Sharifian Army
Sharifian Army | |
---|---|
الجيش الشريفي | |
Hussein Bin Ali | |
Headquarters | Mecca Jeddah Taif |
Nickname(s) | Arab Army Hejazi Army |
Engagements | Arab Revolt Al-Khurma Dispute Saudi Conquest of Hejaz |
The Sharifian Army (
Background
For centuries in the
Dissatisfied with his limited power, Sharif Husayn began discussions with tribal leaders in the region,
The revolt
In early June 1916, the Ottoman government was putting pressure on Sharif Husayn to supply Hijazi troops and to issue a call for jihad from
At the beginning of the revolt, the Sharifian Army consisted of these forces that had been assembled by Husayn and his sons under the guise that they were to fight with the Ottoman forces. After escaping, Faysal wrote a letter stating that if Husayn's demands for greater autonomy were not met their relations with the Ottomans would end. Rather than wait for a reply, the Arab Revolt was started with an attack on the Hijaz Railway by forces that consisted of members of local Arab tribes and Ottoman defectors.
The Ottomans decisively won a battle for the first time when the Sharifian Army attacked Medina in October 1916. The Ottoman forces were entrenched in Medina with artillery that the poorly equipped Sharifian Army lacked. The Sharifian forces retreated and were forced to develop a new strategy in regard to Medina. Rather than attack the well-protected Ottoman army and suffer large casualties, the Arabs surrounded the city and cut it off from access to other Ottoman forces. For much of the war the Ottomans managed to keep the Hijaz Railway open to Medina and, through this, were able to continue to supply their men with weapons, ammunition, and other equipment until near the end of the war. The constant need for supplies in Medina played into the Sharifian strategy which was designed to have the Ottomans station troops along the railway and in Medina, wasting troops and supplies, while the Arabs continued up the coast of the Red Sea.
As the British and Sharifian forces sought a way to overtake the Ottoman forces at
Forces
The Sharifian Army consisted of about 5,000 regular forces and many thousands of irregular forces.[8] Many of the regular forces were former Arab members of the Ottoman military who defected and joined the Arab Revolt. Irregular forces refer to largely untrained Arabs who joined the revolt for a short period of time when the fighting was taking place near their home. As the fighting stretched further from Mecca, many soldiers from around Mecca decided that they had done their part and returned home. The constant flow of British gold and weaponry into the hands of the Sharifian Army was the main driving force behind the Revolt. Many tribes would fight for whoever offered them the most money. Some tribal leaders would agree to fight for the British and accept their payment and weapons and soon afterwards begin fighting for the Ottomans because they offered to pay the tribes more. This fickleness showed that many of the tribes were not interested in Arab unity, the ultimate goal of Sharif Husayn, but rather just wanted to be paid. While this made things more difficult for the Sharifian Army, Faysal's strong negotiating skills won many tribal chieftains over, giving the Hashemites the support they needed to challenge the Ottomans.[9]
The army was divided into four groups led by Sharif Husayn's sons, ‘Ali, ‘Abdullah, Faysal, and Zayd. Nuri al-Said and his brother-in-law Ja’far al-Askari, who had previously been a Colonel in the Ottoman Army, joined the Sharifian Army because of their strong belief in Arab nationalism and rose to become leaders within the Sharifian Army. The first few months of the revolt were led by ‘Ali and his forces which consisted of about 30,000 men, most of whom were irregular forces who only fought for a short period of time. By September 1916 these 30,000 were divided amongst all four of Husayn's sons who each now had at least 6,000 irregular forces under their control. The Sharifian Army consisted of about 4,000 regular forces by the beginning of 1917. The majority of these regular soldiers served under Husayn or ‘Ali. As the revolt continued, Faysal emerged as the most successful of the four brothers and most of the forces fell under his control. The fact that Faysal worked alongside Lawrence of Arabia gave him access to more British intelligence, which is a large part of the reason he was the most successful.
Aftermath
Following the
See also
- Sharif of Mecca
- Jordanian Army- Successor
References
- ^ Marshall Cavendish Corporation. History of World War I, Volume 1. Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2002. Pp. 255.
- ^ Marshall Cavendish Corporation. History of World War I, Volume 1. Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2002. Pp. 255
- ^ Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz Under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1984.
- ^ Kedourie, Elie. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: the McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914–1939. Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- ^ Pasha, Djemal. Memories of a Turkish Statesman- 1913–1919. New York: Arno, 1973.
- ^ Parnell, Charles L., CDR USN "Lawrence of Arabia's Debt to Seapower" United States Naval Institute Proceedings. August 1979.
- ^ Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Doubleday, Doran, and Co. 1935.
- ^ Tauber, Eliezer. The Arab Movements in World War I. London: Cass, 1993.
- ^ Lawrence, T.E. “The Howeitat and their Chiefs”. The Arab Bulletin. 24 July 1917.
- ^ Paris, Timothy. Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925 The Sharifian Solution. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
Further reading
- Eldar, D. “France in Syria: the abolition of the Sharifian government, April–July 1920.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 29 (July 1993) p 487–504.
- Eldar, D. “French policy towards Husayn, Sharif of Mecca.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 26 (July 1990) p 329–50.
- Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. Avon Books. 1989.
- Goldstein, E. “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question: the Political Intelligence Department and the Eastern Committee, 1918.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 23 (October 1987) p 419–36.
- H. A. R. Gibb. “Review of The Independent Arab by Hubert Young.” International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (May, 1933), p 425–426.
- Haj, Samira. The Making of Iraq: 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Johnson, Maxwell. “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba.” Society for Military History. Military Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), p 194–201.
- Karsh, E., et al. “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 33 (April 1997) p 267–312.
- Leach, H. “Lawrence's Strategy and Tactics in the Arab Revolt.” Asian Affairs (London) v. 37 no. 3 (Nov 2006) p 337–41.
- Martin, Thomas. “Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist Disorder, 1920–1939.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Dec 2006, Vol. 17 Issue 4, p 771–798.
- McKale, D. M. “Germany and the Arab question in the First World War.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 29 (April 1993) p 236–53.
- R. H. Lieshout. “'Keeping Better Educated Moslems Busy': Sir Reginald Wingate and the Origins of the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.” The Historical Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), p 453–463.
- Teitelbaum, Joshua. “Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and the Hashemite vision of the post-Ottoman order: from chieftaincy to suzerainty.” Middle Eastern Studies v. 34 no. 1 (January 1998) p 103–22.
- Wilson, Jeremy. Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence. Atheneum. 1990.
- Young, Hubert. The Independent Arab. Gorgias Press. London, 1933.