Anatoliy Golitsyn
Anatoliy Golitsyn | |
---|---|
Born | Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn 25 August 1926 |
Died | 29 December 2008 | (aged 82)
Occupation(s) | Author, KGB operative (formerly) |
Known for | Soviet KGB defector |
Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn
Defection
Golitsyn worked in the strategic planning department of the
In November 1962, KGB head
Golitsyn provided information about many famous Soviet agents including Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, John Vassall, double agent Aleksander Kopatzky who worked in Germany, and others.[2] While unable to identify some agents like Philby specifically by name, Golitsyn provided sufficient information that SIS was able to determine the culprits.[5] Thus, Golitsyn's defection in 1961 set in motion the process that definitively confirmed Philby as a Soviet mole.
Controversies
Golitsyn was a figure of significant controversy in the Western intelligence community. The military writer General Sir
Accusing Harold Wilson
Golitsyn said that
Golitsyn also accused the KGB of poisoning
Accusing Urho Kekkonen
Golitsyn said after his defection that the Note Crisis of 1961 was an operation masterminded by Finnish president Urho Kekkonen together with the Soviets to ensure Kekkonen's re-election. Golitsyn further said that Kekkonen had been a KGB agent codenamed "Timo" since 1947. Most Finnish historians believe that Kekkonen was closely connected with the KGB, but the matter remains controversial.[citation needed][13]
Golitsyn and Nosenko
Golitsyn had said from the very beginning that the KGB would send a false defector to the US to try to discredit him. In January of 1964, Yuri Nosenko, a Golitsyn-discrediting putative KGB officer who had defected "in place" to the CIA in 1962 in Geneva, returned there, once again as the ostensible security officer of a Soviet arms control delegation, and, as promised, recontacted his CIA case officers, Tennent H. Bagley and Russian-born George Kisevalter.[14] Nosenko proceeded to them that he now wanted to physically defect to the US (and leave his previously beloved wife and two daughters behind in Moscow) because he allegedly feared that the KGB was aware of his treason. Bagley, having read Golitsyn's CIA file shortly after his and Kisevalter's June 1962 meetings with him, knew that what Nosenko had told them about KGB penetrations of Western intelligence services overlapped (and contradicted) what Golitsyn had told the CIA. Bagley had thought this strange, because Nosenko and Golitsyn had worked in different parts of the highly compartmentalized KGB and therefore would not have been privy to the same information. Bagley also did not believe that the KGB would have allowed Nosenko to travel to Geneva in 1964 if it suspected him of spying for the CIA. For these and other reasons Bagley came to believe that Nosenko was a false defector, originally sent to the CIA in Geneva to discredit and deflect what Golitsyn had told it.
When Nosenko told Kisevalter and Bagley that he wanted to physically defect to the US, Bagley, who was Nosenko's primary case officer from the beginning, stalled and suggested to him that he wait a few days while headquarters prepared for him, and Nosenko agreed. Two developments, however, hastened the process: Nosenko told Bagley and Kisevalter during that same meeting that he had been
Judging it improbable that the KGB had not, as Nosenko claimed, interviewed former Marine radar operator Oswald, and faced with further challenges to Nosenko's credibility (e.g., his originally telling Bagley that he was a major, then in January 1964 boasting -- with a KGB travel document that stated as much -- that he had recently been promoted to lieutenant-colonel, and eventually confessing to having been only a captain), Angleton did not object when Murphy and Bagley detained Nosenko in April of 1964. This confinement lasted sixteen months and involved austere living conditions, a minimal diet, and interrogations that were frequent and intensive. Nosenko spent an additional four months in a ten-foot by ten-foot concrete bunker in Camp Peary,[6] and was allegedly told that this arrangement would continue for 25 years unless he confessed to being a Soviet spy.[15]
During the three years Nosenko was detained and interrogated by the CIA, he was given three polygraph tests. According to Gerald Posner (who befriended Nosenko in 1993), he failed the first two (1964 and 1966) while under great duress, but passed the third one in 1968, which was "monitored by several Agency departments."[16] However, Nosenko's long-term CIA case officer, Tennent H. Bagley, says in his 2007 book Spy Wars that Bruce Solie of the Office of Security (whom Professor John M. Newman believes was a KGB mole[17]) "coached" Nosenko through the easy third test, and polygraph expert Richard D. Arthur said that of the three tests, the second one (which Nosenko had failed) was by far the most reliable one.
In October of 1968, Nosenko was virtually cleared by Bruce Solie via the aforementioned polygraph test and a report he had written, and a few years later the CIA declared Nosenko to be a true defector and hired him to teach counterintelligence to its new recruits.[6]
Golitsyn's books
New Lies for Old
In 1984, Golitsyn published the book New Lies For Old,[18] wherein he warned about a long-term deception strategy of seeming retreat from hard-line Communism designed to lull the West into a false sense of security, and finally economically cripple and diplomatically isolate the United States. Among other things, Golitsyn stated:
The "liberalization" would be spectacular and impressive. Formal pronouncements might be made about a reduction in the communist party's role: its monopoly would be apparently curtailed. An ostensible separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary might be introduced. The Supreme Soviet would be given greater apparent power, and the president of the Soviet Union and the first secretary of the party might well be separated. The KGB would be "reformed." Dissidents at home would be amnestied; those in exile abroad would be allowed to return, and some would take up positions of leadership in government.
Sakharov might be included in some capacity in the government or allowed to teach abroad. The creative arts and cultural and scientific organizations, such as the writers' unions and Academy of Sciences, would become apparently more independent, as would the trade unions. Political clubs would be opened to nonmembers of the communist party. Leading dissidents might form one or more alternative political parties.
There would be greater freedom for Soviet citizens to travel. Western and United Nations observers would be invited to the Soviet Union to witness the reforms in action.[19]
Angleton and Golitsyn reportedly sought the assistance of
New Lies for Old received a first edition in Portuguese in 2018.[21][22]
The Perestroika Deception
In 1995, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Christopher Story published a book entitled The Perestroika Deception containing purported memoranda attributed to Golitsyn claiming:
- "The [Soviet] strategists are concealing the secret coordination that exists and will continue between Moscow and the 'nationalist' leaders of [the] 'independent' republics."[citation needed]
- "The power of the KGB remains as great as ever… Talk of cosmetic changes in the KGB and its supervision is deliberately publicized to support the myth of 'democratization' of the Soviet political system."[citation needed]
- "Scratch these new, instant Soviet 'democrats,' 'anti-Communists,' and 'nationalists' who have sprouted out of nowhere, and underneath will be found secret Party members or KGB agents."[citation needed]
Reactions
In his book
According to Russian political scientist
According to Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, "In 1992 I had unprecedented access to Politburo and Central Committee secret documents which have been classified, and still are even now, for 30 years. These documents show very clearly that the whole idea of turning the European common market into a federal state was agreed between the left-wing parties of Europe and Moscow as a joint project which Gorbachev in 1988–89 called our 'common European home'." (interview by The Brussels Journal, February 23, 2006).
On 8 June 1995 the British
According to Daniel Pipes, Golitsyn's publications "had some impact on rightist thinking in the United States".[27]
Golitsyn's views are echoed by Czech dissident and politician Petr Cibulka, who has alleged that the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia was staged by the communist StB secret police.
In popular culture
The 1996 American film Mission: Impossible featured a fictionalized character based on Anatoliy Golitsyn named Alexander Golitsyn, played by actor Marcel Iureș.
See also
- Finnish Security Intelligence Service
- List of Eastern Bloc defectors
- List of KGB defectors
References
- ISBN 9780297861010.
- ^ ISBN 0-14-028487-7.
- ^ Arnold Beichman, New lies for old: the communist strategy of deception and disinformation. - book reviews, National Review, September 7, 1984
- ^ "NARA Record Number: 104-10169-10125". Mary Ferrell Foundation. Retrieved 28 June 2021.
- ISBN 0-307-27581-7.
- ^ a b c Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, August 27, 2008, Yuri I. Nosenko, 81; KGB Agent Who Defected to the U.S.
- ^ Herron, Caroline Rand; Wright, Michael (2 February 1986). "THE NATION; A K.G.B. Defector Who May Not Be" – via NYTimes.com.
- ^ War and Intelligence Conference Archived May 10, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Christopher Andrew, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries and Deadly Games By Tennent H Bagley Reviewed by Christopher Andrew, The Sunday Times, June 24, 2007
- ^ Dorril, Stephen and Ramsay, Robin (1992). Smear! - Wilson and the Secret State. Grafton
- ^ Wright, Peter (1987). Spycatcher. New York and London: Viking Penguin Inc.
- ^ Leigh, David (1988). The Wilson Plot. Heinemann
- ^ Kansakunnan sijaiskärsijät, Lehtinen&Rautkallio. Neuvostotiedustelu Suomessa 1917–1991 strategia ja toiminta, Jukka Seppinen. Vuodet Tehtaankadulla, Albert Akulov. Sisäänajo, Kalevi Sorsa ... etc
- ISBN 978-0-300-12198-8.
- ^ Posner, p.39
- ^ Posner, Gerald, Case Closed (New York:Random House, 1993, pgs. 40–42)
- ISBN 9798355050771.
- ^ Anatoly Golitsyn, New Lies for Old
- ISBN 0-396-08194-0.
- ISBN 0-15-100513-3.
- ^ "A ameaça comunista | Articulação Conservadora". articulacaoconservadora.org (in Brazilian Portuguese). 2020-04-07. Retrieved 2021-08-15.
- ^ "Meias Verdades, Velhas Mentiras". www.goodreads.com. Retrieved 2021-08-15.
- Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA, pgs. 407-408
- ISBN 0-374-52738-5, see chapter Who was behind perestroika?
- Radio Free Europe
- ^ Christopher Gill MP Archived September 30, 2007, at the Wayback Machine, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 8 June 1995, Column 370
- ISBN 9780684871110.
Books
- Anatoliy Golitsyn. New Lies for Old G. S. G. & Associates, Incorporated, 1990, ISBN 0-945001-13-4
- Christopher Story (Editor). ("by Anatoliy Golitsyn") The Perestroika Deception : Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency, Edward Harle Ltd; 2nd Ed edition (1998) ISBN 1-899798-03-X
External links
- Interview with Christopher Story, editor of The Perestroika Deception; part I, part II, part III
- Bombs Away, interview with Jeffrey Nyquist, 18 December 2004
- Unmasking Spies, Then and Now, by Jeffrey Nyquist, Geopolitical Global Analysis, 01.06.2005
- Memorandum to the CIA: 26 August 1991, by Anatoliy Golitsyn
- IN HIS DEFECTOR HE TRUSTED : HOW THE CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF BROKE THE WESTERN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR TEN YEARS (1962–1973)
- The Perestroika Deception, by Anatoliy Golitsyn