Battle of Groix
Battle of Groix | |
---|---|
Part of the 5 messidor an III) | |
Location | 47°35′N 3°20′W / 47.583°N 3.333°W |
Result | British victory |
3 ships of the line captured
The Battle of Groix (
Villaret, believing that the stronger British fleet would destroy his own 12 ships of the line, ordered his force to fall back to the inshore anchorage off Groix, hoping to take shelter in protected coastal waters. Several of his ships were too slow, falling behind so that early in the morning of 23 June the rearmost ships of his fleet were caught by the British vanguard, overhauled one by one and brought to battle. Although Villaret fought a determined rearguard action, three French ships were captured, all with very heavy casualties, and the remainder of the French fleet was left scattered across miles of coastline. In this position they were highly vulnerable to continued British attack, but after only a few hours' engagement, concerned that his ships might be wrecked on the rocky coastline, Bridport called off the action and allowed Villaret to regroup inshore and retreat to Lorient.
Although the battle was a British victory, there was criticism of Bridport's rapid withdrawal. British historians have subsequently considered that a unique opportunity to destroy the French Atlantic fleet had been lost. The invasion at Quiberon ended in disaster a month later, although Bridport remained at sea in the region until September. The French fleet by contrast was trapped in the port of Lorient where food supplies ran out, forcing Villaret to discharge many of his ships' crews. As a result, most ships did not return to Brest until the winter and were consequently unable to threaten British control of the French coastline for the remainder of the year. Several French captains were court-martialled following the battle, with two dismissed from the Navy for disobeying orders.
Background
The first two years of the French Revolutionary Wars had seen the French Atlantic Fleet, based principally at the Breton harbour of Brest, suffer a series of setbacks. The tense atmosphere in France following the French Revolution was reflected in the fleet, which suffered a mutiny in September 1793 followed by a purge of suspected anti-republicans which resulted in the death or imprisonment of a number of experienced commanders.[1][2] In May 1794, the French fleet sallied into the Atlantic to protect an incoming grain convoy from the United States and was attacked by the British Channel Fleet at the battle of the Glorious First of June, losing seven ships, although the convoy was saved. In the winter of 1794–1795, five more French ships were lost in a disastrous sortie in the middle of the Atlantic winter storm season known as the Croisière du Grand Hiver. By the spring of 1795, the British Channel Fleet was in the ascendancy, enforcing a distant blockade of the French fleet in Brest.[3]
In May 1795, with much of the winter's damage repaired, the French commander
On the morning of 16 June Cornwallis returned to the region, hunting for Vence, and instead discovered Villaret de Joyeuse with an overwhelming force. This time Cornwallis was forced to retreat, heading into open water with the French fleet in pursuit. Cornwallis was hampered by the poor sailing of two of his squadron, and on the morning of 17 June the leading French ships were close enough to open fire on his rearguard.[7] Throughout the day the French vanguard kept up a distant but continual fire on the rearmost British ship HMS Mars, until eventually the ship began to fall behind. In an effort to protect Mars, Cornwallis interposed his 100-gun flagship HMS Royal Sovereign between the British squadron and the French force, its massive broadsides driving the French back.[8] At the same time, Cornwallis had ordered the frigate HMS Phaeton to range ahead of his squadron making false signals announcing the imminent arrival of a British fleet. These signals, in combination with the coincidental appearance of unidentified sails to the north, caused Villaret to become so concerned that at 18:40 he called off pursuit and returned to the French coast, allowing Cornwallis to return to Britain without further incident. The engagement was subsequently known as Cornwallis's Retreat.[9]
Unbeknownst to either Villaret or Cornwallis, the British Channel Fleet was also at sea, having sailed from
Engagement off Groix
Villaret's retreat
It was one of Warren's ships, the frigate
The adverse southeasterly winds frustrated both fleets, and it was not until 03:30 on 22 June that lookouts on Bridport's scouting frigates
All day the chase continued: at 12:00 the French fleet were approximately 12 nautical miles (22 km) distant, and all through the afternoon the British ships slowly gained on their opponents, both sides hampered by long periods of calm weather.[16] To ensure that his fleet was in a position to intercept the French whichever tack they took, Bridport split his fleet across a wide front, clustered in two trailing groups. At 19:00, Bridport signaled for his ships to attack the rearmost French vessels, and at 19:25 to attack French ships as and when they overhauled them, taking up mutually supportive positions.[14][17] At 22:30 a calm fell, arresting both fleets until 03:00 on 23 June, when a light breeze from the south-west was enough to allow Bridport's fleet to push onwards so that as dawn rose the French were dead ahead. The main body of the French fleet was sailing in a loose cluster with three or four ships trailing behind and one ship, Alexandre under Captain François Charles Guillemet far to the rear and only 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) from the British vanguard.[19] Alexandre had been a British ship until November 1794, when she had been captured in a sharp engagement with a French squadron in which the ship had been badly damaged.[20] The ship was a poor sailer, and its position was worsened by poor handling by Guillemet who did not follow Villaret's orders to form a line of battle rapidly enough.[21]
Against expectation, Bridport's leading ship was Queen Charlotte, which had attained an unusually fast speed for a first rate through the carefully planned sailing of Captain
23 June
With Alexandre now in danger of becoming isolated, Villaret sent the frigate
At 06:15, Queen Charlotte passed Alexandre and began firing on Formidable, Linois returning fire against his much larger enemy for fifteen minutes before a fire broke out on the
At 07:00, four British ships and six French fought a confused melee while the French vanguard continued eastwards without pause and the slower portions of the British fleet struggled to come up in the light winds.[23] The entire combat was slowly pulling closer to the fortified rocky island of Groix, close to which Villaret intended to shelter his fleet. Douglas in Queen Charlotte had been forced out of the engagement due to severe damage to his rigging and sails which made his ship unmanageable. At 07:14, he drifted past the shattered hull of Alexandre; Captain Guillemet opened fire briefly before surrendering as Douglas returned it with devastating effect.[29] Even as his ship fell back, Douglas continued to engage the French at long range, turning the guns on Peuple and Tigre, joined by Sans Pareil which attacked Tigre under Captain Jacques Bedout and forced it out of the French formation with severe damage. Villaret again attempted to gather his forces in support of Tigre, and even positioned his frigate ahead of his own fleeing ships in hope of cutting off their retreat and forcing them to imitate his own manoeuvres, but in vain; "they would have passed over my very body had not representant Topsent taken command and prevented a collision", he wrote in his report.[30] As Tigre fell out of line, Queen and London joined the attack on the isolated ship, and Bedout was forced to surrender in the face of overwhelming odds.[31] The French ship had been severely damaged, with 8 feet (2.4 m) of water in the hold, the masts and rigging badly torn and more than 130 men killed or wounded, including Bedout, who had been hit three times.[32]
At 07:57, Bridport's Royal George reached the combat, Douglas falling in behind his ship in anticipation of a renewed attack, the crew of Queen Charlotte having conducted enough hasty repairs to regain control of their ship. At 08:15 Bridport signaled Colossus under Captain
Aftermath
Bridport gave instructions as he withdrew for Alexandre, Formidable and Tigre to be taken under tow by HMS Prince, HMS Barfleur and HMS Prince George respectively.[34] The British fleet was in good condition: five ships had seen no action at all and of those that had fought, only Queen Charlotte had suffered any significant damage, principally to her rigging. The British fleet had lost 31 men killed and 113 wounded; Queen Charlotte and Colossus had the heaviest casualties of 36 and 35 respectively.[15] Bridport placed prize crews on the captured vessels and sent them back to Britain while turning the fleet back eastwards once it had reached a safe distance from the coast, in order to provide support for Warren's expedition to Quiberon. Warren landed the French Royalist forces at Carnac on 27 June, but the invasion ended in disaster a month later, the surviving Royalists driven back to the coast and collected by Warren.[35] Bridport had remained off Quiberon to ensure that Villaret did not return to harass the expeditionary force, returning to Britain on 20 September but leaving the bulk of the blockade fleet off the Breton coast under Rear-Admiral Henry Harvey. The 68-year-old Bridport was forcibly retired in October after an unrelated argument with First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer, but was reinstated in 1796 and continued to serve in command of the Channel Fleet until 1800.[36][37]
Villaret meanwhile gathered his scattered ships and called a council of his senior officers on the frigate
In common with the battle of the Glorious First of June the previous year,
All three captured ships were taken into the Royal Navy. The name of Alexandre reverted to the former Alexander, and although James suggests that the ship was never again fit for frontline service, this claim is refuted by Alexander's presence in the line at the Battle of the Nile in 1798 under Captain Alexander Ball.[45] Tigre retained her French name, while Formidable, as there was already a ship by that name in the Royal Navy, became HMS Belleisle, apparently due to confusion between the islands of Groix and Belle Île in the aftermath of the battle.[46] Belleisle had a long and successful career, fighting at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 under Captain William Hargood.[47]
More controversial than the distribution of commendations was the debate over Bridport's decision to withdraw from the battle while the remainder of the French fleet was still within reach. In his official dispatch, the British admiral wrote that "If the Enemy had not been protected and sheltered by the Land, I have every reason to believe that a much greater Number, if not all the Line of Battle ships, would have been taken or destroyed", going on note that "When the ships struck, the British squadron was near to some Batteries [on Groix], and in the Face of a strong Naval Port [Lorient].
References
- ^ James, p. 59
- ^ Willis, p. 34
- ^ Gardiner, Fleet Battle and Blockade p. 16
- ^ Clowes, p. 255
- ^ Clowes, p. 256
- ^ James, pp. 237–238
- ^ James, p. 240
- ^ Clowes, p. 257
- ^ James, p. 241
- ^ Gardiner, Fleet Battle and Blockade p. 48
- ^ a b James, p. 244
- ^ James, p. 243
- ^ James, p. 238
- ^ a b c d James, p. 245
- ^ a b c d "No. 13790". The London Gazette. 27 June 1795. pp. 673–674.
- ^ a b c Clowes, p. 261
- ^ a b Brenton, p. 231
- ^ Clowes, p. 260
- ^ James, pp. 245–246
- ^ a b Clowes, p. 262
- ^ Rouvier, p. 210
- ^ Gardiner, Campaign of Trafalgar p. 101
- ^ a b James, p. 246
- ^ Chasseriau, p. 240
- ^ Allen, p. 184
- ^ James, pp. 246–248
- ^ Brenton, p. 232
- ^ Rouvier, p. 212
- ^ Clowes, pp. 262–263
- ^ Chasseriau, p. 242
- ^ a b c d James, p. 247
- ^ Rouvier, p. 213
- ^ Décret no 1051 de la Convention nationale, Collection générale des décrets rendus par la Convention Nationale, Volume 51, Retrieved 28 April 2012
- ^ a b Clowes, p. 263
- ^ a b Clowes, p. 266
- doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/13671. (Subscription or UK public library membershiprequired.)
- ^ Clowes, p. 267
- ^ a b c James, p. 249
- ^ James, p. 253
- ^ James, p. 248
- ^ Granier, p. 98
- ^ Rouvier, p. 214
- ^ James, p. 181
- ^ Clowes, p. 265
- ^ Winfield, p. 51
- ^ James, p. 250
- doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/12312. (Subscription or UK public library membershiprequired.)
- ^ Mostert, p. 164
- ^ Woodman, p. 61
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- Gardiner, Robert, ed. (2001) [1996]. Fleet Battle and Blockade. Caxton Editions. ISBN 978-1-84067-363-0.
- Gardiner, Robert, ed. (2001) [1998]. The Campaign of Trafalgar. Caxton Editions. ISBN 1-84067-358-3.
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- Mostert, Noel (2007). The Line upon a Wind: The Greatest War Fought at Sea Under Sail 1793–1815. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-7126-0927-2.
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- Willis, Sam (2011). The Glorious First of June. Quercus. ISBN 978-1-84916-039-1.
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