins along the river would be shared, and allocated based on need. It was expected that the port would handle 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) per day not counting bulk POL, of which 22,500 long tons (22,900 t) was allocated to the Americans and 17,500 long tons (17,800 t) to the British. Overall command of the port was vested in the Royal Navy Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC),[90][91] Captain Cowley Thomas,[92] who also chaired a port executive committee on which both American and British interests were represented. Local administration was the responsibility of the British base sub area commander. US forces were allocated primary rights to the roads and railway lines leading southeast to Liège, while the British were given those leading to the north and northeast. A joint US, British and Belgian Movements Organization for Transport (BELMOT) was created to coordinate highway, railway and waterway traffic.[90][91]
The rehabilitation of the port was undertaken by the British, on the understanding that American resources could be called upon as required. The main US engineer unit assigned was the 358th Engineer General Service Regiment. Two of the ETO's five engineer port repair ships were also available. American engineers cleared rubble away from the quays, improved roads, repaired rail lines, rebuilt warehouses and constructed
The 13th Port was assigned to operate the American part of Antwerp, and began arriving from
Between October 1944 and March 1945 V-1 flying bombs struck Antwerp nearly every day, with 150 striking the port area.[97] Three anti-aircraft brigades were deployed to defend the city under the command of Brigadier General Clare H. Armstrong.[95] The possibility of a V-weapon striking an ammunition ship was taken seriously enough to ban ammunition ships from Antwerp. Ammunition, except some for the anti-aircraft guns around Antwerp, was unloaded at Cherbourg or Le Havre. The danger was real enough: on 8 January a V-2 rocket struck pier 123 about 50 yards (46 m) from the American freighter SS Blenheim. Twenty of those on board were injured, and the ship was so badly damaged that nearly a month was required to effect repairs to enable it to sail. A week later, another V-2 hit berth 218 and badly damaged the Liberty ship Michael de Kovats, injuring three on board and killing a soldier on the pier.[98] V-weapons were also used against the depots around Liège between November 1944 and March 1945. One that struck a fuel dump on 17 December started a fire that consumed 400,000 US gallons (1,500,000 L) of gasoline, and another on 21 December destroyed or badly damaged fourteen railway cars and set fire to six others. Some of the burning cars contained bags of mail from home, which were hastily unloaded.[99]
Antwerp was capable of handling far more than the allotted 40,000 long tons (41,000 t) a day; the limiting factor was clearance. Before the war, Antwerp had been a transit port, and it did not possess large amounts of covered storage space. What there was, was taken over by the British, as Antwerp was the logical site for the 21st Army Group's base installations. The Americans were allocated only a small amount of storage space, none of which was covered, on the assumption that American supplies would immediately be moved to the depots around Liège. Colonel
Port operations were interrupted by the German Ardennes offensive,[101] which commenced on 16 December 1944,[102] and threatened the depots around Liège. Rail and barge shipments to the area were halted, and large quantities of supplies piled up in the port area.[101] By 4 January 1945 there were nearly 3,500 railway cars lying fully loaded but idle at the port; thousands more unloaded cars were at the ADSEC depots around Liège.[100] Five anti-aircraft gun battalions were re-roled as infantry to protect Antwerp in case of a German breakthrough.[103] In January, new depots were opened in the Lille area, and supplies began moving again, but the number of railway cars reporting each day was consistently below what was required to clear the backlog.[100] That month, Antwerp handled 432,756 long tons (439,700 t) of cargo, of which 238,518 long tons (242,345 t) was cleared by rail, 120,799 long tons (122,737 t) by road and 41,616 long tons (42,284 t) by barge.[101]
Ghent
Ghent was an inland port about 20 miles (32 km) from the sea, which was accessed through the Ghent–Terneuzen Canal. Before the war it had been the second busiest port in Belgium after Antwerp. Although captured in September 1944, it had not figured in Allied logistical planning, as Antwerp was considered sufficient. The intensity of the German V-weapon attacks had brought about a reconsideration, and it was decided to activate Ghent as a backup in case Antwerp was temporarily put out of action. Ghent had not been badly damaged, but some bridges had been demolished, the lock gates had been damaged, cranes had been removed and there were some sunken ships. The administration of the port was similar to that of Antwerp, with a port executive committee. Tonnage capacity was divided, with 5,000 long tons (5,100 t) per day for the British and 7,500 long tons (7,600 t) for the Americans. The American sector was operated by the US 17th Port.[104]
Ghent had been used by the Germans only for barge traffic, so bringing it into operation required dredging 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) of sand and aggregate. This was carried out by the US Army hopper dredge W. L. Marshall, which had previously been engaged in dredging the Scheldt, and had several doors blown off by near misses by V-1s and V-2s. As it turned out, the 57-foot (17 m) beam of a Liberty ship could just pass through the Terneuzen locks. The first US Liberty ship to do so, the Hannis Taylor, reached Ghent on 23 January. The port was used for both Liberties and coasters. In its first month of operation, Ghent unloaded only 2,500 long tons (2,500 t) per day, but it was handling twice that by March.[105][104]
Highways
Motor transport was the most flexible form of transportation in that it could make deliveries to any location at any time, and could respond rapidly to changing demands. By September 1944 motor transport had three missions: short hauls around depots, port clearance, and long hauls on the lines of communication between them. Most of the activity involved short hauls,[106] but during the pursuit from the Seine to the German border in August and early September, the distance between the armies and the ports and beaches stretched to over 400 miles (640 km), and most of the long haulage had to be carried out by motor transport. On an average day the Red Ball Express dispatched 8,209 long tons (8,341 t) in 1,542 trucks carrying an average load of 5.3 long tons (5.4 t) per truck per round trip that averaged 714 miles (1,149 km).[107] Fortunately, the road network in northern France and Belgium had not been badly damaged, and required little maintenance effort. Highway repair mainly involved filling in potholes.[108]
Although the Red Ball Express was the first and most famous express highway delivery route, it was not the only one. The Red Lion ran from 16 September to 12 October and hauled 18,000 long tons (18,000 t) of supplies from Bayeux to Brussels. Half of the supplies were for the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions participating in Operation Market Garden to seize a crossing over the Rhine. Eight companies were withdrawn from the Red Ball Express for the purpose: six equipped with standard GMC CCKW 2½-ton 6×6 trucks, and two with 10-ton semi-trailers. They were supported by two medium automotive maintenance companies, which maintained a pool of replacement vehicles that could be issued in cases where repairs could not be carried out immediately.[109]
The White Ball route was organized by the Channel Base Section and ran from Le Havre and Rouen to rail transfer points in Paris and Reims. It operated from 6 October 1944 to 10 January 1945. An average of 29 truck companies were involved, delivering 134,067 long tons (136,218 t) of supplies with an average outbound trip of 113 miles (182 km). The Green Diamond was organized by the Normandy Base Section and delivered 15,600 long tons (15,900 t) of supplies from Cherbourg to railway transfer points at Granville and Dol between 10 October and 1 November.[109]
The last to operate was the ABC Haul, which delivered supplies from Antwerp to the depots around Liège. It differed from the others in that it used an average of sixteen companies, all of which were equipped with semi-trailer trucks with 10-long-ton (10 t) trailers. It ran from 30 November 1944 until 26 March 1945, and hauled 245,000 long tons (249,000 t). There was one more: the Little Red Ball Express, which was organized to deliver 100 long tons (100 t) of critical supplies from Carentan to Paris each day. While the train took three days to make this run, a truck could do it in just one. It ran from 15 December 1944 until 17 January 1945, after which it was replaced by an express train.[109]
Requests for more heavy vehicles led to reduced production of 2½-ton vehicles. The main bottleneck in both cases was the
Tires were the most critical item, being in short supply because the Japanese had overrun most of the world's sources of
COMZ attempted to obtain additional supplies of tires by restoring the local French and Belgian tire industries. This was hampered by a shortage of raw materials, which had to be imported, and the transportation systems and electricity grids, which had to be restored. The first tire made from American
The flexibility of motor transport was demonstrated in December when the American armies were struck by the German Ardennes offensive. On 18 December, two days after it began, 274 2½-ton trucks were taken from the White Ball Route and another 258 from the Seine Base Section to move the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to the Ardennes. The following day another 347 trucks were taken from the White Ball Route to help the Third Army respond to the offensive. Semitrailers were withdrawn from the ABC Haul to assist, and by the end of the month 2,500 trucks had been withdrawn from port clearance and short haul duties to handle emergency movements of troops, equipment and supplies. At Liège
Railways
While motor transport was flexible, it lacked the capacity of rail transport to move large tonnages over long distances. It was upon the railways that the movement of supplies from the ports to the depots ultimately depended. The railway system in northern France was operated by the 2nd Military Railway Service,[113] under the command of Brigadier General Clarence L. Burpee, an Atlantic Coast Line Railroad executive who had commanded the 703rd Railway Grand Division in the North African campaign and the military railways in the Italian campaign.[114]
By the end of September, the 2nd Military Railway Service was responsible for the operation of roughly 2,000 miles (3,200 km) of single-track railway and 2,775 miles (4,466 km) of double-track railway lines. To the northeast of Paris, lines had been opened to the depot areas around Liège and Verdun. The extent of damage to the rail network varied greatly. Most of the bridges across the Seine had been destroyed by Allied bombing or demolished by the retreating Germans, and for a time freight had to be routed through the passenger network in Paris. To the northeast, the Germans had not had sufficient time to carry out widespread demolitions, and the network was largely intact, although some of the double-track lines had single-track sections, and only one bridge in the Liège area was still standing, resulting in a bottleneck that was not rectified until January 1945.[113]
Rehabilitation of the railway system was largely a matter of repairing bridges.
The railway system was steadily improved in September and October, easing the burden on the motor vehicles. The railway system northeast of the Seine was in relatively good condition, and had greater capacity than that to the southwest. Two transloading points were established around Paris, at Aubervilliers station for the First Army, and Vincennes station for the Third Army, where trucks could transfer their loads onto trains. Aubervilliers could accommodate 225 railroad cars and load 20 simultaneously, while Vincennes could accommodate 400 and load 115 simultaneously. The task of loading the trains was performed by 300 to 350 French civilians who worked in three eight-hour shifts each day. Except for a crane at Vincennes, there was no provision for loading heavy or bulky items, so only loads that could be manhandled were accepted. Manifests were checked at a regulating point at Trappes south of Paris, and trucks were routed accordingly. Truck to train transfer proved very successful, and Red Ball shipments beyond Paris were discontinued on 20 October, except for some heavy and bulky engineering supplies. In early November, such items began being hauled all the way by train, and the Red Ball Express was discontinued on 16 November, around the same time as the Normandy beaches were closed.[117] In October, 798 freight trains arrived in Paris from Normandy and Brittany, and 999 departed for destinations in the northeast hauling US Army cargo.[118] By November, 23,000 long tons (23,000 t) of supplies was being forwarded northeast of the Seine each day, representing over half the tonnage arriving at the depots.[119]
It was not intended that the railway network would be operated entirely by Allied service personnel for an extended period of time. The plan was that the lines would be progressively handed over to civilian operators once the fighting had passed through and the network was restored. The rapid Allied advance in August and September disrupted this plan, and resulted in the military personnel being spread far more widely and thinly than anticipated. This was complicated by the fact that while the railway operating battalions were formed around cadres drawn from American railroads, not all of their personnel had operating or supervisory experience. Difficulties also arose in dealing with the French civilian operators through differences of language, documentation and operating procedures.[119]
The most important limiting factor affecting the railways was the availability of rolling stock. The Operation Overlord planners had anticipated that much of the French rolling stock would be destroyed by Allied bombing, and that the retreating Germans would take what they could with them. This proved prescient: only fifty serviceable French locomotives were captured southwest of the Seine. It was estimated that the Allied forces would require 2,724 of the large 2-8-0 and 680 of the smaller 0-6-0 type, of which 1,800 and 470 respectively would be for American use, but only 1,358 2-8-0s and 362 0-6-0s were on hand by the end of June 1944.[119]
Due to cutbacks in American locomotive production, the War Department was unable to guarantee delivery of the remaining 2,000 locomotives, and suggested that ETOUSA obtain 450 locomotives that had been loaned to the British. The British refused to hand them over unless the Americans released their coasters. In December, 100,000 deadweight tons (100,000 deadweight tonnes) of coasters was released, and the British agreed to ship 150 locomotives in December, followed by 100 per month thereafter. By the end of the year 1,500 locomotives had been shipped to the continent, and 800 captured French, German and Italian ones had been repaired by French and American mechanics and restored to service.[119]
More than 57,000 railroad cars of various types, including boxcars, flatcars, refrigerator cars and tank cars were shipped to the continent. Of these, some 20,000 had been shipped from the US in the form of knock-down kits and had been assembled in the UK. These were augmented by captured rolling stock.[119] Nonetheless, serious shortages of rolling stock developed in November. Part of the problem was that the armies liked to keep a certain amount of supplies on wheels, using railroad cars as mobile warehouses, but a major factor was a decision to ship bulk supplies directly from the ports to the ADSEC and army depots to reduce port congestion. These depots were primarily points for issuing supplies, with limited unloading and storage capacity, and did not have sufficient resources to classify and segregate bulk supplies. By the end of November there were 11,000 loaded freight cars on the rails northeast of Paris, and ten days later this had increased to 14,000, but the depots could unload only about 2,000 cars per day. This resulted in increased railroad car turnaround times, with many cars taking 20 to 40 days to be unloaded.[120]
COMZ recognized what was happening, and took steps to remedy the situation, but before they could take effect the German Ardennes offensive engulfed the American army.[121] The forward railheads at Malmedy, Eupen and Herbesthal had to be evacuated. Rail shipments abruptly dropped from 50,000 to 30,000 long tons (51,000 to 30,000 t) per day as supplies were held back until the operational situation improved, and trains were used to back haul stocks from depots threatened by the German advance.[122] About 35,000 railroad cars accumulated in forward areas, while supplies piled up at the ports and trains were held idle. Bridges were damaged by Allied and German demolitions and air attacks. The vital railway bridge over the Meuse at Namur was struck by a German air raid on 24 December that set off Allied demolition charges. The bridge had to be rebuilt, and was reopened for traffic on 15 January 1945.[121]
Air
Air transport was the least economic form of transport, but in September and October, with road and rail transport unable to supply even the minimum daily requirements of the armies, the Ninth Air Force and ADSEC, air transport was called on to supplement them. In the second week of September, troop carrier and cargo aircraft of the First Allied Airborne Army's IX Troop Carrier Command and No. 46 Group RAF, and converted Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers managed to deliver 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) per day to airfields at Saint-Dizier, Clastres and Florennes that were made available by the Ninth Air Force. The First Allied Airborne Army units were withdrawn to participate in Operation Market Garden, leaving only the B-24s. Each could carry between 1,600 and 1,800 US gallons (6,100 and 6,800 L) in four bomb bay tanks. In thirteen days of operations commencing on 9 September, 1,601 B-24 sorties delivered 2,589,065 US gallons (9,800,680 L) of gasoline. They were augmented by some British Handley Page Halifax bombers. Part of the planned Market Garden resupply missions were canceled on 22 September, and in the final week of September deliveries averaged a record 1,525 long tons (1,549 t) per day.[123]
The Communications Zone would have liked to have continued to exploit air transport to the maximum extent, but the use of bombers was uneconomical, and they were withdrawn at the end of September. Bad flying weather in October reduced daily deliveries by air to 675 long tons (686 t) per day. In November, 3,227 long tons (3,279 t) were dispatched by air, of which 2,143 long tons (2,177 t) was gasoline. The Third Army complained about this. Gasoline was no longer in short supply; what was required was winter clothing and equipment. It was suspected that gasoline was being shipped simply because it was on hand and easy to handle.[124]
In December, isolated units of the 106th Infantry Division called for air supply, and 150 aircraft were readied, but the mission was not flown due to bad weather around their bases in the UK. Mussions were flown to support the 101st Airborne Division, which was cut off in Bastogne. Between 23 and 27 December, 850 sorties were flown to airdrop supplies, and 61 more were dispatched with gliders, one of which carried a surgical team. As was normal for this sort of operation, some supplies could not be recovered for various reasons, but the 101st Airborne Division considered it successful. An attempt to resupply cut off elements of the 3rd Armored Division was less successful; errors in map reading resulted in 23 of the 29 aircraft dispatched dropping their supplies behind enemy lines, and the rest were either diverted or shot down. A second attempt the following day was canceled due to bad weather.[124][125]
Inland waterways
Inland water transport had not figured prominently in the Operation Overlord plan because it was felt that the benefit from rehabilitating the waterways would not be worth the effort involved. A policy was therefore laid down that waterways would be used only where the repairs required were minor and when there was a clear necessity for their use. In September such a need arose to restore inland waterways to supply coal to the Paris region in order to relieve pressure on the railways. In November an Inland Waterways Division was established in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Four waterways were rehabilitated for military use: the Seine, Oise and Rhône rivers, and the Albert Canal.[126]
The Oise was restored to supply coal to Paris from the coalfields around
Barge traffic on the Seine was obstructed by a pair of
The Albert Canal had more direct military use, as it connected Antwerp with the depots around Liège. Its rehabilitation was undertaken jointly with the British, with the Americans responsible for the 50-mile (80 km) section between Kwaadmechelen and Liège. This work was undertaken by the 1056th Port Construction and Repair Group, with assistance from the 332nd and 355th Engineer General Service Regiments and Belgian civilian contractors.[128] Delays in clearing away obstructions in the Albert Canal, notably the demolished Yserburg Bridge at the entrance, caused the opening of the canal to be delayed from 15 to 28 December, by which time there was a backlog of 198 loaded barges.[100] During the winter the canal froze, and sea mules—tiny tugs normally used for towing barges—equipped with bulldozer blades were used as icebreakers.[129][130] Barges eventually handled half the tonnage discharged at Antwerp.[128] Between December 1944 and July 1945, 1,222,000 long tons (1,242,000 t) of Army cargo was carried by barge on the Albert Canal, and 580,000 long tons (590,000 t) on the French waterways.[129]
Outcome
Although logistical difficulties constituted a brake on combat operations, they were not the only factors that brought the Allied advance to a halt. The American forces also had to contend with rugged terrain, worsening weather and, above all, stiffening German resistance. American forces were widely dispersed and, with the logistical situation preying on his mind, a cautious Hodges ordered his corps commanders to halt when they encountered strong resistance.
As American forces confronted the defenses of the Siegfried Line, priority shifted from fuel to ammunition.[134] The armies made little progress during the fighting in September and October. Although the logistical situation improved even before the opening of Antwerp, the effort to reach the Rhine in November was probably premature. Worsening weather and stubborn German resistance impeded the American advance as much as any logistical difficulties. The German recovery was sufficient to mount the Ardennes offensive in December. This placed immense strain on the American lines of communication, especially the newly opened port of Antwerp. By the new year though, the American transportation system was stronger and more robust than ever, and preparations were underway to support the final drive into the heart of Germany.[135]
Notes
- ^ Dick 2016, pp. 70–73.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1951, pp. 476–478.
- ^ a b Dick 2016, p. 278.
- ^ a b Pogue 1954, p. 204.
- ^ a b Pogue 1954, pp. 264–265.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1953, pp. 198–202.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 26–27.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1953, p. 483.
- ^ Mack 1981, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Blumenson 1961, p. 186.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1953, pp. 484–485.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 509.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1953, p. 488.
- ^ Van Creveld 1977, pp. 213–215.
- ^ Dick 2016, pp. 268–269.
- ^ Dick 2016, pp. 276, 292.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1953, pp. 510–511, 552–553.
- ^ Thomson & Mayo 1960, pp. 286–289.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 242–243.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 244.
- ^ Dick 2016, p. 292.
- ^ Thomson & Mayo 1960, pp. 298–299.
- ^ Dick 2016, pp. 277–278.
- ^ Ludewig 2012, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1953, p. 413.
- ^ a b Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 282.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 55–57.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 77.
- ^ a b c d Ruppenthal 1959, p. 52.
- ^ a b c Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 49–50.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 124–125.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 124–126.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 5.
- ^ Coakley & Leighton 1968, p. 385.
- ^ a b c Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 126–128.
- ^ a b c d e Coakley & Leighton 1968, pp. 386–387.
- ^ Coakley & Leighton 1968, pp. 551–553.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 128–130.
- ^ a b Wardlow 1951, pp. 287–289.
- ^ Coakley & Leighton 1968, pp. 551–554.
- ^ "4-590 Memorandum for General Somervell, November 22, 1944". George C. Marshall Foundation. Retrieved 3 June 2021.
- ^ Ballantine 1947, p. 240.
- ^ Ballantine 1947, p. 216.
- ^ Ballantine 1947, p. 241.
- ^ Coakley & Leighton 1968, p. 554.
- ^ Coakley & Leighton 1968, p. 555.
- ^ a b Coakley & Leighton 1968, p. 556.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 132.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 131.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 132–133.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 94–95.
- ^ a b Bykofsky & Larson 1957, pp. 315–316.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Beck et al. 1985, pp. 359–363.
- ^ a b Beck et al. 1985, pp. 358–359.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 89.
- ^ a b Morison 1957, pp. 302–303.
- ^ a b c d e f Bykofsky & Larson 1957, pp. 316–318.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 308.
- ^ Beck et al. 1985, pp. 352–353.
- ^ Horton, Alex (22 July 2018). "Branson: How the World War II 'Duck' evolved into a tourist staple". The Washington Post. Retrieved 11 August 2021.
- ^ Beck et al. 1985, p. 354.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 75–78.
- ^ a b c d Bykofsky & Larson 1957, pp. 313–314.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 33–34.
- ^ a b c d Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 79–81.
- ^ a b Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 315.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 85.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 86–88.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 48–49.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 97–98.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 50–51.
- ^ "Miantonomah I (CMc-5)". United States Navy. Retrieved 17 January 2021.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 317.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, p. 102.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, pp. 318–319.
- ^ Scheffauer 1954, p. 15.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 102–103.
- ^ a b c d Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 104–105.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 320.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 48.
- ^ Allen 1997, pp. 218–219.
- ^ Pogue 1954, p. 17.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 107.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, p. 108.
- ^ a b c Beck et al. 1985, pp. 363–366.
- ^ a b Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 321.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, p. 109.
- ^ "Captain W Cowley Thomas, RN, NOIC Antwerp, assisting Captain K W Munch, of the Asborjren, the first coaster to enter Antwerp". Imperial War Museum. Retrieved 11 July 2021.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 110.
- ^ a b c Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 322.
- ^ a b King & Kutta 1998, pp. 267–269.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, p. 115.
- ^ King & Kutta 1998, pp. 271–272.
- ^ King & Kutta 1998, pp. 280–281.
- ^ King & Kutta 1998, pp. 281–286.
- ^ a b c d Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 111–113.
- ^ a b c Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 323.
- ^ Pogue 1954, pp. 366–367.
- ^ King & Kutta 1998, pp. 270–271.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, p. 395.
- ^ Beck et al. 1985, pp. 365–366.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 327.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 134–135.
- ^ Beck et al. 1985, p. 397.
- ^ a b c Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 139–143.
- ^ Gropman 1996, p. 115.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, p. 145.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 243–245.
- ^ a b c d e Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 148–149.
- ^ Ancell & Miller 1996, p. 41.
- ^ Beck et al. 1985, pp. 397–398.
- ^ Erang, Gerry (23 May 2021). "Dark Luxembourg: Explosions, snipers, and gory shootouts on Liberation Day in central Luxembourg". RTL Today. Retrieved 26 November 2022.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 135–137.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 342.
- ^ a b c d e Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 150–153.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 153–154.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 154–155.
- ^ Bykofsky & Larson 1957, p. 344.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 161–162.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 162–165.
- ^ Landon 1945, p. 53.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 165–166.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 166–167.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 167–168.
- ^ a b Bykofsky & Larson 1957, pp. 355–356.
- ^ "A sea mule tug pulls a vessel across the Atlantic Ocean during World War II". Critical Past. Retrieved 29 November 2021.
- ^ Rinkleff 2012, pp. 354–355.
- ^ Hogan 2000, pp. 147–149.
- ^ Andidora 2002, pp. 151–152.
- ^ Rinkleff 2012, p. 318.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 24–26.
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