Ba'athist Iraq

Coordinates: 33°20′N 44°23′E / 33.333°N 44.383°E / 33.333; 44.383
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Iraqi Republic
(1968–1992)
الجمهورية العراقية
al-Jumhūriyah al-‘Irāqīyah
Republic of Iraq
(1992–2003)
جمهورية العراق
Jumhūriyyat al-ʽIrāq
1968–2003
Motto: (1968–1991)
وحدة، حرية، اشتراكية
Wahda, Hurriyah, Ishtirakiyah[1]
("Unity, Freedom, Socialism")
(1991–2003)
الله أكبر
Allāhu akbar
("God is the Greatest")
Anthem: (1968–1981)
والله زمان يا سلاحي
Walla Zaman Ya Selahy
("Oh it's been a long time, my Weapon!")

(1981–2003)
أرض الفراتين
Arab socialist[4] republic
President
 
• 1968–1979
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr
• 1979–2003
Saddam Hussein
Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif
• 1968–1979
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr
• 1979–1991
Saddam Hussein
• 1991[9]
Sa'dun Hammadi
• 1991–1993[9][10]
Mohammed Hamza Zubeidi
• 1993–1994[11]
Ahmad as-Samarrai
• 1994–2003
Saddam Hussein
Legislature
UN sanctions[15]
Aug 1990 – May 2003
20 March – 1 May 2003
3–9 April 2003
Area
1999[16]437,072 km2 (168,754 sq mi)
2002438,317 km2 (169,235 sq mi)
Population
• 1999
22,802,063 (43rd)[17][18]
• 2002
24,931,921 (41st)[19][20]
• Density
57/sq mi (22.0/km2) (
AST)
Driving sideright
Calling code+964
ISO 3166 codeIQ
Internet TLD.iq
Preceded by
Succeeded by
Iraqi Republic
Saudi Arabian–Iraqi neutral zone
Republic of Kuwait
Kuwait
Coalition Provisional Authority

Ba'athist Iraq, officially the Iraqi Republic (1968–1992) and later the Republic of Iraq (1992–2003), was the Iraqi state between 1968 and 2003 under the rule of the

UNSC sanctions against Iraq, in particular, were widely criticized for negatively impacting the country's quality of life, prompting the establishment of the Oil-for-Food Programme. The Ba'athist period formally came to an end with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Ba'ath Party has since been indefinitely banned across the country.[22][23]

Led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the Ba'ath Party came to power in Iraq through the bloodless 17 July 1968 Revolution, which overthrew Iraqi president Abdul Rahman Arif and Iraqi prime minister Tahir Yahya. The Ba'athists had previously assumed power for a brief period after the 8 February 1963 Revolution, but were forced into exile by Nasserists within their ranks following the November 1963 coup d'état.[24] By the mid-1970s, Saddam Hussein, through his post as chief of the party's intelligence services, became the country's de facto leader, despite al-Bakr's de jure presidency. Under Saddam's new policies, both the Iraqi economy and citizens' standard of living grew, and Iraq's standing within the Arab world increased significantly. As land reforms were introduced, the country's wealth was distributed on a more equal basis. However, several internal factors were imminently threatening Iraq's stability; the Ba'athist government, which was secular, Arab nationalist, and dominated by Sunni Muslims, was drawn into an escalating conflict with the religious separatism among Shia Muslims in the south and the ethnic separatism among Kurds in the north. The then-ongoing Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, in particular, was increasingly becoming a cause of great concern for the government, in light of the fact that Kurdish rebels were enjoying extensive support from Iran, Israel, and the United States. After the Iraqis suffered a major defeat to the Iranians in the 1974–1975 Shatt al-Arab clashes, Saddam met with Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and, with the ratification of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, ceded parts of Iraqi territory in exchange for Iran's termination of support for the Kurds. With the Kurdish rebellion subsequently disadvantaged, the Iraqi military was able to successfully reassert the federal government's control over Iraqi Kurdistan.

In 1979, al-Bakr resigned from the presidency, citing health reasons, though it has been alleged that Saddam coerced him into stepping down. Nonetheless, al-Bakr was succeeded by Saddam, who became the fifth Iraqi president—a position he would hold for the next two and a half decades. Saddam's seizure of power occurred during a wave of Shia-led anti-government protests, which were violently suppressed by the Ba'ath Party. Alarmed by the

ongoing internal post-revolutionary chaos. For the duration of the conflict, the state of the Iraqi economy deteriorated and Iraq became dependent on foreign loans (primarily from other Arab countries) to fund the war effort. The Iran–Iraq War ended in a stalemate in 1988, when both sides accepted UNSC Resolution 598
after suffering over a million casualties combined.

Claiming a decisive victory over the Iranians, Iraq emerged from the conflict under a steep economic depression while owing millions of dollars to foreign countries.

Saddam had friendly links with al-Qaeda, both of which were found to be false claims during and after the Iraq War. In December 2003, nine months after the invasion, American troops captured Saddam near Tikrit and turned him over to Iraq's new Shia-led government. After almost two years in custody, Saddam's trial for crimes against humanity began in 2005. In December 2006, after sentencing him to death, the Iraqi tribunal executed Saddam for crimes against humanity with regard to the 1982 Dujail massacre, in which 142 Shia Muslims were killed by the Iraqi government in response to an assassination attempt against Saddam by the Iranian-backed Islamic Dawa Party
.

History

1968 coup

In contrast to previous coups d'état in Iraq's history, the 1968 coup, referred to as the 17 July Revolution, was, according to Con Coughlin, "a relatively civil affair". The coup started in the early hours of 17 July, when a number of military units and civilian Ba'athists seized several key government and military buildings; these included the Ministry of Defence, the electricity station, radio stations, all the city's bridges and "a number of military bases". All telephone lines were cut at 03:00, by which time several tanks had been commanded to halt in front of the Presidential Palace. Abdul Rahman Arif, the then-President of Iraq, first knew of the coup when jubilant members of the Republican Guard started shooting into the air in "a premature triumph". Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, the leader of the operation, told Arif about his situation through military communication hardware at the base of operations. Arif asked for more time, during which he contacted other military units to seek support. As he soon found out, the odds were against him, and he surrendered. Arif telephoned al-Bakr and told him that he was willing to resign; to show his gratitude, al-Bakr guaranteed his safety. al-Bakr's deputies, Hardan al-Tikriti and Salah Omar al-Ali, were ordered to give Arif this message in person.[25] Arif and his wife and son were quickly sent on the first available flight to London, UK. Later that morning, a Ba'athist broadcast announced that a new government had been established. The coup was carried out with such ease that there were no deaths.[26]

The coup succeeded because of contributions made by the military; the

Abd ar-Razzaq an-Naif, the deputy head of military intelligence, and Ibrahim Daud, the head of the Republican Guard. Both Naif and Daud knew that the long-term survival of Arif's and Tahir Yahya's government looked bleak, but also knew that the Ba'athists needed them if the coup was to be successful. For his participation in the coup, Naif demanded to be given the post of Prime Minister after the coup as a reward, and a symbol for his strength. Daud was also "rewarded" with a post; he became Minister of Defence. However, not everything was going according to Naif's and Daud's plan; al-Bakr had told the Ba'ath leadership in a secret meeting that the two would be liquidated either "during, or after, the revolution".[27]

al-Bakr, as the leader of the coup's military operation, retained his position as Regional Secretary of the Ba'ath Party, and was elected to the posts of Chairman of the

Revolutionary Command Council, President and Prime Minister. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a power struggle developed between al-Bakr and Naif. In all practicality, Naif should have had the upper hand; he was a respected officer and was supported by the common soldiers. al-Bakr, however, proved to be more cunning, persuasive and organised than Naif, Daud and their supporters.[28] One of al-Bakr's first decisions in office was to appoint over 100 new officers to the Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein worked, in the meantime, to establish the party's security and intelligence organisation to combat its enemies. On 29 July, Daud left for a tour to Jordan to inspect the Iraqi troops located there following the Six-Day War with Israel. The following day, Naif was invited to eat lunch at the Presidential Palace with al-Bakr, during which Saddam burst into the room with three accomplices and threatened Naif with death. Naif responded by crying out; "I have four children". Saddam ordered Naif to leave Iraq immediately if he wanted to live.[29] Naif complied, was exiled to Morocco. An assassination attempt in 1973 was unsuccessful, but he was assassinated in London on the orders of Saddam in 1978. Daud shared a similar fate, and was exiled to Saudi Arabia. The Ba'athists were by no means ensured of victory; if any of Naif's supporters had known of the operation against him, Baghdad could have become the centre, in the words of journalist Con Coughlin, "of an ugly bloodbath".[30]

Al-Bakr's rule and Saddam's rise to power (1968–1979)

Black-and-white photo of middle-aged, mustachioed man in suit
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was de jure leader of Iraq from 1968 to 1979.

al-Bakr strengthened his position in the party with the help of Saddam's newly established party security apparatus and the intelligence services. Most of 1968 was used to repress non-Ba'athist thought and groups; for instance, a campaign against

Zionist plot against the state.[32] The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was skeptical of the new Ba'athist government, as many of its members remembered the anti-communist campaign launched against them by the Ba'athist government of 1963. After taking power, al-Bakr offered the ICP cabinet positions in the new government; the ICP rejected this offer. al-Bakr responded by initiating a systematic campaign against the ICP and communist sympathisers. However, as historian Charles Tripp notes in A History of Iraq, the campaign started "a curious game" whereby the government alternately persecuted and courted the party until 1972–1973, when the ICP was offered, and accepted, membership in the National Progressive Front (NPF). The reason for this "curious game" was the Ba'ath Party's belief that the ICP was more dangerous than it really was. When Aziz al-Haji broke away from the ICP, established the Iraqi Communist Party (Central Command) and initiated a "popular revolutionary war" against the government, it was duly crushed. By April 1969 the "popular revolutionary" uprising had been crushed, and al-Haji recanted his beliefs publicly.[33] Another reason for this anti-communist policy was that many Ba'ath Party members openly sympathised with communists or other socialist forces. However, at this stage, neither al-Bakr nor Saddam had enough support within the party to initiate a policy unpopular within it; at the Seventh Regional Congress of the Ba'ath Party, both al-Bakr and other leading Ba'athists expressed their support for "radical socialism".[34]

During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime on at least two occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired officers, Major General

Shia and the director of internal security, to assassinate al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was also thwarted. Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions, and purges of the military.[35]

By the mid-to-late 1970s, Saddam's power within the Ba'ath Party and the government grew; he became de facto leader of the country, although al-Bakr remained as president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman. In 1977, following a wave of protests by

Adnan Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam's brother-in-law, was appointed defence minister. This appointment underscored the clannish character of the Ba'ath Party and the government. In contrast to Saddam's fortunes, those of al-Bakr's were on the wane. Rumours of al-Bakr's bad health began to circulate in the country. By the end of 1977, al-Bakr had little control over the country through his office as president. The reason Saddam did not become president until 1979 may be explained by Saddam's own insecurity.[36] Before making himself de jure head of state, Saddam initiated an anti-communist campaign; the ICP had no real power, and most of its leading officials had left the country or been imprisoned or executed by the Ba'ath government. The campaign was not centered on the ICP, but also Ba'athists who did not support Saddam. Saddam had initiated a similar campaign in 1978, that time to check where the loyalties of certain left-wingers were: Ba'athism or socialism. Following the campaign, Saddam entered the Arab-world stage for the first time under the banner of Nasserism and Gamal Abdel Nasser by criticising the Camp David Accords between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and the state of Israel.[37]

It was in this situation that Saddam took over the offices of president, Ba'ath Party leader and Revolutionary Command Council chairman.

Early years, Iran–Iraq War and aftermath (1979–1990)

Adnan Khairallah, Iraqi Defense Minister, meeting with Iraqi soldiers during the Iran-Iraq war
.

Once he assumed the presidency, a

civil unrest, and the Iranian leaders had purged thousands of officers and soldiers because of their political views.[44]

It was presumed that the

Iraqi military; the Iranian government saw the invasion as a test of the revolution itself and all its achievements.[45] The military plan proved to be elusive; Iraq believed that the Iranian government would quickly disintegrate during the Iraqi invasion, this did not happen. Saddam, "in a rare moment of frankness, [...] admitted as much".[46] While the war was not going as planned, Iraq reasserted its view of the situation, and claimed that winning the war was a matter of "national honour". The majority of the Ba'athist leadership (and Saddam himself) still believed that Iran would collapse under the weight of Iraqi force.[47]

On 17 July 1981, on the 13th anniversary of a bloodless coup, Ardulfurataini was adopted as the official national anthem of Iraq, with its lyrics mentioned of prominent figures in Iraqi history, including Saladin, Harun al-Rashid and al-Muthanna ibn Haritha, along with the last verse extolled by Ba'athism.

Donald Rumsfeld, as US special envoy to the Middle East, meets Saddam Hussein in December 1983 (video).

In 1982, Iran counter-attacked and was successful in driving the Iraqis back into Iraq. That year alone, an estimated 40,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner. The defeats of 1982 were a blow to Iraq. With the economic situation worsening because of falling oil prices (and the rising military budget), the Iraqi standard of living worsened. The

al-Anfal campaign; chemical weapons were used against civilians.[53] In April 1988, after a series of Iraqi military victories, a ceasefire was agreed between Iraq and Iran; the war is commonly considered status quo ante bellum.[54] In 1989, Saddam Hussein initiated a campaign to strengthen Iraqi nationalism by rebuilding ancient temples and palaces, encouraging all Iraqis
to view their country as the cradle of civilization in justification for war with Iran.

Gulf War, the 1990s, and the Iraq War (1990–2003)

Huge oil fire, with two soldiers in foreground
Retreating Iraqi forces sabotaged Kuwaiti oil wells, causing massive fires across Kuwait's oil fields.

In the aftermath of the

invasion of Kuwait. The invasion led to an international outcry; the United Nations, United States and the United Kingdom condemned the invasion and introduced sanctions against Iraq, and the Soviet Union and several Arab states also condemned the invasion. George H. W. Bush, President of the United States, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restoration of the Kuwaiti government; Saddam responded by making Kuwait an Iraqi province.[56] The Gulf War was initiated by a United States-led coalition, which succeeded in winning the war in less than a year.[57]

On the evening of 24 February, several days before the Gulf War

nationwide uprising against Saddam's rule began in March 1991[59] which was repressed by Saddam's loyalist forces. The Coalition successfully established a no-fly zone to halt the advance of Saddam's forces. Instead of occupying Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish Autonomous Republic was established, with thousands of Iraqi troops stationed at the Iraqi-Kurdish border.[60] The suppression of the rebellion led thousands of people to flee their homes, most to Turkey or Iran. On 2 and 3 April 1991 Turkey and Iran, respectively, raised the issue at the UN Security Council. The Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which stated that Iraq had to allow access for international humanitarian organisations and report openly about government repression.[61]

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Iraq became a target by a series of U.S.

Operation Desert Fox
in 1998.

In 1997, Iraq prohibited all weapons inspectors of UNSCOM from sites declared to be sovereign palaces, which were compounds capable of storing chemical weapons.

Iraq experienced another

Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr by Iraqi security forces.[62]

In the aftermath of the

Politics

Political system

Black-and-white photo of two men in suits, shaking hands
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (left), the Regional Secretary of the Iraqi Ba'ath, shaking hands with Michel Aflaq, principal founder of Ba'athist thought, in 1968.

The 1970 Iraqi Constitution stated that Iraq was in a transitional phase of development; in

National Assembly existed, which was (in theory) democratically elected by the Iraqi people; the problem was that the RCC had the authority to decide how much (or little) power the National Assembly should have.[66]

The constitution of 1970 proclaimed Ba'athist Iraq as "a sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to the establishment of a Ba'athist

Ba'ath Party

Saddam Hussein in uniform and man in suit, seated at opposite ends of a sofa and talking
Saddam Hussein (right) talking with founder of Ba'athism and Ba'ath Party leader Michel Aflaq in 1988.
National leaders Regional leaders
Name Term Name Term
Michel Aflaq 1968–1989 Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr 1966–1979
Saddam Hussein 1992–2003 Saddam Hussein 1979–2003

Iraq, under the rule of the Iraqi-led

Syrian-led branch), the National Command never controlled the whole Ba'ath movement; there was a National Command headquartered in Syria, which commanded another Ba'ath movement. Another problem was the fact that the National Commands in Iraq and Syria were under the control of the country's respective regional commands.[70]

National Progressive Front

The National Progressive Front (NPF) was a popular front led by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party, established on 17 July 1973 (the fifth anniversary of the 17 July Revolution). The NPF charter was signed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (representing the Ba'ath Party) and Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, or ICP). In Al-Thawrah, a Ba'athist newspaper, the charter was hailed as a success for the revolution.[71] The ICP was the most prominent party to join; however, it left the NPF in March 1979. While officially an independent organisation (and the only non-Ba'athist political forum), the NPF's leadership consisted entirely of Ba'athist members or Ba'athist loyalists. The organisation's purpose was to give the Ba'athist regime a semblance of popular support.[72] Throughout the NPF's existence, Naim Haddad was its general secretary.[73]

Opposition

Group of about 20 Iraqi soldiers, posing with guns
Kurdish peshmerga (opposition forces) in northern Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War.

The

1991 uprising.[74] Another problem was that the Iraqi opposition had frequent problems with internal strife; for instance, the ICP was forced to hold a party congress in 1985 to stabilise the party. A more immediate problem was the strength of Iraq's secret services, renowned in the Arab world as the most efficient.[75]

In contrast to the secular opposition, the religious opposition was better organised and stronger. Several religious opposition groups could appeal to Iraqis, because of the secular nature of the Ba'athist government. During the Iran–Iraq War the government allowed some degree of religious freedom, but only to win support from the populace.[76]

State ideology

Party ideology

The Ba'ath Party was based on the ideology of

economic equality.[82]

Saddamism

Saddamism (Saddamiyya) is a political ideology based on the politics related to (and pursued by) Saddam Hussein.[83] It has also been referred to by Iraqi politicians as Saddamist Ba'athism (Al-Ba'athiyya Al-Saddamiyya).[84] It is officially described as a distinct variation of Ba'athism.[83] It espouses Iraqi nationalism and an Iraq-centred Arab world that calls upon Arab countries to adopt Saddamist Iraqi political discourse, and reject "the Nasserite discourse" which it claims collapsed after 1967.[83] It is militarist, viewing political disputes and conflict from a military standpoint as "battles" requiring "fighting", "mobilization", "battlefields", "bastions" and "trenches".[85] Saddamism was officially supported by Saddam Hussein's government and promoted by the Iraqi daily newspaper Babil, which was owned by Saddam's son Uday Hussein.[83]

Saddam Hussein and Michel Aflaq seated, talking. Both wear suits.
Saddam Hussein (left) talking with Michel Aflaq in 1979.

Saddam Hussein and his ideologists sought to fuse a connection between the ancient Babylonian and Assyrian civilizations in Iraq to Arab nationalism by claiming that the Babylonians and ancient Assyrians are the ancestors of the Arabs. Thus, Saddam Hussein and his supporters claim that there is no conflict between Mesopotamian heritage and Arab nationalism.[86]

Saddam Hussein based his political views and ideology upon the views of Aflaq, Ba'athism's key founder. Saddam was also an avid reader of topics on moral and material forces in

class division was more along national lines (between Arabs and non-Arabs) than within the Arab community.[88] However, he spoke fondly of Vladimir Lenin and commended Lenin for giving Russian Marxism a uniquely Russian specificity which Marx alone was incapable of doing. He also expressed admiration for other communist leaders (such as Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh and Josip Broz Tito) for their spirit of asserting national independence, rather than for their communism.[89]

The Return to Faith Campaign

In 1993, the Iraqi regime embarked on the Return to Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyyah), under the supervision of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The ultimate aim of this new policy was to encourage popular devotion to Islam within Iraqi society.[90]

Up until the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Iraqi regime had espoused the secular ideology of Ba'athism. This started to change when Saddam, who wished to bolster the Iraqi government's Islamic credentials, implemented a variety of reforms. The Iraqi flag had the

takbīr added on to it. The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs appointed clergy, approved the building and repair of mosques and approved the publication of Islamic literature. The Faith Campaign allowed Sunni mosques more freedom in practicing religious ceremonies and rites, which reduced substantially the opposition to the regime among Sunni Islamists.[90]

Saddam coordinated the media and educational system to put heavy emphasis on Islamic identity. Religious academic institutions were opening up across the country, and Qu'ranic and Islamic studies were introduced into the curriculum at all school levels. A religious radio station, al-Qu'ran al-Karim Radio was set up to expand and promote Islam in Iraqi life. Aspects of the

Shari'ah were adopted into the Iraqi judicial system. Judges were required to study courses on Islamic jurisprudence. The selling and consumption of alcohol was curtailed by the state. Establishments which involved the vices of gambling or alcohol were restricted or closed.[91] Prostitution was deemed illegal and punishable by death. The Fedayeen Saddam, the paramilitary force loyal to the regime were well known for beheading suspected prostitutes. Thieves were punished with amputation.[92] Saddam Hussein introduced in a new penal code article 111, exempting from punishment a man who kills a woman in defense of the honour of his family.[93]

This new influx of religious involvement into the government had sectarian undertones. The government's attempt to cloak itself in Islamic conservatism saw it launch verbal attacks on Iran, which were perceived by Shia Iraqis as being veiled attacks on their community, due to the shared faith between them and Iran. Sunni rhetoric emitting from the Iraqi government sought to discredit Iran, with scathing criticism stating that they were subscribing to a " foreign and heretical form of religion". While daily newspaper Babil, owned by Saddam's eldest son

Foreign policy

Relations with the Soviet Union

Two men signing an agreement, with other men standing behind them
Alexei Kosygin (left) and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr signing the Iraqi–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1972.

The Ba'ath Party policy towards the

Council of Ministers, visited Iraq and met with high-ranking officials. Kosygin's visit forced the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) to improve its relations with the Ba'ath Party; two ICP members were given cabinet positions and repression of the ICP ended.[98] Relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union were at its zenith during al-Bakr's rule.[99] Iraq became a member of the Comecon (the Eastern Bloc trading organisation) as an observer in 1975.[100]

During the early years of al-Bakr's rule, the Soviet Union became a strategic ally. However, with the increase in oil revenues relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union weakened. The Iraqi regime was given more freedom of choice, and lost its dependence on Soviet investments. The Soviet Union, during this period, retained its role as Iraq's largest arms supplier. With Iraq's foreign-policy priorities changing, repression against the ICP was reintroduced. The Soviet Union tried to act as a mediator between the two parties, but Soviet involvement was considered by the Ba'athist government as Soviet interference in Iraq's internal affairs.

shipments of modern arms to Iraq during its war with Iran. This proved to be wrong, and Saddam openly complained that the Treaty of Friendship signed with the Soviet Union "has not worked."[104] During the rule of Konstantin Chernenko, the Soviet Union's relations with Iran further deteriorated as the Soviet leadership began to criticise Islamic fundamentalism.[105] In 1986, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union officially changed its position from neutral to that of "active containment" of Iran. This policy lasted until the war with Iran ended in 1988.[106] During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the following Gulf War, the Soviet Union was officially neutral.[107] Shortly after, on 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved.[108]

Relations with the United States

Throughout the

increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a U.S. bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.[113] Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism. ... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."[114][115]

Economy

Planning system

Since it did not have an economic policy of its own, the Ba'ath Party, when it took power in 1968, allowed the Five-Year Plan set up by the previous regime in 1965 to continue until its end date in 1969.[116] The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decided by the mid-1970s to alter the planning system; instead of creating stable Five-Year Plans (as had been done earlier), an annual investment plan was to be created. Every year, the RCC convened to create an investment for the year to come; for example, there were separate investment plans for 1976 and 1977. Another change is that the plan's final draft was not accepted by the highest economic elite but by the RCC, the political elite.[117] In 1976 (as a break with the new trend) the RCC introduced the National Development Plan, which was set to last from 1976 to 1980. Unlike the previous plans, the sectoral investment-allocation figures were not made public.[118]

Economic growth

A view of modern Baghdad with the Tigris in the foreground. The skyscraper in the center of the Baghdad telecommunications building

The

Council of Ministers) and the appointment of two cabinet ministers from the Iraqi Communist Party.[97]

After the nationalisation of the IPC, Iraq's oil revenue increased from 219 million

Iranian revolution, Iraq became the second-largest oil exporter in the world. The increase in oil exports rejuvenated the country's economy; nearly all economic indices increased to unprecedented levels. From 1970 to 1980, Iraq's economy grew by 11.7 percent. During the Iran–Iraq War Iraq's oil-exporting capabilities decreased, and the price for oil decreased simultaneously. The growth of the 1970s was not sustainable. The economy was dependent on high oil prices and Iraq's oil-exporting capabilities; once oil was out of the picture, Iraq's growth would decrease dramatically (even more so during a war).[120]

The National Development Plan (1976–1980) ended with an 11-percent increase in

Demise of development

At the beginning of the war the Iraqi government had a monetary reserve of $35 billion, and the annual growth rate was 27.9 percent. During the early war years, ambitious development plans were followed; because of high military spending (approaching 50 percent of

Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq Aziz acknowledged that the situation had become so bad that the Iraqi government could not afford to pay for the food it had imported. Former foreign creditors were reluctant to loan money to Iraq because of the economy's near-bankruptcy.[123]

Graph of Iraqi GNP, showing highest GNP in 1980
GNP per capita in Iraq from 1950 to 2008.

When the war started, Saddam was widely quoted as saying that Iraq faced the war with a two-year supply "of all key commodities."; this proved true. Beginning in October 1982, Iraq's foreign assets began to dwindle as the government failed to repay its loans. At the end of the war, Iraq's monetary reserve had been depleted and international oil prices were not as stable (high) as they had been during the 1970s.[124] The economy was still healthy in late 1982, due to government expenditure on large development programmes.[125] Before the war, Iraq's workforce stood at five million. During the war, one million were mobilised in the war against Iran. Of the million sent to war, 100,000 died. The labour shortage led to stagnation; to fill the gap, an increasing number of women were hired.[126] There was a shift in industrial production during the war from consumer to military goods. Social programmes that had been established in the previous decade began to deteriorate, and the average standard of living decreased.[127]

During the mid-to-late 1980s, international oil prices collapsed. The Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established a quota system in which the international oil price (for its members) was set at US$18 per barrel. This system did not work, as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not follow OPEC policy and continued to flood the market with their oil. The result was that international oil prices were still at the 1970s level. In October 1988, because of Kuwait and the UAE, international oil prices had fallen to US$12 per barrel.[128] The policy which the UAE (and especially Kuwait) followed hampered Iraq's economic growth. In the Iran–Iraq War's aftermath, Iraq had grown more dependent on oil prices.[129] The result of Kuwait and the UAE's oil policies could be felt in 1990, when international oil prices decreased to US$13.67 per barrel. This time, the sudden fall in oil prices triggered reactions in Iraq; in Al-Thawra, the Ba'ath Party newspaper, Foreign Minister Aziz criticised Kuwait and the UAE's oil policies.[130] Because of the sudden slump, Saddam claimed at an Arab League conference that international oil prices could increase to US$25 per barrel without hurting exports. Saddam also claimed that the abrupt fall in oil prices decreased Iraq's oil revenue by one billion dollars. Iraq was not the only member criticising Kuwait and the UAE; several other members also criticised their oil-production policy.[129] Kuwait would not budge, continuing its oil-production strategy even when threatened by Iraq. This, coupled with foreign loans Iraq owed to Kuwait, was the main reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[131]

UN sanctions

Following Iraq's defeat in the

sanctions against Iraq. At the beginning, most American observers believed the sanctions would lead to Saddam's downfall. U.S. President George H. W. Bush said, "Economic sanctions in this instance if fully enforced can be very, very effective, [...] There are some indications that that he's [Saddam] already beginning to feel the pinch and nobody can stand up forever to total economic deprivation."[132] In theory (and practice), Iraq was very vulnerable to sanctions during this time. Thirty percent of its GNP before the Gulf War was used to import food, and 95 percent of Iraq's export earnings came from oil; oil production was 40 percent of GNP. The country was also reliant on foreign trade (35–50 percent of GNP for exported and imported goods). Iraq was also an easy country to blockade economically; its oil exports could be blockaded by closing its pipelines (which ran through Turkey, Jordan and Syria). While sanctions were successful from an economic point of view, politically they failed; Saddam would rule Iraq until 2003.[133]

Throughout the Ba'ath Party's rule over Iraq, the agricultural sector had been under-performing. Those in the United States who supported sanctions believed that low agricultural production in Iraq (coupled with sanctions) would lead to "a hungry population", and "a hungry population was an unruly one".[134] The Iraqi government, which understood the serious effects the sanctions could have on Iraq, were able to increase agricultural output by 24 percent from 1990 to 1991. During the sanction years, the agricultural sector witnessed "a boom of unprecedented proportions". The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) introduced several decrees during this period to increase agricultural performance. These decrees may be separated into three categories:

  • They introduced severe penalties on farmers (or landowners) unable to produce at full capacity on their land.
  • Government programmes made it cheaper (and therefore more profitable for farmers and landowners) to produce.
  • Programmes were initiated to increase the amount of arable land.[135]

The RCC introduced Decree No. 367 in 1990, which stated that all lands which were not under production by their owners would be taken over by the state; if the owner could not use all the land he owned, he would lose it. However, the RCC's policy was not "all stick and no carrot". The government made it easier for farmers and landowners to receive credit. On 30 September 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture announced that it would increase loans to farmers by 100 percent, and would subsidise machinery and tools. In October 1990, the RCC stated it was planning to utilize and exploit "every inch of Iraqi arable land". While official statistics cannot be trusted entirely, they showed massive growth in arable land: from 16,446 donums in 1980 to 45,046 in 1990.[136] The increase in agricultural output does not mean that hunger was not widespread; prices of foodstuffs increased dramatically during this period. However, overall the sanctions failed and (indirectly) led to an unprecedented improvement in agriculture.[137]

While the agricultural sector improved, most other economic indicators deteriorated. Transport (which had been bombed during the Gulf War) further deteriorated due to the government's neglect. The economy suffered from chronic inflation and currency depreciation; the sanctions exacerbated the structural problems in Iraq's economic system. Iraq was, on balance, a planned economy with market-economy characteristics.[138]

Modest growth

By the late 1990s, the Iraqi economy showed signs of modest growth. These would continue until 2003 when the government was toppled. The gross domestic product increased from US$10.8 billion in 1996 to US$30.8 billion in 2000. The major factor in this growth was the UN-initiated Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP). Saddam was originally opposed to the OFFP. The OFFP led to the inflow of hard currency, which helped reduce the country's chronic inflation and reopened old trade routes with foreign countries.[138] It was around this time that many countries started to ignore the UN sanctions.[139] While internal and external trade was revitalised, this did not lead to a significant increase in the standard of living for the majority of the population; on the contrary, the government tried to prevent benefits from flowing to Shi'ite areas to persuade more countries to oppose the sanctions. In 2000, the national income per capita was estimated to be US$1,000—less than half of what it had been in 1990.[140]

Military

Expenditure

The Ba'ath regime, like its predecessors, came to power by military force. From

national incomes of Jordan and Yemen combined.[142] The military buildup was made possible because of Iraq's oil production and the high international price for oil. Per capita military spending in 1981 was 370 percent higher than that for education. During the Iran–Iraq War military expenditures increased dramatically (while economic growth was shrinking) and the number of people employed in the military increased fivefold, to one million.[143]

Size

Six uniformed soldiers waving from an armoured vehicle on a highway
28 February 2003: Iraqi soldiers ride an MT-LB armored vehicle on an Iraqi highway, one month before the start of the Iraq War.

In 1967, the Iraqi army consisted of 50,000 men on two-year service; the Iraqi Air Force had 170 aircraft. In 1980, these numbers had increased to a standing army of 200,000, 250,000 reserves and 250,000 paramilitary troops in the Ba'ath Party-led Popular Army. The army had 2,500 tanks, 335 combat aircraft and 40 combat helicopters. In 1988, at the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq fielded the fourth largest army in the world; the army consisted of 955,000 standing soldiers and 650,000 paramilitary forces in the Popular Army. The army could field 4,500 tanks, 484 combat aircraft and 232 combat helicopters.[144] According to Michael Knights, the Iraqi army fielded one million men and 850,000 reservists; there were 53 divisions, 20 special-forces brigades, and several regional militias. The Iraqi military was able to field 5,500 tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, the country had a strong air defence and could employ 700 combat aircraft and helicopters.[145] By 1990 (according to Keith Shimko) the Iraqi army fielded nearly one million men, 5,700 tanks, 3,700 artillery pieces and 950 combat aircraft. During the Gulf War the most optimistic military analysis believed that, during an all-out war with the Iraqi military, the United States military would suffer between 17,000 and 30,000 casualties.[146] In the aftermath of the Gulf War the size of the Iraqi military was reduced to an estimated 350,000 standing troops; it could deploy 2,300 main battle tanks, had about 260 combat aircraft and could deploy up to 120 combat helicopters.[144] In 2002, one year before the 2003 invasion, the Iraqi army could deploy 375,000 men. According to the United States Central Command, Iraq's army (standing and reserves) stood at 700,000 men.[147]

Culture

Black-and-white photo of Saddam Hussein, in a suit, with a group of women students
Saddam Hussein and female students. Ba'athism promoted greater participation of women in Iraqi society.

By the end of the 1970s women in Iraq formed 46 per cent of the teachers, 29 per cent of the doctors, 46 per cent of the dentists, 70 per cent of the pharmacists, 15 percent of the accountants, 14 percent of the factory workers and 16 percent of the civil servants.[148][149]

The Ba'athist era was a period of

Kurds, who sought independence for their region; Sunnis with an Islamist ideology, and non-Ba'athists (such as the Iraqi communists who were heavily suppressed in 1978). The Iraqi government promoted women's rights to a degree, allowing them education and service in the armed forces, but—despite the Ba'ath's avowed "radicalism"—its changes to family law were "considerably less radical than ... the Shah's family reforms, to say nothing of Atatürk's radical break with Islamic family law in 1926."[150] The government sought restoration of Iraqi cultural heritage, such as rebuilding replicas of parts of the ancient city of Babylon. Under Saddam Hussein, the glorification of Saddam and the Ba'athist government was common in state-sponsored artwork. The Ba'ath Party dominated the political life of the country, although a National Progressive Front
was proclaimed in 1974 to allow for the (mostly nominal) participation of non-Ba'athist figures and parties in Iraqi politics.

During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein sought to gain support from the Muslim religious community for the government, adding the Takbir to the flag, coat of arms and motto of Iraq.

Space program

Images of Iraqs Al Abid Launch Vehicle. The Iraqi's intended to domestically produce an Orbital Launch System
Image of Iraq's Al Abid launch vehicle. The Iraqi's attempt to domestically produce an orbital launch system.

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq maintained a domestic

space program
. Ba'athist Iraq began its space efforts in earnest around 1988. The program operated under several names, including the declared name of Al Abid (العابد) as well as alternate names such as Bird (الطائر) and Comet. Iraq began development of its indigenous space program after an effort to cooperate with another unnamed country failed. However, according to UNMOVIC, at least one other country provided assistance, and one or two additional countries were also sought for help, but did not provide it.

Flags and coats of arms

  • Flag (1963–1991)
    Flag (1963–1991)
  • Flag (1991–2004)[151][152]
    Flag (1991–2004)[151][152]
  • Coat of arms (1965–1991)
    Coat of arms (1965–1991)
  • Coat of arms (1991–2004)
    Coat of arms (1991–2004)

See also

References

Notes

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  55. .
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  68. ^ Metz 2004, pp. 166–167.
  69. ^ Metz 2004, p. 191.
  70. ^ Metz 2004, p. 192.
  71. .
  72. ^ Metz 2004, p. 164.
  73. .
  74. .
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  76. .
  77. ^ Bengio 1998, p. 33.
  78. ^ Bengio 1998, pp. 34–35.
  79. ^ Bengio 1998, pp. 35–36.
  80. ^ Bengio 1998, p. 44.
  81. ^ Bengio 1998, pp. 38–40.
  82. ^ Bengio 1998, pp. 40–41.
  83. ^ a b c d Bengio 1998, p. 208
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  123. .
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  129. ^ a b Alnasrawi 1994, p. 116
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  134. ^ Selden 1999, p. 89.
  135. ^ Selden 1999, p. 90.
  136. ^ Selden 1999, p. 91.
  137. ^ Selden 1999, pp. 93–94.
  138. ^ .
  139. .
  140. .
  141. .
  142. .
  143. .
  144. ^
    ISBN 978-0-631-16848-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link
    )
  145. ISBN 978-1-59114-444-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link
    )
  146. ISBN 978-0-521-12884-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link
    )
  147. ISBN 978-0-89206-416-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link
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Bibliography

Further reading