Armenian genocide

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Armenian genocide
Part of
gendarmes in Harput vilayet
LocationOttoman Empire
Date1915–1917[1][2]
TargetOttoman Armenians
Attack type
Genocide, death march, Islamization
Deaths600,000–1.5 million[3]
PerpetratorsCommittee of Union and Progress

The Armenian genocide[a] was the systematic destruction of the Armenian people and identity in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Spearheaded by the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), it was implemented primarily through the mass murder of around one million Armenians during death marches to the Syrian Desert and the forced Islamization of others, primarily women and children.

Before World War I, Armenians occupied a somewhat protected, but subordinate, place in Ottoman society. Large-scale massacres of Armenians had occurred

Armenian resistance
as evidence of a widespread rebellion, though no such rebellion existed. Mass deportation was intended to permanently forestall the possibility of Armenian autonomy or independence.

On 24 April 1915, the Ottoman authorities arrested and deported hundreds of Armenian intellectuals and leaders from Constantinople. At the orders of Talaat Pasha, an estimated 800,000 to 1.2 million Armenians were sent on death marches to the Syrian Desert in 1915 and 1916. Driven forward by paramilitary escorts, the deportees were deprived of food and water and subjected to robbery, rape, and massacres. In the Syrian Desert, the survivors were dispersed into concentration camps. In 1916, another wave of massacres was ordered, leaving about 200,000 deportees alive by the end of the year. Around 100,000 to 200,000 Armenian women and children were forcibly converted to Islam and integrated into Muslim households. Massacres and ethnic cleansing of Armenian survivors continued through the Turkish War of Independence after World War I, carried out by Turkish nationalists.

This genocide put an end to more than two thousand years of Armenian civilization in eastern

Republic of Turkey. The Turkish government maintains that the deportation of Armenians was a legitimate action that cannot be described as genocide. As of 2023, 34 countries have recognized the events as genocide
, concurring with the academic consensus.

Background

Further information: Causes of the Armenian genocide

Armenians in the Ottoman Empire

Main article: Armenians in the Ottoman Empire
Van—the six most heavily Armenian-populated Ottoman vilayets.[4]

The presence of

dhimmis) in exchange for a special tax.[11]

On the eve of

middleman minorities, despite the wealth of some Armenians, their overall political power was low, making them especially vulnerable.[13]

Land conflict and reforms

Column of people and domestic animals carrying bundles
"Looting of an Armenian village by the Kurds", 1898 or 1899

Armenians in the eastern provinces lived in semi-

forced labor, illegal taxation, and unpunished crimes against them including robberies, murders, and sexual assaults.[14][15] Beginning in 1839, the Ottoman government issued a series of reforms to centralize power and equalize the status of Ottoman subjects regardless of religion. The reforms to equalize the status of non-Muslims were strongly opposed by Islamic clergy and Muslims in general, and remained mostly theoretical.[16][17][18] Because of the abolition of the Kurdish emirates in the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman government began to directly tax Armenian peasants who had previously paid taxes only to Kurdish landlords. The latter continued to exact levies illegally.[19][20]

From the mid-nineteenth century, Armenians faced large-scale

revolutionary political parties, of which the most influential was the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), founded in 1890. These parties primarily sought reform within the empire and found only limited support from Ottoman Armenians.[28]

Russia's decisive victory in the

Great Powers to interfere in Ottoman politics.[33] Although Armenians had been called the "loyal millet" in contrast to Greeks and others who had previously challenged Ottoman rule, the authorities began to perceive Armenians as a threat after 1878.[34] In 1891, Abdul Hamid created the Hamidiye regiments from Kurdish tribes, allowing them to act with impunity against Armenians.[35][31] From 1895 to 1896 the empire saw widespread massacres; at least 100,000 Armenians were killed[36][37] primarily by Ottoman soldiers and mobs let loose by the authorities.[38] Many Armenian villages were forcibly converted to Islam.[26] The Ottoman state bore ultimate responsibility for the killings,[39][40] whose purpose was violently restoring the previous social order in which Christians would unquestioningly accept Muslim supremacy,[41] and forcing Armenians to emigrate, thereby decreasing their numbers.[42]

Young Turk Revolution

Main article: Young Turk Revolution

Abdul Hamid's despotism prompted the formation of an opposition movement, the

Mehmed Talaat (later Talaat Pasha) emerged as a leading member.[44] Although skeptical of a growing, exclusionary Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk movement, the ARF decided to ally with the CUP in December 1907.[45][46] In 1908, the CUP came to power in the Young Turk Revolution, which began with a string of CUP assassinations of leading officials in Macedonia.[47][48] Abdul Hamid was forced to reinstate the 1876 constitution and restore the parliament, which was celebrated by Ottomans of all ethnicities and religions.[49][50] Security improved in parts of the eastern provinces after 1908 and the CUP took steps to reform the local gendarmerie,[51] although tensions remained high.[52] Despite an agreement to reverse the land usurpation of the previous decades in the 1910 Salonica Accord between the ARF and the CUP, the latter made no efforts to carry this out.[53][54]

Destroyed cityscape with ruined buildings and rubble in the street
The Armenian quarter of Adana after the 1909 massacres

In early 1909

an unsuccessful countercoup was launched by conservatives and some liberals who opposed the CUP's increasingly repressive governance.[55] When news of the countercoup reached Adana, armed Muslims attacked the Armenian quarter and Armenians returned fire. Ottoman soldiers did not protect Armenians and instead armed the rioters.[56] Between 20,000 and 25,000 people, mostly Armenians, were killed in Adana and nearby towns.[57] Unlike the 1890s massacres, the events were not organized by the central government but instigated by local officials, intellectuals, and Islamic clerics, including CUP supporters in Adana.[58] Although the massacres went unpunished, the ARF continued to hope that reforms to improve security and restore lands were forthcoming, until late 1912, when they broke with the CUP and appealed to the European powers.[59][60][61] On 8 February 1914, the CUP reluctantly agreed to reforms brokered by Germany that provided for the appointment of two European inspectors for the entire Ottoman east and putting the Hamidiye regiments in reserve. CUP leaders feared that these reforms, which were never implemented, could lead to partition and cited them as a reason for the elimination of the Armenian population in 1915.[62][63][64]

Balkan Wars

Main article: Balkan Wars
Muslim bandits parading with loot in Phocaea (modern-day Foça, Turkey) on 13 June 1914
. In the background are Greek refugees and burning buildings.

The 1912 First Balkan War resulted in the loss of almost all of the empire's European territory[65] and the mass expulsion of Muslims from the Balkans.[66] Ottoman Muslim society was incensed by the atrocities committed against Balkan Muslims, intensifying anti-Christian sentiment and leading to a desire for revenge.[67][68] Blame for the loss was assigned to all Christians, including the Ottoman Armenians, many of whom had fought on the Ottoman side.[69] The Balkan Wars put an end to the Ottomanist movement for pluralism and coexistence;[70] instead, the CUP turned to an increasingly radical Turkish nationalism to preserve the empire.[71] CUP leaders such as Talaat and Enver Pasha came to blame non-Muslim population concentrations in strategic areas for many of the empire's problems, concluding by mid-1914 that they were internal tumors to be excised.[72] Of these, Ottoman Armenians were considered the most dangerous, because CUP leaders feared that their homeland in Anatolia—claimed as the last refuge of the Turkish nation—would break away from the empire as the Balkans had.[73][74][71]

In January 1913, the CUP

Muslim bandits, who were secretly backed by the CUP and sometimes joined by the regular army.[79][80][81] Historian Matthias Bjørnlund states that the perceived success of the Greek deportations allowed CUP leaders to envision even more radical policies "as yet another extension of a policy of social engineering through Turkification".[82]

Ottoman entry into World War I

Ottoman Turkish
: انتقام) map highlighting territory lost during and after the Balkan Wars in black

A few days after the outbreak of World War I, the CUP concluded

surprise attack on Russian ports in the Black Sea.[87] Many Russian Armenians were enthusiastic about the war, but Ottoman Armenians were more ambivalent, afraid that supporting Russia would bring retaliation. Organization of Armenian volunteer units by Russian Armenians, later joined by some Ottoman Armenian deserters, further increased Ottoman suspicions against their Armenian population.[88]

Wartime requisitions were often corrupt and arbitrary, and disproportionately targeted Greeks and Armenians.

labor battalions.[98] The Armenian soldiers in labor battalions were systematically executed, although many skilled workers were spared until 1916.[99]

Onset of genocide

Further information: Causes of the Armenian genocide § Wartime radicalization
Men with guns crouching in a trench and leaning against a defensive wall
Armenian defenders in Van, 1916
Two armed men standing by a ruined wall, surrounded by skulls and other human remains
Russian soldiers pictured in the former Armenian village of Sheykhalan near Mush, 1915

Minister of War Enver Pasha took over command of the Ottoman armies for the invasion of Russian territory, and tried to encircle the

Russian Caucasus Army at the Battle of Sarikamish, fought from December 1914 to January 1915. Unprepared for the harsh winter conditions,[100] his forces were routed, losing more than 60,000 men.[101] The retreating Ottoman army destroyed dozens of Ottoman Armenian villages in Bitlis vilayet, massacring their inhabitants.[97] Enver publicly blamed his defeat on Armenians who he claimed had actively sided with the Russians, a theory that became a consensus among CUP leaders.[102][103] Reports of local incidents such as weapons caches, severed telegraph lines, and occasional killings confirmed preexisting beliefs about Armenian treachery and fueled paranoia among CUP leaders that a coordinated Armenian conspiracy was plotting against the empire.[104][105] Discounting contrary reports that most Armenians were loyal, the CUP leaders decided that the Armenians had to be eliminated to save the empire.[104]

Massacres of Armenian men were occurring in the vicinity of

Bashkale in Van vilayet from December 1914.[106] ARF leaders attempted to keep the situation calm, warning that even justifiable self-defense could lead to escalation of killing.[107] The governor, Djevdet Bey, ordered the Armenians of Van to hand over their arms on 18 April 1915, creating a dilemma: If they obeyed, the Armenians expected to be killed, but if they refused, it would provide a pretext for massacres. Armenians fortified themselves in Van and repelled the Ottoman attack that began on 20 April.[108][109] During the siege, Armenians in surrounding villages were massacred at Djevdet's orders. Russian forces captured Van on 18 May, finding 55,000 corpses in the province—about half its prewar Armenian population.[110] Djevdet's forces proceeded to Bitlis and attacked Armenian and Assyrian/Syriac villages; the men were killed immediately, many women and children were kidnapped by local Kurds, and others marched away to be killed later. By the end of June, there were only a dozen Armenians in the vilayet.[111]

The first deportations of Armenians were proposed by

CUP Central Committee decided on the large-scale removal of Armenians from areas near the front lines.[113] During the night of 23–24 April 1915 hundreds of Armenian political activists, intellectuals, and community leaders were rounded up in Constantinople and across the empire. This order from Talaat, intended to eliminate the Armenian leadership and anyone capable of organizing resistance, eventually resulted in the murder of most of those arrested.[114][115][116] The same day, Talaat banned all Armenian political organizations[117] and ordered that the Armenians who had previously been removed from Cilicia be deported again, from central Anatolia—where they would likely have survived—to the Syrian Desert.[118][119]

Systematic deportations

See also: Population transfer in the Ottoman Empire

Aims

We have been blamed for not making a distinction between guilty and innocent Armenians. [To do so] was impossible. Because of the nature of things, one who was still innocent today could be guilty tomorrow. The concern for the safety of Turkey simply had to silence all other concerns.

—Talaat Pasha in Berliner Tageblatt, 4 May 1916[120][121]

During World War I, the CUP—whose central goal was to preserve the Ottoman Empire—came to identify Armenian civilians as an existential threat.[122][123] CUP leaders held Armenians—including women and children—collectively guilty for betraying the empire, a belief that was crucial to deciding on genocide in early 1915.[124][125] At the same time, the war provided an opportunity to enact what Talaat called the "definitive solution to the Armenian Question".[123][126] The CUP wrongly believed that the Russian Empire sought to annex eastern Anatolia, and ordered the genocide in large part to prevent this eventuality.[127] The genocide was intended to permanently eliminate any possibility that Armenians could achieve autonomy or independence in the empire's eastern provinces.[128] Ottoman records show the government aimed to reduce Armenians to no more than five percent of the local population in the sources of deportation and ten percent in the destination areas. This goal could not be accomplished without mass murder.[129][130][131]

The deportation of Armenians and resettlement of Muslims in their lands was part of a broader project intended to permanently restructure the demographics of Anatolia.

Assyrian genocide, and expulsion of Greeks after World War I—paved the way for the formation of an ethno-national Turkish state.[137][138] In September 1918, Talaat emphasized that regardless of losing the war, he had succeeded at "transforming Turkey to a nation-state in Anatolia".[139][140]

Deportation amounted to a death sentence; the authorities planned for and intended the death of the deportees.[141][142][143] Deportation was only carried out behind the front lines, where no active rebellion existed, and was only possible in the absence of widespread resistance. Armenians who lived in the war zone were instead killed in massacres.[144] Although ostensibly undertaken for military reasons,[145] the deportation and murder of Armenians did not grant the empire any military advantage and actually undermined the Ottoman war effort.[146] The empire faced a dilemma between its goal of eliminating Armenians and its practical need for their labor; those Armenians retained for their skills, in particular for manufacturing in war industries, were indispensable to the logistics of the Ottoman Army.[147][148] By late 1915, the CUP had extinguished Armenian existence from eastern Anatolia.[149]

Map showing locations where Armenians were killed, deportation routes, and transit centers, as well as locations of Armenian resistance
Map of the Armenian genocide in 1915

Administrative organization

Large group of people gathered in a town square, holding some possessions
Armenians gathered in a city prior to deportation. They were murdered outside the city.

On 23 May 1915, Talaat ordered the deportation of all Armenians in Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum.

Adrianople, 2,000 kilometers (1,200 mi) from the Russian front.[154] Following the elimination of the Armenian population in eastern Anatolia, in August 1915, the Armenians of western Anatolia and European Turkey were targeted for deportation. Some areas with a very low Armenian population and some cities, including Constantinople, were partially spared.[155][156]

Overall, national, regional, and local levels of governance cooperated with the CUP in the perpetration of genocide.[157] The Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (IAMM) coordinated the deportation and the resettlement of Muslim immigrants in the vacant houses and lands. The IAMM, under the control of Talaat's Ministry of the Interior, and the Special Organization, which took orders directly from the CUP Central Committee, closely coordinated their activities.[158] A dual-track system was used to communicate orders; those for the deportation of Armenians were communicated to the provincial governors through official channels, but orders of a criminal character, such as those calling for annihilation, were sent through party channels and destroyed upon receipt.[159][160] Deportation convoys were mostly escorted by gendarmes or local militia. The killings near the front lines were carried out by the Special Organization, and those farther away also involved local militias, bandits, gendarmes, or Kurdish tribes depending on the area.[161] Within the area controlled by the Third Army, which held eastern Anatolia, the army was only involved in genocidal atrocities in the vilayets of Van, Erzerum, and Bitlis.[162]

Many perpetrators came from the Caucasus (

movable property (another third went to local authorities and the last to the CUP). Embezzling beyond that was punished.[166][167] Ottoman politicians and officials who opposed the genocide were dismissed or assassinated.[157][162][168] The government decreed that any Muslim who harbored an Armenian against the will of the authorities would be executed.[169][170]

Death marches

Color photograph of a lake with gorges leading into it
On 24 September 1915, United States consul Leslie Davis visited Lake Hazar and found nearby gorges choked with corpses and hundreds of bodies floating in the lake.[171]

Although the majority of able-bodied Armenian men had been conscripted into the army, others deserted, paid the exemption tax, or fell outside the age range of conscription. Unlike the earlier massacres of Ottoman Armenians, in 1915 Armenians were not usually killed in their villages, to avoid destruction of property or unauthorized looting. Instead, the men were usually separated from the rest of the deportees during the first few days and executed. Few resisted, believing it would put their families in greater danger.[161] Boys above the age of twelve (sometimes fifteen) were treated as adult men.[172] Execution sites were chosen for proximity to major roads and for rugged terrain, lakes, wells, or cisterns to facilitate the concealment or disposal of corpses.[171][173][174] The convoys would stop at a nearby transit camp, where the escorts would demand a ransom from the Armenians. Those unable to pay were murdered.[161] Units of the Special Organization, often wearing gendarme uniforms, were stationed at the killing sites; escorting gendarmes often did not participate in killing.[174]

At least 150,000 Armenians passed through

Kahta highlands, would have found gorges already filled with corpses from previous convoys.[173][176] Many others were held in tributary valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates, or Murat and systematically executed by the Special Organization.[177] Armenian men were often drowned by being tied together back-to-back before being thrown in the water, a method that was not used on women.[178]

Photograph of the bodies of dozens of Armenians in a field
The corpses of Armenians beside a road, a common sight along deportation routes

Authorities viewed disposal of bodies through rivers as a cheap and efficient method, but it caused widespread pollution downstream. So many bodies floated down the Tigris and Euphrates that they sometimes blocked the rivers and needed to be cleared with explosives. Other rotting corpses became stuck to the riverbanks, and still others traveled as far as the Persian Gulf. The rivers remained polluted long after the massacres, causing epidemics downstream.[179] Tens of thousands of Armenians died along the roads and their bodies were buried hastily or, more often, simply left beside the roads. The Ottoman government ordered the corpses to be cleared as soon as possible to prevent both photographic documentation and disease epidemics, but these orders were not uniformly followed.[180][181]

Women and children, who made up the great majority of deportees, were usually not executed immediately, but subjected to hard marches through mountainous terrain without food and water. Those who could not keep up were left to die or shot.

by rail.[155] There was a distinction between the convoys from eastern Anatolia, which were eliminated almost in their entirety, and those from farther west, which made up most of those surviving to reach Syria.[183] For example, around 99 percent of Armenians deported from Erzerum did not reach their destination.[151]

Islamization

Several women dressed in Arab clothing and posed in front of a wall
Islamized Armenians who were "rescued from Arabs" after the war

The Islamization of Armenians, carried out as a systematic state policy involving the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and clergy, was a major structural component of the genocide.

culture, and for women, immediate marriage to a Muslim.[190] Although Islamization was the most feasible opportunity for survival, it also transgressed Armenian moral and social norms.[191]

The CUP allowed Armenian women to marry into Muslim households, as these women would lose their Armenian identity.[173] Young women and girls were often appropriated as house servants or sex slaves. Some boys were abducted to work as forced laborers for Muslim individuals.[173][192] Some children were forcibly seized, while others were sold or given up by their parents to save their lives.[193][194] Special state-run orphanages were also set up with strict procedures intending to deprive their charges of an Armenian identity.[195] Most Armenian children who survived the genocide endured exploitation, hard labor without pay, forced conversion to Islam, and physical and sexual abuse.[192] Armenian women captured during the journey ended up in Turkish or Kurdish households; those who were Islamized during the second phase of the genocide found themselves in an Arab or Bedouin environment.[196]

The rape, sexual abuse, and prostitution of Armenian women were all very common.[197] Although Armenian women tried to avoid sexual violence, suicide was often the only alternative.[198] Deportees were displayed naked in Damascus and sold as sex slaves in some areas, constituting an important source of income for accompanying gendarmes.[199] Some were sold in Arabian slave markets to Muslim Hajj pilgrims and ended up as far away as Tunisia or Algeria.[200]

Confiscation of property

Main articles: Confiscation of Armenian properties in Turkey and National economy (Turkey)
Black and white photograph of a manor house
Çankaya Mansion, the official residence of the president of Turkey, was confiscated from Ohannes Kasabian, an Armenian businessman, in 1915.[201]

A secondary motivation for genocide was the destruction of the Armenian bourgeoisie to make room for a Turkish and Muslim middle class[128] and build a statist national economy controlled by Muslim Turks.[163][202] The campaign to Turkify the economy began in June 1914 with a law that obliged many non-Muslim merchants to hire Muslims. Following the deportations, the businesses of the victims were taken over by Muslims who were often incompetent, leading to economic difficulties.[203] The genocide had catastrophic effects on the Ottoman economy; Muslims were disadvantaged by the deportation of skilled professionals and entire districts fell into famine following their farmers' deportation.[204] The Ottoman and Turkish governments passed a series of Abandoned Properties Laws to manage and redistribute property confiscated from Armenians.[205][206] Although the laws maintained that the state was simply administering the properties on behalf of the absent Armenians, there was no provision to return them to the owners—it was presumed that they had ceased to exist.[207]

Historians

place names, have been systematically erased, beginning during the war and continuing for decades afterward.[213][214][215]

Destination

Further information:
Ras al-Ayn camps
see caption
An Armenian woman kneeling beside a dead child in a field outside Aleppo
Thin stream of water surrounded by greenery and banks, above which is desert
Khabur near Ras al-Ayn

The first arrivals in mid-1915 were accommodated in

Ras al-Ayn; the camps around Ras al-Ayn were closed in early 1916 and the survivors sent to Deir ez-Zor.[221]

In general, Armenians were denied food and water during and after their forced march to the Syrian desert;

Ottoman Fourth Army under Djemal Pasha, there were no concentration camps or large-scale massacres, rather Armenians were resettled and recruited to work for the war effort. They had to convert to Islam or face deportation to another area.[227]

The ability of the Armenians to adapt and survive was greater than the perpetrators expected.[141][228] A loosely organized, Armenian-led resistance network based in Aleppo succeeded in helping many deportees, saving Armenian lives.[229] At the beginning of 1916 some 500,000 deportees were alive in Syria and Mesopotamia.[183] Afraid that surviving Armenians might return home after the war, Talaat Pasha ordered a second wave of massacres in February 1916.[230] Another wave of deportations targeted Armenians remaining in Anatolia.[231] More than 200,000 Armenians were killed between March and October 1916, often in remote areas near Deir ez-Zor and on parts of the Khabur valley, where their bodies would not create a public health hazard.[232][233] The massacres killed most of the Armenians who had survived the camp system.[221]

International reaction

Near East Relief

The Ottoman Empire tried to prevent journalists and photographers from documenting the atrocities, threatening them with arrest.

The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (1916) and Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (1918), which raised public awareness about the genocide.[239]

The German Empire was a military ally of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.[240] German diplomats approved limited removals of Armenians in early 1915, and took no action against the genocide,[241][242] which has been a source of controversy.[240][243]

Relief efforts were organized in dozens of countries to raise money for Armenian survivors. By 1925, people in 49 countries were organizing "Golden Rule Sundays" during which they consumed the diet of Armenian refugees, to raise money for humanitarian efforts.

Near East Relief raised $110 million ($2 billion adjusted for inflation) for refugees from the Ottoman Empire.[245]

Aftermath

End of World War I

Eastern Anatolia is all close to black, but western Anatolia is more varied.
Percent of prewar Armenian population unaccounted for in 1917 based on Talaat Pasha's record. Black indicates that 100 percent of Armenians have disappeared. Resettlement zone is displayed in red.

Intentional, state-sponsored killing of Armenians mostly ceased by the end of January 1917, although sporadic massacres and starvation continued.[246] Both contemporaries[247][248] and later historians have estimated that around 1 million Armenians died during the genocide,[3][249] with figures ranging from 600,000 to 1.5 million deaths.[250] Between 800,000 and 1.2 million Armenians were deported,[250][251] and contemporaries estimated that by late 1916 only 200,000 were still alive.[250] As the British Army advanced in 1917 and 1918 northwards through the Levant, they liberated around 100,000 to 150,000 Armenians working for the Ottoman military under abysmal conditions, not including those held by Arab tribes.[252]

As a result of the

Bolshevik Revolution and a subsequent separate peace with the Central Powers, the Russian army withdrew and Ottoman forces advanced into eastern Anatolia.[253] The First Republic of Armenia was proclaimed in May 1918, at which time 50 percent of its population were refugees and 60 percent of its territory was under Ottoman occupation.[254] Ottoman troops withdrew from parts of Armenia following the October 1918 Armistice of Mudros.[255] From 1918 to 1920, Armenian militants committed revenge killings of thousands of Muslims, which have been cited as a retroactive excuse for genocide.[256][257] In 1918, at least 200,000 people in Armenia, mostly refugees, died from starvation or disease, in part due to a Turkish blockade of food supplies[258] and the deliberate destruction of crops in eastern Armenia by Turkish troops, both before and after the armistice.[259]

Armenians organized a coordinated effort known as

Alexandropol held 25,000 orphans, the largest number in the world.[262] In 1920, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople reported it was caring for 100,000 orphans, estimating that another 100,000 remained captive.[263]

Trials

Main articles:
Ottoman Special Military Tribunal

Following the armistice, Allied governments championed the prosecution of Armenian genocide perpetrators.

Ottoman Special Military Tribunal, by which it sought to pin the Armenian genocide onto the CUP leadership while exonerating the Ottoman Empire as a whole, therefore avoiding partition by the Allies.[267] The court ruled that "the crime of mass murder" of Armenians was "organized and carried out by the top leaders of CUP".[268] Eighteen perpetrators (including Talaat, Enver, and Djemal) were sentenced to death, of whom only three were ultimately executed as the remainder had fled and were tried in absentia.[269][270] The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which awarded Armenia a large area in eastern Anatolia, eliminated the Ottoman government's purpose for holding the trials.[271] Prosecution was hampered by a widespread belief among Turkish Muslims that the actions against the Armenians were not punishable crimes.[163] Increasingly, the genocide was considered necessary and justified to establish a Turkish nation-state.[272]

On 15 March 1921,

Talaat was assassinated in Berlin as part of a covert operation of the ARF to kill the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide.[273][274][275] The trial of his admitted killer, Soghomon Tehlirian, focused on Talaat's responsibility for genocide. Tehlirian was acquitted by a German jury.[276][277]

Turkish War of Independence

Further information:
Near East Relief
in 1922 or 1923
Crowded tent camp stretching out a long distance
Refugee camp in Beirut, early 1920s

The CUP regrouped as the

Soviet occupation of Armenia prevented another genocide.[285]

The victorious nationalists subsequently declared the

Republic of Turkey in 1923.[287] CUP war criminals were granted immunity[288] and later that year, the Treaty of Lausanne established Turkey's current borders and provided for the Greek population's expulsion. Its protection provisions for non-Muslim minorities had no enforcement mechanism and were disregarded in practice.[289][290]

Armenian survivors were left mainly in three locations. About 295,000 Armenians had fled to Russian-controlled territory during the genocide and ended up mostly in

French-mandate Syria.[296]

Legacy

According to historian

Margaret Lavinia Anderson, the Armenian genocide reached an "iconic status" as "the apex of horrors conceivable" before World War II.[297] It was described by contemporaries as "the murder of a nation", "race extermination",[298] "the greatest crime of the ages", and "the blackest page in modern history".[299][300] According to historian Stefan Ihrig, in Germany, the Nazis viewed post-1923 Turkey as a post-genocidal paradise and, "incorporated the Armenian genocide, its 'lessons', tactics, and 'benefits', into their own worldview".[301]

Turkey

See also: Armenian genocide denial

In the 1920s,

belief that Turkey is constantly under threat—thus justifying state violence—are among the main legacies of the genocide in Turkey.[302] In postwar Turkey, the perpetrators of the genocide were hailed as martyrs of the national cause.[280] Turkey's official denial of the Armenian genocide continues to rely on the CUP's justification of its actions. The Turkish government maintains that the mass deportation of Armenians was a legitimate action to combat an existential threat to the empire, but that there was no intention to exterminate the Armenian people.[303][304] The government's position is supported by the majority of Turkish citizens.[305] Many Kurds, who themselves have suffered political repression in Turkey, have recognized and condemned the genocide.[306][307]

The Turkish state perceives open discussion of the genocide as a threat to national security because of its connection with the foundation of the republic, and for decades strictly

AK Party came to power and relaxed censorship to a certain extent, and the profile of the issue was raised by the 2007 assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian journalist known for his advocacy of reconciliation.[310] Although the AK Party softened the state denial rhetoric, describing Armenians as part of the Ottoman Empire's war losses,[311] during the 2010s political repression and censorship increased again.[312] Turkey's century-long effort to prevent any recognition or mention of the genocide in foreign countries has included millions of dollars in lobbying,[313] as well as intimidation and threats.[314]

Armenia and Azerbaijan

Armenian Genocide memorial complex on a hill above Yerevan

deportation of Armenian intellectuals.[315][316] On 24 April 1965, 100,000 Armenians protested in Yerevan, and diaspora Armenians demonstrated across the world in favor of recognition of the genocide and annexing land from Turkey.[317][315] A memorial was completed two years later, at Tsitsernakaberd above Yerevan.[315][318]

Azeris have been involved in a conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Initially involving peaceful demonstrations by Armenians, the conflict turned violent and has featured massacres by both sides, resulting in the displacement of more than half a million people.[319][320][321] During the conflict, the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments have regularly accused each other of plotting genocide.[319] Azerbaijan has also joined the Turkish effort to deny the Armenian genocide.[322]

International recognition

Main article: Armenian genocide recognition
see Commons description for full list of countries depicted
  National legislatures that have passed resolutions recognizing the Armenian genocide
  States that explicitly deny the Armenian genocide

In response to continuing denial by the Turkish state, many Armenian diaspora activists have lobbied for international formal recognition of the Armenian genocide, an effort that has become a central concern of the Armenian diaspora.

UN member states have formally recognized the genocide, along with Pope Francis and the European Parliament.[326][327]
Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey explicitly deny the genocide.

Cultural depictions

Main article: Armenian genocide in culture

After meeting Armenian survivors in the Middle East, Austrian–Jewish writer

abstract expressionist paintings of Arshile Gorky were influenced by his experience of the genocide.[335] More than 200 memorials have been erected in 32 countries to commemorate the event.[336]

Archives and historiography

See also: Kemalist historiography

The genocide is extensively documented in the archives of Germany, Austria, the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom,[337] as well as the Ottoman archives, despite systematic purges of incriminating documents by Turkey.[338] There are also thousands of eyewitness accounts from Western missionaries and Armenian survivors.[339][340][341] Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide in 1944, became interested in war crimes after reading about the 1921 trial of Soghomon Tehlirian for the assassination of Talaat Pasha. Lemkin recognized the fate of the Armenians as one of the most significant genocides in the twentieth century.[342][343] Almost all historians and scholars outside Turkey, and an increasing number of Turkish scholars, recognize the destruction of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide.[305][344]

Notes

  1. ^ Also known by other names.

References

  1. ^ Suny 2015, pp. 245, 330.
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Sources

Main article: Bibliography of the Armenian genocide

Books

Chapters

Journal articles

External links