German invasion of Greece

Battle of Greece
Part of the Balkans Campaign during World War II
Germany's attack on Greece
Date 6 April 1941 – 1 June 1941 (1 month, 3 weeks and 5 days) Location Greece and southern Albania Result Axis victory Start of the Greek Resistance and The Holocaust in Greece Territorial changes Axis occupation of Greece
Belligerents
Axis:  Germany  Italy	Allies:  Greece  United Kingdom  Australia  New Zealand
Commanders and leaders
Wilhelm List Maximilian von Weichs Rudolf Veiel Sepp Dietrich Ugo Cavallero	Bernard Freyberg
Strength
Germany:[1][2] 680,000 men 1,200 tanks 700 aircraft 1Italy:[3] 565,000 men 463 aircraft[4] 163 tanks Total: 1,245,000 men	1Greece:[5] 450,000 men Britain, Australia & New Zealand:[6][7][8][9] 252,612 men 100 tanks 200–300 aircraft Total: 502,612 men
Casualties and losses
1Italy:[9] 19,755 dead 63,142 wounded 25,067 missing 3Germany:[10] 7,599 dead 10,752 wounded 385 missing	1Greece:[9][11] 13,408 dead 42,485 wounded 1,290 missing 270,000 captured British Commonwealth:[6] 903 dead 1,250 wounded 13,958 captured
1 Statistics about the strength and casualties of Italy and Greece refer to both the Greco-Italian War and the Battle of Greece (at least 300,000 Greek soldiers fought in Albania).[2] 2 Including Cypriots and Mandatory Palestinians. British, Australian and New Zealand troops were c. 58,000.[6] 3 Statistics about German casualties refer to the Balkans Campaign as a whole and are based on Hitler's statements to the Reichstag on 4 May 1941.[9][10][12]

The German invasion of Greece, also known as the Battle of Greece or Operation Marita (German: Unternehmen Marita

Modern analysts believe that the Italian campaign failed because Mussolini and his generals initially allocated insufficient resources to the campaign (an expeditionary force of 55,000 men), failed to reckon with the autumn weather, attacked without the advantage of surprise and without Bulgarian support.[29]^[30][31] Elementary precautions such as issuing winter clothing had not been taken.^[32] Mussolini had not considered the warnings of the Italian Commission of War Production, that Italy would not be able to sustain a full year of continuous warfare until 1949.^[33]

During the six-month fight against Italy, the Hellenic army made territorial gains by eliminating Italian

Italian invasion and initial Greek counter-offensive 28 October – 18 November 1940	Greek counter-offensive and stalemate 14 November 1940 – 23 April 1941

Hitler's decision to attack and British aid to Greece

Britain was obliged to assist Greece by the Declaration of 13 April 1939, which stated that in the event of a threat to Greek or Romanian independence, "His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Romanian Government... all the support in their power."

Hitler decided to intervene on 4 November 1940, four days after British troops arrived at Crete and Lemnos. Although Greece was neutral until the Italian invasion, the British troops that were sent as defensive aid created the possibility of a frontier to the German southern flank. Hitler's principal fear was that British aircraft based in Greece would bomb the Romanian oil fields, which was one of Germany's most important sources of oil.^[40] As Hitler was already seriously considering launching an invasion of the Soviet Union the next year, this increased the importance of Romanian oil as once Germany was at war with the Soviet Union, Romania would be the Reich's only source of oil, at least until the Wehrmacht presumably captured the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.^[40] As the British were indeed contemplating using the Greek air fields to bomb the Romanian oil fields, Hitler's fears that his entire war machine might be paralyzed for a lack of oil should the Ploești oil fields be destroyed were to a certain extent grounded in reality.^[40] However, the American historian Gerhard Weinberg noted: "...the enormous difficulties of air attacks on distant oil fields were not understood by either side at this time; it was assumed on both sides that even small air raids could bring about vast fire and destruction".^[40] Furthermore, the massive Italian defeats in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and North Africa had pushed the Fascist regime in Italy to the brink of collapse by late 1940 with Mussolini becoming extremely unpopular with the Italian people. Hitler was convinced that if he did not rescue Mussolini, Fascist Italy would be knocked out of the war in 1941.^[40] Weinberg wrote the continuing Italian defeats "....could easily lead to the complete collapse of the whole system Mussolini had established, and this was recognized at the time; it is not hindsight from 1943".^[40] If Italy was knocked out of the war, then the British would be able to use the central Mediterranean again, and the governors of the French colonies in Africa loyal to the Vichy regime might switch their loyalties to the French National Committee headed by Charles de Gaulle.^[40] As Hitler had plans to ultimately use the French colonies in Africa as bases for the war against Britain, the potential loss of Vichy control over its African empire was seen as a problem by him.^[41]

Furthermore, after Italy entered the war in June 1940, the danger of Axis air and naval attacks had largely closed the central Mediterranean to British shipping except for

On 12 November, the German Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 18, in which they scheduled simultaneous operations against Gibraltar and Greece for the following January. On 17 November 1940, Metaxas proposed a joint offensive in the Balkans to the British government, with Greek strongholds in southern Albania as the operational base. The British were reluctant to discuss Metaxas' proposal, because the troops necessary for implementing the Greek plan would seriously endanger operations in North Africa.^[47] In December 1940, German ambitions in the Mediterranean underwent considerable revision when Spain's General Francisco Franco rejected the Gibraltar attack.^[48] Consequently, Germany's offensive in southern Europe was restricted to the Greek campaign. The Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 20 on 13 December 1940, outlining the Greek campaign under the code designation Operation Marita. The plan was to occupy the northern coast of the Aegean Sea by March 1941 and to seize the entire Greek mainland, if necessary.^[46][19][49] To attack Greece would require going through Yugoslavia and/or Bulgaria. The Regent of Yugoslavia for the boy king Peter II, Prince Paul was married to a Greek princess and refused the German request for transit rights to invade Greece.^[50] King Boris III of Bulgaria had long-standing territorial disputes with Greece, and was more open to granting transit rights to the Wehrmacht in exchange for a promise to have the parts of Greece that he coveted.^[50] In January 1941, Bulgaria granted the transit rights to the Wehrmacht.^[50]

During a meeting of British and Greek military and political leaders in Athens on 13 January 1941,

Under heavy German diplomatic pressure, Prince Paul had Yugoslavia join the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941, but with a proviso that Yugoslavia would not grant transit rights to the Wehrmacht to attack Greece.^[58] As the Metaxas Line protected the Greek–Bulgarian border, the Wehrmacht generals much preferred the idea of attacking Greece via Yugoslavia instead of Bulgaria.^[59] During a hasty meeting of Hitler's staff after the unexpected 27 March Yugoslav coup d'état against the Yugoslav government, orders for the campaign in Yugoslavia were drafted, as well as changes to the plans for Greece. The coup d'état in Belgrade greatly assisted German planning as it allowed the Wehrmacht to plan an invasion of Greece via Yugoslavia.^[58] The American historians Allan Millett and Williamson Murray wrote from the Greek perspective, it would have had been better if the Yugoslav coup d'état had not taken place as it would have forced the Wehrmacht to assault the Metaxas Line without the option of outflanking the Metaxas Line by going through Yugoslavia.^[58] On 6 April, both Greece and Yugoslavia were to be attacked.^[19][60]

British Expeditionary Force

Little more than a month later, the British reconsidered.

Greece's mountainous terrain favored a defensive strategy, while the high ranges of the Rhodope, Epirus, Pindus and Olympus mountains offered many defensive opportunities. Air power was required to protect defending ground forces from entrapment in the many defiles. Although an invading force from Albania could be stopped by a relatively small number of troops positioned in the high Pindus mountains, the northeastern part of the country was difficult to defend against an attack from the north.^[71]

Following a March conference in Athens, the British believed that they would combine with Greek forces to occupy the Haliacmon Line—a short front facing north-eastwards along the Vermio Mountains and the lower Haliacmon river. Papagos awaited clarification from the Yugoslav government and later proposed to hold the Metaxas Line—by then a symbol of national security to the Greek populace—and not withdraw divisions from Albania.^[72][73][5] He argued that to do so would be seen as a concession to the Italians. The strategically important port of Thessaloniki lay practically undefended and transportation of British troops to the city remained dangerous.^[72] Papagos proposed to take advantage of the area's terrain and prepare fortifications, while also protecting Thessaloniki.^[74]

General Dill described Papagos' attitude as "unaccommodating and defeatist" and argued that his plan ignored the fact that Greek troops and artillery were capable of only token resistance.

The German strategy was based on using so-called "blitzkrieg" methods that had proved successful during the invasions of Western Europe. Their effectiveness was confirmed during the invasion of Yugoslavia. The German command again coupled ground troops and armour with air support and rapidly drove into the territory. Once Thessaloniki was captured, Athens and the port of Piraeus became principal targets. Piraeus, was virtually destroyed by bombing on the night of the 6/7 April.^[79] The loss of Piraeus and the Isthmus of Corinth would fatally compromise withdrawal and evacuation of British and Greek forces.^[71]

Defence and attack forces

The Fifth Yugoslav Army took responsibility for the south-eastern border between Kriva Palanka and the Greek border. The Yugoslav troops were not fully mobilised and lacked adequate equipment and weapons. Following the entry of German forces into Bulgaria, the majority of Greek troops were evacuated from Western Thrace. By this time, Greek forces defending the Bulgarian border totalled roughly 70,000 men (sometimes labelled the "Greek Second Army" in English and German sources, although no such formation existed). The remainder of the Greek forces—14 divisions (often erroneously referred to as the "Greek First Army" by foreign sources)—was committed in Albania.^[80]

On 28 March, the Greek

• First Panzer Group, under the command of General Ewald von Kleist.
• XL Panzer Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Stumme
  .
• XVIII Mountain Corps, under Lieutenant General Franz Böhme.
• XXX Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Otto Hartmann.
• L Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Lindemann.
• 16th Panzer Division, deployed behind the Turkish-Bulgarian border to support the Bulgarian forces in case of a Turkish attack.^[82]

German plan of attack and assembly

The German plan of attack was influenced by their army's experiences during the Battle of France. Their strategy was to create a diversion through the campaign in Albania, thus stripping the Hellenic Army of manpower for the defence of their Yugoslavian and Bulgarian borders. By driving armoured wedges through the weakest links of the defence chain, penetrating Allied territory would not require substantial armour behind an infantry advance. Once Southern Yugoslavia was overrun by German armour, the Metaxas Line could be outflanked by highly mobile forces thrusting southward from Yugoslavia. Thus, possession of Monastir and the Axios valley leading to Thessaloniki became essential for such an outflanking maneuver.^[83]

The Yugoslav coup d'état led to a sudden change in the plan of attack and confronted the Twelfth Army with a number of difficult problems. According to the 28 March Directive No. 25, the Twelfth Army was to create a mobile task force to attack via Niš toward Belgrade. With only nine days left before their final deployment, every hour became valuable and each fresh assembly of troops took time to mobilise. By the evening of 5 April, the forces intended to enter southern Yugoslavia and Greece had been assembled.^[84]

German invasion

Thrust across southern Yugoslavia and the drive to Thessaloniki

At dawn on 6 April, the German armies invaded Greece, while the

The 2nd Panzer Division (XVIII Mountain Corps) entered Yugoslavia from the east on the morning of 6 April and advanced westward through the Strumica Valley. It encountered little resistance, but was delayed by road clearance demolitions, mines and mud. Nevertheless, the division was able to reach the day's objective, the town of Strumica. On 7 April, a Yugoslav counter-attack against the division's northern flank was repelled, and the following day, the division forced its way across the mountains and overran the thinly manned defensive line of the Greek 19th Mechanised Division south of Doiran Lake.^[87] Despite many delays along the mountain roads, an armoured advance guard dispatched toward Thessaloniki succeeded in entering the city by the morning of 9 April.^[88] Thessaloniki was taken after a long battle with three Greek divisions under the command of General Bakopoulos, and was followed by the surrender of the Greek Eastern Macedonia Army Section, taking effect at 13:00 on 10 April.^[89][90] In the three days it took the Germans to reach Thessaloniki and breach the Metaxas Line, some 60,000 Greek soldiers were taken prisoner.^[11]

Greek-Yugoslav counteroffensive

In early April 1941, Greek, Yugoslav and British commanders met to set in motion a counteroffensive, that planned to completely destroy the Italian army in Albania in time to counter the German invasion and allow the bulk of the Greek army to take up new positions and protect the border with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Between 11 and 13 April 1941, with German and Italian troops advancing on its rear areas, the Zetska Division was forced to retreat back to the Pronisat River by the Italian 131st Armored Division "Centauro", where it remained until the end of the campaign on 16 April. The Italian armoured division along with the 18th Infantry Division "Messina" then advanced upon the Yugoslav fleet base of Kotor in Montenegro, also occupying Cettinje and Podgorica. The Yugoslavs lost 30,000 men captured in the Italian counterattacks.^[96]

Metaxas Line

The Metaxas Line was defended by the

The Germans had to break the Metaxas line, in order to capture Thessaloniki, Greece's second-largest city and a strategically important port. The attack started on 6 April with one infantry unit and two divisions of the XVIII Mountain Corps. Due to strong resistance, the first day of the attack yielded little progress in breaking the line.^[98][99] A German report at the end of the first day described how the German 5th Mountain Division "was repulsed in the Rupel Pass despite strongest air support and sustained considerable casualties".^[100] Two German battalions managed to get within 600 ft (180 m) of Fort Rupel on 6 April, but were practically destroyed. Of the 24 forts that made up the Metaxas Line, only two had fallen and only after they had been destroyed.^[98] In the following days, the Germans pummelled the forts with artillery and dive bombers and reinforced the 125th Infantry Regiment. Finally, a 7,000 ft (2,100 m) high snow-covered mountainous passage considered inaccessible by the Greeks was crossed by the 6th Mountain Division, which reached the rail line to Thessaloniki on the evening of 7 April.^[101]

The 5th Mountain Division, together with the reinforced 125th Infantry Regiment, crossed the Struma river under great hardship, attacking along both banks and clearing bunkers until they reached their objective on 7 April. Heavy casualties caused them to temporarily withdraw. The 72nd Infantry Division advanced from Nevrokop across the mountains. Its advance was delayed by a shortage of pack animals, medium artillery and mountain equipment. Only on the evening of 9 April did it reach the area north-east of Serres.^[99] Most fortresses—like Fort Roupel, Echinos, Arpalouki, Paliouriones, Perithori, Karadag, Lisse and Istibey—held until the Germans occupied Thessaloniki on 9 April,^[102] at which point they surrendered under General Bakopoulos' orders. Nevertheless, minor isolated fortresses continued to fight for a few days more and were not taken until heavy artillery was used against them. This gave time for some retreating troops to evacuate by sea.^[103][104] Although eventually broken, the defenders of the Metaxas Line succeeded in delaying the German advance.^[105]

Capitulation of the Greek army in Macedonia

The XXX Infantry Corps on the left wing reached its designated objective on the evening of 8 April, when the 164th Infantry Division captured Xanthi. The 50th Infantry Division advanced far beyond Komotini towards the Nestos river. Both divisions arrived the next day. On 9 April, the Greek forces defending the Metaxas Line capitulated unconditionally following the collapse of Greek resistance east of the Axios river. In a 9 April estimate of the situation, Field Marshal List commented that as a result of the swift advance of the mobile units, his 12th Army was now in a favourable position to access central Greece by breaking the Greek build-up behind the Axios river. On the basis of this estimate, List requested the transfer of the 5th Panzer Division from First Panzer Group to the XL Panzer Corps. He reasoned that its presence would give additional punch to the German thrust through the Monastir Gap. For the continuation of the campaign, he formed an eastern group under the command of XVIII Mountain Corps and a western group led by XL Panzer Corps.^[106]

Breakthrough to Kozani

By the morning of 10 April, the XL Panzer Corps had finished its preparations for the continuation of the offensive and advanced in the direction of Kozani. The 5th Panzer Division, advancing from Skopje encountered a Greek division tasked with defending Monastir Gap, rapidly defeating the defenders.^[107] First contact with Allied troops was made north of Vevi at 11:00 on 10 April. German SS troops seized Vevi on 11 April, but were stopped at the Klidi Pass just south of town. During the next day, the SS regiment reconnoitered the Allied positions and at dusk launched a frontal attack against the pass. Following heavy fighting, the Germans broke through the defence.^[108] By the morning of 14 April, the spearheads of the 9th Panzer Division reached Kozani.^[109]

Olympus and Servia passes

Wilson faced the prospect of being pinned by Germans operating from Thessaloniki, while being flanked by the German XL Panzer Corps descending through the Monastir Gap. On 13 April, he withdrew all British forces to the Haliacmon river and then to the narrow pass at Thermopylae.^[110] On 14 April, the 9th Panzer Division established a bridgehead across the Haliacmon river, but an attempt to advance beyond this point was stopped by intense Allied fire. This defence had three main components: the Platamon tunnel area between Olympus and the sea, the Olympus pass itself and the Servia pass to the south-east. By channelling the attack through these three defiles, the new line offered far greater defensive strength. The defences of the Olympus and Servia passes consisted of the 4th New Zealand Brigade, 5th New Zealand Brigade and the 16th Australian Brigade. For the next three days, the advance of the 9th Panzer Division was stalled in front of these resolutely held positions.^[111][112]

A ruined castle dominated the ridge across which the coastal pass led to Platamon. During the night of 15 April, a German motorcycle battalion supported by a tank battalion attacked the ridge, but the Germans were repulsed by the New Zealand

The New Zealand battalion withdrew, crossing the

On 16 April, Wilson met Papagos at Lamia and informed him of his decision to withdraw to Thermopylae. Lieutenant-General Thomas Blamey divided responsibility between generals Mackay and Freyberg during the leapfrogging move to Thermopylae. Mackay's force was assigned the flanks of the New Zealand Division as far south as an east–west line through Larissa and to oversee the withdrawal through Domokos to Thermopylae of the Savige and Zarkos Forces and finally of Lee Force; Brigadier Harold Charrington's 1st Armoured Brigade was to cover the withdrawal of Savige Force to Larissa and thereafter the withdrawal of the 6th Division under whose command it would come; overseeing the withdrawal of Allen Force which was to move along the same route as the New Zealand Division. The British, Australian and New Zealand forces remained under attack throughout the withdrawal.^[117]

On the morning of 18 April, the Battle of Tempe Gorge, the struggle for the Pineios Gorge, was over when German armoured infantry crossed the river on floats and 6th Mountain Division troops worked their way around the New Zealand battalion, which was subsequently dispersed. On 19 April, the first XVIII Mountain Corps troops entered Larissa and took possession of the airfield, where the British had left their supply dump intact. The seizure of ten truckloads of rations and fuel enabled the spearhead units to continue without ceasing. The port of Volos, at which the British had re-embarked numerous units during the prior few days, fell on 21 April; there, the Germans captured large quantities of valuable diesel and crude oil.^[118]

Withdrawal and surrender of the Greek Epirus Army

As the invading Germans advanced deep into Greek territory, the Epirus Army Section of the Greek army operating in Albania was reluctant to retreat. By the middle of March, especially after the Tepelene offensive, the Greek army had suffered, according to British estimates, 5,000 casualties, and it was fast approaching the end of its logistical tether.^[120]

General Wilson described this unwillingness to retreat as "the fetishistic doctrine that not a yard of ground should be yielded to the Italians."

General Papagos rushed Greek units to the Metsovon pass where the Germans were expected to attack. On 14 April a pitched battle between several Greek units and the LSSAH brigade—which had by then reached Grevena—erupted.^[111] The Greek 13th and Cavalry Divisions lacked the equipment necessary to fight against an armoured unit, and on 15 April were finally encircled and overwhelmed.^[122] On 18 April, General Wilson in a meeting with Papagos, informed him that the British and Commonwealth forces at Thermopylai would carry on fighting till the first week of May, providing that Greek forces from Albania could redeploy and cover the left flank.^[126] On 21 April, the Germans advanced further and captured Ioannina, the final supply route of the Greek Epirus Army.^[127] Allied newspapers dubbed the Hellenic army's fate a modern-day Greek tragedy. Historian and former war-correspondent Christopher Buckley – when describing the fate of the Hellenic army – stated that "one experience[d] a genuine Aristotelian catharsis, an awe-inspiring sense of the futility of all human effort and all human courage."^[128]

On 20 April, the commander of Greek forces in Albania—Lieutenant General

As early as 16 April, the German command realised that the British were evacuating troops on ships at Volos and Piraeus. The campaign then took on the character of a pursuit. For the Germans, it was now primarily a question of maintaining contact with the retreating British forces and foiling their evacuation plans. German infantry divisions were withdrawn due to their limited mobility. The 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions, the 1st SS Motorised Infantry Regiment and both mountain divisions launched a pursuit of the Allied forces.^[135]

To allow an evacuation of the main body of British forces, Wilson had ordered the rearguard to make a last stand at the historic Thermopylae pass, the gateway to Athens. General Freyberg's 2nd New Zealand Division was given the task of defending the coastal pass, while Mackay's 6th Australian Division was to hold the village of Brallos. After the battle Mackay was quoted as saying "I did not dream of evacuation; I thought that we'd hang on for about a fortnight and be beaten by weight of numbers."^[136] When the order to retreat was received on the morning of 23 April, it was decided that the two positions were to be held by one brigade each. These brigades, the 19th Australian and 6th New Zealand were to hold the passes as long as possible, allowing the other units to withdraw. The Germans attacked at 11:30 on 24 April, but met fierce resistance, lost 15 tanks and sustained considerable casualties.^[137][138] The Allies held out the entire day; with the delaying action accomplished, they retreated in the direction of the evacuation beaches and set up another rearguard at Thebes.^[137] The Panzer units launching a pursuit along the road leading across the pass made slow progress because of the steep gradient and difficult hairpin bends.^[139]

German drive on Athens

After abandoning the Thermopylae area, the British rearguard withdrew to an improvised switch position to the south of Thebes, where they erected a last obstacle in front of Athens. The motorcycle battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division, which had crossed to the island of Euboea to seize the port of Chalcis and had subsequently returned to the mainland, was given the mission of outflanking the British rearguard. The motorcycle troops encountered only slight resistance and on the morning of 27 April 1941, the first Germans entered Athens, followed by armoured cars, tanks and infantry. They captured intact large quantities of petroleum, oil and lubricants ("POL"), several thousand tons of ammunition, ten trucks loaded with sugar and ten truckloads of other rations in addition to various other equipment, weapons and medical supplies.^[141] The people of Athens had been expecting the Germans for several days and confined themselves to their homes with their windows shut. The previous night, Athens Radio had made the following announcement:

You are listening to the voice of Greece. Greeks, stand firm, proud and dignified. You must prove yourselves worthy of your history. The valor and victory of our army has already been recognised. The righteousness of our cause will also be recognised. We did our duty honestly. Friends! Have Greece in your hearts, live inspired with the fire of her latest triumph and the glory of our army. Greece will live again and will be great, because she fought honestly for a just cause and for freedom. Brothers! Have courage and patience. Be stout hearted. We will overcome these hardships. Greeks! With Greece in your minds you must be proud and dignified. We have been an honest nation and brave soldiers.^[143]

The Germans drove straight to the

General

5,200 men, mostly from the 5th New Zealand Brigade, were evacuated on the night of 24 April, from Porto Rafti of East Attica, while the 4th New Zealand Brigade remained to block the narrow road to Athens, dubbed the 24 Hour Pass by the New Zealanders.^[151] On 25 April (Anzac Day), the few RAF squadrons left Greece (D'Albiac established his headquarters in Heraklion, Crete) and some 10,200 Australian troops evacuated from Nafplio and Megara.^[152][153] 2,000 more men had to wait until 27 April, because Ulster Prince ran aground in shallow waters close to Nafplio. Because of this event, the Germans realised that the evacuation was also taking place from the ports of the eastern Peloponnese.^[154]

On 25 April the Germans staged an airborne operation to seize the bridges over the

The erection of a temporary bridge across the Corinth canal permitted 5th Panzer Division units to pursue the Allied forces across the Peloponnese. Driving via Argos to Kalamata, from where most Allied units had already begun to evacuate, they reached the south coast on 29 April, where they were joined by SS troops arriving from Pyrgos.^[141] The fighting on the Peloponnese consisted of small-scale engagements with isolated groups of British troops who had been unable to reach the evacuation point. The attack came days too late to cut off the bulk of the British troops in Central Greece, but isolated the Australian 16th and 17th Brigades.^[152]

By 30 April the evacuation of about 50,000 soldiers was completed,

At least eighty percent of the British forces were evacuated from eight small southern ports. This was made possible with the help of the Royal and Greek Navies. Twenty-six ships, twenty-one of which were Greek, were destroyed by air bombardment [...] The small but efficient Greek Navy now passed under British control ... Thereafter, the Greek Navy represented with distinction in many of our operations in the Mediterranean[162]

Aftermath

Triple occupation

On 13 April 1941, Hitler issued Directive No. 27, including his occupation policy for Greece.

On 25 April 1941,

The Greek campaign ended with a complete German and Italian victory. The British did not have the military resources to carry out large simultaneous operations in both North Africa and the Balkans. Even if they had been able to block the Axis advance, they would have been unable to exploit the situation by a counter-thrust across the Balkans.^[citation needed] The British came very near to holding Crete and perhaps other islands that would have provided air support for naval operations throughout the eastern Mediterranean.

In enumerating the reasons for the complete Axis victory in Greece, the following factors were of greatest significance:

• German superiority in ground forces and equipment;^[170][171]
• The bulk of the Greek army was occupied fighting the Italians on the Albanian front.
• German air supremacy combined with the inability of the Greeks to provide the RAF with adequate airfields;^[170]
• Inadequacy of British expeditionary forces, since the force available was small;^[171]
• Poor condition of the Hellenic Army and its shortages of modern equipment;^[170]
• Inadequate port, road and railway facilities;^[171]
• Absence of a unified command and lack of cooperation between the British, Greek and Yugoslav forces;^[170]
• Turkey's strict neutrality;^[170] and
• The early collapse of Yugoslav resistance.^[170]

Criticism of British actions

After the Allies' defeat, the decision to send British forces into Greece faced fierce criticism in Britain. Field Marshal

In 1947, de Guingand asked the British government to recognise its mistaken strategy in Greece.^[173] Buckley countered that if Britain had not honoured its 1939 commitment to Greece, it would have severely damaged the ethical basis of its struggle against Nazi Germany.^[174] According to Heinz Richter, Churchill tried through the campaign in Greece to influence the political atmosphere in the United States and insisted on this strategy even after the defeat.^[175] According to Keegan, "the Greek campaign had been an old-fashioned gentlemen's war, with honor given and accepted by brave adversaries on each side" and the vastly outnumbered Greek and Allied forces, "had, rightly, the sensation of having fought the good fight".^[130] It has also been suggested the British strategy was to create a barrier in Greece to protect Turkey, the only (neutral) country standing between the Axis bloc in the Balkans and the oil-rich Middle East.^[176][177] Martin van Creveld believes that the British government did everything in their power to scuttle all attempts at a separate peace between the Greeks and the Italians, in order to ensure the Greeks would keep fighting and thus draw Italian divisions away from North Africa.^[178]

Freyberg and Blamey also had serious doubts about the feasibility of the operation but failed to express their reservations and apprehensions.^[179] The campaign caused a furore in Australia, when it became known that when General Blamey received his first warning of the move to Greece on 18 February 1941, he was worried but had not informed the Australian Government. He had been told by Wavell that Prime Minister Menzies had approved the plan.^[180] The proposal had been accepted by a meeting of the War Cabinet in London at which Menzies was present but the Australian Prime Minister had been told by Churchill that both Freyberg and Blamey approved of the expedition.^[181] On 5 March, in a letter to Menzies, Blamey said that "the plan is, of course, what I feared: piecemeal dispatch to Europe" and the next day he called the operation "most hazardous". Thinking that he was agreeable, the Australian Government had already committed the Australian Imperial Force to the Greek Campaign.^[182]

Impact on Operation Barbarossa

In 1942, members of the

In the aftermath, historians would measure its significance in terms of the delay Marita had or had not imposed on the unleashing of Barbarossa, an exercise ultimately to be judged profitless, since it was the Russian weather, not the contingencies of subsidiary campaigns, which determined Barbarossa's launch date.[130]

Citations

1. ^ Collier 1971, p. 180.
2. ^ ^{a b} Helios 1945, Greek Wars.
3. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 119, 144.
4. ^ History, Hellenic Air Force, archived from the original on 12 December 2008, retrieved 25 March 2008.
5. ^ ^{a b c} Ziemke.
6. ^ ^{a b c d} Beevor 1994, p. 26.
7. ^ Long 1953, pp. 182–183.
8. ^ ^{a b c} McClymont 1959, p. 486.
9. ^ ^{a b c d} Richter 1998, pp. 595–597.
10. ^ ^{a b} Bathe & Glodschey 1942, p. 246.
11. ^ ^{a b c} Greene 2014, p. 563.
12. ^ Hitler, Adolf, Speech to the Reichstag on 4 May 1941 
13. ^ Smith 1986.
14. ^ Johnston 2013, p. 18.
15. ^ Dear & Foot 1995, pp. 102–106.
16. ^ Kershaw 2007, p. 178.
17. ^ Hillgruber 1993, p. 506.
18. ^ von Rintelen 1951, pp. 90, 92–93, 98–99.
19. ^ ^{a b c d e} "Greece, History of". Helios.
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21. ^ Goldstein 1992, p. 53.
22. ^ ^{a b} Buckley 1984, p. 17.
23. ^ "Southern Europe 1940", War in Europe (timeline), World War-2.net.
24. ^ Buckley 1984, p. 19.
25. ^ Buckley 1984, pp. 18–20.
26. ^ Pearson 2006, p. 122.
27. ^ Bailey 1979, p. 22.
28. ^ More U-boat Aces Hunted down, 1941 Mar 16, On War, archived from the original on 30 September 2007, retrieved 30 September 2006.
29. ^ Richter 1998, p. 119.
30. ^ van Creveld 1972, p. 41.
31. ^ Rodogno 2006, pp. 29–30.
32. ^ Neville 2003, p. 165.
33. ^ Lee 2000, p. 146.
34. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 70–71.
35. ^ Blau 1986, p. 5.
36. ^ Lawlor 1994, p. 167.
37. ^ Barrass 2013.
38. ^ ^{a b} Blau 1986, pp. 71–72.
39. ^ Vick 1995, p. 22.
40. ^ ^{a b c d e f g} Weinberg 2005, p. 213.
41. ^ Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 2008, pp. 183–186.
42. ^ Weinberg 2005, pp. 211–214.
43. ^ Weinberg 2005, p. 211.
44. ^ Murray & Millett 2000, pp. 98–108.
45. ^ Weinberg 2005, pp. 213–214.
46. ^ ^{a b} Blau 1986, pp. 5–7.
47. ^ Svolopoulos 1997, pp. 285, 288.
48. ^ Keitel 1979, pp. 154–155.
49. ^ Svolopoulos 1997, p. 288.
50. ^ ^{a b c d e} Murray & Millett 2000, p. 102.
51. ^ Beevor 1994, p. 38.
52. ^ Weinberg 2005, p. 219.
53. ^ Weinberg 2005, pp. 216–219.
54. ^ ^{a b} Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 558.
55. ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 560.
56. ^ Weinberg 2005, pp. 215–216.
57. ^ McClymont 1959, p. 158.
58. ^ ^{a b c} Murray & Millett 2000, p. 103.
59. ^ Murray & Millett 2000, pp. 102–103.
60. ^ McClymont 1959, pp. 158–59.
61. ^ ^{a b c} Churchill 1991, p. 420.
62. ^ ^{a b} Helios 1945, George II.
63. ^ Helios 1945, Greece, History of.
64. ^ Simpson 2004, pp. 86–87.
65. ^ Blau 1986, p. 74.
66. ^ Balkan Operations – Order of Battle – W-Force – 5 April 1941, Orders of Battle.
67. ^ Thomas 1972, p. 127.
68. ^ ^{a b} Bailey 1979, p. 37.
69. ^ Blau 1986, p. 75.
70. ^ Lawlor 1994, pp. 191–192.
71. ^ ^{a b c d} Blau 1986, p. 77.
72. ^ ^{a b} McClymont 1959, pp. 106–107.
73. ^ Papagos 1949, p. 115.
74. ^ Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel 2008, pp. 494–496.
75. ^ ^{a b} Lawlor 1994, p. 168.
76. ^ McClymont 1959, pp. 107–108.
77. ^ Svolopoulos 1997, p. 290.
78. ^ Buckley 1984, pp. 40–45.
79. ^ "Disaster in Piraeus Harbour". Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 14 March 2015.
80. ^ Blau 1986, p. 79.
81. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 79–80.
82. ^ Blau 1986, p. 81.
83. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 82–83.
84. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 83–84.
85. ^ McClymont 1959, p. 160.
86. ^ Blau 1986, p. 86.
87. ^ Carr 2013, p. 211.
88. ^ Blau 1986, p. 87.
89. ^ Playfair et al. 1962, p. 86.
90. ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 2008, p. 237.
91. ^ ^{a b} Carr 2013, p. 162.
92. ^ Carruthers 2012, p. 10.
93. ^ Paoletti 2007, p. 178.
94. ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 153, 183–184.
95. ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 2008, p. 213.
96. ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 2008, pp. 228–229.
97. ^ Buckley 1984, pp. 30–33.
98. ^ ^{a b} Buckley 1984, p. 50.
99. ^ ^{a b} Blau 1986, p. 88.
100. ^ Beevor 1994, p. 33.
101. ^ Carr 2013, pp. 206–207.
102. ^ Sampatakakis 2008, p. 23.
103. ^ Buckley 1984, p. 61.
104. ^ Blau 1986, p. 89.
105. ^ Sharpe & Westwell 2008, p. 21.
106. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 89–91.
107. ^ Cawthorne 2003, p. 91.
108. ^ Blau 1986, p. 91.
109. ^ Detwiler, Burdick & Rohwer 1979, p. 94.
110. ^ Hondros 1983, p. 52.
111. ^ ^{a b c d e} Blau 1986, p. 94.
112. ^ Long 1953, ch. 5.
113. ^ ^{a b} Blau 1986, p. 98.
114. ^ van Crevald 1973, p. 162.
115. ^ Long 1953, p. 96.
116. ^ Long 1953, pp. 96–97.
117. ^ Long 1953, pp. 98–99.
118. ^ Blau 1986, p. 100.
119. ^ Churchill 2013, p. 199.
120. ^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 81–82.
121. ^ Beevor 1994, p. 39.
122. ^ ^{a b c} Carr 2013, p. 225.
123. ^ Bailey 1979, p. 32.
124. ^ Carr 2013, p. 214.
125. ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 2008, p. 248.
126. ^ Carr 2013, pp. 225–226.
127. ^ Long 1953, p. 95.
128. ^ Buckley 1984, p. 113.
129. ^ Carr 2013, pp. 218–219, 226.
130. ^ ^{a b c d} Keegan 2005, p. 158.
131. ^ Electrie 2008, p. 193.
132. ^ Faingold 2010, p. 133.
133. ^ Blau 1986, pp. 94–96.
134. ^ Hondros 1983, p. 90.
135. ^ Blau 1986, p. 103.
136. ^ Long 1953, p. 143.
137. ^ ^{a b c} Bailey 1979, p. 33.
138. ^ Clark 2010, pp. 188–189.
139. ^ Blau 1986, p. 104.
140. ^ Sampatakakis 2008, p. 28.
141. ^ ^{a b c} Blau 1986, p. 111.
142. ^ Keitel 1979, p. 166.
143. ^ Fafalios & Hadjipateras 1995, pp. 248–249.
144. ^ Long 1953, pp. 104–105.
145. ^ McClymont 1959, p. 362.
146. ^ Long 1953, p. 112.
147. ^ McClymont 1959, p. 366.
148. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 566–567, 580–581.
149. ^ McClymont 1959, pp. 362–363.
150. ^ Menzies 1941.
151. ^ Macdougall 2004, p. 194.
152. ^ ^{a b} Macdougall 2004, p. 195.
153. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 584–585.
154. ^ Richter 1998, p. 584.
155. ^ Blau 1986, p. 108.
156. ^ Gazette 1948, pp. 3052–3053.
157. ^ van Lierde, Ed. "Slamat Commemoration". Archived from the original on 6 January 2014. Retrieved 1 September 2013.
158. ^ Blau 1986, p. 112.
159. ^ Eggenberger 1985.
160. ^ Richter 1998, p. 595.
161. ^ Shrader 1999, p. 16.
162. ^ Churchill 2013, p. 419.
163. ^ Richter 1998, p. 602.
164. ^ ^{a b} Richter 1998, p. 615.
165. ^ Richter 1998, p. 616.
166. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 616–617.
167. ^ Carlton 1992, p. 136.
168. ^ Helios 1945, Crete, Battle of; George II.
169. ^ Beevor 1994, p. 231.
170. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Blau 1986, pp. 116–118.
171. ^ ^{a b c} McClymont 1959, pp. 471–472.
172. ^ ^{a b} Broad 1958, p. 113.
173. ^ Richter 1998, p. 624.
174. ^ Buckley 1984, p. 138.
175. ^ Richter 1998, p. 633.
176. ^ Lawlor 1982, pp. 936, 945.
177. ^ Stahel 2012, p. 14.
178. ^ van Creveld 1974, p. 91.
179. ^ McClymont 1959, pp. 475–476.
180. ^ McClymont 1959, p. 476.
181. ^ Richter 1998, p. 338.
182. ^ McClymont 1959, pp. 115, 476.
183. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 638–639.
184. ^ Eggenberger 1985, Greece (World War II).
185. ^ Riefenstahl 1987, p. 295.
186. ^ Bradley & Buell 2002, p. 101.
187. ^ Richter 1998, pp. 639–640.
188. ^ Richter 1998, p. 640.
189. ^ Kirchubel 2005, p. 16.
190. ^ Beevor 2012, p. 158.
191. ^ Hooker 1999.
192. ^ Glantz 2003, p. 27.
193. ^ Murray & Millett 2000, p. 105.
194. ^ ^{a b} Titterton 2002, p. 84.
195. ^ Duncan.
196. ^ Long 1953, pp. 182–183.
197. ^ ^{a b} Blau 1986, pp. 3–4.
198. ^ Sadkovich 1993, pp. 439–464.
199. ^ Blau 1986, p. 72.
200. ^ Papagos 1949, p. 317.
201. ^ Long 1953, p. 41.
202. ^ Beevor 1994, p. 60.

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• Macdougall, A. K. (2004). Australians at War: A Pictorial History. Noble Park: The Five Mile Press.
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• Murray, Williamson; Millett, Allan Reed (2000). "Diversions in the Mediterranean and Balkans". A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Journals

• Hooker, Richard D. Jr. (Spring 1999). "'The World Will Hold Its Breath': Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa". Parameters. United States Army War College: 150–64. Archived from the original on 2 May 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2017.
• Lawlor, Sheila (December 1982). "Greece, March 1941: The Politics of British Military Intervention". The Historical Journal. XXV (4): 933–946.
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• Sadkovich, James J. (July 1993). "The Italo-Greek War in Context: Italian Priorities and Axis Diplomacy". Journal of Contemporary History. XXVIII (3): 439–464.
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• van Creveld, Martin (1972). "In the Shadow of Barbarossa: Germany and Albania, January–March 1941".
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• van Creveld, Martin (1974). "Prelude to Disaster: The British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940–41". Journal of Contemporary History. IX (3): 65–92.
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Newspapers

• ^[
  OCLC 813744927
  . Retrieved 7 January 2014.

Websites

• "Balkan Operations – W-Force – 5 April 1941". Orders of Battle. Retrieved 31 March 2007.
• Barrass, M. B. (2013). "Air Marshal Sir John D'Albiac". Air of Authority: A History of RAF Organisation. Retrieved 31 March 2007.
• Duncan, George. "More Maritime Disasters of World War II". Historical Facts of World War II. Archived from the original on 1 September 2007. Retrieved 14 September 2007.
• "Events Marking the Anniversary of the Liberation of the City of Athens from Occupation Troops". News in English. The Hellenic Radio (ERA). 12 October 2000. Retrieved 23 April 2007.
• Menzies, Robert (1941). "The Greek campaign". Diary. Old Parliament House, Canberra. Archived from the original on 9 September 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2006.
• "More U-boat Aces Hunted down". Chronology of World War II. On War. 16 March 1941. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 6 October 2006.
• van Lierde, Ed. "Slamat Commemoration". NL: Koninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd Te Oudehorne. Archived from the original on 6 January 2014. Retrieved 7 January 2014.
• Ziemke, Earl F. "Balkan Campaigns". World War II Commemoration. Grolier. Archived from the original on 5 February 2007. Retrieved 4 April 2007.

Further reading

Books

• Barber, Laurie; Tonkin-Covell, John (1990). Freyberg: Churchill's Salamander. Hutchinson.
  ISBN 978-1-86941-052-0
  .
• Bitzes, John (1989). Greece in World War II: To April 1941. Sunflower University Press.
  ISBN 978-0-89745-093-5
  .
• Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002). Mussolini. London: Hodder Arnold.
  ISBN 978-0-340-73144-4
  .
• ISBN 978-0-8352-0693-8
  .
• Ciano, Galeazzo (1946). The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936–1943. Doubleday.
  OCLC 245645
  .
• Ėrlikhman, Vadim (1946). The Ciano Diaries: the Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936–1943. Doubleday.
  OCLC 245645
  .
• ISBN 978-0-241-10893-2
  .
• Hitler, Adolf (1981). Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann Diktate vom Februar und April 1945 [Hitler's political testament. The Bormann dictations from February and April 1945] (in German). Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus.
  ISBN 978-3-81355-111-2
  .
• OCLC 660825581
  .
• Panayiotis, Jerasimof Vatikiotis (1998). "Metaxas Becomes Prime Minister". Popular Autocracy in Greece, 1936–41: a Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas. Routledge.
  ISBN 978-0-7146-4869-9
  .
• Pelt, Mogens (1998). Tobacco, Arms and Politics: Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War, 1929–1941. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
  ISBN 978-87-7289-450-8
  .
• OCLC 4550659
  .
• Wards, Ian McLean (1952). "Panzer Attack in Greece". In Kippenberger, H. K. (ed.). Episodes & Studies. New Zealand in the Second World War. Vol. II. Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs.
  OCLC 173284173
  .

Encyclopedias

• "Campaign in Greece". The Encyclopedia Americana. Danbury: Grolier. 2000.
  ISBN 978-0-7172-0133-4
  .

Journals

• Kitsikis, Dimitri (July–September 1967). "La Grèce entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, de 1936 à 1941" [Greece between England & Germany, 1936–41]. Revue Historique (in French). 238 (91e année). Paris.
• Koliopoulos, Ioannis S. (1976–1977). "Η στρατιωτική και πολιτική κρίση στην Ελλάδα τον Απρίλιο του 1941" [The Military and Political Crisis in Greece in April 1941] (PDF). Μνήμων (in Greek). 6: 53–74.
  doi:10.12681/mnimon.174
  .
• Sadkovich, James J. (October 1994). "Anglo-American bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940–1941". The Journal of Military History. 58 (4): 617–42.
  JSTOR 2944271
  .
• Sadkovich, James J. (May 1994). "Italian Morale during the Italo-Greek War of 1940–1941". War and Society. 12 (1): 97–123.
  doi:10.1179/072924794794954323
  .

Websites

• Pilavios, Konstantinos (director); Tomai, Fotini (text & presentation) (28 October 2010). "The Heroes Fight like Greeks—Greece during the Second World War" (Motion Picture) (in Greek). Athens: Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 31 October 2010. Retrieved 28 October 2010.
• Roosevelt, Franklin D. (5 December 1940). "President Roosevelt to King George of Greece". Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941. Archived from the original on 14 August 2007. Retrieved 1 August 2007.
• "A Great Risk in a Good Cause, Australians in Greece and Crete April – May 1941". Department of Veterans' Affairs. May 2001. Archived from the original on 20 May 2009. Retrieved 5 May 2009.
• "Judgement: The Aggression Against Yugoslavia and Greece". The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. Archived from the original on 13 October 2007. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
• "To Greece". Australian War Memorial. Archived from the original on 6 June 2007. Retrieved 4 July 2007.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Greece.

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Adolf Hitler's Order of the Day Calling for Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Address to the Reichstag (4 May 1941)

• The Fate of the Jews in South-Eastern Europe During the First Years of the War on the Yad Vashem website