Battle of Coral–Balmoral
Battle of Coral–Balmoral | |
---|---|
Part of the Bình Dương Province, South Vietnam 11°05′N 106°47′E / 11.08°N 106.79°E | |
Result | Australian victory |
New Zealand
United States
Viet Cong
Phan Viet Dong
- 1 RAR
- 3 RAR
- A Sqn, 3rd Cavalry Regt
- C Sqn, 1st Armd Regt
- 12th Field Regt, RAA
- 161 Bty RNZA
- 141st Regt
- 165th Regt
11 captured
The Battle of Coral–Balmoral (12 May – 6 June 1968) was a series of actions fought during the
1 ATF was redeployed on 12 May to obstruct the withdrawal of forces from the capital, with two battalions establishing a
The Australians then moved against the PAVN/VC base areas east of Route 16, with 3 RAR redeploying to establish FSB Balmoral on 24 May, 4.5 kilometres (2.8 mi) to the north. Now supported by tanks which had arrived from Coral just hours before, the infantry at Balmoral were subjected to a two-battalion attack by the PAVN 165th Regiment. Following a rocket and mortar barrage at 03:45 on 26 May, the attack fell primarily on D Company before being repelled with heavy casualties by the combined firepower of the tanks and infantry. The next day the Australians at Coral assaulted a number of bunkers that had been located just outside the base, with a troop of Centurions supported by infantry destroying the bunkers and their occupants without loss to themselves. A second major PAVN attack, again of regimental strength, was made against Balmoral at 02:30 on 28 May but was called off after 30 minutes after being soundly defeated by the supporting fire of the tanks, artillery and mortars. Regardless, the battle continued into June as the Australians patrolled their area of operations. However, with contacts decreasing, 1 ATF returned to Nui Dat on 6 June, being relieved by US and South Vietnamese forces. The battle was the first time the Australians had clashed with regular PAVN units operating in regimental strength in conventional warfare. During 26 days of fighting the PAVN/VC sustained heavy losses and were forced to postpone a further attack on Saigon, while 1 ATF also suffered significant casualties. The largest unit-level action of the war for the Australians, today the battle is considered one of the most famous actions fought by the Australian Army during the Vietnam War.
Background
Military situation
Based in
The
At the strategic level the general uprising never eventuated, and in late-February the PAVN/VC offensive collapsed after suffering more than 45,000 killed, against South Vietnamese and allied losses of 6,000 men.
On the ground, the war continued without respite and Hughes—the 1 ATF commander—turned his attention to the VC
The operation lasted until 15 April, with mines—including many
Prelude
Planning and preliminary operations
Despite their losses during the previous fighting, the PAVN/VC appeared to have gained the initiative.
The Australians were initially employed on operations inside Phước Tuy Province during Operation Toan Thang I.
2 RAR was tasked with patrolling and ambushing tracks and likely rocket-launching sites to disrupt the expected attack against Saigon. The battalion established FSB Hunt, and conducted a number of small but successful ambushes.
Opposing forces
1 ATF would move with its headquarters and two infantry battalions—1 RAR and 3 RAR—as well as cavalry, artillery, engineer, and aviation elements operating in support, including M113 armoured personnel carriers from
A number of PAVN units had been identified in AO Surfers, including the regular PAVN
Battle
Occupation of FSB Coral, 12 May 1968
On the night of 11/12 May, only a few hours before the Australian redeployment was scheduled to commence, forces from US 1st Division operating in AO Surfers were attacked just west of the proposed landing zone (LZ). Continuing through the night and into the following morning, the fighting prevented the Americans from leaving the area and led to initial delays in occupying FSB Coral.[40] Further delays arose after the terrain around the proposed LZ was found to be unsuitable for helicopters, and Shelton was forced to designate a new location 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) to the south-west for his battalion. Meanwhile, the American company providing security for the lead Australian elements had to redeploy to secure the new LZ. Communications were problematic throughout the operation and this further compounded the delays.[40] The first infantry company to fly in—B Company, 3 RAR under the command of Major Bert Irwin—was already airborne and Shelton directed them to the new LZ. On landing, Irwin moved quickly to the original position, and despite rapidly clearing it, the insertion was further delayed.[41]
1 ATF was not well practised in flying in and setting up a large fire support base, and a poorly co-ordinated, prolonged and dislocated operation caused considerable delay in getting on the ground, and the scattering of a number of units.
These delays in turn affected the fly-in of 1 RAR, with the companies forced to wait at the departure point in AO Columbus before they commenced the air move to FSB Coral. Hughes visited Bennett at FSB Coral at 15:30 to discuss aspects of the defence, as well as events planned for the following day. The deployment of the second battalion was not complete until 16:10, with the 1 RAR Mortar Platoon arriving on the last flight, more than four hours late. It became clear to Bennett that 1 RAR would need to deploy to the east of the FSB, and with just two hours before last light the companies were moved into hasty defensive positions, the last of which were not established until 17:00.[43] Due to the hurried deployment, by dusk the two battalions of 1 ATF and their supporting elements were scattered around FSB Coral in four roughly connected groups, rather than in a co-ordinated defensive position. The task force headquarters advance party and part of its Defence Platoon were located centrally, yet the task force tactical headquarters and the artillery tactical headquarters under Lieutenant Colonel Jack Kelly—Commanding Officer of 12th Field Regiment—both remained in Bearcat.[44] Hughes was not present either, having left Bearcat to attend to matters at the task force rear headquarters at Nui Dat, and was due to move forward with the tactical headquarters to FSB Coral the following day.[45]
There had been little opportunity for co-ordination, with the Australian infantry strung out along the routes away from FSB Coral in preparation for their move the next day. 3 RAR was responsible for the security of FSB Coral, with D Company defending the north-west approaches, while the remaining three companies were dispersed over 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) to the west, spread between the FSB and the 161st Battery, RNZA gun positions to the south-west. 1 RAR occupied the eastern approaches, with its rifle companies dispersed over 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) harbouring in night ambush positions, while C Company was isolated to the south-east picketing the road to Tan Uyen in order to provide security for the convoy due to arrive from Bearcat the following day.[45] Bennett kept his anti-tank and assault pioneer platoons inside the FSB to protect the battalion command post, while the mortar platoon would be particularly exposed, being located adjacent to the 102nd Field Battery gun position in an open area on the outer edge of the base facing to the north and east.[45] The rifle companies to the north-east provided the only protection, yet there were large gaps between these positions and they could be easily bypassed.[46] Although the Australians made further efforts to co-ordinate their defences prior to last light, attempting to tie in their positions to achieve mutual support between the sub-units, these arrangements remained incomplete as night fell.[46]
Command posts were dug in and weapons pits and
First attack on FSB Coral, 12/13 May 1968
Unknown to 1 ATF, the headquarters of the PAVN 7th Division was located approximately 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) to the east of FSB Coral and several units of the division were also based in the vicinity. The PAVN 165th Regiment was operating to the north and the 141st Regiment to the east, while the battalion-strength 275th Infiltration Group had only recently arrived, having left the
During the evening B Company, 1 RAR—under the command of Major Bob Hennessy—had a further contact to the east with another ten-man group. Later, Major Colin Adamson's A Company detected 20 PAVN moving on the perimeter utilising newly issued
Finally at 03:30, rocket and mortar fire began falling on FSB Coral, concentrating on the 102nd Field Battery and the 1 RAR Mortar Platoon positions in an intense bombardment lasting five minutes.
Meanwhile, the 1 RAR Anti-Tank Platoon—commanded by Lieutenant Les Tranter—also engaged with flechettes from their 90 mm RCLs, firing across the front of the mortars and relieving the immediate pressure on them.[58] However, with the PAVN having successfully achieved a break-in, and faced with the possibility of imminent annihilation, the 1 RAR Mortar Platoon second-in-command—Lieutenant Tony Jensen—was forced to direct the RCLs onto his own position, to which Bennett agreed. As the PAVN attempted to turn the captured mortars against the Australians, the flechette darts swept the area, clearing everything above ground, causing heavy casualties among the assaulting force and damaging a number of mortar tubes.[59] Elsewhere, the PAVN assault had reached the Australian gun position, over-running two guns as desperate close quarters fighting broke out between the emplacements. The attackers subsequently succeeded in capturing No. 6 gun on the extreme edge of the gun-line and then attempted to destroy it with satchel charges.[56] In both the mortar and artillery positions the PAVN and Australians occupied adjacent pits, fighting each other at close range for their possession. The gun position officer—Captain Ian Ahearn—co-ordinated the defence, and the Australians finally drove off the assault with grenades and small arms, as well as flechette rounds fired from the Anti-Tank Platoon.[59] Meanwhile, with the assault falling mainly on 1 RAR and 102nd Field Battery, to the west 3 RAR had largely remained out of contact.[24]
Although the PAVN troops were well trained and equipped, they were ultimately unable to prevail against the superior firepower of the Australian infantry and gunners, which had turned the battle in their favour.[60] Throughout the night, fire support was co-ordinated by the 1 RAR command post and the fire support co-ordinating centre, which controlled integral fires from 102nd Field Battery, its direct support battery, as well as from 161st Battery RNZA and the 81 mm mortars from 3 RAR.[59] Yet the Australian gunners soon ran out of flechette rounds, and they were forced to use standard high-explosive with their direct-action fuses set to 'delay'. The guns were then depressed to fire the shell at the ground approximately 40 to 50 metres (44 to 55 yd) in front of the emplacement, which caused the round to ricochet and explode in the air above the heads of the assaulting force, an expedient which proved very effective.[56] The Australians were also supported by artillery from a number of neighbouring American batteries that were in range, as well as by aerial strafing from helicopter gunships and continuous illumination by flares. Forward observers adjusted the artillery to within 20 metres (22 yd) of the Australian position, while AC-47 Spooky gunships fired thousands of rounds into the assaulting forces.[56]
After an hour of intense fighting, by 04:30 the main attack began to falter and the PAVN subsequently withdrew into a rubber plantation to the north-east, carrying many of their dead and wounded. However, in an attempt prevent the Australians from following them a company-sized force remained, and the Australian gunners attempted to engage them with their remaining flechette rounds and high explosive.[61] Taking advantage of the extinguishing of a fire that the Australians had been using to direct the helicopter gunships, the PAVN again attacked at 05:00 in an effort to further cover their withdrawal.[56] Greatly reduced in strength, the attack was quickly broken up in a crossfire of high explosive and flechettes. A series of sporadic contacts then took place between the Australians and withdrawing PAVN, while at 05:30 a helicopter light-fire team became effective and forced the PAVN rearguard to abandon its positions. Also during this time, rockets and mortars had landed on B Company, 1 RAR 1,500 metres (1,600 yd) to the south-east, killing one Australian and wounding another.[62] At 05:45, 161st Battery RNZA began firing on likely withdrawal routes as the pre-dawn light began to appear.[62] The Australians then began a sweep of their position, with the 102nd Field Battery clearing the gun position while Bennett accompanied the 1 RAR Anti-Tank Platoon and a regimental medical officer's party to clear the rest of the perimeter.[63] A number of PAVN soldiers were subsequently located, with the last killed in the gun position at 06:10. The two patrols then met in the mortar position while a patrol from 3 RAR carried out a similar sweep from north to south, and FSB Coral was finally cleared by 06:25. By 06:30 the evacuation of the Australian dead and wounded began by helicopter.[62] The PAVN finally completed their withdrawal by 08:00.[64][65]
The fighting had been costly for both sides. Australian casualties included nine killed and 28 wounded, while one howitzer and two mortars had been damaged.[Note 2] PAVN casualties included 52 dead, who lay strewn around the perimeter, while 23 small arms and seven crew-served weapons had also been captured by the Australians.[62] While Radio Hanoi quickly announced a major PAVN victory there was little doubt that the Australians had convincingly repulsed the attack, even if they had come close to suffering a military catastrophe, with the task force headquarters itself nearly being destroyed.[56][66][67] The initial delays during the fly-in had left the defenders spread haphazardly and, had the PAVN assaulted without the preparatory fire that ultimately alerted the Australians, the result may have been different. Equally, the fortunes of war had resulted in the Australian guns being laid in the direction of the main PAVN assault, and the firepower they afforded had probably been decisive.[62] The occupation of FSB Coral was one of the first such operations conducted by 1 ATF and many of the deficiencies evident had been due to this inexperience.[68] Command and control had been insufficient and in hindsight the lack of co-ordination in setting up the defence could have been avoided with the appointment of a local defence commander.[43] The absence of proper aerial reconnaissance prior to insertion had also resulted in units and their supporting elements landing on unsuitable ground in full view of the PAVN, while the delay in the insertion of the second battalion denied them enough time to establish their positions before night fell. Failures in the assessment and timely distribution of intelligence were also identified.[68]
1 ATF consolidates in AO Surfers, 13–15 May 1968
The 1 ATF forward tactical headquarters arrived from Bearcat by CH-47 on 13 May, while additional personnel and stocks were brought in by road convoy to establish the forward task force maintenance area.
The unsuccessful assault against FSB Coral on the night of 12/13 May had demonstrated that the PAVN would react violently to Australian attempts to control AO Surfers, and with 1 ATF deployed astride a key route to Saigon and threatening a number of PAVN/VC bases and staging areas located nearby, further heavy fighting was expected over the following days. In response, the Australians were forced to refine their tactics and Hughes decided to establish strong defensive positions in order to destroy the PAVN by fire, rather than by the painstaking patrolling more familiar to the Australians. The FSBs would be heavily defended by night, while the battalions would conduct defensive patrols by day. Later, fighting patrols up to company-size with armoured support would then be used to locate and destroy the VC main force bases. As such the Australian concept of operations subsequently evolved from one of searching and clearing in order to locate and cut infiltration and withdrawal routes, into a series of reconnaissance-in-force operations from heavily defended bases.[75] Meanwhile, in AO Manly, 3 RAR continued patrolling for the next seven days, successfully ambushing staging areas and infiltration routes between 13 and 19 May for the loss of one soldier killed.[65][72]
On 14 May there were a number of patrol clashes in AO Bondi, as both sides tried to determine the intentions of the other.[73] The Australians sent out platoon-sized defensive patrols between 3 and 4 kilometres (1.9 and 2.5 mi) from Coral and in nine contacts they suffered three killed and five wounded, while PAVN casualties included 12 killed and two wounded. Later, two more Australians were wounded by an RPG fired into FSB Coral.[75] During the afternoon, the patrol activity resulted in heavy fighting, and two separate actions fought within half an hour of each other by different platoons from 1 RAR led to two Australians being awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM)—Lance Corporal David Griffiths and Private Richard Norden.[76] The PAVN/VC appeared to be probing the Australians to gain information on their dispositions and these efforts continued the following day with the defenders observing two PAVN near the perimeter of FSB Coral, while patrols from 1 RAR later contacted a number of small groups and uncovered a recently used company-sized camp just 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) from the base.[77][78] By 15 May, the Australians considered their defences to be properly co-ordinated, while nearby the PAVN 141st Regiment was again preparing to attack Coral after evading the intensive patrolling. Yet that night a large number of lights and flares were observed by the defenders, effectively warning them of the impending assault.[70][78]
Second attack on FSB Coral, 16 May 1968
At 02:30 on 16 May the PAVN began a heavy barrage of RPGs and mortar fire, concentrating on A Company 1 RAR, 1 ATF headquarters, and the forward task force maintenance area.
By 04:00 A Company was still heavily engaged and the Australians called in helicopter light-fire teams and AC-47 gunships, which dropped flares continuously from 04:30 to illuminate the battlefield. By 05:00 the main attack was halted and the PAVN began withdrawing, just as the Australians were beginning to run low on ammunition. During the lull A Company was resupplied by APC, while the Australians pushed an RCL team forward to provide additional support.[79] At 05:15 the PAVN attacked again, targeting the boundary between A and C Companies on the northern edge of the perimeter, only to be repulsed by mortar fire. Later a two-battalion attack on A, B and C Companies was also turned back. The Australians then counter-attacked with elements of A Company supported by APCs, regaining the lost 3 Platoon section post.[79] Finally, after a six-hour battle the PAVN broke contact at 06:30 and withdrew with their dead and wounded, fighting a series of rearguard actions to prevent follow-up.[82] The Australians also began collecting their casualties for evacuation, while another resupply was completed with APCs. 1 RAR subsequently commenced a clearance of the area, with the four Australian rifle companies patrolling to a depth of 1,000 metres (1,100 yd), killing one PAVN soldier and capturing another.[83] Five Australians had been killed and 19 wounded, while two US artillerymen were also wounded during the fighting.[84] Only 34 PAVN bodies were counted on the perimeter at dawn, however intelligence later indicated that fewer than 100 of the 790 attacking troops had survived unwounded.[23] Meanwhile, in an attempt to disrupt the PAVN withdrawal, Keldie led a troop of cavalry from Coral, engaging a PAVN battalion during a pursuit that lasted until 15:00.[85]
On 17 May, Westmoreland visited FSB Coral and congratulated the task force on its defence. Both Australian battalions continued to patrol with minor contacts, and during one such incident at least six PAVN were killed when a group of approximately 35 was engaged by artillery and armed helicopters after being observed by scouts from B Company, 3 RAR.[83] During the week that followed Australian patrols clashed with groups of PAVN moving through AO Surfers, many of them from the PAVN 165th Regiment, which was believed to be withdrawing into War Zone D.[86] A Company, 3 RAR subsequently occupied a blocking position on the Suoi Ba Pho creek, ambushing PAVN moving northwards and directing mortar firing onto evasion routes, killing eight and capturing two. Elsewhere, C Company, 3 RAR located and destroyed a number of base camps in the vicinity of FSB Coogee.[72] Meanwhile, with the approval of MacDonald, Hughes departed on a long-planned leave to Singapore on 18 May, and Colonel Donald Dunstan, the task force second-in-command, took over as Commander 1 ATF on 20 May.[87] A respected and experienced leader, he quickly took control amidst growing tension.[83]
At 01:00 on 22 May FSB Coral was again attacked, though not on the same scale as before, coming under a short but accurate mortar bombardment that was subsequently broken up artillery and mortar fire.
First attack on FSB Balmoral, 26 May 1968
With 3 RAR achieving limited results in AO Manly, MacDonald suggested that Dunstan establish the battalion in a new location east of Route 16 in order to locate and destroy the PAVN/VC bases suspected to be in the area.[87] 3 RAR subsequently occupied FSB Balmoral in AO Newport, 4.5 kilometres (2.8 mi) north of Coral, on 24 May in the hope of provoking another battle.[87][91] Shelton was keen to avoid the mistakes that had been made during the earlier occupation of FSB Coral however, and he sent two companies forward on foot to occupy the new fire support base while the battalion tactical headquarters accompanied them in APCs.[92] During the insertion there were a number of contacts between the Australians and PAVN, with at least one PAVN soldier being killed. Yet with B and D Companies securing the landing zone, the remainder of 3 RAR was inserted by helicopter from FSB Coogee in the late afternoon.[72] FSB Balmoral would be developed as a battalion defensive position only, and 161st Battery RNZA was subsequently flown to FSB Coral, in order to concentrate all of the artillery in that location from where they would be able to cover the whole of the new AO. Meanwhile, the PAVN had been caught by surprise and, with no time prepare an attack, they were unable to respond on the first evening.[92] Regardless, 3 RAR worked quickly to establish their defensive position, digging in and laying wire and claymore mines.[93]
On 25 May, 3 RAR began local defensive and familiarisation patrols.[93] Four Centurion tanks from 2 Troop, C Squadron were ordered to redeploy to FSB Balmoral to bolster the defences, escorted by two infantry platoons from B Company, 1 RAR under Captain Bob Hennessy.[92] En route, the PAVN engaged the Australian infantry from a series of bunkers, pinning them down with machine-gun fire at close range. In response the Australian tanks moved forward, suppressing the bunkers with canister rounds while the infantry was extracted. The Australians had struck the edge of a large, defended base camp estimated at company-size, however under orders to continue to Balmoral before nightfall, they broke contact. The column subsequently arrived at FSB Balmoral without further incident at 15:30 and B Company, 1 RAR then returned to FSB Coral by helicopter. At least two PAVN were killed in the encounter, while one Australian was wounded. Although a relatively minor action, the tanks had been decisive and the engagement was early proof of their effectiveness in co-operation with the infantry.[94] Meanwhile, the PAVN commander was no longer able to tolerate the Australian encroachment into his base areas, and with FSB Balmoral located just 1,500 metres (1,600 yd) away, he subsequently tasked the 165th Regiment, commanded by Phan Viet Dong, to attack Balmoral.[95] That evening tracer rounds, shots and lights again alerted the defenders of an impending attack.[88]
At 03:45 on 26 May the PAVN began a heavy bombardment with mortar and rockets, accompanied by machine-gun and small-arms fire. Immediately following the barrage, Balmoral was subjected to a ground assault across the open ground from the north-east by a force of up to battalion strength, falling primarily on D Company, commanded by Major Peter Phillips. At the same time the PAVN conducted a feint on the southern perimeter opposite A Company—under Major Horrie Howard—using
Bunker clash and patrolling in AO Surfers, 26–27 May 1968
Dunstan subsequently directed the clearance of the bunker system that had been located the previous day, and a combined force of D Company, 1 RAR and 1 Troop C Squadron under the command of Major Tony Hammett was tasked with carrying out a reconnaissance-in-force.[95] Departing at 06:00 on the morning of 26 May, at 12:27 the lead Australian infantry platoon was hit by small arms fire and RPGs 3,000 metres (3,300 yd) from Coral, after having paused to direct an air strike by Canberra bombers from No. 2 Squadron RAAF onto a nearby bunker system. In what would become the first Australian combined infantry and tank assault since the Bougainville campaign against the Japanese in the Second World War, the tanks were called forward and attacked the bunkers with anti-tank solid shot and machine-guns, while the infantry indicated targets with their M79 grenade launchers.[95][97] Moving forward two or three abreast, the Centurions crushed many of the bunkers with their tracks and engaged others at point-blank range with their main armament. Further bunkers were exposed when the foliage was cut away by canister rounds and the infantry followed the tanks using rifles and grenades, while assault pioneers provided support with a flame-thrower as artillery and mortar fire engaged targets further away.[101]
The bunkers were well constructed and camouflaged, while visibility was limited to just 10 to 20 metres (11 to 22 yd) among the dense vegetation and consequently many were not located by the Australians until they were upon them. The bunkers were sited to be mutually supporting, and the PAVN defending them responded with a crossfire of RPG-2s, although the heavy armour of the Centurions proved impervious and they remained undamaged.[65][102][Note 4] During a three-hour battle the Australians and PAVN fought each other from bunker to bunker. However, with aerial reconnaissance revealing that the bunker system was part of a much larger base area, and with the Australian force judged too small to deal with it, Bennett directed Hammett to retire by late afternoon. Amidst a heavy rain the Australians broke contact at 16:00 under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, and they moved quickly back to FSB Coral. Fourteen bunkers had been destroyed, while seven PAVN bodies were counted and quantities of weapons, ammunition and documents were also captured. Yet many more men were undoubtedly entombed in the bunkers after being crushed by the tanks, making a comprehensive body count impossible. Although it had been a fierce engagement the Australians suffered no casualties, a fact which was attributed to the effectiveness of the tanks, and further validated Dunstan's decision to call them forward from Nui Dat.[104] Second Lieutenant John Salter was later awarded the Military Cross for his leadership during this and other actions.[105]
Over the following days 1 ATF continued patrolling, although these operations resulted in only small-scale contact with the PAVN. On 27 May an Australian OH-13 helicopter was damaged by ground fire during a reconnaissance flight 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) outside AO Newport, and air strikes on the area exposed several bunkers which were likely to have been used by the PAVN as a headquarters; they were subsequently destroyed by artillery fire.[106]
Second attack on FSB Balmoral, 28 May 1968
A second regimental-sized attack against 3 RAR at Balmoral was launched by the PAVN at 02:30 on 28 May, with a two-battalion assault preceded by 60 mm and 80 mm mortar fire from the south.
At first light a clearing patrol from D Company, 3 RAR swept the area with tanks and APCs in support, killing and capturing a number of attackers that had been pinned down in old B-52 bomb craters to the north of Balmoral. The daylight revealed that the PAVN had once again been soundly defeated leaving 42 dead and seven prisoners, while Australian losses were one killed and eight wounded.[108] Quantities of weapons, clothing, ammunition and equipment were also recovered by the Australians.[108] Phillips was subsequently awarded the Military Cross for his leadership during the battle.[109] Many of the PAVN dead were teenagers of 16 or 17 years, evidence that the North Vietnamese had begun drafting 15-year-old boys into its combat units; as had happened after the earlier fighting, their bodies were collected by a bulldozer and buried in a mass grave.[110] Later, a large number of shell scrapes were discovered to the north-east of Balmoral during an aerial reconnaissance by an OH-13 helicopter, and they were thought likely to have been used by the PAVN as an assembly area before being engaged by artillery firing defensive fire tasks early in the battle.[111] The successful defence of Balmoral and the high ratio of PAVN killed had confirmed the judgement of MacDonald and Dunstan and validated the decision to adopt an aggressive defence with strong static positions and forceful patrolling.[108] The failed assault proved to be the final attempt to remove 1 ATF from AO Surfers, and there were no further attacks by the PAVN against either Coral or Balmoral.[65]
Operation Toan Thang I concludes, 28 May − 6 June 1968
The Australians continued to patrol aggressively, with further clashes occurring between companies from 1 RAR and 3 RAR, and the PAVN. On the morning of 30 May, C Company, 1 RAR under Major Ian Campbell had patrolled into a bunker system 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) east of FSB Coral and was contacted by a large dug-in PAVN force.[97] At 08:30 the lead platoon, 9 Platoon, came under fire and was pinned down by RPGs and 7.62 mm RPD light machine-guns. Meanwhile, 7 Platoon moved to assist but was also pinned down, with one section suffering heavy casualties and losing an M60 machine-gun. Campbell struggled to establish a company defensive position, pushing 8 Platoon forward covered by armed helicopters and indirect fire. Yet with the two forces facing each other at only 10 to 15 metres (11 to 16 yd), the Australian artillery and mortars were rendered ineffective and Dunstan subsequently dispatched two tanks from Coral to reinforce them as heavy fighting developed.[112] Supported by APCs, the Australian infantry and tanks then assaulted and cleared several bunkers, allowing the lead platoon to withdraw after three hours of fighting. Suffering one killed and seven wounded, C Company broke contact by 11:55, withdrawing 500 metres (550 yd) as artillery, mortars and air strikes engaged the bunker system.[113] Three days later C Company returned to the area to recover the lost machine-gun only to find the position as they had left it; strewn with dead bodies and caved-in bunkers with the battlefield having been abandoned by the PAVN, who had also withdrawn following the Australian assault. The tanks had destroyed at least eight bunkers, while PAVN casualties included 24 dead and a further eight believed killed. Another group of 13 had also been engaged in the open by artillery, and were also possibly killed.[114]
The PAVN then appeared to abandon AO Surfers to the Australians, and increasingly diverted their movement around Coral and Balmoral.[115] Operation Toan Thang I continued for another six days regardless, and 1 ATF patrolled extensively into June. However, with contacts decreasing, on 1 June Weyand judged the Australian blocking operation to have been successful in limiting the offensive against Saigon, and directed US and ARVN units to relieve them.[116] Meanwhile, Hughes returned from leave and visited Dunstan at FSB Coral to discuss the situation and the task force's redeployment to Phước Tuy.[117] FSB Balmoral was subsequently declared closed on 5 June, with 3 RAR and its direct support battery returning to Nui Dat by air, while FSB Coral was also closed the following day.[118] The operation finally concluded on 6 June, with 1 RAR returning to Nui Dat by CH-47 after handing over the area of operations to the US 1st Infantry Division, while the logistic, artillery and armoured elements returned by road convoy.[97][119] Yet the approach of the wet season concerned Hughes, who believed it could hinder the movement of the Centurions and leave them stranded 120 kilometres (75 mi) from base until the dry season.[120] Nonetheless, the tanks departed FSB Coral on 5 June; travelling via Bearcat and Route 15, the road move went without incident and they returned to Nui Dat by 17:00 on 6 June.[117]
Aftermath
Casualties
Although Operation Toan Thang I had begun relatively quietly for the Australians it had ended far more spectacularly.
Assessment
The fighting represented a watershed in the campaign for the Australians, and while they had deployed outside Phước Tuy Province previously, they now faced regular PAVN formations and VC Main Force units operating in battalion and regimental strength, rather than VC guerrillas. With 1 ATF deploying astride their lines of communication the PAVN/VC had been forced to respond, resulting in a set-piece battle far removed from the counter-insurgency doctrine the Australians normally espoused.[118][128] Yet while the battle ended in victory for 1 ATF, they had come close to suffering defeat at the hands of the PAVN. Inexperienced at large air-mobile operations, poor reconnaissance and inadequate operational planning had caused delays and confusion during the fly-in to FSB Coral, leaving the Australian force exposed to attack on the first night.[118][118] The PAVN had fought in greater numbers, with heavier firepower and greater intensity than previously experienced by the Australians in South Vietnam, forcing them to refine their tactics. Later, the Australian use of platoon patrols to search an area and conduct ambushes was challenged by the constant movement of PAVN forces operating in superior strength, which threatened to quickly overwhelm an isolated patrol.[118]
Meanwhile, prolonged operations outside of Phước Tuy during the first half of 1968 had placed considerable strain on the Australian logistic system.
While many of the failings in Australian command arrangements evident from the initial stages of the battle were rapidly rectified as 1 ATF developed more exact standard operating procedures, future operational planning would need to pay greater heed to intelligence when determining the strength of patrols, as well as providing for quick reaction forces and rapidly responsive indirect fires to support sub-units operating independently.[68][118] Ultimately though the firepower of the Australian combined arms teams proved decisive. Indeed, while the value of using armour in South Vietnam was originally questioned by the Australian Army, the performance of the tanks during the fighting at Coral and Balmoral demonstrated their advantages once and for all. Indeed, whereas before the battle some infantry had doubted the usefulness or necessity of the Centurions, afterwards they did not like working without them. Over the next four years the tanks would provide invaluable close support, particularly during the clearance of bunker systems, proving to be powerful weapons in both offence and defence and were later credited with limiting casualties among the Australian infantry.[130]
In contrast, for the PAVN the battle was just one part of the May Offensive, although they later claimed to have killed 800 Australians during a single attack—a fact which may have indicated the importance they placed on it at the time.[121][Note 6] They had reacted quickly and proficiently to mount a battalion attack on the first night in an attempt to push the Australians off their line of communications; however, while the attacks on Coral and Balmoral had been well co-ordinated, the PAVN/VC had repeatedly surrendered the element of surprise with preparatory fire and poor light discipline alerting the defenders on each occasion.[108] Meanwhile, rigid command-and-control arrangements and a lack of radio communications had forced the PAVN to operate on fixed schedules, preventing them from taking the initiative or responding rapidly to changing situations.[132] Such inflexibility had resulted in predictability, with the PAVN commanders ultimately committing their forces to a frontal assault on Coral on the first night, and mounting very similar attacks against Balmoral on the nights of 26 and 28 May, both of which ended in costly failures.[133]
Subsequent operations
Meanwhile, 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (4 RAR) had arrived to replace 2 RAR. Joined by two New Zealand infantry companies—W and V Companies—it was designated 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) and under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lee Greville they commenced operations in June.[134] Later, on 13 June, 1 RAR was again deployed to protect the bases at Long Binh and Biên Hòa from rocket attacks, operating to the north and east of Biên Hòa as part of a wider allied operation, known as Operation Toan Thang II. On 23 June the battalion was joined by 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) and 1 ATF headquarters was deployed under Dunstan's command as the operation expanded.[122] On 3 July, 1RAR was relieved by 3RAR and returned to Nui Dat.[135] Largely uneventful, the operation resulted in minimal contact and lasted until 18 July.[122] Three VC were killed and 13 captured, while Australian casualties included one killed and one wounded.[136] The Australians then attempted to interdict VC supplies, with a small force of tanks and APCs supported B Company 3 RAR occupying the area along Route 15 to the west and north-west of Bà Rịa, the provincial capital, between 25 and 30 June during Operation Ulladulla. As part of the operation the tanks ambushed a river and sank seven loaded sampans with their 20-pounder main armament.[137]
Operations outside the province over the previous eighteen months had been costly, and of the 228 Australians killed and 1,200 wounded during the war to that point, almost two-thirds had been killed since January 1967.
Meanwhile, the VC began their
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ Later it became known that forces identified during this fighting included part of the PAVN 141st Regiment and resulted in PAVN casualties of 36 killed and three captured.[49]
- ^ The bulk of the Australian casualties had been suffered by the 1 RAR Mortar Platoon. Those men not killed or wounded suffered battle shock and they were subsequently withdrawn to Nui Dat and temporarily replaced by men from 3 RAR until reinforcements could be obtained.[62]
- ^ There are some inconsistencies regarding the dispositions of 1 RAR during both attacks on FSB Balmoral. Some sources indicate that A Company occupied the western perimeter and that the feint had been conducted against the southern end of their positions, while C Company occupied the southern perimeter itself.[96][97] Other sources place A Company on the southern perimeter with C Company to their west.[98][99] The dispositions adopted here are those from the official history.
- ^ The newer RPG-7 was able to penetrate the Centurion hull however, as was demonstrated during subsequent contacts in the following months.[103]
- ^ Marginally different figures for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong casualties are provided in other sources, such as McNeill and Ekins who list 276 killed, 69 wounded/escaped, 11 captured and five detained.[124] Horner provides similar figures, breaking them down into 238 North Vietnamese and 38 Viet Cong killed as determined by body count, with a further 69 claimed as killed.[97]
- ^ Although years later the fighting at Coral and Balmoral did not rate a mention in the PAVN official history of the conflict.[131]
- ^ 147 Australian soldiers were killed in Vietnam between January 1967 and 30 June 1968, with 62 killed and 310 wounded in the first six months of 1968 alone.[122]
Citations
- ^ Dennis et al 2008, p. 556.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 35, 89 and 196.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 317.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 303.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 308–310.
- ^ a b Ham 2007, p. 345.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 311.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 362.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 310.
- ^ Edwards 1992, p. 193.
- ^ Edwards 1992, p. 196.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 200.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 333.
- ^ a b c d e f Horner 2008, p. 201.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 338–339.
- ^ Kuring 2004, p. 335.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 199.
- ^ O'Brien 1995, p. 137.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 201–202.
- ^ a b c d e Horner 2008, p. 202.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 347.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 348.
- ^ a b Coulthard-Clark 1998, p. 287.
- ^ a b c Stuart 1968, p. 33.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 350.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 318.
- ^ Horner 1990, p. 452.
- ^ Horner 2002, p. 255.
- ^ Newman 1995, p. 71.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 202–203.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 349.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 355–356.
- ^ a b McAulay 1988, p. 18.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 356.
- ^ a b c Horner 2008, p. 203.
- ^ McAulay 1988, pp. 344–346.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 356–357.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 357.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 354.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 358.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 359.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 359–360.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 360.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 360–361.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 361.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 362.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 362–363.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 363.
- ^ a b c d e McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 364.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 203–204.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 364–365.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 93.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 365.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 365 and 367.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 366.
- ^ a b c d e f Horner 2008, p. 204.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 367.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 367–368.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 368.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 368–369.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 369.
- ^ a b c d e f McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 370.
- ^ McAulay 1988, pp. 97–102.
- ^ Palazzo 2006, p. 89.
- ^ a b c d e Kuring 2004, p. 337.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 371.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 361.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 372.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 372–374.
- ^ a b Horner 2008, p. 205.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 374.
- ^ a b c d e Stuart 1968, p. 35.
- ^ a b McAulay 1988, p. 127.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 25.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 374.
- ^ McAulay 1988, pp. 127–131.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 132.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 375.
- ^ a b c d McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 377.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 145.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 375.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 377–378.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 378.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 176.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 181.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 205–206.
- ^ a b c McAulay 1988, p. 197.
- ^ a b Horner 2008, p. 206.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 380–381.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 206.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 378.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 383.
- ^ a b c d e f McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 384.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 383–384.
- ^ a b c McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 386.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 270.
- ^ a b c d e Horner 2008, p. 207.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 385.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 383.
- ^ a b Coulthard-Clark 1998, p. 288.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 387.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 387–388.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 388.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 388–389.
- ^ McAulay 1991, p. 278.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 389.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 389–390.
- ^ a b c d e McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 390.
- ^ Ham 2007, p. 382.
- ^ McAulay 1988, pp. 284–286.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 285.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 392.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 392–393.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 393–394.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 311.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 304.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 395.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Kuring 2004, p. 338.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 312.
- ^ McAulay 1988, pp. 313–314.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 401.
- ^ a b c d e Horner 2008, p. 208.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 338 and 345.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 452.
- ^ a b McNeill & Ekins 2003, p. 396.
- ^ Rodger 2003, p. 394.
- ^ Terrett & Taubert 2015, pp. 180–181.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 402–403.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 397–398.
- ^ "Unit Information—1st Armoured Regiment, Vietnam". Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 11 May 2009. Retrieved 19 April 2009.
- ^ Van Thai & Van Quang 2002, pp. 230–231.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 326.
- ^ McAulay 1988, p. 268.
- ^ Avery 2002, p. 13.
- ^ McAulay 1991, p. 110.
- ^ McNeill & Ekins 2003, pp. 453–454.
- ^ Hopkins 1978, p. 261.
- ^ Horner 2002, p. 313.
- ^ a b c d Horner 2008, p. 209.
- ^ McAulay 1991, pp. 143–150.
- ^ Van Thai & Van Quang 2002, p. 231.
- ^ Spector 1993, p. 240.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 212–214.
References
- Avery, Brian (2002). In the ANZAC Spirit: The Fourth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment/NZ (ANZAC): South Vietnam 1968 to 1969. McCrae, Victoria: Slouch Hat Publications. ISBN 0-9579752-1-X.
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (1998). Where Australians Fought: The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles (First ed.). St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86448-611-2.
- Dennis, Peter; Grey, Jeffrey; Morris, Ewan; Prior, Robin; Bou, Jean (2008). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Second ed.). Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-551784-2.
- Edwards, Peter (1992). Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965. ISBN 1-86373-184-9.
- ISBN 978-0-7322-8237-0.
- ISBN 0-642-99407-2.
- ISBN 0-04-442227-X.
- Horner, David (2002). Phantoms of War: A History of the Australian Special Air Service (Second ed.). Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-647-9.
- Horner, David, ed. (2008). Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment (Second ed.). Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-1-74175-374-5.
- Kuring, Ian (2004). Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military Historical Publications. ISBN 1-876439-99-8.
- McAulay, Lex (1988). The Battle of Coral: Vietnam Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, May 1968. London, England: Arrow Books. ISBN 0-09-169091-9.
- McAulay, Lex (1991). The Fighting First—Combat Operations in Vietnam 1968–69: The First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. North Sydney, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-04-442219-9.
- McNeill, Ian; Ekins, Ashley (2003). On the Offensive: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1967–1968. The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975. Vol. Eight. St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86373-304-3.
- Newman, K.E. (1995). The ANZAC Battalion in South Vietnam 1967–68: A Record of the Tour of 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and 1st Battalion, The Royal New Zealand Regiment (The ANZAC Battalion) (Second ed.). Swanbourne, Western Australia: John Burridge Military Antiques. ISBN 0-646-25824-9.
- O'Brien, Michael (1995). Conscripts and Regulars: With the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam. St Leonards, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86373-967-X.
- Palazzo, Albert (2006). Australian Military Operations in Vietnam. Australian Army Campaigns Series. Vol. 3. Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Army History Unit. ISBN 1-876439-10-6.
- Rodger, Alexander (2003). Battle Honours of the British Empire and Commonwealth Land Forces 1662–1991. Ramsbury, Wiltshire: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-637-5.
- Sorley, Lewis (1999). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt. ISBN 0-15-601309-6.
- ISBN 0-679-75046-0.
- Stuart, R.F (1968). 3RAR in South Vietnam 1967–1968. Brookvale, New South Wales: Printcraft Press. OCLC 64813.
- Terrett, Leslie; Taubert, Stephen (2015). Preserving our Proud Heritage: The Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army. Newport, New South Wales: Big Sky Publishing. ISBN 978-1-92527-554-4.
- Van Thai, Hoang; Van Quang, Tran, eds. (2002) [1988]. Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow (English ed.). Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4.
Further reading
- Jamieson, Mark (2014). "Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Coral Remembered". Sabretache. LV (4, December). Garran, Australian Capital Territory: Military Historical Society of Australia: 17–31. ISSN 0048-8933.
External links
- Battle of Coral/Balmoral – Australia and the Vietnam War