Asymmetric warfare
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Asymmetric warfare (or asymmetric engagement) is a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ significantly. This type of warfare often, but not necessarily, involves insurgents or resistance movement militias who may have the status of unlawful combatants against a standing army.[1]
Asymmetrical warfare can also describe a conflict in which belligerents' resources are uneven, and consequently, they both may attempt to exploit each other's relative weaknesses. Such struggles often involve unconventional warfare, with the weaker side attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in the quantity or quality of their forces and equipment.[2] Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized.[3] This is in contrast to symmetrical warfare, where two powers have comparable military power, resources, and rely on similar tactics.
Asymmetric warfare is a form of irregular warfare – conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states. The term is frequently used to describe what is also called guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, rebellion, terrorism, and counterterrorism.
Definition and differences
The popularity of the term dates from
Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism.
Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:
- Weaker actors may have secret weapons.[5]
- Weaker actors may have powerful allies.[5]
- Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible.[6]
- The demands of a stronger actor are extreme.[6]
- The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors.[7]
Second, if "power," as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" can defeat the "strong." Key explanations include:
- Strategic interaction.
- Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs.
- External support of weak actors.
- Reluctance to escalating violence on the part of strong actors.
- Internal group dynamics.[8]
- Inflated strong actor war aims.
- Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time.[9]
Asymmetric conflicts include interstate and civil wars, and over the past two hundred years, have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won the majority of asymmetric conflicts.[10]
Strategic basis
In most
Tactical basis
This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2022) |
The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
- One side can have a technological advantage that outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the English longbow at the Battle of Crécy is an example.[13][14]
- Technological superiority usually is cancelled by the more vulnerable infrastructure, which can be targeted with devastating results. Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems in highly populated areas could devastate the economy and morale. In contrast, the weaker side may not have these structures at all.
- Training, tactics, and technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries, the Greek phalanx made them far superior to their enemies. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well-known example.[15]
- If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense, i.e., under attack or Soviet and Yugoslav partisans. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can be used to play on the electorate's patience with the conflict (as in the Vietnam War, and others since), provoking protests, and consequent disputes among elected legislators.
- However, if the weaker power is in an aggressive position or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (flag of truce or marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush. Still, an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, warfare laws prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior force uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior one will respect the law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.
Terrorism
There are two opposing viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and
Use of terrain
Terrain that limits mobility, such as forests and mountains, can be used as a
The contour of the land is an aid to the army, sizing up opponents to determine victory and assessing dangers and distance. "Those who do battle without knowing these will lose."
The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.
In the 12th century, irregulars known as the
In the American Revolutionary War, Patriot Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion, known as the "Swamp Fox," took advantage of irregular tactics, interior lines, and the wilderness of colonial South Carolina to hinder larger British regular forces.[17]
Yugoslav Partisans, starting as small detachments around mountain villages in 1941, fought the German and other Axis occupation forces, successfully taking advantage of the rough terrain to survive despite their small numbers. Over the next four years, they slowly forced their enemies back, recovering population centers and resources, eventually growing into the regular Yugoslav Army.
Role of civilians
Civilians can play a vital role in determining the outcome of an asymmetric war. In such conflicts, when it is easy for insurgents to assimilate into the population quickly after an attack, tips on the timing or location of insurgent activity can severely undermine the resistance. An information-central framework,[18] in which civilians are seen primarily as sources of strategic information rather than resources, provides a paradigm to understand better the dynamics of such conflicts where civilian information-sharing is vital. The framework assumes that:
- The consequential action of non-combatants (civilians) is information sharing rather than supplying resources, recruits, or shelter to combatants.
- Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilian who relays it.
Given the additional assumption that the larger or dominant force is the government, the framework suggests the following implications:
- Civilians receive services from government and rebel forces as an incentive to share valuable information.
- Rebel violence can be reduced if the government provides services.
- Provision of security and services are complementary in reducing violence.
- Civilian casualties reduce civilian support to the perpetrating group.
- Provision of information is strongly correlated with the level of anonymity that can be ensured.
A survey of the empirical literature on conflict,[18] does not provide conclusive evidence on the claims. But the framework gives a starting point to explore the role of civilian information sharing in asymmetric warfare.
War by proxy
Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed
Examples
American Revolutionary War
From its initiation, the American Revolutionary War was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric techniques. In the 1920s, Harold Murdock of Boston attempted to solve the puzzle of the first shots fired on Lexington Green and came to the suspicion that the few score militiamen who gathered before sunrise to await the arrival of hundreds of well-prepared British soldiers were sent to provoke an incident which could be used for Patriot propaganda purposes.[19] The return of the British force to Boston following the search operations at Concord was subject to constant skirmishing by Patriot forces gathered from communities all along the route, making maximum use of the terrain (particularly, trees and stone field walls) to overcome the limitations of their weapons – muskets with an effective range of only about 50–70 meters. Throughout the war, skirmishing tactics against British troops on the move continued to be a key factor in the Patriots' success; particularly in the Western theater of the American Revolutionary War.[20][21][22][23]
Another feature of the long march from Concord was the urban warfare technique of using buildings along the route as additional cover for snipers. When revolutionary forces forced their way into Norfolk, Virginia and used waterfront buildings as cover for shots at British vessels out in the river, the response of destruction of those buildings was ingeniously used to the advantage of the rebels, who encouraged the spread of fire throughout the largely Loyalist town and spread propaganda blaming it on the British. Shortly afterwards, they destroyed the remaining houses because they might provide cover for British soldiers.[24][25][26]
The rebels also adopted a form of asymmetric
From 1776, the conflict turned increasingly into a proxy war on behalf of
American Civil War
This section needs additional citations for verification. (October 2014) |
The
The abolitionists would not return the attacks and Brown theorized that a violent spark set off on "the Border" would be a way to finally ignite his long hoped-for slave rebellion.[28][time needed] Brown had broad-sworded slave owners at Potawatomi Creek, so the bloody civilian violence was initially symmetrical; however, once the American Civil War ignited in 1861, and when the state of Missouri voted overwhelmingly not to secede from the Union, the pro-slavers on the MO-KS border were driven either south to Arkansas and Texas, or underground—where they became guerrilla fighters and "Bushwhackers" living in the bushy ravines throughout northwest Missouri across the (now) state line from Kansas. The bloody "Border War" lasted all during the Civil War (and long after with guerrilla partisans like the James brothers cynically robbing and murdering, aided and abetted by lingering lost causers[29][page needed]). Tragically the Western Border War was an asymmetric war: pro-slavery guerrillas and paramilitary partisans on the pro-Confederate side attacked pro-Union townspeople and commissioned Union military units, with the Union army trying to keep both in check: blocking Kansans and pro-Union Missourians from organizing militarily against the marauding Bushwhackers.
The worst act of domestic terror in U.S. history came in August 1863 when paramilitary guerrillas amassed 350 strong and rode all night 50 miles across eastern Kansas to the abolitionist stronghold of Lawrence (a political target) and destroyed the town, gunning down 150 civilians. The Confederate officer whose company had joined Quantrill's Raiders that day witnessed the civilian slaughter and forbade his soldiers from participating in the carnage. The commissioned officer refused to participate in Quantrill's asymmetric warfare on civilians.[30][full citation needed]
Philippine–American War
The Philippine–American War (1899–1902) was an armed conflict between the United States and Filipino revolutionaries. Estimates of the Filipino forces vary between 100,000 and 1,000,000, with tens of thousands of auxiliaries.[31] Lack of weapons and ammunition was a significant impediment to the Filipinos, so most of the forces were only armed with bolo knives, bows and arrows, spears and other primitive weapons that, in practice, proved vastly inferior to U.S. firepower.
The goal, or end-state, sought by the
20th century
Second Boer War
Asymmetric warfare featured prominently during the
The Boer commando raids deep into the Cape Colony, which were organized and commanded by Jan Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted the tactics first used against them by the Boers.[34]
World War I
- T.E. Lawrence and British support for the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were the stronger power, and the Arab coalition were the weaker.
- invasion of Serbia, August 1914. Austria-Hungary was the stronger power, and Serbia was the weaker.
- Germany's invasion of Belgium, August 1914. Germany was the stronger power, Belgium the weaker.
Between the World Wars
- Abd el-Krim led resistance in Morocco from 1920 to 1924 against French and Spanish colonial armies ten times as strong as the guerrilla force, led by General Philippe Pétain.
- anti-fascist national-defensive organization in Europe, fought against Benito Mussolini's regime in Northeast Italy.
- Anglo-Irish War (Irish War of Independence) fought between the Irish Republican Army and the Black and Tans/Auxiliaries. Though Lloyd George (Prime Minister at the time) attempted to persuade other nations that it was not a war by refusing to use the army and using the Black and Tans instead, the conflict was conducted as an asymmetric guerrilla war and was registered as a war with the League of Nations by the Irish Free State.
World War II
- Philippine resistance against Japan – During the Japanese occupation in World War II, there was an extensive Philippine resistance movement, which opposed the Japanese with an active underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years.
- mechanized military units of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets captured 8% of Finland, they suffered enormous casualties versus much lower losses for the Finns. Soviet vehicles were confined to narrow forest roads by terrain and snow, while the Finns used ski tactics around them unseen through the trees. They cut the advancing Soviet column into what they called motti (a cubic metre of firewood) and then destroyed the cut-off sections one by one. Many Soviets were shot, had their throats cut from behind, or froze to death due to inadequate clothing and lack of camouflage and shelter. The Finns also devised a petrol bomb they called the Molotov cocktailto destroy Soviet tanks.
- Soviet partisans – resistance movement which fought in the German occupied parts of the Soviet Union.
- German occupation.
- ).
Britain
- British Commandos and European coastal raids. German countermeasures and the notorious Commando Order.
- Long Range Desert Group and the Special Air Service in Africa and later in Europe.
- Special Operations Executive (SOE)
- Provisional Irish Republican Army against British security forces in the Northern Campaign.
United States
- Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
- China Burma India Theater: Merrill's Marauders and OSS Detachment 101.
After World War II
- Algerian War of Independence(1954-1962); both against France
- The Cuban Revolution of 1953-1958 became a template of asymmetric warfare.[35]
- The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (or "Russo-Hungarian" war[36]) saw makeshift forces improvising lopsided tactics against Soviet tanks.
- Libyan support to the Provisional Irish Republican Army during the Troubles (1960s to 1998) and collusion between British security forces and Ulster loyalist paramilitaries.
- .
- The South African Border War, otherwise known as the Namibian War of Independence (1966-1990) between the South African Defense Force and People's Liberation Army of Namibia.
- United States support of the Nicaraguan Contras (1979-1990).
Cold War (1945–1992)
The end of
Cold War examples of proxy wars
In Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, the
Post-Cold War
The Kosovo War, which pitted Yugoslav security forces (Serbian police and Yugoslav army) against Albanian separatists of the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army, is an example of asymmetric warfare, due to Yugoslav forces' superior firepower and manpower, and due to the nature of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), which pitted NATO air power against the Yugoslav armed forces during the Kosovo war, can also be classified as asymmetric, exemplifying international conflict with asymmetry in weapons and strategy/tactics.[40]
21st century
Israel/Palestine
The ongoing conflict between
Sri Lanka
The
Iraq
The victory by the US-led coalition forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated that training, tactics and technology could provide overwhelming victories in the field of battle during modern conventional warfare. After Saddam Hussein's regime was removed from power, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology was of much less use against continued opposition from the various partisan groups operating inside Iraq.
Syria
This section contains wording that promotes the subject in a subjective manner without imparting real information. (September 2015) |
Much of the 2012–present
Ukraine
The
Semi-symmetric warfare
A new understanding of warfare has emerged amidst the
See also
- Civilian casualty ratio
- Counter-insurgency
- Counter-terrorism
- Fourth-generation warfare
- Free War
- Grey-zone (international relations)
- Guerrilla warfare
- Irregular military
- List of guerrillas
- Lawfare
- Low intensity conflict
- Military use of children
- Millennium Challenge 2002
- New generation warfare
- People's war
- Partisan (military)
- Political warfare
- Protracted social conflict
- Reagan Doctrine
- Resistance movement
- Scorched earth
- Unconventional warfare
- Unconventional warfare (United States)
- Unrestricted Warfare
- War amongst the people
- War on Terror
- Yank Levy
U.S. organisations:
- Center for Asymmetric Warfare (CAW)
- Asymmetric Warfare Group
- Special Activities Division
Wars
- 2006 Lebanon War
- People's War in Nepal
- Second Gaza war
Documents:
References
- ISSN 0022-0418.
- ^ Tomes, Robert (Spring 2004). "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" (PDF). Parameters. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-06-07.
- ^ Stepanova, E. 2008 Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: SIPRI Report 23 (PDF). Oxford Univ. Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-03-10. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
- ^ Russell, James A. (2004). "Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power". Naval War College Review. 57 (19).
- ^ ISBN 9780521466219.
- ^ .
- .
- S2CID 2413984.
- ISBN 978-1-137-30398-1.
- ^ Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. "How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-08-23. Retrieved 2012-09-17.
- ISBN 978-0-313-31266-3. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
- ISBN 978-0-00-719209-0.
- S2CID 161286935.
- ^ Sumption, Jonathan (1990). The Hundred Years War 1: Trial by Battle. London: Faber & Faber.
- ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1.
- ^ "Reshaping the military for asymmetric warfare". Center for Defense Information. Archived from the original on 2004-02-21.
- ^ James, William Dobein (1821). A Sketch of the Life of Brig. Gen. Francis Marion.
- ^ .
- ^ "Harold Murdock's "The Nineteenth Of April 1775"". Retrieved 2015-08-05.
- ISBN 0-8240-5623-X.
- ISBN 978-0-19-512783-6.
- ISBN 978-0-19-512786-7.
- JSTOR 1916389.
- ^ Guy, Louis L. Jr. (Spring 2001). "Norfolk's Worst Nightmare". Norfolk Historical Society. Archived from the original on 2018-06-29. Retrieved 2008-01-03.
- ^ Eckenrode, H.J. (1916). "The Revolution in Virginia (chap. III: The Struggle for Norfolk)". newrivernotes.com. Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. Retrieved 2008-01-03.
- ^ Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts: records of Commissioners to examine claims in Norfolk, 1777–1836. (Library of Virginia archives, ref. APA 235)
- ^ ISBN 978-0-007-15625-2.
- ^ Rob, Rapley (2012). "The Abolitionists". The American Experience. Season 24. Episode 9, 10, 11. PBS. Transcript. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
- ^ T.J. Stiles, "Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War," 2002
- ^ Border War Sesquicentennial proceedings at Lawrence, Kan., August 2013
- ^ Deady 2005, p. 55
- ^ a b c d Deady 2005, p. 57
- ^ a b c d e Deady 2005, p. 58
- ^ JSTOR 487007.
- ^
Lawson, George (2019). "Revolutionary Trajectories: Cuba and South Africa". Anatomies of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 149. ISBN 9781108482684. Retrieved 2020-04-03.
Like many other radical groups in southern Africa, the ANC was deeply influenced by the Cuban Revolution, in part because of its successful use of asymmetrical warfare, in part because of its transition from a grassroots, nationalist insurgency into a people's war, and in part because of the organic link made by Cuban revolutionaries between its political and military wings [...].
- ^
Arreguín-Toft, Ivan (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Vol. 99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 232. ISBN 9781316583005. Retrieved 2020-04-03.
Table App.1
- ^ Chris Bray, The Media and GI Joe, in Reason (Feb 2002)
- ^ Oxford English Dictionary
- ISBN 978-1-57488-849-2.
- ^
Bell, Coral (2001). First War of the 21st Century: Asymmetric Hostilities and the Norms of Combat. Working paper (Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre). Vol. 364. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. p. 5. ISBN 9780731554171. Retrieved 2020-04-03.
Until [...] 11 September 2001, the model of asymmetric war held in most analysts' minds was one far more promising for the West: Kosovo.
- S2CID 150473862.
- ^ "Hamas claims responsibility for attack". 6 May 2009. Retrieved 2009-05-06.
- ^ McCarthy, Rory (1 January 2008). "Death toll in Arab-Israeli conflict fell in 2007". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 2008-02-18.
- ^ Lavie, Smadar (2 July 2018). "Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture -- Revised Edition with a New Afterword". University of Nebraska Press.
- ^ "Several killed in Syria car bombings". BBC News. 5 November 2012.
- ^ "Syrian rebels emboldened after assassinations". CBS News. 19 July 2012.
- ^ Kessler, Andy (27 March 2022). "Ukraine's Asymmetric War: Moscow has more firepower, but Kyiv is using digital technology better". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 12 April 2022.
- ^ Reporter (30 January 2022). "Asymmetric warfare in Ukraine's population centres". wct.com.au. Defence Connect. Retrieved 12 April 2022.
- ^ The Brock News. "How Ukraine's small missiles help defend against a bigger invader". brocku.ca. Brock University. Retrieved 12 April 2022.
- NBC Right Now. Agence France-Presse. Archivedfrom the original on 16 February 2024. Retrieved 2024-02-16.
- ^ "Phillips P. O'Brien describes Semi-Symmetric Warfare". 2 Mar 2022. Retrieved 2022-03-05.
- ^ "Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?". 4 Mar 2022. Retrieved 2022-03-05.
Further reading
Bibliographies
- Compiled by Joan T. Phillips Bibliographer at Air University Library: A Bibliography of Asymmetric Warfare, August 2005.
- Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Debate sponsored by the Project on Defense Alternatives
Books
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54869-4.
- Beckett, I. F. W. (15 September 2009). Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Hardcover). Santa Barbara, California: Abc-Clio Inc. ISBN 978-0-874-36929-8.
- Barnett, Roger W. (2003). Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-574-88562-0.
- ISBN 978-0-316-72862-1.
- ISBN 978-0-521-45117-8.
- Schröfl, Josef (2007). Political Asymmetries in the Era of Globalization. Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-56820-0.
- ISBN 978-0-375-72627-9.
- Levy, Bert "Yank"; Wintringham, Tom (Foreword) (1964). Guerrilla Warfare (PDF). Paladin Press. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2014-04-12. Retrieved 2014-04-15.
- Merom, Gil (2003). How Democracies Lose Small Wars. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-80403-5.
- ISBN 978-1-58487-041-8.
- Schröfl, Josef; Cox, Sean M.; Pankratz, Thomas (2009). Winning the Asymmetric War: Political, Social and Military Responses. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-57249-8.
- Record, Jeffrey (2007). Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1-59797-090-7.
- Giuseppe, Gagliano (2007). Introduzione alla conflittualita' non convenzionale. Edizioni New Press. ISBN 978-8-895-38302-6.
- Resnick, Uri (July 12, 2013). Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave-Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-30398-1.
- Sobelman, Daniel (2004). New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon (PDF). Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University. ISBN 978-9-654-59057-0. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2012-11-02.
- Sobelman, Daniel (2009). "Hizbollah – from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy". In Jones, Clive; Catignani, Sergio (eds.). Israel and Hizbollah An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Routledge. pp. 49–66. ISBN 9781135229207.
- Sobelman, Daniel (Winter 2017). "Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–2016". International Security. 41 (3): 151–196. S2CID 57571128.
Articles and papers
- Bryant, G. J. (2004). "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India". Journal of Military History. 68 (2): 431–469. S2CID 144222473– via Project Muse(subscription required).
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (Summer 2001). "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict". International Security. 26 (1): 93–128. S2CID 51776546.
- Dunne, J. Paul; García-Alonso, María D.C.; Levine, Paul; Smith, Ron P. (April 2006). "Managing Asymmetric Conflict". Oxford Economic Papers. 58 (2): 183–208. JSTOR 3876996.
- Fowler, C. A. "Bert" (March 2006). "Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer". IEEE Spectrum. Archived from the original on 2008-01-04. Retrieved 2006-03-05. A mathematical approach to the concept.
- Corbin, Marcus (October 5, 2001). "Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare". CDI. Archived from the original on 2012-04-10.
- Deady, Timothy K. (2005). "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902" (PDF). Parameters. 35 (1): 53–68. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-12-10. Retrieved 2018-01-13.
- Goulding Jr., Vincent J. "Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare". Parameters. 30 (4) 7: 21–30. Archived from the original on 2004-02-10. Retrieved 2006-06-12.
{{cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - Mack, Andrew (January 1975). "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict". World Politics. 27 (2): 175–200. S2CID 154410180.
- Meigs, Montgomery C. "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2003-10-02.
- Norton-Taylor, Richard (October 3, 2001). "Asymmetric Warfare: Military Planners Are Only Beginning to Grasp the Implications of September 11 for Future Deterrence Strategy". The Guardian.
- Novak, Michael (February 10, 2003). ""Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War: A Moral Obligation". NRO.
- Pfanner, Toni (March 2005). "Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action". International Review of the Red Cross. 87 (857): 149–174. S2CID 145126086.
- Sullivan, Patricia (2007). "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 51 (3): 496–524. S2CID 37158560.
- Tucker, Jonathan B. (Summer 1999). "Asymmetric Warfare". Archived from the original on 2006-05-15.
- "Asymmetry and other fables". Jane's Defence Weekly. 18 August 2006. Archived from the original on 26 January 2013. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
- Buffaloe, David (September 2006). "Defining Asymmetric Warfare" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-03-22.
- White, Josh; Branigin, William (April 22, 2008). "Gates Assails Pentagon on Resources for Battlefields". The Washington Post.
- Mandel, Robert (July 2007). "Reassessing Victory in Warfare". Armed Forces & Society. 33 (4). Sage Publications: 461–495. S2CID 145246391.
- Mandel, Robert (January 2004). "The Wartime Utility of Precision Versus Brute Force in Weaponry". Armed Forces & Society. 30 (2). Sage Publications: 171–201. S2CID 110384704.