Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project | |
---|---|
Active | 1 January 1947 – 6 May 1959 |
Country | United States |
Garrison/HQ | Washington, D.C.[1] |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | Leslie Groves Kenneth Nichols Herbert Loper Alvin Luedecke |
Insignia | |
Seal |
The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was a United States military agency responsible for those aspects of
The early nuclear weapons were large, complex, and cumbersome. They were stored as components rather than complete devices and required expert knowledge to assemble. The short life of their
As nuclear weapons development proceeded, the weapons became mass-produced, smaller, lighter, and easier to store, handle, and maintain. They also required less effort to assemble. The AFSWP gradually shifted its emphasis away from training assembly teams, and became more involved in stockpile management and providing administrative, technical, and logistical support. It supported nuclear weapons testing, although after
Origins
After the war ended, the Manhattan Project supported the
Groves's biggest concern was about people. Soldiers and scientists wanted to return to their peacetime pursuits, and there was a danger that wartime knowledge would be lost, leaving no one who knew how to handle and maintain nuclear weapons, much less how to improve the weapons and processes. The military side of the Manhattan Project had relied heavily on
Groves hoped a new, permanent agency would be created to take over the responsibilities of the wartime Manhattan Project in 1945, but passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 through Congress took much longer than expected, and involved considerable debate about the proper role of the military with respect to the development, production and control of nuclear weapons.[9][10] The act that was signed by President Harry S. Truman on 1 August 1946 created a civilian agency, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to take over the functions and assets of the Manhattan Project, but the commissioners were not appointed until October, and AEC did not assume its role until 1 January 1947.[11][12] In the meantime, the Military Appropriation Act of 1946 gave the Manhattan Project $72.4 million for research and development, and $19 million for housing and utilities at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge.[13]
The Atomic Energy Act provided for a Military Liaison Committee to advise the AEC on military matters,
Organization
-
Major GeneralLeslie R. Groves Jr.(1947–1948)
-
Major GeneralKenneth D. Nichols(1948–1951)
-
Major GeneralHerbert B. Loper(1952–1953)
-
Major GeneralAlvin R. Luedecke(1953–1957)
-
Rear Admiral Edward N. Parker (1957–1959)
Patterson asked Groves to create a new agency to take over responsibility for the aspects of nuclear weapons that still remained under the military. It was to be jointly staffed by the Army and Navy,
Groves and Parsons drafted a proposed organization and charter for the AFSWP, which they sent to Eisenhower and Nimitz for approval in July 1947.
Groves initially established the headquarters of the AFSWP in the old offices of the Manhattan Project on the fifth floor of the
The 2761st Engineer Battalion (Special) at Sandia was commanded by Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland, and consisted of a headquarters company, a security company (Company A), a bomb assembly company (Company B) and a radiological monitoring company (Company C), although Company C was never fully formed. For training purposes, Company B was initially divided into command, electrical, mechanical and nuclear groups, but the intention was to create three integrated 36-man bomb assembly teams.[23]
To free the bomb assembly teams from having to train newcomers, a Technical Training Group (TTG) was created under
The first bomb assembly team was formed in August 1947, followed by a second in December and a third in March 1948. Experience with assembling the bombs convincingly demonstrated the requirement, in Sandia if not in Washington, for a much larger unit. Groves reluctantly approved a 109-man special weapons unit, and Montague converted the three lettered companies of the 38th Engineer Battalion into special weapons units.[26] In 1948, they began training a Navy special weapons unit, as the Navy foresaw delivery of nuclear weapons with its new North American AJ Savage bombers from its Midway-class aircraft carriers. This unit became the 471st Naval Special Weapons Unit on its certification in August 1948.[27] Two Air Force units were created in September and December 1948, which became the 502d and 508th Aviation Squadrons. An additional Army special weapons unit was created in May 1948, and in December, the 38th Engineer Battalion (Special) became the 8460th Special Weapons Group, with all seven special weapons units under its command. The four Army units were then renamed the 111th, 122d, 133d and 144th Special Weapons Units.[28][29] During the late 1940s the Air Force gradually became the major user of nuclear weapons, and by the end of 1949 it had twelve assembly units and another three in training. The Army had only four and the Navy three, one for each of the Midway-class aircraft carriers.[22]
In March 1948, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, proposed that the Air Force take over the AFSWP, on the grounds that the Key West Agreement had given it responsibility for strategic bombing. This would have simplified command of the AFSWP, as it would have been answerable to only one service chief instead of three. The Army cautiously supported the proposal, but the Navy was strongly opposed, fearing that the Air Force's confusion of atomic bombing and strategic bombing would impede or even prevent the Navy from having access to nuclear weapons, which it felt was necessary to accomplish its primary maritime mission. Another series of talks was held at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, from 20 to 22 August 1948, which resulted in the Newport Agreement, under which the Navy agreed to drop its opposition to the AFSWP being placed under the Air Force temporarily, in return for the Air Force recognizing the Navy's requirement for nuclear weapons.[30] When the Air Force moved to make the temporary arrangement permanent in September 1948, the Army and Navy objected, and the Military Liaison Committee directed that the AFSWP should remain a tri-service organization answerable to the three service chiefs.[31]
Field operations
Groves and the wartime director of the Los Alamos Laboratory,
The 1947 nuclear stockpile consisted of nuclear weapons components, not weapons. Meeting with Truman in April 1947, Lilienthal informed him that not only were there no assembled weapons, there were only a few sets of components and no fully trained bomb-assembly teams.
The 38th Engineer Battalion's electrical group studied the batteries, the electrical firing systems and the radar fuzes which detonated the bomb at the required altitude. The mechanical group dealt with the exploding-bridgewire detonators and the explosive lenses. The nuclear group moved to Los Alamos to study the cores and initiators. As part of their training, they attended lectures by Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, Lise Meitner and Enrico Fermi.[39] The electrical and mechanical groups at Sandia, although not the nuclear group, completed their training around the end of October 1946 and spent the next month devising the best methods of assembling a Fat Man, drawing up detailed checklists so later bomb assembly teams could be trained. They also drew up a proposed table of organization and equipment for an assembly team. It took two weeks for them to assemble their first bomb in December 1946.[40]
Most of 1947 was spent planning for a field exercise in which a bomb team would deploy to a base and assemble weapons under field conditions.
This was followed by other exercises. In one exercise in March 1948, the base personnel successfully fought off an "attack" by 250 paratroopers from
Nuclear testing
In addition to assembly of weapons, the AFSWP supported nuclear weapons testing. For
After Operation Sandstone, only relatively small numbers of AFSWP personnel were involved in nuclear testing. The AFSWP was heavily involved in the planning, preparation and coordination of tests, but it had limited participation in the tests themselves, where the bomb-assembly function was usually undertaken by scientists.
Custody of nuclear weapons
When the AEC was formed in 1947 it acquired custody of nuclear components from the Manhattan Project on the understanding that the matter would be reviewed.[54] In November 1947, the Military Liaison Committee requested that custody of the nuclear stockpile be transferred to the military, but Lilienthal believed AEC custody of the stockpile was an important aspect of civilian control of nuclear weapons. He was disturbed that the AFSWP had not informed the AEC in advance of Operation Ajax.[55] For his part, Groves suspected the AEC was not keeping bomb components in the condition in which the military wanted to receive them, and Operation Ajax only confirmed his suspicions.[56] Reviewing the exercise, Montague reported that "under the existing law, with the AEC charged with procurement and custody of all atomic weapons, there was no adequate logistic support for the weapon." He recommended a larger role for the military, a recommendation with which Groves concurred, but was powerless to implement.[46]
Groves retired at the end of February 1948, and Nichols was designated as his successor with the rank of major general. At the same time, Forrestal, now the
Nichols's position was the same as Groves's and Montague's: that nuclear weapons needed to be available in an emergency, and the men who had to use them in battle needed to have experience with their maintenance, storage and handling.[59] Norris Bradbury, who had replaced Oppenheimer as the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory in December 1945, argued that rapid transfer could be accomplished by improved procedures and that the other difficulties could best be resolved by further development, mostly from the scientists.[60] Forrestal and Carpenter took the matter up with Truman, who issued his decision on 21 July 1948: "I regard the continued control of all aspects of the atomic energy program, including research, development and the custody of atomic weapons as the proper functions of the civil authorities."[61]
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, air transport resources were put under great strain, and it was decided to reduce the requirement for it by pre-positioning non-nuclear components at locations in Europe and the Pacific. That way, in an emergency, only the nuclear components would have to be flown out.[62] In June, Truman ordered the transfer of 90 sets of non-nuclear Mark 4 components to the AFSWP for training purposes. In December, he authorized the carriage of non-nuclear components on board the Midway-class carriers.[63] In April 1951, the AEC released nine Mark 4 weapons to the Air Force in case the Soviet Union intervened in the war in Korea.[64] These were flown to Guam, where they were maintained by the Air Force special weapons unit there.[65] Thus, at the end of 1951, there were 429 weapons in AEC custody and nine held by the Department of Defense.[66]
In the light of this, a new AEC-AFSWP agreement on "Responsibilities of Stockpile Operations" was drawn up in August 1951, but in December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began a new push for weapons to be permanently assigned to the armed forces, so as to ensure a greater degree of flexibility and a higher state of readiness.[67] On 20 June 1953, Eisenhower, now as president, approved the deployment of nuclear components in equal numbers to non-nuclear components,[68] and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 amended the sections of the old act that gave exclusive custody to the AEC.[69] By 1959, the nuclear stockpile had grown to 12,305 weapons of which 3,968 were in AEC custody and the remaining 8,337 were held by the Department of Defense.[66] The total yield of the stockpile was now in excess of 19,000 megatons of TNT (79,000 PJ).[70]
As Bradbury had promised, with research and development, nuclear weapons became smaller, simpler and lighter. They also became easier to store, assemble, test and maintain.[71] Thus, while under Eisenhower's New Look policy the Armed Forces became more heavily involved with aspects of nuclear weapons than ever, the role of the AFSWP diminished. It began moving away from training assembly teams, which were increasingly not required, as its primary mission, and became more involved in the management of the rapidly growing nuclear stockpile, and providing technical advice and logistical support.[72] In 1953, the AFSWP Field Command had 10,250 personnel.[73] On 16 October 1953, the Secretary of Defense charged the AFSWP with responsibility for "a centralized system of reporting and accounting to ensure that the current status and location" of all nuclear weapons "will be known at all times". The Atomic Warfare Status Center was created within the AFSWP to handle this mission.[53]
Conversion to Defense Atomic Support Agency
In April 1958, Eisenhower asked Congress for legislation to overhaul the Department of Defense. Over a decade had passed since the legislation which had established it, and he was concerned about the degree of inter-service rivalry, duplication and mismanagement that was evident in many programs. In
The
Notes
- ^ Borg, D. C. (May 1954). "Report AFSWP-507: Radioactive Fallout Hazards from Surface Bursts of Very High Yield Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). U.S. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Retrieved 10 December 2022.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 2–8.
- ^ Rhodes 1995, pp. 228–229.
- ^ Rhodes 1995, pp. 212–213.
- ^ a b Groves 1962, pp. 373–376.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 75–76.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 625.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 2.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 389–391.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 628–630.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 394–395.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, pp. 620–622.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 635.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 598.
- ^ Lilienthal et al. 1947, p. 199.
- ^ Groves 1962, pp. 398–399.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 29–30.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, p. 131.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 30.
- ^ a b Brahmstedt 2002, p. 71.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 21–24.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 79–80.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 67–68.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 67–69.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, p. 114.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, p. 153.
- ^ "8460th Special Weapons Group". The Army Historical Foundation. Archived from the original on 29 March 2012. Retrieved 17 August 2011.
- ^ Rearden 1984, pp. 398–401.
- ^ Rearden 1984, p. 437.
- ^ Truslow & Smith 1961, p. 2.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 12.
- ^ Truslow & Smith 1961, pp. 95–96.
- ^ a b Hansen 1995b, p. 143.
- ^ a b Hansen 1995b, p. 144.
- ^ a b Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, p. 41.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 24–25.
- ^ a b Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 48–50.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, pp. 54, 71–76.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 49–50.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 62.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 65.
- ^ a b Brahmstedt 2002, p. 50.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, p. 159.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 60.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 69.
- ^ Nichols 1987, p. 269.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 80, 87, 96.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 80.
- ^ a b Brahmstedt 2002, p. 100.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 150–151.
- ^ Abrahamson & Carew 2002, p. 73.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 154–158.
- ^ Nichols 1987, p. 259.
- ^ United States 1978, p. 8.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 166–167.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 169–170.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 521–522.
- ^ United States 1978, pp. 16–17.
- ^ Anders 1988, pp. 1–2.
- ^ United States 1978, p. 18.
- ^ a b Hansen 1995a, p. 170.
- ^ Hewlett & Duncan 1969, pp. 579–580.
- ^ United States 1978, p. 29.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 125.
- ^ Hansen 1995a, p. 172.
- ^ Hansen 1995a, p. 214.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 81.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 102.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, p. 149.
- ^ "Transmittal Letter for Summary of Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Development" (PDF). US Department of Energy. Retrieved 21 April 2021.
- ^ "DNA and Defense Atomic Support Agency Organizational Charts, from 1 July 1969 - 1 July 1973" (PDF). US Department of Energy. Retrieved 21 April 2021.
- ^ Brahmstedt 2002, pp. 149–150.
- ^ "Records of the Defense Nuclear Agency". National Archives. 15 August 2016. Retrieved 1 January 2021.
References
- Abrahamson, James L.; Carew, Paul H. (2002). Vanguard of American Atomic Deterrence. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. OCLC 49859889.
- Anders, Roger M. (January 1988). "The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control". Military Affairs. 52 (1). Society for Military History: 1–6. JSTOR 1988372.
- Brahmstedt, Christian (2002). Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947–1997 (PDF). DTRA history series. Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, US Department of Defense. OCLC 52137321. Archived from the original(PDF) on 11 June 2011.
- OCLC 537684.
- OCLC 231585284.
- Hansen, Chuck (1995). Swords of Armageddon: US Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Vol. V: US Nuclear Weapons Histories. Sunnyvale, California: Chukelea Publications. OCLC 231585284.
- OCLC 637004643. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
- OCLC 3717478. Retrieved 7 March 2015.
- Jones, Vincent (1985). Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (PDF). Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 10913875. Archived from the original(PDF) on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 29 December 2013.
- PMID 17737874.
- OCLC 15223648.
- Rearden, Steven L. (1984). Volume I, The Formative Years, 1947–1950. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical office. OCLC 463881489.
- OCLC 32509950.
- Truslow, Edith C.; Smith, Ralph Carlisle (1961). Project Y: The Los Alamos Project August 1945 through November 1946 (PDF). Los Alamos, New Mexico: Los Alamos National Laboratory. Retrieved 11 August 2011.
- United States (1978). History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945 through September 1977. Washington, DC: The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Energy). OCLC 43574850.
Further reading
- United States (1997). Defense Special Weapons Agency 1947–1997: The First 50 Years of National Service (PDF). Washington, DC: Defense Technical Information Center.