Antipositivism
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In social science, antipositivism (also interpretivism, negativism or antinaturalism) is a theoretical stance which proposes that the social realm cannot be studied with the methods of investigation utilized within the natural sciences, and that investigation of the social realm requires a different epistemology. Fundamental to that antipositivist epistemology is the belief that the concepts and language researchers use in their research shape their perceptions of the social world they are investigating and seeking to define.[1]
Interpretivism (anti-positivism) developed among researchers dissatisfied with
History
Beginning with Giambattista Vico, in the early eighteenth century, and later with Montesquieu, the study of natural history and human history were separate fields of intellectual enquiry. Natural history is not under human control, whereas human history is a human creation. As such, antipositivism is informed by an epistemological distinction between the natural world and the social realm. The natural world can only be understood by its external characteristics, whereas the social realm can be understood externally and internally, and thus can be known.[3]
In the early nineteenth century, intellectuals, led by the
The enhanced positivism of
At the turn of the twentieth century, the first wave of German sociologists formally introduced verstehende (interpretive) sociological antipositivism, proposing research should concentrate on human cultural
The interaction between theory (or constructed
[Sociology is ] ... the science whose object is to interpret the meaning of social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the action proceeds and the effects which it produces. By 'action' in this definition is meant the human behaviour when and to the extent the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful ... the meaning to which we refer may be either (a) the meaning actually intended either by an individual agent on a particular historical occasion or by a number of agents on an approximate average in a given set of cases, or (b) the meaning attributed to the agent or agents, as types, in a pure type constructed in the abstract. In neither case is the 'meaning' thought of as somehow objectively 'correct' or 'true' by some metaphysical criterion. This is the difference between the empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and history, and any kind of a priori discipline, such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, or aesthetics whose aim is to extract from their subject-matter 'correct' or 'valid' meaning.
Through the work of
Antipositivism thus holds there is no methodological unity of the sciences: the three goals of positivism – description, control, and prediction – are incomplete, since they lack any understanding.[citation needed] Science aims at understanding causality so control can be exerted. If this succeeded in sociology, those with knowledge would be able to control the ignorant and this could lead to social engineering.[according to whom?]
This perspective has led to controversy over how one can draw the line between
Frankfurt School
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The antipositivist tradition continued in the establishment of critical theory, particularly the work associated with the Frankfurt School of social research. Antipositivism would be further facilitated by rejections of 'scientism'; or science as ideology. Jürgen Habermas argues, in his On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967), that "the positivist thesis of unified science, which assimilates all the sciences to a natural-scientific model, fails because of the intimate relationship between the social sciences and history, and the fact that they are based on a situation-specific understanding of meaning that can be explicated only hermeneutically ... access to a symbolically prestructured reality cannot be gained by observation alone."[12]
The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argued that "our innate tendency to express moral concern and identify with the Other's wants is stifled in modernity by positivistic science and dogmatic bureaucracy. If the Other does not 'fit in' to modernity's approved classifications, it is liable to be extinguished."[13]
See also
- Critical theory
- Grounded theory
- Holism
- Humanistic sociology
- Methodological dualism
- Philosophy of social science
- Poststructuralism
- Social action
- Symbolic interactionism
References
- ISBN 978-0-13-700161-3.
- ^ Miller, K. (2004). Interpretive Perspectives on Theory Development. In Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts (pp. 46–59). Boston, Massachusetts: McGraw-Hill.
- ISBN 978-0710077462.
- ^ Jordan, Zbigniew A. (1967). The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis. New York: Macmillan. pp. 131, 321. [1] [[iarchive:evolutionofdiale0000jord|]]
- ISBN 978-0-7456-4328-1pp. 20–25
- ^ S2CID 199061702.
- ^ Ashley D, Orenstein DM (2005). Sociological theory: Classical statements (6th ed.). Boston: Pearson Education. p. 241.
- ^ Weber, Max The Nature of Social Action in Runciman, W.G. 'Weber: Selections in Translation' Cambridge University Press, 1991. p. 7.
- ^ Levine, Donald (ed) 'Simmel: On individuality and social forms' Chicago University Press, 1971. p. xix.
- ^ Levine, Donald (ed) 'Simmel: On individuality and social forms' Chicago University Press, 1971. p. 6.
- ^ Robertson, Susan (2020-04-30). "Module 2: Introducing the Sociological Perspective".
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(help) - ISBN 978-0-7456-4328-1p. 22
- ^ John Scott. Fifty Key Sociologists: The Contemporary Theorists. Routledge. 2006. p. 19