Appeasement
Appeasement, in an international context, is a diplomatic policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power to avoid conflict.[1] The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of the British governments of Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald (in office 1929–1935), Stanley Baldwin (in office 1935–1937) and (most notably) Neville Chamberlain (in office 1937–1940) towards Nazi Germany (from 1933) and Fascist Italy (from 1922)[2] between 1935 and 1939. Under British pressure, appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in French foreign policy of the period but was always much less popular there than in the United Kingdom.[3]
In the early 1930s, appeasing concessions were widely seen as desirable because of the
As alarm grew about the rise of fascism in Europe, Chamberlain resorted to attempts at news censorship to control public opinion.[5] He confidently announced after Munich that he had secured "peace for our time".[6]
Academics, politicians and diplomats have intensely debated the 1930s appeasement policies ever since they occurred. Historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation ("Lesson of Munich") for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong to the judgment that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and that postponing a showdown was in the best interests of the West.
History
Failure of collective security
Appeasement policy, the policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini, operating jointly at that time, during 1937 and 1938 by continuous concessions granted in the hope of reaching a point of saturation when the dictators would be willing to accede to international collaboration.... It came to an end when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, in defiance of his promises given at Munich, and Prime Minister Chamberlain, who had championed appeasement before, decided on a policy of resistance to further German aggression.
— Walter Theimer (ed.), The Penguin Political Dictionary, 1939
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement emerged from the failure of the
Invasion of Manchuria
In September 1931, the
The 1935
Abyssinia crisis
Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini had
Earlier, in April 1935, Italy had joined Britain and France in protest against
Remilitarisation of the Rhineland
Under the
Spanish Civil War
Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of the Establishment's anti-communist stance. Scott Ramsay (2019) instead argues that Britain demonstrated "benevolent neutrality" and was simply hedging its bets by avoiding the favouring of one side or the other. The goal was that in a European war Britain would enjoy the "benevolent neutrality" of whichever side won in Spain.[10]
Conduct of appeasement, 1937–1939
In 1937,
Anschluss
When the
Austrian Chancellor
Although the
Munich Agreement
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.
— Neville Chamberlain, 27 September 1938, 8 p.m. radio broadcast, on Czechoslovak refusal to accept Nazi demands to cede border areas to Germany.
Under the Versailles Settlement,
France and Britain advised Czechoslovak acceptance of Sudeten autonomy. The Czechoslovak government refused and ordered a partial mobilisation in expectation of German aggression.
and there was an increase of violence by Sudeten Nazis against Czechoslovak and Jewish targets.Chamberlain, faced with the prospect of a German invasion, flew to Berchtesgaden on 15 September to negotiate directly with Hitler, who now demanded that Chamberlain accept not Sudeten self-government within Czechoslovakia but the absorption of the Sudeten lands into Germany. Chamberlain became convinced that refusal would lead to war. The geography of Europe was such that Britain and France could forcibly prevent the German occupation of the Sudetenland only by the invasion of Germany.[17] Chamberlain, therefore, returned to Britain and agreed to Hitler's demands. Britain and France told the Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš to hand over to Germany all territory with a German majority. Hitler increased his aggression against Czechoslovakia and ordered the establishment of a Sudeten German paramilitary organisation, which proceeded to carry out terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak targets.
German annexation of Sudetenland
On 22 September, Chamberlain flew to Bad Godesberg for his second meeting with Hitler and said that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. He was startled by the response of Hitler that the cession of the Sudetenland was not enough and that Czechoslovakia, which Hitler had described as a "fraudulent state", must be broken up completely. Later in the day, Hitler resiled by saying that he was willing to accept the cession of the Sudetenland by 1 October. On 24 September, Germany issued the Godesberg Memorandum, which demanded cession by 28 September or war. The Czechoslovak government rejected those demands, France ordered mobilisation and Britain mobilised the Royal Navy.
On 26 September, Hitler made a speech at the
In the atmosphere of growing conflict, Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference. On 29 September 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and Mussolini met in Munich. Czechoslovakia was not to be a party to these talks, nor was the Soviet Union. The four powers agreed that Germany would complete its occupation of the Sudetenland but that an international commission would consider other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was told that if it did not submit, it would stand alone. At Chamberlain's request, Hitler readily signed an agreement for between the United Kingdom and Germany. Chamberlain returned to Britain and promised "peace for our time". Before Munich, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sent a telegram to Chamberlain that said, "Good man" and he later told the American ambassador in Rome, William Phillips, "I am not a bit upset over the final result".[20]
First Vienna Award and German annexation of Bohemia and Moravia
As a result of the annexation of the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia lost 800,000 citizens, much of its industry and its mountain defences in the west. The rest of Czechoslovakia was left weak and powerless to resist subsequent occupation. In the following months, Czechoslovakia was broken up and ceased to exist, as Germany occupied the Sudetenland; Hungary took part of Slovakia, including
In March 1939, Chamberlain foresaw a possible disarmament conference between himself, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and
In effect, the British and French had by the Munich negotiations pressured their ally of Czechoslovakia to cede part of its territory to a hostile neighbour in order to preserve peace. Churchill likened the negotiations at Berchtesgarten, Bad Godesberg and Munich to a man demanding £1, then, when it is offered, demanding £2, then when it is refused settling for £1.17s.6d.[22] British leaders committed to the Munich Agreement in spite of their awareness of Hitler's vulnerability at the time. In August 1938, General Ludwig Beck relayed a message to Lord Halifax to explain that most of the German General Staff had prepared a coup against the Fuhrer for if there was "proof that England will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked". When Chamberlain received the news, he dismissed it out of hand. In September, the British received assurance that the General Staff's offer to launch the coup still stood with key private sector police and army support, even though Beck had resigned his post.[23] Chamberlain ultimately ceded to all of Hitler's demands at Munich because he believed Britain and Nazi Germany were "the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against communism".[24][25]
Czechoslovakia had a modern well-prepared military, and Hitler, on entering Prague, conceded that a war would have cost Germany much blood[26][22] but the decision by France and Britain not to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of war and the exclusion from the equation of the Soviet Union, which Chamberlain distrusted, meant that the outcome would have been uncertain.[22] The event forms the main part of what became known as Munich betrayal (Czech: Mnichovská zrada) in Czechoslovakia and the rest of Eastern Europe,[27] as the Czechoslovak view was that Britain and France had pressured it to cede territory to prevent a major war, which would involve Western Europe. The Western view is that the pressure was done to save Czechoslovakia from total annihilation.
German annexation of Lithuania's Klaipėda Region
Rumours had reached the
Lithuania secretly informed the signatories of the
Outbreak of World War II and Phoney War
By August 1939, Hitler was convinced that the democratic nations would never put up any effective opposition to him. He expressed his contempt for them in a speech that he delivered to his Commanders in Chief: "Our enemies have leaders who are below the average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.... Our enemies are small fry. I saw them in Munich".[33]
On 1 September 1939, German forces started their
Attitudes
As the policy of appeasement failed to prevent war, those who advocated it were quickly criticised. Appeasement came to be seen as something to be avoided by those with responsibility for the diplomacy of Britain or any other democratic country. By contrast, the few who stood out against appeasement were seen as "voices in the wilderness whose wise counsels were largely ignored, with almost catastrophic consequences for the nation in 1939–40".[36] More recently, however, historians have questioned the accuracy of that simple distinction between appeasers and anti-appeasers. "Few appeasers were really prepared to seek peace at any price; few, if any, anti-appeasers were prepared for Britain to make a stand against aggression whatever the circumstances and wherever the location in which it occurred".[36]
Avoiding mistakes of First World War
Chamberlain's policy in many respects continued the policies of MacDonald and Baldwin and was popular until the failure of the Munich Agreement to stop Hitler in Czechoslovakia. "Appeasement" had been a respectable term between 1919 and 1937 to signify the pursuit of peace.
Government views
Appeasement was accepted by most of those responsible for British foreign policy in the 1930s; by leading journalists and academics; and by members of the
Most Conservative MPs were also in favour, but Churchill said that their supporters were divided and in 1936 led a delegation of leading Conservative politicians to express to Baldwin their alarm about the speed of German rearmament and the fact that Britain was falling behind.[22] Baldwin rejected their sense of urgency and declared that he would not get Britain to war with anybody "for the League of Nations or anybody else" and that if there were to be any fighting in Europe, "I should like to see the Bolshies and Nazis doing it".[41] Amongst Conservatives, Churchill was unusual in believing that Germany menaced freedom and democracy, that British rearmament should proceed more rapidly and that Germany should be resisted over Czechoslovakia. His criticism of Hitler began from the start of the decade, but Churchill was slow to attack fascism overall because of his own vitriolic opposition to communists, "international Jews" and socialism generally.[42] Churchill's sustained warnings about fascism commenced only in 1938 after Francisco Franco, who was receiving aid from Italy and Germany during the Spanish Civil War, decimated the left in Spain.[43]
The week before Munich, Churchill warned, "The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from the UK and France amounts to the complete surrender of the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force. Such a collapse will bring peace or security neither to the UK nor to France".[22] He and a few other Conservatives who refused to vote for the Munich settlement were attacked by their local constituency parties.[22] However, Churchill's subsequent leadership of Britain during the war and his role in creating the post-war consensus against appeasement have tended to obscure the fact that "his contemporary criticism of totalitarian regimes other than Hitler's Germany was at best muted".[36] It was not until May 1938 that he began "consistently to withhold his support from the National Government's conduct of foreign policy in the division lobbies of the House of Commons". He seems "to have been convinced by the Sudeten German leader, Henlein, in the spring of 1938, that a satisfactory settlement could be reached if Britain managed to persuade the Czech government to make concessions to the German minority".[36]
Military views
In Britain, the Royal Navy generally favoured appeasement although it was during the Abyssinia Crisis of 1937 that it was confident it could easily defeat the Royal Italian Navy in open warfare. However, it favoured appeasement because it did not want to commit a large fraction of its naval power to the Mediterranean Sea, which would weaken its positions against Germany and Japan.[44] In 1938, the Royal Navy approved appeasement regarding Munich because it calculated that Britain then lacked the political and military resources to intervene and to maintain an imperial defence capability simultaneously.[45][46]
Public opinion in Britain throughout the 1930s was frightened by the prospect of German terror bombing of British cities, which had started during the First World War. The media emphasised the dangers, and the general consensus was that defence was impossible and, as Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had said in 1932, "The bomber will always get through".[47] However, the Royal Air Force had two major weapons systems in the works: better interceptors (Hurricanes and Spitfires) and especially radar. They promised to counter the German bombing offensive but were not yet ready and so appeasement was necessary to cause a delay.[48][49] Specifically, regarding the fighters, the RAF warned the government in October 1938 that the German Luftwaffe bombers would probably get through: "the situation... will be definitely unsatisfactory throughout the next twelve months".[50]
In France, the Armée de l'Air intelligence section closely examined the strength of the Luftwaffe and decided the German pursuit planes and bombers were the best in the world and that the Germans were producing 1000 warplanes a month. It perceived decisive German air superiority and so it was pessimistic about its ability to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938. Guy La Chambre, the civilian air minister, optimistically informed the government that the air force could stop the Luftwaffe. However, General Joseph Vuillemin, air force chief of staff, warned that it was far inferior and consistently opposed war against Germany.[51]
Opposition parties
The
A few on the left said that Chamberlain looked forward to a war between Germany and the
Public opinion
British public opinion had been strongly opposed to war and rearmament in the early 1930s, but that began to shift by mid-decade. At a
Czechoslovakia did not concern most people until mid-September 1938, when they began to object to a small democratic state being bullied.[9][15] Nevertheless, the initial response of the British public to the Munich agreement was generally favourable.[9] As Chamberlain left for Munich in 1938, the whole House of Commons cheered him noisily. On 30 September, on his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his famous "peace for our time" speech to delighted crowds. He was invited by the royal family onto the balcony at Buckingham Palace before he had reported to Parliament. The agreement was supported by most of the press, with only Reynold's News and the Daily Worker dissenting.[9] In Parliament, the Labour Party opposed the agreement. Some Conservatives abstained in the vote, but the only MP to advocate war was the Conservative Duff Cooper, who had resigned from the government to protest the agreement.[9]
Role of media
Positive opinion of appeasement was shaped partly by
Chamberlain's direct manipulation of the BBC was sustained and egregious.
[Chamberlain] had successfully demonstrated how a government in a democracy could influence and control the press to a remarkable degree. The danger in this for Chamberlain was that he preferred to forget that he exercised such influence, and so increasingly mistook his pliant press for real public opinion... the truth of the matter was that by controlling the press he was merely ensuring that the press was unable to reflect public opinion.[69]
The journalist Shiela Grant Duff's Penguin Special, Europe and the Czechs, was published and distributed to every MP on the day that Chamberlain returned from Munich. Her book was a spirited defence of the Czech nation and a detailed criticism of British policy and confronted the need for war if necessary. It was influential and widely read. Although she argued against the policy of "peace at almost any price",[70] she did not take a personal tone, unlike Guilty Men two years later.
At start of World War II
Once Germany invaded Poland and so ignited World War II, consensus was that appeasement was responsible. The Labour MP Hugh Dalton identified the policy with wealthy people in the City of London, Conservatives and members of the peerage who were soft on Hitler.[71] The appointment of Churchill as Prime Minister after the Norway Debate hardened opinion against appeasement and encouraged the search for those responsible. Three British journalists, Michael Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard, writing under the name of "Cato" in their book Guilty Men, called for the removal from office of 15 public figures they held accountable, including Chamberlain. The book defined appeasement as the "deliberate surrender of small nations in the face of Hitler's blatant bullying". It was hastily written and has few claims to historical scholarship,[72] but Guilty Men shaped subsequent thinking about appeasement, and it is said[73][74] that it contributed to the defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election.
The change in the meaning of "appeasement" after Munich was summarised later by the historian David Dilks: "The word in its normal meaning connotes the pacific settlement of disputes; in the meaning usually applied to the period of Neville Chamberlain['s] premiership, it has come to indicate something sinister, the granting from fear or cowardice of unwarranted concessions in order to buy temporary peace at someone else's expense."[75]
Postwar historians
Churchill's book The Gathering Storm, published in 1948, made a similar judgment to Guilty Men though in moderate tones. The book and Churchill's authority confirmed the orthodox view.[citation needed]
Historians have subsequently explained Chamberlain's policies in various ways. It could be said that he believed sincerely that the objectives of Hitler and Mussolini were limited, and that the settlement of their grievances would protect the world from war since for safety, military and air power should be strengthened.
One of the first dissents to the prevailing criticism of appeasement was made by John F. Kennedy in his 1940 Harvard College thesis, Why England Slept, in which he argued that appeasement had been necessary because the United Kingdom and France were unprepared for a world war.[76][77]
In 1961, the view of appeasement as avoidable error and cowardice was similarly set on its head by
His view has been shared by other historians. For example, Paul Kennedy, who says of the choices facing politicians at the time, "Each course brought its share of disadvantages: there was only a choice of evils. The crisis in the British global position by this time was such that it was, in the last resort, insoluble, in the sense that there was no good or proper solution".[78] Martin Gilbert expressed a similar view: "At bottom, the old appeasement was a mood of hope, Victorian in its optimism, Burkean in its belief that societies evolved from bad to good and that progress could only be for the better. The new appeasement was a mood of fear, Hobbesian in its insistence upon swallowing the bad in order to preserve some remnant of the good, pessimistic in its belief that Nazism was there to stay and, however horrible it might be, should be accepted as a way of life with which Britain ought to deal".[79]
The arguments in Taylor's Origins of the Second World War, which have sometimes been described as "revisionist",[9][80] were rejected by many historians at the time, and reviews of his book in Britain and the United States were generally critical. Nevertheless, he was praised for some of his insights. By showing that appeasement was a popular policy and that there was a continuity in British foreign policy after 1933, he shattered the common view of the appeasers as a small degenerate clique that had mysteriously hijacked the British government sometime in the 1930s that had carried out their policies in the face of massive public resistance. Also, by portraying the leaders of the 1930s as real people attempting to deal with real problems, he made the first strides towards explaining the actions of the appeasers, rather than merely condemning them.
In the early 1990s a new theory of appeasement, sometimes called "counter-revisionist",[80] emerged as historians argued that appeasement was probably the only choice for the British government in the 1930s but that it was poorly implemented, carried out too late and not enforced strongly enough to constrain Hitler. Appeasement was considered a viable policy because of the strains that the British Empire faced in recuperating from World War I, and Chamberlain was said to have adopted a policy suitable to Britain's cultural and political needs. Frank McDonough is a leading proponent of that view of appeasement, which was described his book Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War[81] as a "post revisionist" study.[82] Appeasement was a crisis management strategy seeking a peaceful settlement of Hitler's grievances. "Chamberlain's worst error", says McDonough, "was to believe that he could march Hitler on the yellow brick road to peace when in reality Hitler was marching very firmly on the road to war". He criticised revisionist historians for concentrating on Chamberlain's motivations, rather than how appeasement worked in practice, as a "usable policy" to deal with Hitler. James P. Levy argues against the outright condemnation of appeasement. "Knowing what Hitler did later", he writes, "the critics of Appeasement condemn the men who tried to keep the peace in the 1930s, men who could not know what would come later.... The political leaders responsible for Appeasement made many errors. They were not blameless. But what they attempted was logical, rational, and humane".[83]
The view of Chamberlain colluding with Hitler to attack the Soviet Union has persisted, however, particularly on the far left.
Postwar politicians
Statesmen in the postwar years have often referred to their opposition to appeasement as a justification for firm, sometimes armed, action in international relations.
United States
U.S. President
Vietnam
After the Viet Minh won the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in a letter to British Prime Minister Churchill, "We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?" Similarly, President Lyndon Johnson said to defend the Vietnam War, "Everything I knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be doing exactly what Chamberlain did in World War II. I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggression".[77]
Cuba
During the
Soviet Union
During the
Argentina
British Prime Minister
Iraq
U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair also cited Churchill's warnings about German rearmament to justify their action in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War.[92]
Syria
In 2013,
Iran
In May 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush cautioned against "the false comfort of appeasement" when dealing with Iran and
Islam
The Dutch politician
China
Russia
The minimal international reactions to the invasion of Chechnya, the invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, as well as the conflict in the Donbas, which all stand in violation of international law, is seen by some as the cause that encouraged Russian president Vladimir Putin to conduct a full-scale invasion of the rest of Ukraine in 2022.[98][99]
Some commentators have suggested that some
Criticism
In the mid-20th century, appeasement was seen as discredited in the United Kingdom due to its role in contributing to World War II.[104]
Scholar Aaron McKeil pointed out that appeasement restraint against liberal interventionism would lead to more proxy wars, and fail to offer institutions and norms for mitigating great power conflict.
Appeasement can be seen as promoting
The case of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste can be seen as appeasement to avoid conflict without addressing underlying conflict grievances.[109]
See also
- Confidence and security-building measures
- Containment
- Danegeld
- Détente
- Deterrence theory
- Global Peace Index
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Mutual Assured Destruction
- Peace through strength
- Realpolitik
- Why Die for Danzig?
- Why England Slept
References
- ^ "Appeasement - World War 2 on History". www.history.co.uk. Archived from the original on 4 April 2013.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link) - ^ Mallett, Robert (1997). "The Anglo‐Italian war trade negotiations, contraband control and the failure to appease Mussolini, 1939–40." Diplomacy and Statecraft 8.1: 137–67.
- ^
Hucker, Daniel (2011). Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France. London: Routledge (published 2016). ISBN 978-1-317-07354-3. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
- ^ Andrew Roberts, "'Appeasement' Review: What Were They Thinking? Britain's establishment coalesced around appeasement and bared its teeth at those who dared to oppose it", Wall Street Journal 1 Nov. 2019).
- ISBN 978-0-7190-4832-6.
By and large, the Chamberlain government tried to persuade editors to operate an informal self-censorship. [...] Editors of leading national newspapers were asked to support Chamberlain's efforts to gain a peaceful settlement and to avoid critical comment. Yet the freedom enjoyed by the press ensured that total government control was never feasible and critical comment continued to appear.
Government pressure to restrict criticism of appeasement on BBC radio was far more successful. Radio coverage of foreign policy during the inter-war years was severely restricted through a combination of discreet pressure, self-censorship and guidance from Downing Street and the foreign office. - ^ Hunt, The Makings of the West p. 861.
- .
- ^ Thomson, David (1957) Europe Since Napoleon, London: Longans Green & Co. p. 691
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Taylor, A.J.P., English History, 1914–1945, 1965
- ^ Scott Ramsay. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939". International History Review 41:3 (2019): 604–623. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211.
- ^ Mujtaba Haider Zaidi "Chamberlain and Hitler vs. Pakistan and Taliban" The Frontier Post Newspaper, 3 July 2013 URL: [1]
- ^ Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power (2006) pp. 646–58
- ^ Alfred D. Low, The Anschluss Movement 1931–1938 and the Great Powers (1985)
- ISBN 0-316-78703-5.
- ^ a b Grant Duff 1938.
- ^ Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War (1989) ch. 2
- ^ A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945, p. 415
- ^ Domarus, Max; Hitler, Adolf (1990). Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945: The Chronicle of a Dictatorship. p. 1393.
- ISBN 978-1-929631-42-1. p.73
- ^ The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision, by Norman A. Graebner, Edward M. Bennett
- ^ International: Peace Week, Time magazine, 20 March 1939
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 1948
- ISBN 978-1-84832-508-1– via Google Books.
- ^ "Munich Timeline". International Churchill Society. 14 February 2015.
- ISBN 978-1-135-76127-1– via Google Books.
- ^ Grant Duff 1938, p. 137.
- ^ František Halas, Torzo naděje (1938), poem "Zpěv úzkosti", "Zvoní zvoní zrady zvon zrady zvon, Čí ruce ho rozhoupaly, Francie sladká hrdý Albion, a my jsme je milovali"
- ^ ISBN 0-312-22458-3.
- ^ ISBN 9986-9216-9-4. Archived from the originalon 26 February 2008. Retrieved 14 March 2008.
- LCCN 75-80057.
- ^ "Lithuania Agrees to Yield Memel to Reich After Berlin Asks Speed to Avoid "Clashes"". New York Times: 2. 22 March 1939.
- ISBN 0-521-53120-9. Retrieved 28 June 2010.
- ^ Hitler's Speech to the Commanders in Chief (22 August 1939), German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org
- ^ Richard Overy, "Civilians on the front-line", The Second World War – Day 2: The Blitz, The Guardian/The Observer, September 2009
- ^ "Neville Chamberlain". International Churchill Society. 12 November 1940. Archived from the original on 2 July 2010.
- ^ a b c d e "Oxford Dictionary of National Biography".
- ^ Medlicott, W.N., Review of "The Roots of Appeasement" by M.Gilbert (1966), in The English Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 327 (Apr. 1968), p. 430
- ^ a b ""An evaluation of the reasons for the British policy of appeasement, 1936–1938" BBC History".
- ^ a b "Imagining Hitler". Vanity Fair. 16 February 1999.
- ^ Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax (Phoenix, 1997), p. 282.
- ISBN 0-333-32564-8.
- ^ ""The Creeds of the Devil": Churchill between the Two Totalitarianisms, 1917-1945 (1 of 3)". International Churchill Society. 1 September 2009.
- ^ ""The Creeds of the Devil": Churchill between the Two Totalitarianisms, 1917-1945 (2 of 3)". International Churchill Society. 13 May 2015.
- ^ Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935–36." American Historical Review 75.5 (1970): 1327–1356. online
- ^ G. A. H. Gordon, "The admiralty and appeasement." Naval History 5.2 (1991): 44+.
- ^ Joseph Maiolo , The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War (1998).
- ^ John Terraine, "The Spectre of the Bomber," History Today (1982) 32#4 pp. 6–9.
- ^ Zara Steiner, The triumph of the dark: European international history 1933–1939 (2011) pp 606–9, 772.
- ^ Walter Kaiser, "A case study in the relationship of history of technology and of general history: British radar technology and Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy." Icon (1996) 2: 29–52. online
- ^ N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy. Vol. 1 1976) p 598.
- ^ Peter Jackson, 'La perception de la puissance aérienne allemande et son influence sur la politique extérieure française pendant les crises internationales de 1938 à 1939', Revue Historique des Armées, 4 (1994), pp. 76–87
- ^ hdl:10036/26952
- ^ Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World: The evolution of Labour's foreign policy, Manchester University Press, 2003, Chapter 5
- ^ "Defence". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Vol. 299. Commons. 11 March 1935. col. 35-174. Retrieved 20 March 2013.
- ^ A.J.Davies, To Build A New Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair, Abacus, 1996
- ISBN 1-86066-101-7
- ^ Teddy J. Uldricks, "Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II," History & Memory Volume 21, Number 2, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 60–82 (in Project Muse)
- ^ Willie Gallacher, The Chosen Few, Lawrence and Wishart, 1940
- ISBN 978-0-19-513571-8– via Google Books.
- ISBN 978-1-4128-2080-6 – via Google Books.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link - ^ Richard Overy, "Parting with Pacifism: In the Mid-1930s Many Millions of British People Voted Overwhelmingly against Any Return to Conflict. but Events in Spain Changed Public Opinion" History Today, Vol. 59, No. 8, August 2009
- – via open.library.ubc.ca.
- ^ "Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and The Manipulation of the Press | Richard Cockett". Richard Cockett. Archived from the original on 9 February 2020. Retrieved 2 November 2017.
- ISBN 978-1-4299-2364-4– via Google Books.
- ^ Olson, Lynne (2008) Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 120–22]
- S2CID 142206339– via repository.lboro.ac.uk.
- ^ McDonough, Frank (1998). Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement, and the British Road to War. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 124–33.]
- ^ Olson, Lynne (2008). Troublesome Young Men: The Rebels Who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 258.
- ^ Cited in Caputi, Robert J. (2000). Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement. Susquehanna University Press, pp. 168–69.
- ^ Grant Duff 1938, p. 201.
- ^ Dalton, H. Hitler's War, London, Penguin Books, 1940
- ^ "Oxford Dictionary of National Biography".
- ^ David Willets and Richard Forsdyke, After the Landslide, London: Centre For Policy Studies, 1999
- ^ "Hal G.P. Colebatch, "Epitaph for a Liar", American Spectator, 3.8.10". Archived from the original on 17 October 2011.
- ^ Dilks, D. N. (1972). "Appeasement Revisited", Journal of Contemporary History.
- OCLC 929588770.
- ^ a b c d e f Shachtman, Tom (29 September 2013). "It's Time to Abandon 'Munich'". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 1 May 2021.
- ISBN 0-00-686165-2.
- ^ Gilbert, M., The Roots of Appeasement, 1968
- ^ a b Dimuccio, R.A.B. (March 1998). "The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 2.
- ^ McDonough, Frank (1998). Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, Manchester University Press.
- ^ See, for example, McDonough, F., Brown, R., and Smith, D., Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 2002
- ^ Levy, James P. (2006). Appeasement and rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939, Rowman and Littlefield.
- ISBN 0-85345-999-1
- ISBN 978-1-101-20120-6– via Google Books.
- ^ Beck, R.J., "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", International Security, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Autumn, 1989), pp. 161–91
- ^ a b Cummings, William. "Secretary of State Pompeo blames current tension with Iran on 'Obama administration's appeasement'". USA Today. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- )
- ^ Johns, Michael (Summer 1987). "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", Policy Review.
- ISBN 0-00-637457-3.
- ^ Vuilliamy, E. (1998). "Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement", International Affairs , 1998, pp. 73–91.
- ^ "Appeasement: The Gathering Storm (Teachers Exercises)". Churchill College Cambridge. Archived from the original on 16 April 2008. Retrieved 11 September 2008.
- ^ Thomas, E. (23 June 2008). "The Mythology of Munich", Newsweek, Vol. 151, issue 25, pp. 22–26.
- ^ Loyola, Mario (12 January 2020). "Obama Should Never Have Appeased Iran". The Atlantic. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- ^ Picard, Joe (25 August 2015). "Appeasing Iran?". The Hill. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
- ^ (in Dutch) Confrontatie, geen verzoening, de Volkskrant, 8 April 2006, copy here Archived 18 June 2006 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ McRae, Penny (15 September 2009). "West appeasing China on Tibet, says PM-in-exile", AFP.
- ^ Goncharenko, Oleksiy (27 February 2020). "The lesson of Crimea: Appeasement never works". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 4 September 2023.
- ^ Free, Anya (2 March 2023). "Putin's Crimea Mythmaking". Wilson Center. Retrieved 4 September 2023.
- ^ "Appeasing Putin in Ukraine would be disastrous for European security". Atlantic Council. 6 January 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Lewis, Simon; Melander, Ingrid (4 March 2022). "NATO rejects Ukraine no-fly zone, unhappy Zelenskiy says this means more bombing". Reuters. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "The west knows the cost of appeasement. We can't rule out any option for stopping Putin | Ian Bond". The Guardian. 22 February 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Bella, Timothy (25 May 2022). "Kissinger says Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to end war". The Washington Post.
- S2CID 145359825.
- ISSN 2057-3170.
- ISBN 978-0-8039-0819-2. Archivedfrom the original on 24 February 2024. Retrieved 30 August 2021.
- JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt1rv61v2. Archivedfrom the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 5 September 2021.
- ^ Karsten Jung (2023) A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War, The Washington Quarterly, 46:1, 25-437
- ^ [https://phrg.padovauniversitypress.it/2018/2/3 Dal Poz A. (2018) "‘Buying Peace’ in Timor-Leste: Another UN-success Story? " Peace Human Rights Governance, 2(2), 185-219.
Sources
- Grant Duff, Sheila (1938). Europe and the Czechs. London: Penguin.
Further reading
- Adams, R.J.Q., British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–1939 (1993)
- Alexandroff A. and Rosecrance R., "Deterrence in 1939," World Politics 29#3 (1977), pp. 404–24.
- Beck R.J., "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered" in International Security, 14, 1989
- Bouverie, Tim. Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War (2019) online review
- Cameron Watt, Donald. How War Came: Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–39 (1990)
- Doer P.W., British Foreign Policy 1919–39 (1988)
- Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932–1939 (2004); translation of his highly influential La décadence, 1932–1939 (1979)
- Dutton D., Neville Chamberlain
- Faber, David. Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II (2009) excerpt and text search
- Farmer Alan. British Foreign and Imperial Affairs 1919–39 (2000), textbook
- Feiling, Keith. The Life of Neville Chamberlain (1947) online
- Gilbert, Martin, Winston Churchill, The Wilderness Years. (Macmillan, 1981).
- Goddard, Stacie E. "The rhetoric of appeasement: Hitler's legitimation and British foreign policy, 1938–39." Security Studies 24.1 (2015): 95–130.
- Hill C., Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy: The British Experience, October 1938 – June 1941, (1991).
- Hucker, Daniel. Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France. (Routledge, 2016).
- Jenkins Roy, Baldwin New York: HarperCollins (1987)
- Johns, Michael, "Peace in Our Time: The Spirit of Munich Lives On", Policy Review magazine, Summer 1987
- Levy J., Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936–1939, 2006
- McDonough, F., Neville Chamberlain, appeasement, and the British road to war (Manchester UP, 1998)
- ISBN 0-04-940068-1.
- Murray, Williamson. "Munich, 1938: The military confrontation." Journal of Strategic Studies (1979) 2#3 pp. 282–302.
- Neville P., Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War, 2005
- Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Proponents and Critics of Appeasement
- Parker, R.A.C. Chamberlain and appeasement: British policy and the coming of the Second World War (Macmillan, 1993)
- Peden G. C., "A Matter of Timing: The Economic Background to British Foreign Policy, 1937–1939," History, 69, 1984
- Post G., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934–1937, Cornell UP, 1993.
- Ramsay, Scott. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939". International History Review 41:3 (2019): 604–623. DOI: Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939. online review in H-DIPLO
- Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Naval Institute Press, 2002).
- Riggs, Bruce Timothy. "Geoffrey Dawson, editor of "The Times" (London), and his contribution to the appeasement movement" (PhD dissertation, U of North Texas, 1993) online, bibliography pp. 229–33.
- Roberts, Andrew. 'The Holy Fox': A Biography of Lord Halifax (1991) online
- Rock S.R., Appeasement in International Politics, 2000
- Rock W.R., British Appeasement in the 1930s
- Shay R.P., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Sontag, Raymond J. "Appeasement, 1937" Catholic Historical Review 38#4 (1953), pp. 385–396 online
- Stedman, A. D. (2007). 'Then what could Chamberlain do, other than what Chamberlain did'? A Synthesis and Analysis of the Alternatives to Chamberlain's Policy of Appeasing Germany, 1936–1939 (PhD). Kingston University. OCLC 500402799. Docket uk.bl.ethos.440347. Retrieved 24 October 2016.
- Wheeler-Bennett J., Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948
Historiography
- Barros, Andrew, Talbot C. Imlay, Evan Resnick, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jack S. Levy. "Debating British Decision-making toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s." International Security 34#1 (2009): 173–98. online.
- Cole, Robert A. "Appeasing Hitler: The Munich Crisis of 1938: A Teaching and Learning Resource," New England Journal of History (2010) 66#2 pp. 1–30.
- Dimuccio, Ralph BA. "The study of appeasement in international relations: Polemics, paradigms, and problems." Journal of peace research 35.2 (1998): 245–259.
- Finney, Patrick. "The romance of decline: The historiography of appeasement and British national identity." Electronic Journal of International History 1 (2000). online; comprehensive evaluation of the scholarship
- Hughes, R. Gerald. "The Ghosts of Appeasement: Britain and the Legacy of the Munich Agreement." Journal of Contemporary History (2013) 48#4 pp. 688–716.
- Record, Jeffrey. "Appeasement Reconsidered – Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s" (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005) online
- Roi, Michael. "Introduction: Appeasement: Rethinking the Policy and the Policy-Makers." Diplomacy and Statecraft 19.3 (2008): 383–390.
- Strang, G. Bruce. "The spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and british appeasement in the 1930s." Diplomacy and Statecraft 19.3 (2008): 481–526.
- Van Tol, David. "History extension 2019: Constructing history case study: Appeasement." Teaching History 51.3 (2017): 35+.
- Walker, Stephen G. "Solving the Appeasement Puzzle: Contending Historical Interpretations of British Diplomacy during the 1930s." British Journal of International Studies 6#3 (1980): 219–46. online.
- Watt, D. C. "The Historiography of Appeasement", in Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor, ed. A. Sked and C. Cook (London, 1976)
External links
- Media related to Appeasement at Wikimedia Commons