Battle of Bardia
Battle of Bardia | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of Operation Compass | |||||||
Australian troops enter Bardia, 4 January 1941 | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Italy | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Iven Mackay | Annibale Bergonzoli | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
16,000[1] | 45,000[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
130 killed 326 wounded[3] |
1,703 killed 3,740 wounded 36,000 captured[4] 13 medium tanks 117 tankettes 708 vehicles 400+ artillery guns[5] |
The Battle of Bardia was fought between 3 and 5 January 1941, as part of
In the second phase of the operation, the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade exploited the breach made in the perimeter and pressed south as far as a secondary line of defences known as the Switch Line. On the second day, the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade captured the township of Bardia, cutting the fortress in two. Thousands more prisoners were taken and the Italian garrison now held out only in the northern and southernmost parts of the fortress. On the third day, the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade advanced south from Bardia, supported by artillery and the six operational Matilda tanks. Its advance allowed the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade to make progress as well and the two brigades reduced the southern sector of the fortress. The Italian garrisons in the north surrendered to the 16th Australia Infantry Brigade and the Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division outside the fortress. In all, some 36,000 Italian prisoners were taken.
The victory at Bardia enabled the Allied forces to continue the advance into Libya and capture almost all of Cyrenaica, which led to Operation Sonnenblume, German intervention in the fighting in North Africa, changing the nature of the war in the theatre.
Background
Italian invasion of Egypt
Italy declared war on the United Kingdom on 10 June 1940.
Italy's position in the centre of the Mediterranean made it unacceptably hazardous to send ships from Britain to Egypt via that route, so British reinforcements and supplies for the area had to travel around the
On 9 December 1940 the
Geography
Unlike the Great Sand Sea, the coastal portion of the Libyan Desert is stony rather than sandy, but it is no less arid, and supports little vegetation. Close to the coast, the ground was broken by wadis. Military vehicles could traverse the stony desert with little difficulty, although the heat, dust and wind caused their rapid deterioration. Because it was so thinly populated, bombs and shells could be used with minimal risk of civilian casualties. Winter nights could be bitterly cold, yet the days could still be uncomfortably hot. There was almost no food or water, and little shelter from the cold, the heat or the wind. The desert was, however, relatively free from disease.[14]
Planning and preparation
Italian
After the disaster at Sidi Barrani and the withdrawal from Egypt,
These divisions guarded an 18-mile (29 km) perimeter which had an almost continuous antitank ditch, extensive
The defence was supported by a strong artillery component that included forty-one
As a "mobile reserve" there were thirteen
Bergonzoli knew that if Bardia and Tobruk held out, a British advance further into Libya eventually must falter under the logistical difficulties of maintaining a desert force using an extended overland supply line.
Allied
The 6th Australian Division had been formed in September 1939 as part of the
Despite the rivalry between regular and reserve officers, the 6th Australian Division staff was an effective organisation. Brigadier John Harding, the chief of staff of XIII Corps, as the Western Desert Force was renamed on 1 January 1941, had been a student at Staff College, Camberley along with Mackay's chief of staff, Colonel Frank Berryman, at a time when O'Connor had been an instructor there.[35][37] Harding later considered the 6th Australian Division staff "as good as any that I came across in that war, and highly efficient."[38] Australian doctrine emphasised the importance of initiative in its junior leaders and small units were trained in aggressive patrolling, particularly at night.[39]
As it moved into position around Bardia in December 1940, the 6th Australian Division was still experiencing shortages. It had only two of its three artillery regiments and only the 2/1st Field Regiment was equipped with the new 25-pounders, which it had received only that month. The 2/2nd Field Regiment was still equipped with twelve
To make up for this, O'Connor augmented Brigadier
Italian gun positions were located using
At a meeting with Mackay on Christmas Eve, 1940, O'Connor visited Mackay at divisional headquarters and directed him to prepare an attack on Bardia. O'Connor recommended that this be built around the 23 Matilda tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Jerram) that remained in working order. The attack was to be made with only two brigades, leaving the third for a subsequent advance on Tobruk. Mackay did not share O'Connor's optimism about the prospect of an easy victory and proceeded on the assumption that Bardia would be resolutely held, requiring a well-planned attack similar to that required to breach the
Much depended on the Western Desert Force moving fuel, water and supplies forward. The 6th Australian Division Assistant Adjutant General and Quartermaster General (AA&QMG), Colonel George Alan Vasey said "This is a Q war".[49] Captured Italian vehicles and fuel were used to haul supplies where possible. On 12 December, a Reserve Mechanical Transport company took over 80 Italian 5- and 6-ton diesel trucks that had been captured at Sidi Barrani. They were joined on 15 December by fifty 7½-ton trucks that arrived from Palestine. The British were unfamiliar with diesel engines and a lack of spare parts, indifferent maintenance and hard use under desert conditions soon took their toll, leading to many breakdowns. By the end of December the Western Desert Force vehicle fleet was only 40 per cent of its establishment strength.[50]
Supplies were stocked at 8 Field Supply Depot at Sallum, where a jetty was constructed by the Royal Engineers.[51] Troops of the 16th Infantry Brigade began working at the port on 18 December. They were soon joined by two pioneer companies of the Cyprus Regiment and a pioneer detachment from the Palestine Regiment. Stores were hauled to 8 Field Supply Depot by the New Zealand 4th Mechanical Transport Company.[46]
The port was subject to long range shelling by medium guns in Bardia, known to the Australians as "Bardia Bill" and to Italian air attacks.
On 23 December the water carrier
Battle
A series of air raids were mounted against Bardia in December, in the hope of persuading the garrison to withdraw. Once it became clear that the Italians intended to stand and fight, bombing priorities shifted to the Italian airbases around Tobruk, Derna and Benina.[44] Air raids on Bardia resumed in the lead-up to the ground assault, with 100 bombing sorties flown against Bardia between 31 December 1940 and 2 January 1941, climaxing with a particularly heavy raid by Vickers Wellington bombers of No. 70 Squadron RAF and Bristol Bombay bombers of No. 216 Squadron RAF on the night of 2/3 January 1941.[54] Lysanders of No. 208 Squadron RAF directed the artillery fire. Fighters from No. 33 Squadron RAF, No. 73 Squadron RAF and No. 274 Squadron RAF patrolled between Bardia and Tobruk.[55]
A naval bombardment was carried out on the morning of 3 January by the
Break in
The assault troops rose early on 3 January 1941, ate a meal and drank a tot of
The infantry scrambled to their feet and rushed forward while the sappers hurried to break down the sides of the antitank ditch with picks and shovels.[58] They advanced on a series of posts held by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Italian 115th Infantry Regiment.[59] Posts 49 and 47 were rapidly overrun, as was Post 46 in the second line beyond. Within half an hour Post 48 had also fallen and another company had taken Posts 45 and 44. The two remaining companies now advanced beyond these positions towards a low stone wall as artillery fire began to fall along the broken wire. The Italians fought from behind the wall until the Australians were inside it, attacking with hand grenades and bayonets. The two companies succeeded in taking 400 prisoners.[58] The 2/2nd Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel F. O. Chilton) found that it was best to keep skirmishing forward throughout this advance, because going to ground for any length of time meant sitting in the middle of the enemy artillery concentrations that inflicted further casualties. The Australian troops made good progress, six tank crossings were readied and mines between them and the wire had been detected. Five minutes later, the 23 Matildas of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment advanced, accompanied by the 2/2nd Infantry Battalion. Passing through the gaps, they swung right along the double line of posts.[60]
At 0750 the 2/3rd Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel V. T. England), accompanied by the Bren gun carriers of A Squadron, 2/6th Cavalry Regiment (Major Denzil MacArthur-Onslow) moved off for Bardia. Major J. N. Abbot's company advanced to the Italian posts, and attacked a group of sangers. The Italian defenders were cleared with grenades. By 0920 all companies were on their objectives and they had linked with 2/1st Infantry Battalion. However, the Bren gun carriers encountered problems as they moved forward during the initial attack. One was hit and destroyed in the advance and another along the Wadi Ghereidia.[61]
The 2/3rd Infantry Battalion was now assailed by half a dozen Italian M13/40 tanks who freed a group of 500 Italian prisoners. The tanks continued to rumble to the south while the British crews of the Matildas "enjoying a brew, dismissed reports of them as an Antipodean exaggeration".
Follow up
The artillery barrage came down at 1125, and five minutes later the advance began. The sun had now risen, and
Meanwhile, Captain D. I. A. Green's B Company of the 2/7th Infantry Battalion had captured Posts 26, 27 and 24. After Post 24 had been taken, two Matildas arrived and helped to take Post 22. As the prisoners were rounded up, one shot Green dead, then threw down his rifle and climbed out of the pit smiling broadly. He was immediately thrown back and a
Upon hearing of the losses to the 2/5th Infantry Battalion, Brigade Major G. H. Brock sent Captain J. R. Savige's A Company of the 2/7th Infantry Battalion to take "The Triangle". Savige gathered his platoons and, with fire support from machine guns, attacked the objective, 3,000 yards (2,700 m) away. The company captured eight field guns, many machine-guns and nearly 200 prisoners on the way, but casualties and the need to detach soldiers as prisoner escorts left him with only 45 men at the end of the day.[68]
Lieutenant Colonel A. H. L. Godfrey's 2/6th Infantry Battalion was supposed to "stage a demonstration against the south west corner of the perimeter",[69] held by the 1st Battalion, Italian 158th Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, Italian 157th Infantry Regiment.[59] Instead, in what military historians consider one of the most "disastrous example of a CO seeking to make his mark",[70] Godfrey decided instead to launch an attack, in defiance of the clear instructions he had received, and against all basic military logic and common sense.[71] Although poorly planned and executed,[72] Godfrey's attack managed to capture Post 7 and part of Post 9, but Post 11 resisted stubbornly.[73]
That evening, Brigadier Savige came forward to the 2/5th Infantry Battalion's position to determine the situation, which he accurately evaluated as "extremely confused; the attack was stagnant."
Meanwhile, Captain G. H. Halliday's D Company moved southwards against Post 19. He drew the defenders' attention with a demonstration by one platoon in front of the post while the rest of the company moved around the post and attacked silently from the rear. This maneuver took the defenders by surprise and D Company captured the post—and 73 prisoners—at 0230. Halliday repeated this tactic against Post 14, which was taken at 0400 with 64 prisoners. Capturing the two posts cost one Australian killed and seven wounded. A third attempt against Post 17 failed: the previous attacks had alerted the post and D Company came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire. A furious battle raged until the post fell shortly before dawn. Another 103 Italians were captured at a cost of two Australians killed and nine wounded. Between casualties and men detached as prisoner escorts, D Company strength fell to 46 men, and Halliday elected to halt for the night.[76]
Although the Australian progress had been slower than that achieved during the break-in phase, the 17th Infantry Brigade had achieved remarkable results. Another ten posts, representing 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) of perimeter had been captured, the Switch Line had been breached, and thousands of Italian defenders had been captured. For the Italians, halting the Australian advance would be an immensely difficult task.[77]
Bardia falls
On the afternoon of 3 January, Berryman met with Allen, Jerram and Frowen at Allen's headquarters at Post 40 to discuss plans for the next day. It was agreed that Allen would advance on Bardia and cut the fortress in two, supported by Frowen's guns, every available tank, MacArthur-Onslow's Bren gun carriers and the 2/8th Infantry Battalion, which Mackay had recently allocated from reserve. Allen gave orders accordingly. During the afternoon the 6th Cavalry Regiment was pulled back to become the brigade reserve and the 2/5th Infantry Battalion relieved the 2/2nd to free it to advance the next day. That evening, Berryman came to the conclusion that unless the Italian defence collapsed soon, the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades would become incapable of further effort and Brigadier Horace Robertson's 19th Infantry Brigade would be required. Mackay was more sanguine about the situation, and reminded Berryman that his orders had been to capture Bardia with only two brigades. While they were discussing the matter, O'Connor and Harding arrived at 6th Division headquarters, and O'Connor readily agreed to the change of plan.[78]
The 2/1st Infantry Battalion began its advance on schedule at 0900, but the lead platoon came under heavy machine gun fire from Post 54, and Italian artillery knocked out the supporting mortars. The 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery engaged the Italian guns and the platoon withdrew. Colonel Eather then organised a formal attack on Post 54 for 1330, following a bombardment of the post by artillery and mortars.[79] The Italian guns were silenced when an Australian shell detonated a nearby ammunition dump. The Australians then captured the post. About a third of its defenders had been killed in the fighting. The remaining 66 surrendered.[80] This prompted a general collapse of the Italian position in the north. Posts 56 and 61 surrendered without a fight and white flags were raised over Posts 58, 60, 63 and 65, and the gun positions near Post 58.[79] By nightfall, Eather's men had advanced as far as Post 69 and only the fourteen northernmost posts still held out in the Gerfan sector.[80]
Colonel England's 2/3rd Infantry Battalion was supported by the guns of the 104th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery and a troop of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. The tanks were late in arriving, and England postponed his attack to 1030. The battalion came under artillery fire, mostly from a battery north of Bardia that was then engaged and silenced by the 104th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery. The advance resumed, only to come under machine gun and artillery fire from Wadi el Gerfan.
The brigade major, Major I. R. Campbell, ordered MacArthur-Onslow, whose carriers were screening England's advance, to seize Hebs el Harram, the high ground overlooking the road to the township of Bardia. MacArthur-Onslow's carriers discovered an Italian hospital with 500 patients, including several Australians, and 3,000 unwounded Italians. Leaving a small party at the hospital under Corporal M. H. Vause, who could speak some Italian, MacArthur-Onslow pressed on with two carriers to the Hebs el Harram, where they took over 1,000 prisoners. The tanks and the remainder of A Squadron continued along the road to Bardia under intermittent artillery fire, followed by C Company of the 2/3rd Infantry Battalion. The column entered the town at 1600, its tanks firing the occasional shot.[83]
The 2/2nd Infantry Battalion, supported by the three Matilda tanks and the guns of the 7th Medium Regiment, advanced down the Wadi Scemmas towards an Italian fort on the southern headland of Bardia. After some hours of climbing, the 2/2nd reached the headland and attacked the fort at 1645. Inside the fort were two 6 inch guns, two field guns and five other guns of the fort. Fortunately, the 6 inch guns were for coastal defence and were unable to fire inland. One of the tanks made straight for the gate of the fort. The Italians opened the gate, and the tanks moved inside, taking the garrison of 300 prisoners. D Company then followed a goat track that led to lower Bardia. Thousands of prisoners were taken, most from service units. Two carriers of the 2/5th Infantry Battalion patrolling near the coast captured 1,500 prisoners. Captain N. A. Vickery, a forward observer from the 2/1st Field Regiment, attacked an Italian battery in his Bren gun carrier and captured 1,000 prisoners.[84]
By the end of the second day, tens of thousands of defenders had been killed or captured. The remaining garrisons in the Gerfan and Ponticelli sectors were completely isolated. The logistical and administrative units were being overrun.
Final drive
On the morning of 5 January, the 19th Infantry Brigade launched its attack on the Meriega sector, starting from the Bardia road and following a
Meanwhile, the Italian garrisons in the north were surrendering to the 16th Infantry Brigade and the Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division outside the fortress;[5] the 2/8th Infantry Battalion had taken the area above Wadi Meriega; and the 2/7th Infantry Battalion had captured Posts 10, 12 and 15. Colonel Godfrey was astonished to discover that the 2/11th Infantry Battalion had captured Post 8. The carrier platoon of the 2/6th Infantry Battalion attacked and captured Post 13 while the 2/11th captured Post 6. The only post still holding out was now Post 11. The 2/6th Infantry Battalion renewed its attack, with the infantry attacking from the front and its carriers attacking from the rear. They were joined by Matildas from the vicinity of Post 6. At this point the Italian post commander, who had been wounded in the battle, lowered his flag and raised a white one. Some 350 Italian soldiers surrendered at Post 11. Inside, the Australians found two field guns, 6 antitank guns, 12 medium machine guns, 27 light machine guns, and two 3 inch mortars. Godfrey sought out the Italian post commander—who wore a British Military Cross earned in the First World War—and shook his hand.[90] "On a battlefield where Italian troops won little honour", Gavin Long later wrote, "the last to give in belonged to a garrison whose resolute fight would have done credit to any army."[91]
Aftermath
Analysis
The victory at Bardia enabled the Allied forces to continue their advance into Libya and capture almost all of Cyrenaica.[5] As the first battle of the war to be commanded by an Australian general, planned by an Australian staff and fought by Australian troops, Bardia was of great interest to the Australian public; congratulatory messages poured in and AIF recruitment surged.[92] John Hetherington, a war correspondent, reported that,
Men who since childhood had read and heard of the exploits in battle of the First Australian Imperial Force, who had enlisted and trained under the shadow of their fathers' reputation as soldiers, had come through their ordeal of fire and built a reputation of their own.
— Hetherington[93]
In the United States, newspapers praised the 6th Division. Favourable articles appeared in The New York Times and the Washington Times-Herald, which ran the headline "Hardy Wild-Eyed Aussies Called World's Finest Troops". An article in the Chicago Daily News told its readers that Australians "in their realistic attitude towards power politics, prefer to send their boys to fight far overseas rather than fighting a battle in the suburbs of Sydney".[94] During the battle, Wavell had received a cable from General Sir John Dill stressing the political importance of such victories in the United States, where President Franklin D. Roosevelt was attempting to get the Lend-Lease Act enacted; it became law in March 1941.[95]
Mackay wrote in a diary note on 6 January that the "Germans cannot possibly keep out of Africa now."[96] In Germany, the Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, was unconcerned by the military implications of the loss of Libya but deeply troubled by the prospect of a political reverse that could lead to the fall of Mussolini. On 9 January 1941, he revealed his intention to senior members of the Wehrmacht to send German troops to North Africa, in Unternehmen Sonnenblume; henceforth, German troops played an important role in the fighting in North Africa.[97]
Within the 6th Division, there were recriminations over what was seen as Berryman showing favouritism towards Robertson, a fellow regular soldier and Royal Military College, Duntroon graduate, in an effort to prove that regular officers could command troops. Savige felt that some of the difficulties of the 17th Infantry Brigade were caused by Berryman, through an over-prescriptive and complicated battle plan.[98] The 6th Division was fortunate to have drawn a "set piece" type of battle, the type that most suited its Great War-based doctrine and training.[99] Confidence and experience was generated and leaders and staff took away important tactical lessons from the battle.[100] The Australian official historian, Gavin Long, considered Bardia "a victory for bold reconnaissance, for audacious yet careful planning, for an artillery scheme which subdued the enemy's fire at the vital time, and a rapid and continuing infantry assault which broke a gap in the enemy's line."[101] To attribute success to the tanks or artillery was "to present Hamlet without the prince."[101]
Casualties
An estimated 36,000 Italian soldiers were captured at Bardia, 1,703 (including 44 officers) were killed and 3,740 (including 138 officers) were wounded.[4][102] A few thousand (including General Bergonzoli and three of his division commanders) escaped to Tobruk on foot or in boats. The Allies captured 26 coastal defence guns, 7 medium guns, 216 field guns, 146 anti-tank guns, 12 medium tanks, 115 L3s, and 708 vehicles.[2] Australian losses totalled 130 dead and 326 wounded.[3]
Subsequent events
Bardia did not become an important port as supply by sea continued to run through Sollum but became an important source of water, after the repair of the large pumping station that the Italians had installed to serve the township and Fort Capuzzo.
See also
- List of Australian military equipment of World War II
- List of British military equipment of World War II
- List of Italian military equipment in World War II
Notes
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 3
- ^ a b c Long 1952, p. 199
- ^ a b Long 1952, p. 203
- ^ a b Stockings 2009, p. 276
- ^ a b c d Playfair 1959, p. 287.
- ^ Long 1952, p. 82
- ^ Gwyer 1964, p. 165
- ^ Wavell 1946a, pp. 3000–3001
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 63
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 190–192.
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 133–139
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 140–141
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 271, 282.
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 146–147
- ^ Long 1952, p. 201
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 121
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 115
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 147–148
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 282.
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 323–324
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 116
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 335
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 340
- ^ Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 1995, pp. 72–73
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 336–337
- ^ a b Stockings 2009, pp. 327–330
- ^ Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 1995, p. 75
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 118–119
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 315–316
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 320
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 54–55
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 44–45, 18–20
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 9–14
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 40–41
- ^ a b c d Playfair 1959, p. 283.
- ^ Herington 1954, p. 57
- ^ Long 1952, p. 190
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 372
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 129–130
- ^ a b Long 1952, p. 146
- ^ a b Long 1952, p. 155
- ^ Long 1952, p. 158
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 148–151
- ^ a b c Herington 1954, p. 64
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 122–123
- ^ a b c d Playfair 1959, p. 280.
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 158–159
- ^ Long 1952, p. 156
- ^ Long 1952, p. 161
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 279.
- ^ a b Carter & Kann 1952, pp. 110–112
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 157–158
- ^ Long 1952, p. 162
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 284.
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 286.
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 355–356
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 164–165
- ^ a b Long 1952, pp. 165–166
- ^ a b Italy 1979, p. 149.
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 166–168
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 169–170
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 170
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 172–173
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 160
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 199–203
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 174–177
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 209–211
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 213–214
- ^ Long 1952, p. 313
- ^ Pratten 2009, p. 96
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 179
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 198
- ^ Long 1952, p. 188
- ^ Long 1952, p. 180
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 181–182
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 218
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 220–221
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 189–190
- ^ a b Long 1952, pp. 194–195
- ^ a b Stockings 2009, p. 226
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 232–233
- ^ Long 1952, p. 193
- ^ Long 1952, p. 195
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 192–193
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 237–238
- ^ Italy 1979, p. 151
- ^ Italy 1979, pp. 152–153
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 196–197
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 255–257
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 257–262
- ^ Long 1952, p. 198
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 2, 269, 274
- ^ Hasluck 1952, p. 312
- ^ Chapman 1975, p. 189
- ^ Stockings 2009, p. 275
- ^ Chapman 1975, p. 190
- ^ Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 1995, pp. 654–657
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 270–273
- ^ Stockings 2009, pp. 378–379
- ^ Long 1952, pp. 303–304
- ^ a b Long 1952, p. 205
- ^ Italy 1979, p. 374.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 289–290.
- ^ Packenham-Walsh 1958, p. 238
- ^ a b "Battle of Bardia". Australian Military Units. Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 28 December 2014.
- ^ Loughnan 1963, pp. 149–168
References
- Carter, J. A. H.; Kann, D. N. (1952). Maintenance in the Field (1939–1942). The Second World War, Army. Vol. I. London: OCLC 39083723.
- Chapman, Ivan D. (1975). Iven G. Mackay: Citizen and Soldier. Malvern, Victoria: Melway Publishing. OCLC 2346434.
- Gwyer, J. M. A. (1964). Grand Strategy. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III. London: OCLC 3321795.
- OCLC 3463225.
- Herington, John (1954). Air War Against Germany and Italy, 1939–1943. OCLC 3633363.
- La prima offensiva britannica in Africa settentrionale (ottobre 1940 – febbraio 1941) [The First British Offensive in North Africa (October 1940 – February 1941)] (in Italian). Vol. I. Rome: Esercito. Corpo di stato maggiore. Ufficio storico. annex 32. 1979. OCLC 6863876.
- OCLC 18400892.
- Loughnan, R. J. M. (1963). Divisional Cavalry. New Zealand in the Second World War. Wellington, New Zealand: War History Branch, New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. OCLC 195420– via New Zealand Electronic Text Centre.
- Packenham-Walsh, R. P. (1958). History of the Corps of Royal Engineers (1938–1948). Vol. VIII. Chatham, Kent: Institution of Royal Engineers. OCLC 59437245.
- OCLC 59086236.
- OCLC 271869976.
- Schreiber, Gerhard; Stegemann, Bernd; Vogel, Detlef (1995). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa 1939–1941. OCLC 468817471.
- OCLC 298612750.
- Wavell, Archibald (13 June 1946a). Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940 (Report). Wavell's Official Despatches. "No. 37609". The London Gazette(Supplement). 13 June 1946. pp. 2997–3006.
Further reading
- Stockings, Craig (2010). "The Anzac Legend and the Battle of Bardia". S2CID 162354980.
- Wavell, Archibald (25 June 1946). Operations in the Middle East from 7th December, 1940 to 7th February, 1941 (Report). Wavell's Official Despatches. "No. 37628". The London Gazette (Supplement). 25 June 1946. pp. 3261–3269.