Battle of Gagra
Battle of Gagra | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of War in Abkhazia | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Abkhazia Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus | Georgia | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Vladimir Arshba Sultan Sosnaliyev Shamil Basayev | Giorgi Karkarashvili | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Abkhaz National Guard Cossack units |
13th "Shavnabada" Light Infantry Battalion[1] "Orbi" (lit. 'griffin') "White Eagles" special units | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
3,000-4,000[1] | Hundreds[1] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
117 killed (Abkhaz claim)[2] |
42 killed, 47 captured (Georgian claim)[3] 300 killed (Russian claim)[4] | ||||||
429 Georgian civilians (Georgian claim)[5] |
The Battle of Gagra was fought between
Background
Gagra is a Black Sea resort town in northwest Abkhazia, near the international border between Georgia and the Russian Federation. Georgian forces took control of the town from the Abkhaz insurgent militia in the August 1992 amphibious operation in an effort to push an offensive southward against the rebel-held enclave around Gudauta, where the Abkhaz secessionist leadership had taken refuge after the Georgian government forces had entered the regional capital of Sukhumi. Gudauta was also a home to the Soviet-era Russian military base, consisting of the 643rd anti-aircraft missile regiment and a supply unit, which were used to funnel arms to the Abkhaz.[7] After initial military setback, Abkhaz leaders urged Russia and the CMPC to intervene in the conflict. The Confederation responded by declaring war on Georgia and by sending hundreds of its fighters to the Abkhaz side. Meanwhile, the Russian government arranged, on 3 September 1992, a truce which left Georgian government in control of most of Abkhazia but obliged it to withdraw a large part of its troops and hardware from Gagra and its environs. The conflicting sides resumed the negotiations concerning Abkhazia’s status within Georgia whose inviolable territorial integrity was emphasized in the ceasefire agreement.[8]
Assault on Gagra
The truce was not to last long, however. Shortly thereafter, the Abkhaz side declared that the Georgian government had failed to complete the withdrawal of its troops from the Gagra zone. However, according to Russian Army
On 1 October, one week after the
The Georgian
Those Georgians who remained in Gagra and the surrounding villages were subjected to a reprisal campaign by Abkhaz forces, many of whom were refugees who had fled Georgian forces earlier and sought revenge for what they themselves had been forced to endure.[18] Official Georgian sources put 429 as the number of civilians who were killed during the battle or in its immediate aftermath. Mikheil Jincharadze, an influential Georgian politician from Gagra who served as Deputy Chairman of Supreme Council of Abkhazia, was captured in his house and executed at the mercy of his Abkhazian friends.[19]
My husband Sergo was dragged and tightened to the tree. An Abkhaz woman named Zoya Tsvizba brought a tray with much salt on it. She took the knife and started to inflict wounds on my husband. Afterwards, she threw handful of salt onto my husband's exposed wounds. They tortured him like that for ten minutes. Afterwards, they forced a young Georgian boy (they killed him after) to dig a hole with the tractor. They placed my husband in this hole and buried him alive. The only thing I remember him saying before he was covered with the gravel and sand was: “Dali take care of the kids![20]
The battle of Gagra triggered the first allegations of Russian aid to the separatists and marked the beginning of a rapid worsening of Georgia’s relations with Russia. By the end of October, the head of the Georgian government, Eduard Shevardnadze, had halted talks on the Russian mediation, declaring that because of Russia’s "undisguised interference, including military interference... in the internal affairs of sovereign Georgia, we have no other choice."[21]
The seesaw fighting around Gagra continued until 6 October 1992. After the capture of Gagra, the Abkhaz-CMPC forces quickly gained control of the strategic area along the Russian border and made steady progress down the coast from Gagra to the Gumista River northwest of Sukhumi, placing the regional capital itself at risk.[22]
Georgian refugees fled to Russia through the land border or were evacuated by the Russian navy.[23]
Notes
- ^ a b c The HRW 1995, p. 25-6
- ^ Changes on the Western Front: how Gagra was liberated Abkhaz World, October 3, 2020
- ^ "A war we will not forget!". for.ge (in Georgian). October 2, 2015.
- ^ "Russian news sources reported some 300 dead on the Georgian side alone" Human Rights Watch Reports. 7 (7). 1995.
- ^ Murphy, p. 15
- ^ The HRW 1995, p. 25
- ^ Seely, p. 192.
- ^ a b Seely, p. 193
- ^ Duffy Toft, p. 104.
- ^ Reports on how Basayev arrived in Abkhazia are conflicting. He received personal orders from Yusuf Soslambekov, head the Parliament of the CMPC, to lead a volunteer battalion into Abkhazia. Georgian officials claimed that the Russian security services sent buses to Grozny, Chechnya, to take Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev and others to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. However, Basayev and dozens of his fighters are known to have left Chechnya on their own car caravan. They did commandeer a Russian passenger bus to Karachay-Cherkessia, where the passengers were freed after the local police (militsiya) allegedly received orders from a higher authority to abandon the chase so Basayev and his men could go on to Abkhazia. Murphy, p. 14
- ^ Murphy, p. 14.
- ^ MacKinlay, p. 89
- ^ Aybak, p. 190
- ^ Jim Flowers (Spring 1999), Who Gave Guns (and Troops and Planes) to the Abkhaz?[permanent dead link]. Modus Vivendi – Rhodes Student Journal of International Studies. Accessed March 31, 2007.
- ^ Vakhtang Kholbaia, Raphiel Gelantia, David Latsuzbaia, Teimuraz Chakhrakia (trans. Nana Japaridze-Chkhoidze; 1999), Labyrinth of Abkhazia Archived September 30, 2007, at the Wayback Machine, page 34. The Parliament of Georgia, Tbilisi.
- ^ Duffy Toft, page 104.
- ^ The HRW 1995, p. 32.
- ^ a b The HRW 1995, p. 26.
- ^ The Parliament of Georgia report “Genocide/Ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia: Ciphers, facts...”. 1999.
- ^ S.Chervonnaia.Chervonnaia, Svetlana Mikhailovna. Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Russian Shadow. Gothic Image Publications, 1994
- ^ Duffy Toft, page 104
- ^ Seely, p. 193; Ekedahl and Goodman, p. 267; MacKinlay, p. 89
- ^ Human Rights Watch report GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR AND RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE CONFLICT, March 1995
References
- Aybak, Tunç (2001), Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict. I.B.Tauris, ISBN 1-86064-454-6.
- Duffy Toft, Monica (2003), The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. ISBN 0-691-11354-8.
- ISBN 1-57488-404-2.
- MacKinlay, John (2003), Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. United Nations University Press, ISBN 92-808-1079-0.
- Murphy, Paul J. (2004), The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror. Brassey's, ISBN 1-57488-830-7.
- Seely, Robert (2001), Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace. Routledge (UK), ISBN 0-7146-4992-9.
- Human Rights Watch Arms Project. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. March 1995 Vol. 7, No. 7. Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict.