Battle of Cold Harbor
Battle of Cold Harbor | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the American Civil War | |||||||
Union troops of the II Corps repelling a Confederate attack | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States (Union) | Confederate States | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
George G. Meade | Robert E. Lee | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Army of Northern Virginia | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
108,000–117,000[11] | 59,000–62,000[11] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
12,738 total 1,845 killed 9,077 wounded 1,816 captured/missing[12][13] |
5,287 total 788 killed 3,376 wounded 1,123 captured/missing Overland campaign | ||||||
The Battle of Cold Harbor was fought during the
On May 31, as Grant's army once again swung around the right flank of Lee's army, Union cavalry seized the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor, about 10 miles northeast of the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, holding it against Confederate attacks until the Union infantry arrived. Both Grant and Lee, whose armies had suffered enormous casualties in the Overland Campaign, received reinforcements. On the evening of June 1, the Union VI Corps and XVIII Corps arrived and assaulted the Confederate works to the west of the crossroads with some success.
On June 2, the remainder of both armies arrived and the Confederates built an elaborate series of fortifications 7 miles long. At dawn on June 3, three Union corps attacked the Confederate works on the southern end of the line and were easily repulsed with heavy casualties. Attempts to assault the northern end of the line and to resume the assaults on the southern were unsuccessful.
Although he was far more optimistic at the time, Grant said of the battle in his
Background
Military situation
Grant's Overland Campaign was one of a series of simultaneous offensives the newly appointed general in chief launched against the Confederacy. By late May 1864, only two of these continued to advance: Maj. Gen.
On May 5, after Grant's army crossed the Rapidan River and entered the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, it was attacked by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Although Lee was outnumbered, about 60,000 to 100,000, his men fought fiercely and the dense foliage provided a terrain advantage. After two days of fighting and almost 29,000 casualties, the results were inconclusive and neither army was able to obtain an advantage. Lee had stopped Grant, but had not turned him back; Grant had not destroyed Lee's army. Under similar circumstances, previous Union commanders had chosen to withdraw behind the Rappahannock, but Grant instead ordered Meade to move around Lee's right flank and seize the important crossroads at Spotsylvania Court House to the southeast, hoping that by interposing his army between Lee and Richmond, he could lure the Confederates into another battle on a more favorable field.[16]
Elements of Lee's army beat the Union army to the critical crossroads of Spotsylvania Court House and began entrenching, a tactic that became increasingly essential for the outnumbered defenders.
Near Spotsylvania Court House, fighting occurred on and off from May 8 through May 21, as Grant tried various schemes to break the Confederate line. On May 8, Union Maj. Gens.
Grant used Upton's assault technique on a much larger scale on May 12 when he ordered the 15,000 men of Maj. Gen.
Grant's objective following Spotsylvania was the North Anna River, about 25 miles (40 km) south. He sent Hancock's Corps ahead of his army, hoping that Lee would attack it, luring him into the open. Lee did not take the bait and beat Grant to the North Anna. On May 23, Warren's V Corps crossed the river at Jericho Mills, fighting off an attack by A.P. Hill's corps, while Hancock's II Corps captured the bridge on the Telegraph Road. Lee then devised a plan, which represented a significant potential threat to Grant: a five-mile (8 km) line that formed an inverted "V" shape with its apex on the river at Ox Ford, the only defensible crossing in the area. By moving south of the river, Lee hoped that Grant would assume that he was retreating, leaving only a token force to prevent a crossing at Ox Ford. If Grant pursued, the pointed wedge of the inverted V would split his army and Lee could concentrate on interior lines to defeat one wing; the other Union wing would have to cross the North Anna twice to support the attacked wing.[21]
The Union Army assaulted the tip of the apex at Ox Ford and the right wing of the V. However, Lee, incapacitated in his tent by diarrhea, could not effect the attack he hoped to make. Grant realized the situation he was faced with and ordered his men to stop advancing and to build earthworks of their own. The Union general remained optimistic and was convinced that Lee had demonstrated the weakness of his army. He wrote to the Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen.
As he did after the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, Grant planned another wide swing around Lee's flank, marching east of the Pamunkey River to screen his movements from the Confederates. His army disengaged on May 27 and crossed the river. Lee moved his army swiftly in response, heading for Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, a point only 9 miles north of Richmond. There, his men would be well-positioned behind a stream known as Totopotomoy Creek to defend against Grant if he moved against the railroads or Richmond. Lee was not certain of Grant's specific plans, however; if Grant was not intending to cross the Pamunkey in force at Hanovertown, the Union army could outflank him and head directly to Richmond. Lee ordered cavalry under Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton to make a reconnaissance in force, break through the Union cavalry screen, and find the Union infantry.[23]
On May 28, Hampton's troopers encountered Union cavalry under Brig. Gen.
After Grant's infantry had crossed to the south bank of the Pamunkey, Lee saw an opportunity on May 30 to attack Warren's advancing V Corps with his Second Corps, now commanded by Lt. Gen. Jubal Early. Early's divisions under Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Stephen Dodson Ramseur drove the Union troops back in the Battle of Bethesda Church, but Ramseur's advance was stopped by a fierce stand of infantry and artillery fire. On that same day, a small cavalry engagement at Matadequin Creek (the Battle of Old Church) drove an outnumbered Confederate cavalry brigade to the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor, verifying to Lee that Grant intended to move toward that vital intersection beyond Lee's right flank, attempting to avoid another stalemate on the Totopotomoy Creek line.[25]
Lee received notice that reinforcements were heading Grant's way from
Lee also received reinforcements.
Opposing forces
Union
Grant's Union forces totaled approximately 108,000 men.[11] They consisted of the Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George Meade, and the XVIII Corps, on temporary assignment from the Army of the James. The six corps were:[28]
- II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, including the divisions of Maj. Gen. David B. Birney and Brig. Gens. Francis C. Barlow, and John Gibbon.
- Henry H. Lockwood, and Lysander Cutler. On June 6, the corps was reorganized to the divisions of Griffin, Cutler, and Brig. Gens. Romeyn B. Ayres and Samuel W. Crawford.
- VI Corps, under Brig. Gen. Horatio Wright, including the divisions of Brig. Gens. David A. Russell, Thomas H. Neill, and James B. Ricketts.
- Robert B. Potter, Orlando B. Willcox, and Edward Ferrero. On June 9, Crittenden was replaced by Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie.
- Cavalry Corps, under Maj. Gen. David McM. Gregg, and James H. Wilson.
- XVIII Corps, under Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, including the divisions of Brig. Gens. William T. H. Brooks, John H. Martindale, and Charles Devens. On June 4, Devens became ill and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames.
Confederate
Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia comprised about 59,000 men[11] and was organized into four corps and two independent divisions:[29]
- First Corps, under Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, including the divisions of Maj. Gens. Charles W. Field and George Pickett, and Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw.
- Stephen D. Ramseur, John B. Gordon, and Robert E. Rodes.
- A.P. Hill, including the divisions of Maj. Gens. Henry Heth and Cadmus M. Wilcox, and Brig. Gen. William Mahone.
- W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee. (Hampton became the commander of the Cavalry Corps on August 11, 1864.)
- Breckinridge's Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge.
- Hoke's Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke.
Location
The battle was fought in central Virginia, in what is now
Battle
May 31
The cavalry forces that had fought at
Grant continued his interest in Old Cold Harbor and ordered Wright's VI Corps to move in that direction from his right flank on Totopotomoy Creek. He ordered Sheridan to return to the crossroads and secure it "at all hazards." Torbert returned at 1 a.m. and was relieved to find that the Confederates had failed to notice his previous withdrawal.[32]
June 1
Robert E. Lee's plan for June 1 was to use his newly concentrated infantry against the small cavalry forces at Old Cold Harbor. But his subordinates did not coordinate correctly. Anderson did not integrate Hoke's division with his attack plan and left him with the understanding that he was not to assault until the First Corps' attack was well underway, because the Union defenders were disorganized as well. Wright's VI Corps had not moved out until after midnight and was on a 15 miles (24 km) march. Smith's XVIII Corps, having been mistakenly sent to the wrong location several miles away, did not reach Old Cold Harbor in time to assist Torbert.[33]
Anderson led his attack with the brigade formerly commanded by veteran Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw, which was now under a less experienced South Carolina politician, Col. Laurence M. Keitt. Keitt's men approached the entrenched cavalry of Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt. Armed with seven-shot Spencer repeating carbines, Merritt's men delivered heavy fire, mortally wounding Keitt and destroying his brigade's cohesion. Hoke obeyed what he understood to be his orders and did not join in the attack, which was quickly called back by Anderson.[34]
By 9 a.m. Wright's lead elements arrived at the crossroads and began to extend and improve the entrenchments started by the cavalrymen. Although Grant had intended for Wright to attack immediately, his men were exhausted from their long march and they were unsure as to the strength of the enemy. Wright decided to wait until after Smith arrived, which occurred in the afternoon, and the XVIII Corps men began to entrench on the right of the VI Corps. The Union cavalrymen retired to the east.[35]
For the upcoming attack, Meade was concerned that the corps of Wright and Smith would not be sufficient, so he attempted to convince Warren to send reinforcements. He wrote to the V Corps commander, "Generals Wright and Smith will attack this evening. It is very desirable you should join this attack, unless in your judgment it is impracticable." Warren decided to send the division of Brig. Gen.
At 6:30 p.m. the attack that Grant had ordered for the morning finally began. Both Wright's and Smith's corps moved forward. Wright's men made little progress south of the Mechanicsville Road, which connected New and Old Cold Harbor, recoiling from heavy fire. North of the road, Brig. Gen. Emory Upton's brigade of Brig. Gen. David A. Russell's division also encountered heavy fire from Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Clingman's brigade, "A sheet of flame, sudden as lightning, red as blood, and so near that it seemed to singe the men's faces." Although Upton tried to rally his men forward, his brigade fell back to its starting point.[37]
To Upton's right, the brigade of Col.
While action continued on the southern end of the battlefield, the three corps of Hancock, Burnside, and Warren were occupying a 5-mile line that stretched southeast to Bethesda Church, facing the Confederates under A.P. Hill, Breckinridge, and Early. At the border between the IX and V Corps, the division of Maj. Gen.
At this same time, Warren's division under Lockwood had become lost wandering on unfamiliar farm roads. Despite having dispatched Lockwood explicitly, the V Corps commander wrote to Meade, "In some unaccountable way, [Lockwood] took his whole division, without my knowing it, away from the left of the line of battle, and turned up the dark 2 miles in my rear, and I have not yet got him back. All this time the firing should have guided him at least. He is too incompetent, and too high rank leaves us no subordinate place for him. I earnestly beg that he may at once be relieved of duty with this army." Meade relieved Lockwood and replaced him with Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.[40]
By dark, the fighting had petered out on both ends of the line. The Union assault had cost it 2,200 casualties, versus about 1,800 for the Confederates, but some progress had been made. They almost broke the Confederate line, which was now pinned in place with Union entrenchments being dug only yards away. Several of the generals, including Upton and Meade, were furious at Grant for ordering an assault without proper reconnaissance.[41]
June 2
Although the June 1 attacks had been unsuccessful, Meade believed that an attack early on June 2 could succeed if he was able to mass sufficient forces against an appropriate location. He and Grant decided to attack Lee's right flank. Anderson's men had been heavily engaged there on June 1, and it seemed unlikely that they had found the time to build substantial defenses. And if the attack succeeded, Lee's right would be driven back into the Chickahominy River. Meade ordered Hancock's II Corps to shift southeast from Totopotomoy Creek and assume a position to the left of Wright's VI Corps. Once Hancock was in position, Meade would attack on his left from Old Cold Harbor with three Union corps in line, totaling 35,000 men: Hancock's II Corps, Wright's VI Corps, and Baldy Smith's XVIII Corps. Meade also ordered Warren and Burnside to attack Lee's left flank in the morning "at all hazards," convinced that Lee was moving troops from his left to fortify his right.[42]
Hancock's men marched almost all night and arrived too worn-out for an immediate attack that morning. Grant agreed to let the men rest and postponed the attack until 5 p.m., and then again until 4:30 a.m. on June 3. But Grant and Meade did not give specific orders for the attack, leaving it up to the corps commanders to decide where they would hit the Confederate lines and how they would coordinate with each other. No senior commander had reconnoitered the enemy position. Baldy Smith wrote that he was "aghast at the reception of such an order, which proved conclusively the utter absence of any military plan." He told his staff that the whole attack was, "simply an order to slaughter my best troops."[43]
Robert E. Lee took advantage of the Union delays to bolster his defenses. When Hancock departed Totopotomoy Creek, Lee was free to shift Breckenridge's division to his far right flank, where he would once again face Hancock. Breckinridge drove a small Union force off Turkey Hill, which dominated the southern part of the battlefield. Lee also moved troops from A.P. Hill's Third Corps, the divisions of Brig. Gens. William Mahone and Cadmus M. Wilcox, to support Breckinridge, and stationed cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee to guard the army's right flank. The result was a curving line on low ridges, 7 miles (11 km) long, with the left flank anchored on Totopotomoy Creek, the right on the Chickahominy River, making any flanking moves impossible.[44]
Lee's engineers used their time effectively and constructed the "most ingenious defensive configuration the war had yet witnessed." Barricades of earth and logs were erected. Artillery was posted with converging fields of fire on every avenue of approach, and stakes were driven into the ground to aid gunners' range estimates. A newspaper correspondent wrote that the works were, "Intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting flanks of lines, lines built to enfilade an opposing line, ... [It was] a maze and labyrinth of works within works." Heavy skirmish lines suppressed any ability of the Union to determine the strength or exact positions of the Confederate entrenchments.[45]
Although they did not know the details of their objectives, the Union soldiers who had survived the frontal assaults at Spotsylvania Court House seemed to be in no doubt as to what they would be up against in the morning. Grant's aide, Lt. Col. Horace Porter, wrote in his memoirs that he saw many men writing their names on papers that they pinned inside their uniforms, so their bodies could be identified. (The accuracy of this story is disputed as Porter is the only source.) One blood-spattered diary from a Union soldier found after the battle included a final entry: "June 3. Cold Harbor. I was killed."[46]
June 3
At 4:30 a.m. on June 3, the three Union corps began to advance through a thick ground fog. Massive fire from the Confederate lines quickly caused heavy casualties and the survivors were pinned down. Although the results varied in different parts of the line, the overall repulse of the Union advance resulted in the most lopsided casualties since the assault on Marye's Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862.[47]
The most effective performance of the day was on the Union left flank, where Hancock's corps was able to break through a portion of Breckinridge's front line and drive those defenders out of their entrenchments in
In the center, Wright's corps was pinned down by the heavy fire and made little effort to advance further, still recovering from their costly charge on June 1. The normally aggressive Emory Upton felt that further movement by his division was "impracticable." Confederate defenders in this part of the line were unaware that a serious assault had been made against their position.[49]
On the Union right, Smith's men advanced through unfavorable terrain and were channeled into two ravines. When they emerged in front of the Confederate line, rifle and artillery fire mowed them down. A Union officer wrote, "The men bent down as they pushed forward, as if trying, as they were, to breast a tempest, and the files of men went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed over by striking against one another." A Confederate described the carnage of double-canister artillery fire as "deadly, bloody work." The artillery fire against Smith's corps was heavier than might have been expected because Warren's V Corps to his right was reluctant to advance and the Confederate gunners in Warren's sector concentrated on Smith's men instead.[50]
The only activity on the northern end of the field was by Burnside's IX Corps, facing Jubal Early. He launched a powerful assault at 6 a.m. that overran the Confederate skirmishers but mistakenly thought he had pierced the first line of earthworks and halted his corps to regroup before moving on, which he planned for that afternoon.[51]
At 7 a.m. Grant advised Meade to vigorously exploit any successful part of the assault. Meade ordered his three corps commanders on the left to assault at once, without regard to the movements of their neighboring corps. But all had had enough. Hancock advised against the move. Smith, calling a repetition of the attack a "wanton waste of life," refused to advance again. Wright's men increased their rifle fire but stayed in place. By 12:30 p.m. Grant conceded that his army was done. He wrote to Meade, "The opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present." Union soldiers still pinned down before the Confederate lines began entrenching, using cups and bayonets to dig, sometimes including bodies of dead comrades as part of their improvised earthworks.[52]
Meade inexplicably bragged to his wife the next day that he was in command for the assault. But his performance had been poor. Despite orders from Grant that the corps commanders were to examine the ground, their reconnaissance was lax and Meade failed to supervise them adequately, either before or during the attack. He was able to motivate only about 20,000 of his men to attack—the II Corps and parts of the XVIII and IX—failing to achieve the mass he knew he required to succeed. His men paid heavily for the poorly coordinated assault. Estimates of casualties that morning are from 3,000 to 7,000 on the Union side, no more than 1,500 on the Confederate.[53] Grant commented after the war:
I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.
— Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs[54]
At 11 a.m. on June 3, the Confederate
June 4–12
Grant and Meade launched no more attacks on the Confederate defenses at Cold Harbor. The two opposing armies faced each other for nine days of trench warfare, in some places only yards apart. Sharpshooters worked continuously, killing many. Union artillery bombarded the Confederates with a battery of eight Coehorn mortars; the Confederates responded by depressing the trail of a 24-pound howitzer and lobbing shells over the Union positions. Although there were no more large-scale attacks, casualty figures for the entire battle were twice as large as from the June 3 assault alone.[57]
The trenches were hot, dusty, and miserable, but conditions were worse between the lines, where thousands of wounded Federal soldiers suffered horribly without food, water, or medical assistance. Grant was reluctant to ask for a formal truce that would allow him to recover his wounded because that would be an acknowledgment he had lost the battle. He and Lee traded notes across the lines from June 5 to 7 without coming to an agreement, and when Grant formally requested a two-hour cessation of hostilities, it was too late for most of the unfortunate wounded, who were now bloated corpses. Grant was widely criticized in the Northern press for this lapse of judgment.[58]
Every corpse I saw was as black as coal. It was not possible to remove them. They were buried where they fell. ... I saw no live man lying on this ground. The wounded must have suffered horribly before death relieved them, lying there exposed to the blazing southern sun o' days, and being eaten alive by beetles o' nights.
Union artillery officer, Frank Wilkeson[59]
On June 4 Grant tightened his lines by moving Burnside's corps behind Matadequin Creek as a reserve and moving Warren leftward to connect with Smith, shortening his lines about 3 miles (4.8 km). On June 6 Early probed Burnside's new position but could not advance through the impassable swamps.[60] Grant realized that, once again in the campaign, he was in a stalemate with Lee and additional assaults were not the answer. He planned three actions to make some headway. First, in the
Aftermath
The Battle of Cold Harbor was the final victory won by Lee's army during the war (part of his forces won the Battle of the Crater the following month, during the Siege of Petersburg, but this did not represent a general engagement between the armies), and its most decisive in terms of casualties. The Union army, in attempting the futile assault, lost 10,000 to 13,000 men over twelve days. The battle brought the toll in Union casualties since the beginning of May to a total of more than 52,000, compared to 33,000 for Lee. Although the cost was great, Grant's larger army finished the campaign with lower relative casualties than Lee's.[62]
Estimates vary as to the casualties at Cold Harbor. The following table summarizes estimates from a variety of popular sources:[63]
Source | Union | Confederate | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Killed | Wounded | Captured/ Missing |
Total | Killed | Wounded | Captured/ Missing |
Total | |
National Park Service | 13,000 | 2,500 | ||||||
Kennedy, Civil War Battlefield Guide | 13,000 | 5,000 | ||||||
King, Overland Campaign Staff Ride | 12,738 | 3,400 | ||||||
Bonekemper, Victor, Not a Butcher | 1,844 | 9,077 | 1,816 | 12,737 | 83 | 3,380 | 1,132 | 4,595 |
Eicher, Longest Night | 12,000 | "few thousand" | ||||||
Rhea, Cold Harbor | 3,500–4,000 (June 3 only) |
1,500 | ||||||
Trudeau, Bloody Roads South | 12,475 | 2,456 | 14,931 | 3,765 | 1,082 | 4,847 | ||
Young, Lee's Army | 788 | 3,376 | 1,123 | 5,287 |
Some authors (Catton, Esposito, Foote, McPherson, Grimsley) estimate the casualties for the major assault on June 3 and all agree on approximately 7,000 total Union casualties, 1,500 Confederate. Gordon Rhea, considered the preeminent modern historian of Grant's Overland Campaign, has examined casualty lists in detail and has published a contrarian view in his 2002 book, Cold Harbor. For the morning assault on June 3, he can account for only 3,500 to 4,000 Union killed, wounded, and missing, and estimates that for the entire day the Union suffered about 6,000 casualties, compared to Lee's 1,000 to 1,500. Rhea noted that although this was a horrific loss, Grant's main attack on June 3 was dwarfed by Lee's daily losses at Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Pickett's Charge, and is comparable to Malvern Hill.[64]
McPherson states:
In that [Cold Harbor] attack, ordered by Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, fifty thousand Union soldiers uffered seven thousand casualties, most of them in less than half an hour. For this mistake, which he admitted, Grant has been branded a 'butcher' careless of the lives of his men, and Cold Harbor has become a symbol of mule-headed futility. At Gettysburg, Lee's men also sustand almost seven thousand casualities in the PIckett-Pettigrew assault, most of them also within a half hour. Yet this attack is perceived as an example of great courage and honor. This contrast speaks volumes about the comparative images of Grant and Lee, North and South, Union and Confederacy.[65]
The battle caused a rise in anti-war sentiment in the Northern states. Grant became known as the "fumbling butcher" for his poor decisions. It also lowered the
Cold Harbor Tavern and Garthright House
During the battle, Burnett's tavern (no longer standing) was used as a hospital. Union soldiers carried away all items of value, except for a crystal compote bowl saved by Mrs. Burnett. The Garthright House was also used as a field hospital, the exterior of which is now preserved.[67]
Battlefield preservation
In 2008, the
See also
- Troop engagements of the American Civil War, 1864
- List of costliest American Civil War land battles
- Overland Campaign
- Battle of Wilderness
- Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
- Armies in the American Civil War
Notes
- ^ Battle of Cold Harbor Facts & Summary American Battlefield Trust
- ^ Furgurson 2000, p. 525.
- ^ Rhea 2002, p. 357.
- ^ Cold Harbor National Park Service
- ^ Bruce Catton, Never Call Retreat (Doubleday, New York, 1965) pp. 363–364
- ^ Shelby Foote The Civil War: Yellow Tavern to Cold Harbor (Time Life Edition, 2000) pp. 87–110
- ^ "Robert e. Lee's Last Great Victory: Clash at Cold Harbor". December 14, 2016.
- ^ "Battle of Cold Harbor | Summary".
- ^ Further information:
Organization of Army of the Potomac, May 31, 1864: Official Records, Series I, Volume XXXVI, Part 1, pp. 198–209. - ^ Temporarily attached to the Army of the Potomac from the Army of the James. See: Official Records, Series I, Volume XXXVI, Part 1, page 178 (note at the bottom of the page).
- ^ a b c d e Eicher, p. 685; Esposito, text for map 136. Salmon, p. 295, cites Confederate strength of 62,000. Kennedy, p. 294, cites 117,000 Union, 60,000 Confederate. McPherson, p. 733, cites 109,000 Union, 59,000 Confederate.
- ^ Return of Casualties in the Union forces, Battle of Cold Harbor, June 2–15, 1864 (Recapitulation): Official Records, Series I, Volume XXXVI, Part 1, p. 180.
- ^ a b Union casualties are from Bonekemper, p. 311, Confederate from Young, p. 240. Estimates from other authors are summarized in the Aftermath section.
- ^ Hattaway & Jones, p. 525; Trudeau, pp. 29–30.
- campaign in the Shenandoah Valley) that were part of Grant's "peripheral strategy."
- ^ Salmon, p. 253; Kennedy, pp. 280–282; Eicher, pp. 663–671; Jaynes, pp. 56–81.
- ^ Earl J. Hess, Trench Warfare Under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (2007)
- ^ Jaynes, pp. 82–86, 114–124; Eicher, pp. 673–674; Salmon, pp. 270–271, 279–283; Kennedy, pp. 283, 286.
- ^ Salmon, pp. 271–275; Kennedy, p. 285; Eicher, pp. 671–673, 675–676.
- ^ Salmon, pp. 275–279; Kennedy, pp. 285–286; Eicher, pp. 676–679; Jaynes, pp. 124–130.
- ^ Welcher, 980; Grimsley, p. 141; Salmon, p. 285; Kennedy, p. 289; Trudeau, pp. 236, 241.
- ^ Jaynes, p. 137; Trudeau, p. 239; Grimsley, pp. 145–148; Esposito, text for map 135.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 32–37, 41–44, 50–57; Eicher, pp. 671, 679, 683; Salmon, p. 288; Furgurson, pp. 43–47; Grimsley, pp. 149–151.
- ^ Jaynes, p. 149; Furgurson, pp. 49–52; Salmon, p. 288; Grimsley, pp. 151–152; Rhea, pp. 68–71, 87–88.
- ^ Grimsley, pp. 156–159; Kennedy, pp. 290–291; Salmon, pp. 290–294.
- ^ King, pp. 295–296; Welcher, pp. 986–987; Kennedy, p. 291.
- ^ Furgurson, pp. 58–60; Rhea, pp. 13, 162; Kennedy, p. 291.
- ^ Welcher, pp. 994–997.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 410–417.
- ^ For an example reference to the First Battle of Cold Harbor, see "battles of Cold Harbor", Encyclopædia Britannica online, accessed May 30, 2012; McPherson, p. 733; Foote, p. 281; Kennedy, p. 291; Eicher, p. 685.
- ^ Grimsley, pp. 196–199; Furgurson, pp. 81–82; Kennedy, pp. 291–293.
- ^ Trudeau, pp. 262–263; King, p. 296; Kennedy, p. 293; Grimsley, pp. 199–201.
- ^ Kennedy, pp. 291–293; Grimsley, pp. 202–203; Trudeau, p. 265.
- ^ Jaynes, p. 152; Welcher, p. 986; Trudeau, pp. 266–267; Grimsley, p. 201; Furgurson, pp. 89–94.
- ^ Furgurson, pp. 94–95; Welcher, pp. 986–987.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 229–230.
- ^ Rhea, p. 241; Furgurson, p. 99; Grimsley, pp. 203–206; Welcher, p. 988; Trudeau, p. 269, states that Smith's assault began at 5 p.m.
- ^ Grimsley, pp. 204–206; Welcher, p. 988.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 256–59; Grimsley, pp. 208–209.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 259–260; Furgurson, pp. 112–113.
- ^ Jaynes, p. 154; Rhea, pp. 266–268; Trudeau, p. 273, states that the fighting stopped by 10 p.m.
- ^ Kennedy, p. 293; Grimsley, pp. 207–208; Welcher, p. 989.
- ^ Jaynes, p. 156; Furgurson, pp. 120–121; Grimsley, p. 207; Trudeau, pp. 276–277; King, p. 297; Welcher, p. 989.
- ^ Welcher, p. 989; Salmon, p. 295; Grimsley, p. 208.
- ^ McPherson, p. 735; Jaynes, p. 156; Grimsley, pp. 209–210.
- ^ Foote, p. 290; Salmon, p. 296; Grimsley, p. 210; Trudeau, pp. 280, 297.
- ^ Salmon, p. 296; Trudeau, p. 284; Catton, p. 267.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 360–361; Grimsley, pp. 211–212; Trudeau, pp. 285–286, 289–290; King, p. 304.
- ^ Grimsley, pp. 214–215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290; King, p. 305.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 353, 356; Grimsley, p. 215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290–291.
- ^ Welcher, p. 992; Grimsley, pp. 215–216.
- ^ Rhea, pp. 374–379; Grimsley, pp. 216–217.
- ^ Rhea, p. 234; Catton, p. 265. See additional casualty estimates in the Aftermath section.
- ^ Grant, vol. 2, pp. 276–277.
- ^ Grimsley, p. 220; Foote, p. 293.
- ^ Rhea, p. 273.
- ^ Catton, p. 267; Furgurson, pp. 181–182; Trudeau, p. 298.
- ^ King, p. 311: "Under the accepted rules of warfare of the 19th century, the losing side in a battle was supposed to send a flag of truce to the victor to ask for a cease-fire that would allow both sides to recover their dead and wounded." Grimsley, p. 220; Trudeau, pp. 304–306.
- ^ Grimsley, p. 221.
- ^ Furgurson, pp. 206–208.
- ^ McPherson, p. 737; Trudeau, pp. 305–306; Eicher, pp. 686–687; Salmon, pp. 258–259; Grimsley, p. 223; Esposito, text for map 136.
- ^ Salmon, pp. 259, 296, cites 55,000 total Union campaign casualties, 27,000 Confederate. Esposito, text to map 137, cites 55,000 Union, 20–40,000 Confederate. Trudeau, p. 341, cites 54,000 Union, 32,000 Confederate.
- ^ National Park Service Archived June 18, 2010, at the Wayback Machine (also Salmon, p. 296); Bonekemper, p. 311; Eicher, p. 686; Kennedy, p. 294; King, p. 307; Rhea, p. 386; Trudeau, p. 341; Young, p. 240.
- ^ Rhea, p. 386. Claims for Union June 3 casualties in the 7,000 range can be found in Grimsley, p. 219, McPherson, p. 735, Catton, p. 267, and Esposito, text for map 136. Shelby Foote, p. 292, claims that the 7,000 casualties were suffered in the first 8 minutes of the battle.
- ISBN 0-609-61023-6.
- ^ Kennedy, p. 294; Salmon, p. 259.
- ^ Richmond Then and Now website. Archived May 18, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Civil War Trust's Most Endangered Battlefields 2008.
- ^ [1] American Battlefield Trust "Saved Land" webpage. Accessed November 23, 2021.
Bibliography
- Bonekemper III, Edward H. (2010). Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher: The Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher. Regnery Publishing. ISBN 978-1-5969-8641-1.
- —— (2015) [1968]. Grant Takes Command. Boston: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0-316-13210-7.
- ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
- Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
- ISBN 0-394-74913-8.
- Fuller, J.F.C. Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Furgurson, Ernest B. (2000). Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor, 1864. Knopf. ISBN 978-0-679-45517-2.
- Grimsley, Mark. And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May–June 1864. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. ISBN 0-8032-2162-2.
- Hess, Earl J. (2007). Trench Warfare Under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-3154-0.
- Hogan, David W. Jr. The Overland Campaign Archived April 22, 2016, at the ISBN 978-0160925177.
- Jaynes, Gregory, and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1986. ISBN 0-8094-4768-1.
- Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
- King, Curtis S., William G. Robertson, and Steven E. Clay. Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A Study on Operational-Level Command Archived May 3, 2016, at the OCLC 62535944.
- ISBN 978-0-1950-3863-7.
- Rhea, Gordon C. (2002). Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26–June 3, 1864. LSU Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-2803-9.
- Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4.
- Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May–June 1864. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1989. ISBN 978-0-316-85326-2.
- Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1.
- Young, Alfred C. III (2013). Lee's Army during the Overland Campaign: A Numerical Study. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-5172-3.
- National Park Service battle description
- CWSAC Report Update
Memoirs and primary sources
- Atkinson, Charles Francis. Grant's Campaigns of 1864 and 1865: The Wilderness and Cold Harbor (May 3 – June 3, 1864). The Pall Mall military series. London: H. Rees, 1908. OCLC 2698769.
- Badeau, Adam. Military History of Ulysses S. Grant (Vol. III). New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1881.
- ISBN 0-914427-67-9.
- ISBN 0-306-80464-6. First published in 1896 by J. B. Lippincott and Co.
- OCLC 913186.
- U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Recordsof the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.
Further reading
- Davis, Daniel T., and Phillip S. Greenwalt. Hurricane from the Heavens: The Battle of Cold Harbor, May 26–June 5, 1864. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2014. ISBN 978-1-61121-187-0.
External links
- Battle of Cold Harbor: Battle Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust)
- Animated map of the Overland Campaign (Civil War Trust)
- National Park Service battlefield site
- 48th New York Infantry account of battle
- Union Army Battle Report
- NYTimes remembrance of 150th anniversary of the battle