Battle of Haman
Battle of Haman | |
---|---|
Part of the South Korea | |
Result | United Nations victory |
~400 wounded
The Battle of Haman was one engagement in the larger
Operating in defense of Masan during the Battle of Masan, the US 24th Infantry Regiment was stretched along a long line on a ridge to the west of the town, at Haman. When the KPA 6th Division attacked the town, the US troops fought to repel their advance in a weeklong battle in which the 24th Infantry performed poorly, and other US reinforcements were brought in to assist in fighting off the attack.
Background
Pusan Perimeter
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA
September push
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of the UN naval forces.[12] Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it; this was considered to be the only hope of achieving success in the battle.[4] Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union, the North Koreans were aware of the UN forces building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that they must conduct an offensive soon or they could not win the battle.[15] A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.[16][17]
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed
Battle
North Korean attack
In the left center of the 25th Division line, Lieutenant Colonel Paul F. Roberts' 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, held the crest of the second ridge west of Haman, 1 mile (1.6 km) from the town. From Chungam-ni, in KPA territory, a secondary road led to Haman along the shoulders of low hills and across
That night the KPA launched a coordinated offensive against the entire UN force. The KPA 6th Division advanced first, hitting F Company on the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni-Haman road. The ROK troops in the pass left their positions and fell back on G Company south of the pass.
On the line farther to the south, KPA
24th Infantry collapses
Shortly after the KPA attack started most of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, fled its positions.[28] One company at a time, the battalion was struck with strong attacks all along its front, and with the exception of a few dozen men in each company, each formation quickly crumbled, with most of the troops running back to Haman against the orders of their officers.[17] The KPA passed through the crumbling US lines quickly and overran the 2nd Battalion command post, killing several men there and destroying much of the battalion's equipment.[29] With the 2nd Battalion broken, Haman was open to direct KPA attack. As the KPA encircled Haman, Lt. Col. Roberts ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establish a roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directed a large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so.[30] The 2nd Battalion was no longer an effective fighting force.[28] Pockets of its soldiers remained in place and fought fiercely, but the majority fled upon attack, and the KPA were able to move around the uneven resistance. They surrounded Haman as the 2nd Battalion crumbled in disarray.[31]
Regimental commander Colonel
The assault did not strike the southern part of the line held by Lieutenant Colonel
When the KPA attack broke through the 2nd Battalion, Champney ordered the 1st Battalion, about 3 miles (4.8 km) south of Haman on the Chindong-ni road, to counterattack and restore the line.[35] Roberts assembled 40 men, all he could find of the disorganized 2nd Battalion, to join in this counterattack, which got under way at 07:30. Upon contact with the KPA, the 1st Battalion broke and fled to the rear.[28] Thus, shortly after daylight the scattered and disorganized men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Infantry had fled to the high ground 2 miles (3.2 km) east of Haman.[36] The better part of two regiments of the KPA 6th Division poured into and through the Haman gap, now that they were holding the town.[28]
North Korean breakthrough
General Kean saw the KPA breakthrough at Haman as a serious threat to his division's line. At dawn on September 1, Kean requested permission from Eighth Army commander General Walton S. Walker to commit the entire 27th Infantry Regiment, just arrived at Masan the previous evening and still held in Eighth Army reserve. Walker denied this request, but did release one battalion of the regiment to Kean's control.[37] Kean immediately dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert J. Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry from its assembly area near Masan toward Haman, to be attached to the 24th Infantry upon arrival at the regimental command post.[38] The 1st Platoon of the 27th Regiment's Heavy Mortar Company; a platoon of B Company, 89th Tank Battalion; and A Battery, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforced Check's battalion. Check with his battalion arrived at Champney's 24th Infantry command post 2 miles (3.2 km) east of Haman at 10:00.[37]
The scene there was chaotic. Large numbers of vehicles loaded with soldiers were moving down the road to the rear. Many soldiers on foot were on the road. Champney tried repeatedly but in vain to get these men to stop and turn around.[39] The few KPA mortar shells falling occasionally in the vicinity did no damage except to cause the troops of the 24th Infantry and intermingled ROK to panic further and increase their speed to the rear.[40] The road was so clogged with retreating troops that Check had to delay his counterattack. In the six hours he waited at this point, Check observed that none of the retreating troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Infantry, could be assembled as units. Military police tried in vain to reassemble troops, but they refused even at gunpoint. At 16:00, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, assembling in the rear of the 27th Infantry, could muster only 150 to 200 men.[39]
The KPA, in the meantime, were suffering serious
UN counterattack
At 14:45 on September 1, Kean ordered an immediate counterattack to restore the 24th Infantry positions.
All day September 2, air strikes harassed the KPA and prevented them from consolidating their gains and reorganizing for further coordinated attack. Some of the planes came from the carriers USS Valley Forge and USS Philippine Sea, 200 miles (320 km) away in the Yellow Sea and steaming toward the Masan battlefield. At 10:45, Eighth Army messaged Kean that the 27th Infantry was to be alerted for a possible move north into the US 2nd Infantry Division sector. West of Haman the KPA and US troops faced each other during the night without further battle, but the KPA kept flares over their position. In the rear areas, KPA mortar fire on the 24th Regiment command post caused Champney to move it still farther to the rear.[39]
In the morning, under cover of a heavy ground fog, the KPA struck Check's battalion in a counterattack. This began a heavy fight which lasted all morning. Air strikes using napalm incinerated many KPA troops and helped the infantry to gain the ridge.[42] At 12:00, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, secured the former positions of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, and took over the same foxholes that unit had abandoned two nights before.[38] During September 2, the USAF flew 135 sorties in the 25th Infantry Division sector, reportedly destroying many KPA units, several tanks and artillery pieces, and three villages containing ammunition dumps.[42]
Early the next morning, September 3, the KPA heavily attacked Check's men in an effort to regain the ridge. Artillery, mortar, and tank fire barrages, and an air strike directed from the battalion command post, met this attack. Part of the battalion had to turn and fight toward its rear. After the attack had been repulsed hundreds of KPA lay dead around the battalion position. A prisoner estimated that during September 2 and 3 the four KPA battalions fighting Check's battalion had lost 1,000 men.[42]
Check's battalion held the ridge until dark on September 4, then the 1st Battalion and F Company of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, which had reorganized in the rear, relieved it.[43] The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry moved back into a secondary defensive position at 1.5 miles (2.4 km) east of Haman.[38] Champney moved his command post back into Haman, placing it at the base of a hill 300 metres (980 ft) west of the center of the town.[43]
Infiltration
Before dawn on September 5, a KPA force of two companies moved against Haman again.[43] A part of this force approached the hill at the western edge of Haman, where H Company was posted as security for the 24th Regiment command post situated at its base.[40] Most of the H Company men left their post without firing a shot, abandoning two new machine guns. KPA captured the guns and opened fire on the regimental command post. A small group of KPA infiltrated into Haman within 100 yards (91 m) of the command post, where members of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon drove them off in a grenade battle.[43]
About 20 KPA soldiers approached, undiscovered, close enough to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, command post west of Haman to throw grenades and fire into it. About 45 soldiers of the battalion command group and 20 ROK recruits were in position there at the time. The KPA were driven off at dawn, but
At the time of this infiltration, a white officer and 35–40 African-American soldiers left their position south of Haman at a roadblock and fled to the rear until they reached Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, command post 1.5 miles (2.4 km) away. There, at 05:00 this officer said 2,000 KPA had overrun his position and others near Haman, including the 24th Regiment command post. Check reported this story to Kean, and then sent a platoon of tanks with a platoon of infantry toward Haman to find out what had happened. Some of his officers, meanwhile, had stopped about 220 soldiers streaming to the rear. Check ordered these men to follow his tank and infantry patrol back into Haman. Some of them did so only when threatened with being shot. The tank-led column entered Haman unopposed, where they found the 24th Regiment command post intact and everything quiet.[44] The next day, September 6, a sniper severely wounded Champney while he was inspecting his front-line positions west of Haman and Champney was evacuated.[40] The commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, Corley, succeeded to the command of the regiment.[44]
After the KPA infiltration on September 7 was repelled, the KPA attack on Haman ground to a halt. The KPA, racked by logistical and manpower shortages, focused more heavily on their attacks against 24th Infantry positions on Battle Mountain, as well as 35th Infantry positions at the Nam River. 24th Infantry troops at Haman encountered only probing attacks until September 18.[45]
North Korean withdrawal
The UN
On September 19 the UN discovered the KPA had abandoned Battle Mountain during the night, and the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, moved up and occupied it. On the right, the 35th Infantry began moving forward.[49] There was only light resistance until it reached the high ground in front of Chungam-ni where hidden KPA soldiers in spider holes shot at 1st Battalion soldiers from the rear. The next day the 1st Battalion captured Chungam-ni, and the 2nd Battalion captured the long ridge line running northwest from it to the Nam River. Meanwhile, the KPA still held strongly against the division left where the 27th Infantry had heavy fighting in trying to move forward.[50]
The KPA withdrew from the Masan area the night of September 18–19. The KPA 7th Division withdrew from south of the Nam River while the 6th Division sideslipped elements to cover the entire front. Covered by the 6th Division, the 7th had crossed to the north side of the Nam River by the morning of September 19. Then the KPA 6th Division had withdrawn from its positions on Sobuk-san.
Aftermath
The 24th Infantry suffered 267 killed, 796 wounded, one captured and two missing during its time at the Pusan Perimeter, of which 450 were wounded and 150 were killed at Battle Mountain. The 8th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 24th Infantry, suffered 18 killed and 26 wounded, while the 79th Tank Battalion, also in support, suffered two killed and 20 wounded.[52]
The KPA suffered heavily in the fight for Masan, and most became casualties in the attack. By mid-September, the KPA 7th Division was reduced to just 4,000 men, a loss of 6,000 from when it was committed to the perimeter.[53] Only 2,000 from the KPA 6th Division returned to North Korea, a loss of 80 percent of its strength. Up to 3,000 troops were captured as they attempted to return to North Korea. The attacking force of over 20,000 had been reduced to only 6,000 by the end of the fights around Masan. It is nearly impossible, however, to calculate how many were lost in each individual engagement.[54]
Desertion was a problem for the 24th Infantry; the 25th Infantry Division had to detain 116 deserters from the 24th Infantry during August, compared to 15 from the 27th Infantry and 12 from the 35th Infantry.
Citations
Note
- ^ North Korean casualties can only be given for the whole battle of Masan, of which the battle of Haman is part. It is nearly impossible to estimate casualties for just the battle of Haman.
References
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 392
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 6
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 138
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 393
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 367
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 149
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 369
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 130
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 139
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 353
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 143
- ^ a b Catchpole 2001, p. 31
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 136
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 135
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 139
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 508
- ^ a b c Alexander 2003, p. 181
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 395
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 132
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 438
- ^ a b c Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 157
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 148
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 155
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 162
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1998, p. 440
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 163
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 153
- ^ a b c d e f Appleman 1998, p. 441
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 164
- ^ a b Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 167
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 165
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 158
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 166
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 168
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 169
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 184
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 479
- ^ a b c Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 170
- ^ a b c d Appleman 1998, p. 480
- ^ a b c Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 171
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 183
- ^ a b c Appleman 1998, p. 481
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1998, p. 482
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 483
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 175
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 568
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 177
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 569
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 179
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 570
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 180
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 29
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 546
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 603
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 113
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 572
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 172
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 173
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 174
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the original on 2014-02-07, retrieved 2010-12-13 This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- Bowers, William T.; Hammong, William M.; MacGarrigle, George L. (2005), Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, ISBN 978-1-4102-2467-5
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84119-413-4
- Ecker, Richard E. (2004), Battles of the Korean War: A Chronology, with Unit-by-Unit United States Casualty Figures & Medal of Honor Citations, ISBN 978-0-7864-1980-7
- ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3
- Millett, Allan R. (2000). The Korean War, Volume 1. ISBN 978-0-8032-7794-6.
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4
Further reading
- Gugeler, Russell A. (2005). Combat Actions in Korea. University Press of the Pacific. ISBN 978-1-4102-2451-4.