Battle of Cardedeu
Battle of Cardadeu | |||||||
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Part of Peninsular War | |||||||
Battle of Cardedeu, 16 December 1808, by Jean-Charles Langlois. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
French Empire Kingdom of Italy | Spain | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
15,000–16,500, 30 guns | 9,000, 7 guns | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
600 | 2,500, 5 guns, 2 colors |
The Battle of Cardadeu on 16 December 1808 saw an
By the fall of 1808, a French corps under Guillaume Philibert Duhesme was besieged in Barcelona by a 24,000-man Spanish army led by Vives. With 23,000 Franco-Italian soldiers, Gouvion Saint-Cyr marched from France to relieve Duhesme's troops. First Saint-Cyr undertook the successful Siege of Roses. Confronted by the fortress of Girona, which had resisted two earlier attacks, the French general resorted to a risky strategy. Leaving his artillery and most of his supplies behind, he avoided Girona by marching 16,500 men though the mountains and headed for Barcelona. Saint-Cyr completely outgeneraled Vives, who was only able to marshal 9,000 troops to block his opponent. Vives drew up his outnumbered troops on high ground, but Saint-Cyr's huge columns proved unstoppable. The Spanish withdrew after suffering heavy losses and Barcelona was soon relieved.
Background
The Dos de Mayo Uprising had put Iberia in revolt against French rule. The Spanish conventional warfare had started with the Battles of El Bruch. The British intervention had started with the Battle of Roliça. Napoleon's invasion of Spain had ended successfully with the French occupation of Madrid. The Corunna campaign started with the Battle of Cardedeu.
French defeats
As part of
In the early summer of 1808, a 12,710-man French corps commanded by
Chabran and Schwarz were defeated at the
Meanwhile,
According to a 5 November report, the Army of Catalonia under Vives had 20,033 soldiers available in five divisions and a small reserve.
General
Saint-Cyr takes command
After the failures of the summer, Napoleon appointed
For many years, Saint-Cyr served France with distinction and had "first-rate ability" according to historian Charles Oman. His soldiers recognized his talents and had confidence in him but he was too aloof to be loved by them. He was also very self-centered and quick to leave his fellow generals to their own devices. Saint-Cyr's dislike of Napoleon had held him back from earlier promotion. Though he later wrote darkly that the emperor wanted him to fail, Napoleon made him a Marshal of France in 1812. Saint-Cyr's reinforcements did not begin to assemble in southern France until mid-September and lack of wagons caused further delay. On 5 November Saint-Cyr's corps finally crossed the Pyrenees near the Fort de Bellegarde.[21]
At this time, Saint-Cyr's VII Corps consisted of six infantry divisions, three cavalry brigades, and attached artillery. A roster from 10 October listed a total of 42,382 soldiers, but 1,302 were on detached duty and another 4,948 were wounded or sick. Of these, Chabran's 1st and Lechi's 2nd Divisions plus the cavalry brigades of Bessières and Schwarz were bottled up in Barcelona with Duhesme. Reille's 3rd Division had one battalion each of the 32nd Light, 16th Line, and 56th Line Infantry Regiments, one battalion each of the 5th Reserve Legion, the Chasseurs des Montagnes, and the Swiss Valais, two battalions of the 113th Line, and four battalions of the Perpignan Provisional Regiment. Souham's 4th Division was made up of three battalions each of the 1st Light and 42nd Line Infantry Regiments, two battalions of the 7th Line, and one battalion each of the 3rd Light and 67th Line.[22]
Pino's 5th Division comprised three battalions each of the Italian 1st Light, 2nd Light, and 6th Line Infantry Regiments, two battalions of the 4th Line, and one battalion each of the 5th and 7th Line. General of Division
Upon taking his new command, Saint-Cyr received his orders in person from Napoleon. The emperor instructed him that the relief of Barcelona was the prime objective but allowed him discretion in how to carry out the assignment. According to the latest information from Duhesme, Barcelona could be expected to hold out until the end of December before running out of food. Saint-Cyr decided that he must first reduce the port of Roses (Rosas) before marching to Duhesme's relief.[24] The Siege of Roses consumed another month, lasting from 7 November to 5 December 1808. The successful operation cost the Imperial French forces about 1,000 killed, wounded, or died of disease.[25]
With Roses out of the way, Saint-Cyr was free to direct his energies to the relief of Barcelona. After assigning Reille to hold Figueras and Roses and to protect the roads from France, Saint-Cyr had about 1,500 horsemen and 15,000 foot soldiers in three divisions of 26 total battalions. Girona (Gerona) stood squarely in the path that the French army would have to take. The French general knew that besieging Girona was out of the question; in the time it would take to capture the place, Barcelona would be starved out. Once past Girona, there were two available roads. Knowing that the coast road via Mataró was obstructed and could easily be placed under the guns of the British Royal Navy, Saint-Cyr chose to use the inland road. In order for his plan to work, the Imperial general hoped to keep Vives guessing as to his true intentions and to defeat his opponent in detail.[26]
Battle
French offensive
On 9 November 1808, Saint-Cyr massed his field army on the north bank of the
On 13 November, Saint-Cyr's host stumbled into Vidreres which was near the coast road that led to Malgrat de Mar, Mataró, and Barcelona. That evening the Imperial soldiers saw the campfires of Lazán to the north and other enemy campfires to the south. But Saint-Cyr knew of a secret path from a Perpignan smuggler; the route connected the coast road with the inland road. Several search parties that were sent out to find the path during the 14th failed to locate it, so Saint-Cyr personally set out with a small escort to find it. In this he was successful, though the group was nearly captured by guerillas and had to fight its way clear. On the 15th the entire Franco-Italian army snaked through the hills, bypassing the small fortress of Hostalric and reaching the inland road at Sant Celoni. At the latter place the Imperial troops scattered a force of miquelets under Milans. Though his men were tired, Saint-Cyr hustled his soldiers along the highway until they reached the dangerous Trentapassos defile which was found to be unoccupied. That evening the Franco-Italians could see a line of campfires ahead of them, indicating the presence of the Spanish army.[28]
The report of Saint-Cyr's march into the hills on 11 November reached the Spanish camp promptly. Vives responded by sending Reding and seven battalions of his leading echelon, a total of 5,000 men, to watch the inland road. Milans with 3,000 volunteers was ordered to block the coast road. Though Caldagues begged him to send every available man to stop the Imperial army, Vives held back at least 16,000 troops to maintain the blockade of Barcelona. Finding the coast road clear, Milans moved to Sant Celoni where his men were defeated. The news of this action on 15 November finally prompted Vives to take an additional 4,000 men and march through the night to reinforce Reding at dawn on 16 November 1808. Caldagues and the remaining 12,000 troops kept up the blockade of Duhesme's troops. Consequently, Saint-Cyr's 16,500 troops only faced 9,000 Spaniards under Vives. Milans and 3,000 more were to the east, recovering from their repulse, while Lazán and 6,000 more were somewhere to the north.[28] According to Gaston Bodart, the Franco-Italians counted 13,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry while Vives' Spanish force numbered 8,400 infantry and 600 cavalry.[1] Digby Smith added that Vives had 7 guns while Saint-Cyr had 30 guns.[2]
Action
The battlefield is located between
Saint-Cyr knew that time was of the essence. The last rations had been eaten, ammunition was running low, and every minute of delay allowed Lazán to close in on his rear. Instructing Chabot to hold the Trentapassos defile with three battalions, the French commander determined to smash through Vives' lines with the remaining 23 battalions. Pino's Italian division was in front, followed by Souham's French division. Saint-Cyr ordered Pino to keep his battalions in column formation and crash through the enemy lines by sheer impetus. Pino was forbidden to deploy a single battalion, not even to take prisoners.[31]
As Pino's narrow column advanced to pierce the Spanish right-center, it began to come under galling fire from the flanks. Ignoring his orders, Pino panicked and sent Fontane with one battalion each of the 2nd Light and 7th Line to the right. He directed General of Brigade Luigi Mazzucchelli to the left with the remaining two battalions of the 2nd Light and three battalions of the 4th Line. The attack broke the Spanish first line but came to a stand before the second line, halfway up the hillside. Reding ordered the Españoles Hussars to charge and sent his whole line forward. Mazzucchelli's Italians faltered and were chased back to their starting point.[32]
At this moment Saint-Cyr arrived at the front to witness the collapse of the first attack. The French commander immediately directed Souham's 10 battalions to angle to their left and assault Reding's right flank. He also sent Pino's second brigade, the three battalions each of the 1st Light and 6th Line, to rush the Spanish center. Fontane continued to distract the enemy's left flank with his two battalions. Souham's heavy column plowed into and ruptured Reding's line. Meanwhile, Pino's second brigade pressed back the Spanish center. With the Spanish position unraveling, Saint-Cyr ordered the Italian light cavalry under Carlo Balabio to charge up the main highway. As the horsemen galloped up the hill, the entire Spanish force bolted to the rear.[33]
The Imperial troops inflicted losses of 1,000 killed and wounded on their enemies. In addition, they scooped up 1,500 Spanish prisoners and captured five artillery pieces and two colors. Saint-Cyr reported losses of 600,[2][33][1] mostly in Pino's Italian units. Reding was nearly captured while trying to rally his men. Vives abandoned his horse while escaping up a cliff. He reached the coast and was taken off to Tarragona in HMS Cambrian. Milans arrived on the scene after the battle was finished. Lazán never got as far as Sant Celoni, nor did he come into contact with Chabot's small division. After hearing the bad news, Lazán marched his command back to Girona.[33]
Result
On the 16th Caldagues repelled an attempt by Duhesme to break out. But when he found out that night that Vives had been routed, he abandoned the blockade and fell back behind the
Aftermath
The Corunna campaign proceeded with the Battle of Molins de Rei.
See also
References
- ^ a b c Bodart 1908, p. 392.
- ^ a b c Smith 1998, p. 272.
- ^ Gates 2002, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Oman 1902a, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 12.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 482.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 59.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 260.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 261.
- ^ Smith 1998, pp. 265–266.
- ^ Oman 1902a, p. 331.
- ^ Oman 1902a, p. 327.
- ^ Smith 1998, pp. 264–265.
- ^ Oman 1902b, pp. 37–39.
- ^ a b Oman 1902b, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Phipps 2011, p. 196.
- ^ a b Oman 1902a, pp. 635–636.
- ^ Oman 1902a, p. 633.
- ^ Oman 1902a, p. 333.
- ^ Oman 1902a, pp. 319–320.
- ^ Oman 1902b, pp. 42–43.
- ^ a b Oman 1902a, pp. 642–643.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 44.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 45.
- ^ Smith 1998, pp. 270–271.
- ^ Oman 1902b, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 60.
- ^ a b Oman 1902b, pp. 61–63.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 66.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 64.
- ^ Oman 1902b, pp. 64–65.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 66.
- ^ a b c Oman 1902b, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Oman 1902b, p. 68.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 273.
Bibliography
- Bodart, Gaston (1908). Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon (1618-1905). Retrieved 17 May 2021.
- Gates, David (2002). The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0-7126-9730-6.
- Oman, Sir Charles William Chadwick (1902a). A History of the Peninsular War Volume I. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
- Oman, Sir Charles William Chadwick (1902b). A History of the Peninsular War Volume II. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
- ISBN 978-1-908692-26-9.
- ISBN 1-85367-276-9.
Further reading
- Adzerias i Causi, Gustau (2009). "La Batalla de Cardadeu, Segona Part" (PDF) (in Spanish). Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 17 May 2021.
- Rickard, J. (2008). "Battle of Cardadeu, 16 December 1808". historyofwar.com. Retrieved 18 June 2012.
- Rickard, J. (2008). "Capture of Barcelona, 29 February 1808". historyofwar.com. Retrieved 14 June 2012.
- Rickard, J. (2008). "Siege of Barcelona, 1 August-17 December 1808". historyofwar.com. Retrieved 18 June 2012.
External links
- Media related to Battle of Cardedeu at Wikimedia Commons