Battle of Insubria
Battle of Insubria | |||||||
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Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
The Mediterranean in 218 BC | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Carthage | Roman Republic | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Mago Barca (WIA) |
Publius Quintilius Varus Marcus Cornelius Cethegus | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
21,000 troops, 7 elephants, 25 warships | four legions plus allies (approximately 35,000) | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
5,000 killed Mago severely wounded22 ensigns captured [Livy XXX/XVIII] |
2,300+ killed 3 tribunes killed [Livy XXX/XVIII] | ||||||
The Battle of Insubria in 203 BC was the culmination of a major war, carried out by the Carthaginian commander
Preceding events
After the disastrous
This undertaking was a last try of the Carthaginians to regain the initiative in the war, which had come to a very dangerous phase for them. With the reconquest of Sicily in 211/210 BC, the destruction of Hasdrubal Barca’s army on the Metaurus river (207 BC) and now with the conquest of Iberia (206 BC), the Romans were not only relieved from immediate pressure but were gaining more and more resources to continue the fight. For the first time since the beginning of the war Carthage was left directly vulnerable to attack, which it could not prevent because of the naval supremacy of Rome.
Along with the instructions, Mago received some money for mercenaries, but not enough to raise a stronger army. So he was forced to requisition not only the public treasury of Gades, but also the wealth from its temples. Search for additional resources was the apparent reason for an unsuccessful naval assault on
Mago's expedition
In the summer of 205 BC, a Carthaginian fleet emerged suddenly at the Ligurian coast. With about 30 warships and many transport vessels, Mago had brought a 14,000 strong army. He took Genua by surprise and then moved to the land of the Ingauni, forming an alliance with them against another Ligurian tribe, the Epanterii.[2]
Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul presented a very suitable ground for Mago's operations. Despite the victorious campaigns in the Po valley before the outbreak of the Second Punic war and the extensive colonization, Rome did not entirely manage to subjugate the local Gauls. Led by the Insubres and Boii, they rose to arms once again just before the invasion of Hannibal (218 BC) and joined the latter's army by the thousands. The same happened on the arrival of Hasdrubal from Iberia in 207 BC and there was no exception in 205 BC, when the younger brother of Hannibal came. "His (Mago's) army grew in numbers every day; the Gauls, drawn by the spell of his name, flocked to him from all parts." Hearing such news, the senators in Rome were filled with "gravest apprehensions". They immediately sent two armies to Ariminum (modern Rimini) and Arretium (modern Arezzo) in order to block an eventual advance of Mago to the south.[2]
It looked as if the Romans were going to pay for their failure to capitalize from the victory at the Metaurus river by conquering the Cisalpine Gauls once and for all, but the danger caused by Mago's landing was not to be overestimated. Even when he received reinforcements from Carthage in the form of about 7,000 troops, 7 elephants, and 25 warships,[3] his strength was still far from enough to break the Roman defences. This is why Mago did not seem to actively pursue the goal set by Carthage – to march south and join Hannibal.
This call was spurred by the raids of C. Laelius, a
Mago had to accomplish the same task in which his other brother, Hasdrubal, had failed two years ago. Bearing in mind Hasdrubal's fate, he knew that an eventual offensive against the concentrating Roman forces had to be well-prepared. So he organized a meeting of Gallic and Ligurian chieftains and assured them that his mission was to liberate them, but for that he needed many more soldiers. The Ligurians committed themselves immediately, but the Gauls, threatened by the Roman armies on the borders and inside their homeland, declined to revolt openly. Nevertheless, they secretly provided supplies and mercenaries and his strength grew gradually.[6]
In the meantime, the proconsul M. Livius moved from Etruria into Cisalpine Gaul and joined forces with the Roman commander there, Sp. Lucretius, blocking Mago's way to Rome. However, Livius remained on the defensive.
The battle in Insubria
In 203 BC, the time came for decisive action. The proconsul M. Cornelius Cethegus and the praetor P. Quintilius Varus led an army of four legions against Mago in a regular battle in the Insubrian land (not far from modern
The course of the battle showed that the first Carthaginian line performed better and the Gauls were less reliable. From the onset, the Romans made futile attempts to break the enemy's resistance and were pressed hard themselves. Then Varus moved the cavalry (3,000 or 4,000 horsemen), hoping to repulse and confuse the Carthaginian lines. However, Mago was not surprised and moved forward the elephants just in time. The horses were stricken by fear and as a result the Roman cavalry was dispersed, chased by Mago's light
According to Livy, all ended with a general retreating of the Carthaginians, who lost up to 5,000 men. Yet, as Livy himself states, the Romans owed their success to the wounding of the Carthaginian commander, who had to be carried away almost fainting from the field because his thigh was pierced. The victory was neither bloodless, nor complete. The first Roman line lost 2,300 men, and the second also took casualties, among them three military tribunes. The cavalry was not spared either, and many noble Equites were trampled to death by the elephants.[10] During the night Mago withdrew his forces to the Ligurian coast, conceding the battlefield to the Romans.[12]
Assessment
For Mago the setback was severe, considering what gains a victory would have brought. (In 218 BC, the victory in the
Some sources claim that Mago died during this voyage from the wound that he suffered in the battle,
References
- ^ Livy, History of Rome, XXVIII, 36; Cassius Dio, Roman History, XVI
- ^ a b Livy, XXVIII, 46
- ^ Livy, XXIX, 4; Appian, The Punic Wars, II, 9
- ^ Livy, XXIX, 4; Cassius Dio, XVII
- ^ Mommsen, Theodor, The History of Rome, Book III
- ^ a b Livy, XXIX, 5
- ^ Mommsen, Theodor, The History of Rome, Book III, Chapter VI
- ^ Livy, XXIX, 15; Cassius Dio, XVII, 70
- ^ "Etruria... was almost wholly in sympathy with Mago, hoping to effect a revolution with his help." (Livy, XXIX, 36)
- ^ a b Livy, XXX, 18
- ^ Caven, Punic Wars, pp. 246-7
- ^ a b c Livy, XXX, 19
- ^ Cassius Dio, XVII
- ^ Appian, The Punic Wars, VIII, 49; IX, 59
- ^ Smith, William (ed.), Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Vol. 2, pp. 330-331 Archived 2006-06-23 at the Wayback Machine
Basic literature and external links
In English:
- Works related to From the Founding of the City (1905) by Livy, (transl. Canon Roberts) at Wikisource.
- Livy, The History of Rome, Vol. IV (ed. E. Rhys, transl. C. Roberts), available at University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, retrieved on 2007-10-3
- Cassius Dio, Roman History, on Bill Thayer's Web Site, LacusCurtius, retrieved on 2007-10-9
- Appian, Roman History, The Punic Wars, retrieved from "Livius Articles on Ancient History" on 2007-10-9
- Mommsen, Theodor, The History of Rome, Book III, The Gutenberg Project eBook, retrieved on 2007-09-30 (in German)
- Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1980, ISBN 0-297-77633-9
- Smith, William (ed.), Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, made available by the University of Michigan, retrieved on 2007-10-3
In Russian:
- Тит Ливий, История Рима от основания города
- Кораблев, И.Ш., Ганнибал, Москва, "Наука", 1976, с. 284, 289-290, на сайте Студенческого научного общества