Ba'athist Iraq
Iraqi Republic (1968–1992) الجمهورية العراقية al-Jumhūriyah al-‘Irāqīyah Republic of Iraq (1992–2003) جمهورية العراق Jumhūriyyat al-ʽIrāq | |||||||||||||||
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1968–2003 | |||||||||||||||
Motto: (1968–1991) وحدة، حرية، اشتراكية Wahda, Hurriyah, Ishtirakiyah[1] ("Unity, Freedom, Socialism") (1991–2003) الله أكبر Allāhu akbar ("God is the Greatest") | |||||||||||||||
Anthem: (1968–1981) والله زمان يا سلاحي Walla Zaman Ya Selahy ("Oh it's been a long time, my Weapon!") (1981–2003) أرض الفراتين
| |||||||||||||||
President | |||||||||||||||
• 1968–1979 | Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr | ||||||||||||||
• 1979–2003 | Saddam Hussein | ||||||||||||||
Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif | |||||||||||||||
• 1968–1979 | Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr | ||||||||||||||
• 1979–1991 | Saddam Hussein | ||||||||||||||
• 1991[9] | Sa'dun Hammadi | ||||||||||||||
Mohammed Hamza Zubeidi | |||||||||||||||
• 1993–1994[11] | Ahmad as-Samarrai | ||||||||||||||
• 1994–2003 | Saddam Hussein | ||||||||||||||
Legislature | UN sanctions[15] | Aug 1990 – May 2003 | |||||||||||||
20 March – 1 May 2003 | |||||||||||||||
3–9 April 2003 | |||||||||||||||
Area | |||||||||||||||
1999[16] | 437,072 km2 (168,754 sq mi) | ||||||||||||||
2002 | 438,317 km2 (169,235 sq mi) | ||||||||||||||
Population | |||||||||||||||
• 1999 | 22,802,063 (43rd)[17][18] | ||||||||||||||
• 2002 | 24,931,921 (41st)[19][20] | ||||||||||||||
• Density | 57/sq mi (22.0/km2) ( AST) | ||||||||||||||
Driving side | right | ||||||||||||||
Calling code | +964 | ||||||||||||||
ISO 3166 code | IQ | ||||||||||||||
Internet TLD | .iq | ||||||||||||||
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History of Iraq |
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Iraq portal |
Ba'athist Iraq, officially the Iraqi Republic (1968–1992) and later the Republic of Iraq (1992–2003), was the Iraqi state between 1968 and 2003 under the rule of the
Led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the Ba'ath Party came to power in Iraq through the bloodless 17 July 1968 Revolution, which overthrew Iraqi president Abdul Rahman Arif and Iraqi prime minister Tahir Yahya. The Ba'athists had previously assumed power for a brief period after the 8 February 1963 Revolution, but were forced into exile by Nasserists within their ranks following the November 1963 coup d'état.[24] By the mid-1970s, Saddam Hussein, through his post as chief of the party's intelligence services, became the country's de facto leader, despite al-Bakr's de jure presidency. Under Saddam's new policies, both the Iraqi economy and citizens' standard of living grew, and Iraq's standing within the Arab world increased significantly. As land reforms were introduced, the country's wealth was distributed on a more equal basis. However, several internal factors were imminently threatening Iraq's stability; the Ba'athist government, which was secular, Arab nationalist, and dominated by Sunni Muslims, was drawn into an escalating conflict with the religious separatism among Shia Muslims in the south and the ethnic separatism among Kurds in the north. The then-ongoing Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, in particular, was increasingly becoming a cause of great concern for the government, in light of the fact that Kurdish rebels were enjoying extensive support from Iran, Israel, and the United States. After the Iraqis suffered a major defeat to the Iranians in the 1974–1975 Shatt al-Arab clashes, Saddam met with Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and, with the ratification of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, ceded parts of Iraqi territory in exchange for Iran's termination of support for the Kurds. With the Kurdish rebellion subsequently disadvantaged, the Iraqi military was able to successfully reassert the federal government's control over Iraqi Kurdistan.
In 1979, al-Bakr resigned from the presidency, citing health reasons, though it has been alleged that Saddam coerced him into stepping down. Nonetheless, al-Bakr was succeeded by Saddam, who became the fifth Iraqi president—a position he would hold for the next two and a half decades. Saddam's seizure of power occurred during a wave of Shia-led anti-government protests, which were violently suppressed by the Ba'ath Party. Alarmed by the
Claiming a decisive victory over the Iranians, Iraq emerged from the conflict under a steep economic depression while owing millions of dollars to foreign countries.
History
1968 coup
In contrast to previous coups d'état in Iraq's history, the 1968 coup, referred to as the 17 July Revolution, was, according to Con Coughlin, "a relatively civil affair". The coup started in the early hours of 17 July, when a number of military units and civilian Ba'athists seized several key government and military buildings; these included the Ministry of Defence, the electricity station, radio stations, all the city's bridges and "a number of military bases". All telephone lines were cut at 03:00, by which time several tanks had been commanded to halt in front of the Presidential Palace. Abdul Rahman Arif, the then-President of Iraq, first knew of the coup when jubilant members of the Republican Guard started shooting into the air in "a premature triumph". Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the leader of the operation, told Arif about his situation through military communication hardware at the base of operations. Arif asked for more time, during which he contacted other military units to seek support. As he soon found out, the odds were against him, and he surrendered. Arif telephoned al-Bakr and told him that he was willing to resign; to show his gratitude, al-Bakr guaranteed his safety. al-Bakr's deputies, Hardan al-Tikriti and Salah Omar al-Ali, were ordered to give Arif this message in person.[25] Arif and his wife and son were quickly sent on the first available flight to London, UK. Later that morning, a Ba'athist broadcast announced that a new government had been established. The coup was carried out with such ease that there were no deaths.[26]
The coup succeeded because of contributions made by the military; the
al-Bakr, as the leader of the coup's military operation, retained his position as Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party, and was elected to the posts of Chairman of the
Al-Bakr's rule and Saddam's rise to power (1968–1979)
al-Bakr strengthened his position in the party with the help of Saddam's newly established party security apparatus and the intelligence services. Most of 1968 was used to repress non-Ba'athist thought and groups; for instance, a campaign against
During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime on at least two occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired officers, Major General
By the mid-to-late 1970s, Saddam's power within the Ba'ath Party and the government grew; he became de facto leader of the country, although al-Bakr remained as president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman. In 1977, following a wave of protests by
It was in this situation that Saddam took over the offices of president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman.
Early years, Iran–Iraq War and aftermath (1979–1990)
Once he assumed the presidency, a
It was presumed that the
On 17 July 1981, on the 13th anniversary of a bloodless coup, Ardulfurataini was adopted as the official national anthem of Iraq, with its lyrics mentioned of prominent figures in Iraqi history, including Saladin, Harun al-Rashid and al-Muthanna ibn Haritha, along with the last verse extolled by Ba'athism.
In 1982, Iran counter-attacked and was successful in driving the Iraqis back into Iraq. That year alone, an estimated 40,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner. The defeats of 1982 were a blow to Iraq. With the economic situation worsening because of falling oil prices (and the rising military budget), the Iraqi standard of living worsened. The
Gulf War, the 1990s, and the Iraq War (1990–2003)
In the aftermath of the
On the evening of 24 February, several days before the Gulf War
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Iraq became a target by a series of U.S.
In 1997, Iraq prohibited all weapons inspectors of UNSCOM from sites declared to be sovereign palaces, which were compounds capable of storing chemical weapons.
Iraq experienced another
In the aftermath of the
Politics
Political system
The 1970 Iraqi Constitution stated that Iraq was in a transitional phase of development; in
The constitution of 1970 proclaimed Ba'athist Iraq as "a sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to the establishment of a Ba'athist
Ba'ath Party
National leaders | Regional leaders | ||
---|---|---|---|
Name | Term | Name | Term |
Michel Aflaq | 1968–1989 | Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr | 1966–1979 |
Saddam Hussein | 1992–2003 | Saddam Hussein | 1979–2003 |
Iraq, under the rule of the Iraqi-led
National Progressive Front
The National Progressive Front (NPF) was a popular front led by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, established on 17 July 1973 (the fifth anniversary of the 17 July Revolution). The NPF charter was signed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (representing the Ba'ath Party) and Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, or ICP). In Al-Thawrah, a Ba'athist newspaper, the charter was hailed as a success for the revolution.[71] The ICP was the most prominent party to join; however, it left the NPF in March 1979. While officially an independent organisation (and the only non-Ba'athist political forum), the NPF's leadership consisted entirely of Ba'athist members or Ba'athist loyalists. The organisation's purpose was to give the Ba'athist regime a semblance of popular support.[72] Throughout the NPF's existence, Naim Haddad was its general secretary.[73]
Opposition
The
In contrast to the secular opposition, the religious opposition was better organised and stronger. Several religious opposition groups could appeal to Iraqis, because of the secular nature of the Ba'athist government. During the Iran–Iraq War the government allowed some degree of religious freedom, but only to win support from the populace.[76]
State ideology
Part of a series on |
Ba'athism |
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Party ideology
The Ba'ath Party was based on the ideology of
Saddamism
Saddamism (Saddamiyya) is a political ideology based on the politics related to (and pursued by) Saddam Hussein.[83] It has also been referred to by Iraqi politicians as Saddamist Ba'athism (Al-Ba'athiyya Al-Saddamiyya).[84] It is officially described as a distinct variation of Ba'athism.[83] It espouses Iraqi nationalism and an Iraq-centred Arab world that calls upon Arab countries to adopt Saddamist Iraqi political discourse, and reject "the Nasserite discourse" which it claims collapsed after 1967.[83] It is militarist, viewing political disputes and conflict from a military standpoint as "battles" requiring "fighting", "mobilization", "battlefields", "bastions" and "trenches".[85] Saddamism was officially supported by Saddam Hussein's government and promoted by the Iraqi daily newspaper Babil, which was owned by Saddam's son Uday Hussein.[83]
Saddam Hussein and his ideologists sought to fuse a connection between the ancient Babylonian and Assyrian civilizations in Iraq to Arab nationalism by claiming that the Babylonians and ancient Assyrians are the ancestors of the Arabs. Thus, Saddam Hussein and his supporters claim that there is no conflict between Mesopotamian heritage and Arab nationalism.[86]
Saddam Hussein based his political views and ideology upon the views of Aflaq, Ba'athism's key founder. Saddam was also an avid reader of topics on moral and material forces in
The Return to Faith Campaign
In 1993, the Iraqi regime embarked on the Return to Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyyah), under the supervision of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The ultimate aim of this new policy was to encourage popular devotion to Islam within Iraqi society.[90]
Up until the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Iraqi regime had espoused the secular ideology of Ba'athism. This started to change when Saddam, who wished to bolster the Iraqi government's Islamic credentials, implemented a variety of reforms. The Iraqi flag had the
Saddam coordinated the media and educational system to put heavy emphasis on Islamic identity. Religious academic institutions were opening up across the country, and Qu'ranic and Islamic studies were introduced into the curriculum at all school levels. A religious radio station, al-Qu'ran al-Karim Radio was set up to expand and promote Islam in Iraqi life. Aspects of the
This new influx of religious involvement into the government had sectarian undertones. The government's attempt to cloak itself in Islamic conservatism saw it launch verbal attacks on Iran, which were perceived by Shia Iraqis as being veiled attacks on their community, due to the shared faith between them and Iran. Sunni rhetoric emitting from the Iraqi government sought to discredit Iran, with scathing criticism stating that they were subscribing to a " foreign and heretical form of religion". While daily newspaper Babil, owned by Saddam's eldest son
Foreign policy
Relations with the Soviet Union
The Ba'ath Party policy towards the
During the early years of al-Bakr's rule, the Soviet Union became a strategic ally. However, with the increase in oil revenues relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union weakened. The Iraqi regime was given more freedom of choice, and lost its dependence on Soviet investments. The Soviet Union, during this period, retained its role as Iraq's largest arms supplier. With Iraq's foreign-policy priorities changing, repression against the ICP was reintroduced. The Soviet Union tried to act as a mediator between the two parties, but Soviet involvement was considered by the Ba'athist government as Soviet interference in Iraq's internal affairs.
Relations with the United States
Throughout the
Economy
Planning system
Since it did not have an economic policy of its own, the Ba'ath Party, when it took power in 1968, allowed the Five-Year Plan set up by the previous regime in 1965 to continue until its end date in 1969.[116] The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decided by the mid-1970s to alter the planning system; instead of creating stable Five-Year Plans (as had been done earlier), an annual investment plan was to be created. Every year, the RCC convened to create an investment for the year to come; for example, there were separate investment plans for 1976 and 1977. Another change is that the plan's final draft was not accepted by the highest economic elite but by the RCC, the political elite.[117] In 1976 (as a break with the new trend) the RCC introduced the National Development Plan, which was set to last from 1976 to 1980. Unlike the previous plans, the sectoral investment-allocation figures were not made public.[118]
Economic growth
The
After the nationalisation of the IPC, Iraq's oil revenue increased from 219 million
The National Development Plan (1976–1980) ended with an 11-percent increase in
Demise of development
At the beginning of the war the Iraqi government had a monetary reserve of $35 billion, and the annual growth rate was 27.9 percent. During the early war years, ambitious development plans were followed; because of high military spending (approaching 50 percent of
When the war started, Saddam was widely quoted as saying that Iraq faced the war with a two-year supply "of all key commodities."; this proved true. Beginning in October 1982, Iraq's foreign assets began to dwindle as the government failed to repay its loans. At the end of the war, Iraq's monetary reserve had been depleted and international oil prices were not as stable (high) as they had been during the 1970s.[124] The economy was still healthy in late 1982, due to government expenditure on large development programmes.[125] Before the war, Iraq's workforce stood at five million. During the war, one million were mobilised in the war against Iran. Of the million sent to war, 100,000 died. The labour shortage led to stagnation; to fill the gap, an increasing number of women were hired.[126] There was a shift in industrial production during the war from consumer to military goods. Social programmes that had been established in the previous decade began to deteriorate, and the average standard of living decreased.[127]
During the mid-to-late 1980s, international oil prices collapsed. The Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established a quota system in which the international oil price (for its members) was set at US$18 per barrel. This system did not work, as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not follow OPEC policy and continued to flood the market with their oil. The result was that international oil prices were still at the 1970s level. In October 1988, because of Kuwait and the UAE, international oil prices had fallen to US$12 per barrel.[128] The policy which the UAE (and especially Kuwait) followed hampered Iraq's economic growth. In the Iran–Iraq War's aftermath, Iraq had grown more dependent on oil prices.[129] The result of Kuwait and the UAE's oil policies could be felt in 1990, when international oil prices decreased to US$13.67 per barrel. This time, the sudden fall in oil prices triggered reactions in Iraq; in Al-Thawra, the Ba'ath Party newspaper, Foreign Minister Aziz criticised Kuwait and the UAE's oil policies.[130] Because of the sudden slump, Saddam claimed at an Arab League conference that international oil prices could increase to US$25 per barrel without hurting exports. Saddam also claimed that the abrupt fall in oil prices decreased Iraq's oil revenue by one billion dollars. Iraq was not the only member criticising Kuwait and the UAE; several other members also criticised their oil-production policy.[129] Kuwait would not budge, continuing its oil-production strategy even when threatened by Iraq. This, coupled with foreign loans Iraq owed to Kuwait, was the main reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[131]
UN sanctions
Following Iraq's defeat in the
Throughout the Ba'ath Party's rule over Iraq, the agricultural sector had been under-performing. Those in the United States who supported sanctions believed that low agricultural production in Iraq (coupled with sanctions) would lead to "a hungry population", and "a hungry population was an unruly one".[134] The Iraqi government, which understood the serious effects the sanctions could have on Iraq, were able to increase agricultural output by 24 percent from 1990 to 1991. During the sanction years, the agricultural sector witnessed "a boom of unprecedented proportions". The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) introduced several decrees during this period to increase agricultural performance. These decrees may be separated into three categories:
- They introduced severe penalties on farmers (or landowners) unable to produce at full capacity on their land.
- Government programmes made it cheaper (and therefore more profitable for farmers and landowners) to produce.
- Programmes were initiated to increase the amount of arable land.[135]
The RCC introduced Decree No. 367 in 1990, which stated that all lands which were not under production by their owners would be taken over by the state; if the owner could not use all the land he owned, he would lose it. However, the RCC's policy was not "all stick and no carrot". The government made it easier for farmers and landowners to receive credit. On 30 September 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture announced that it would increase loans to farmers by 100 percent, and would subsidise machinery and tools. In October 1990, the RCC stated it was planning to utilize and exploit "every inch of Iraqi arable land". While official statistics cannot be trusted entirely, they showed massive growth in arable land: from 16,446 donums in 1980 to 45,046 in 1990.[136] The increase in agricultural output does not mean that hunger was not widespread; prices of foodstuffs increased dramatically during this period. However, overall the sanctions failed and (indirectly) led to an unprecedented improvement in agriculture.[137]
While the agricultural sector improved, most other economic indicators deteriorated. Transport (which had been bombed during the Gulf War) further deteriorated due to the government's neglect. The economy suffered from chronic inflation and currency depreciation; the sanctions exacerbated the structural problems in Iraq's economic system. Iraq was, on balance, a planned economy with market-economy characteristics.[138]
Modest growth
By the late 1990s, the Iraqi economy showed signs of modest growth. These would continue until 2003 when the government was toppled. The gross domestic product increased from US$10.8 billion in 1996 to US$30.8 billion in 2000. The major factor in this growth was the UN-initiated Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP). Saddam was originally opposed to the OFFP. The OFFP led to the inflow of hard currency, which helped reduce the country's chronic inflation and reopened old trade routes with foreign countries.[138] It was around this time that many countries started to ignore the UN sanctions.[139] While internal and external trade was revitalised, this did not lead to a significant increase in the standard of living for the majority of the population; on the contrary, the government tried to prevent benefits from flowing to Shi'ite areas to persuade more countries to oppose the sanctions. In 2000, the national income per capita was estimated to be US$1,000—less than half of what it had been in 1990.[140]
Military
Expenditure
The Ba'ath regime, like its predecessors, came to power by military force. From
Size
In 1967, the Iraqi army consisted of 50,000 men on two-year service; the Iraqi Air Force had 170 aircraft. In 1980, these numbers had increased to a standing army of 200,000, 250,000 reserves and 250,000 paramilitary troops in the Ba'ath Party-led Popular Army. The army had 2,500 tanks, 335 combat aircraft and 40 combat helicopters. In 1988, at the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq fielded the fourth largest army in the world; the army consisted of 955,000 standing soldiers and 650,000 paramilitary forces in the Popular Army. The army could field 4,500 tanks, 484 combat aircraft and 232 combat helicopters.[144] According to Michael Knights, the Iraqi army fielded one million men and 850,000 reservists; there were 53 divisions, 20 special-forces brigades, and several regional militias. The Iraqi military was able to field 5,500 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, the country had a strong air defence and could employ 700 combat aircraft and helicopters.[145] By 1990 (according to Keith Shimko) the Iraqi army fielded nearly one million men, 5,700 tanks, 3,700 artillery pieces and 950 combat aircraft. During the Gulf War the most optimistic military analysis believed that, during an all-out war with the Iraqi military, the United States military would suffer between 17,000 and 30,000 casualties.[146] In the aftermath of the Gulf War the size of the Iraqi military was reduced to an estimated 350,000 standing troops; it could deploy 2,300 main battle tanks, had about 260 combat aircraft and could deploy up to 120 combat helicopters.[144] In 2002, one year before the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi army could deploy 375,000 men. According to the United States Central Command, Iraq's army (standing and reserves) stood at 700,000 men.[147]
Culture
By the end of the 1970s women in Iraq formed 46 per cent of the teachers, 29 per cent of the doctors, 46 per cent of the dentists, 70 per cent of the pharmacists, 15 percent of the accountants, 14 percent of the factory workers and 16 percent of the civil servants.[148][149]
The Ba'athist era was a period of
During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein sought to gain support from the Muslim religious community for the government, adding the Takbir to the flag, coat of arms and motto of Iraq.
Space program
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq maintained a domestic
Flags and coats of arms
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Flag (1963–1991)
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Coat of arms (1965–1991)
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Coat of arms (1991–2004)
See also
References
Notes
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- ^ Saddam, pronounced [sˤɑdˈdæːm], is his personal name, and means the stubborn one or he who confronts in Arabic. Hussein (Sometimes also transliterated as Hussayn or Hussain) is not a surname in the Western sense, but a patronymic, his father's given personal name; Abid al-Majid his grandfather's; al-Tikriti means he was born and raised in (or near) Tikrit. He was commonly referred to as Saddam Hussein, or Saddam for short. The observation that referring to the deposed Iraqi president as only Saddam is derogatory or inappropriate may be based on the assumption that Hussein is a family name: thus, The New York Times refers to him as "Mr. Hussein" [1] Archived 24 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine, while Encyclopædia Britannica uses just Saddam [2] Archived 6 June 2004 at the Wayback Machine. A full discussion can be found [3] Archived 31 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine (Blair Shewchuk, CBC News Online). -- Content originally at Saddam HusseinBurns, John F. (2 July 2004). "Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi Court for Trying Him". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 24 March 2014. Retrieved 2 July 2004.
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- ^ Tripp 2010, pp. 217–218.
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- ^ Tripp 2010, p. 225.
- ^ Tripp 2010, p. 227.
- ^ Coughlin 2005, pp. 209, 218–219.
- ^ Coughlin 2005, p. 219.
- ^ Coughlin 2005, p. 220.
- ^ Tripp 2010, p. 233.
- ^ Tripp 2010, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Tripp 2010, pp. 238–239.
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- ^ Dan Murphy (27 April 2004). "Sadr the agitator: like father, like son". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 4 February 2011. Retrieved 1 February 2013.
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- ISBN 978-0-7656-1693-7.
- ^ Metz 2004, p. 162.
- ^ Metz 2004, pp. 165–166.
- ^ Metz 2004, pp. 164–165.
- ^ Metz 2004, pp. 166–167.
- ^ Metz 2004, p. 191.
- ^ Metz 2004, p. 192.
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- ^ Metz 2004, p. 164.
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- ISBN 978-0-87553-023-9.
- ISBN 978-0-7614-7571-2.
- ^ Alnasrawi 1994, p. 115.
- ^ a b Alnasrawi 1994, p. 116
- ^ Alnasrawi 1994, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Alnasrawi 1994, p. 117.
- ^ Selden 1999, pp. 87–88.
- ^ Selden 1999, pp. 88–89.
- ^ Selden 1999, p. 89.
- ^ Selden 1999, p. 90.
- ^ Selden 1999, p. 91.
- ^ Selden 1999, pp. 93–94.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-8018-8642-3.
- ISBN 978-0-8018-8642-3.
- ISBN 978-0-8018-8642-3.
- ISBN 978-0-415-10033-5.
- ISBN 978-0-415-10033-5.
- ISBN 978-0-415-10033-5.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-631-16848-5.)
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ISBN 978-0-521-12884-1.)
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ISBN 978-0-89206-416-8.)
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ^ Suad Joseph (1982). "The Mobilization of Iraqi Women into the Wage Labor Force". Studies in Third World Societies. 16: 69–90.
- ^ Al-Khalil, Samir. Khalil, 11 April 1991. Iraq and Its Future. [url=https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1991/04/11/iraq-and-its-future Archived 21 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine New York Review of Books].
- ISBN 9780520921245.
- ISBN 9781107001084.
- ISBN 9780292702646. Retrieved 19 February 2014.
Bibliography
- Alnasrawi, Abbas (1994). The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of development and Prospects, 1950–2010. ISBN 978-0-313-29186-9.
- Bengio, Ofra (1998). Saddam's Word: Political discourse in Iraq (Paperback). Oxford, England, UK; New York, New York, USA: ISBN 978-0-19-511439-3.
- ISBN 978-0-06-050543-1.
- ISBN 978-1-4191-2671-0.
- Niblock, Tim (1982). Iraq, the contemporary state (Paperback). London, England, UK: Croom Helm. ISBN 978-0-7099-1810-3.
- Selden, Zachary (1999). Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy. ISBN 978-0-275-96387-3.
- ISBN 978-0-521-52900-6.
Further reading
- Baram, Amatzia (Hebrew: פרופ' אמציה ברעם; University of Haifa). "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96." International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb. 1997), pp. 1–31. Available at JSTOR.
- Baram, Amatzia. "From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003" (Archive). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, History and Public Policy Program, Occasional Paper. October 2011.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2018. State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Princeton University Press.
- Helfont, Samuel. "Saddam and the Islamists: The Ba‘thist Regime's Instrumentalization of Religion in Foreign Affairs." Project MUSE.