Malayan campaign
Malayan campaign | |||||||||
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Part of the Pacific War of World War II | |||||||||
Troops of the Imperial Japanese Army crouch on a street in Johor Bahru in the final stages of the Malayan campaign | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
British Empire Communist Party of Malaya[1] | |||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Archibald Wavell Robert Brooke-Popham Arthur Percival Lewis Heath David Murray-Lyon Archibald Paris † Arthur Barstow † Gordon Bennett Tom Phillips † Conway Pulford † Leong Yew Koh[1] Lai Teck |
Hisaichi Terauchi Tomoyuki Yamashita Takuro Matsui Takuma Nishimura Renya Mutaguchi Michio Sugawara Nobutake Kondō Jisaburō Ozawa Shintarō Hashimoto Ibrahim Yaacob | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
Far East Command[a] ABDA Command[b] Malaya Command
RAF Far East
ML-KNIL
East Indies Fleet MPAJA[1] |
South Expeditionary Army
2nd Fleet Royal Thai Police Young Malays Union | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
130,246 troops[2] 253 aircraft 810 artillery pieces 208+ anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns 54 fortress guns[3][c] 250+ AFVs[3][d][4] 15,400+ motor vehicles[5][e] |
125,408 troops[6] 799 aircraft[7] 440+ artillery pieces[8] 265 tanks[9] 3,000+ trucks[10] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
130,246 (Including the casualties of the | 14,768 (Including the casualties of the |
History of Malaysia |
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Malaysia portal |
The Malayan campaign, referred to by Japanese sources as the Malay Operation (馬来作戦, Maree Sakusen), was a military campaign fought by Allied and Axis forces in Malaya, from 8 December 1941 – 15 February 1942 during the Second World War. It was dominated by land battles between British Commonwealth army units and the Imperial Japanese Army, with minor skirmishes at the beginning of the campaign between British Commonwealth and Royal Thai Police. The Japanese had air and naval supremacy from the opening days of the campaign. For the British, Indian, Australian, and Malayan forces defending the colony, the campaign was a total disaster.
The operation is notable for the Japanese use of
Background
Japanese
By 1941 the Japanese had been engaged for four years in trying to subjugate China. They were heavily reliant on imported materials for their military forces, particularly oil from the United States.[18] From 1940 to 1941, following the Japanese takeover of French colonies the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands imposed embargoes on supplying oil and war materials to Japan.[18] The object of the embargoes was to assist the Chinese and encourage the Japanese to halt military action in China. The Japanese considered that pulling out of China would result in a loss of face and decided instead to take military action against US, British and Dutch territories in South East Asia.[18] The Japanese forces for the invasion were assembled in 1941 on Hainan Island and in French Indochina. This troop build-up was noticed by the Allies and, when asked, the Japanese advised that it related to its operations in China.
When the Japanese invaded, they had over 200
When the Japanese invaded Malaya it was part of expansive attack all across the Pacific and South East Asia, stretching from Pearl Harbor and islands in the Pacific, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Burma, Singapore, Borneo, and Thailand.[20][21]
Commonwealth
Between the wars, the British military strategy in the
By 1940, however, the army commander in Malaya, Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, conceded that a successful defence of Singapore demanded the defence of the whole peninsula, and that the naval base alone would not be sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion.[23] Military planners concluded that the desired Malayan air force strength would be 300–500 aircraft, but this was never reached because of the higher priorities in the allocation of men and material for Britain and the Middle East.[citation needed]
The defence strategy for Malaya rested on two basic assumptions: first, that there would be sufficient early warning of an attack to allow for reinforcement of British troops, and second, that American help was at hand in case of attack. By late 1941, after Lieutenant-General
Intelligence operations
Planning for this offensive was undertaken by the Japanese Military Affairs Bureau's Unit 82 based in Taiwan. Intelligence on Malaya was gathered through a network of agents which included Japanese embassy staff; disaffected Malayans (particularly members of the Japanese-established Tortoise Society);[citation needed] and Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese business people and tourists. Japanese spies, which included a British intelligence officer, Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughan Heenan, also provided intelligence and assistance.[24]
Prior to hostilities Japanese intelligence officers like Iwaichi Fujiwara had established covert intelligence offices (or Kikans) that linked up with the Malay and Indian pro-independence organisations such as Kesatuan Melayu Muda and the Indian Independence League. The Japanese gave these movements financial support in return for their members providing intelligence and later assistance in determining Allied troop movements, strengths, and dispositions prior to the invasion.[25]
Through the operation of these networks prior to the invasion the Japanese knew where the Commonwealth forces were based and their unit strengths, had good maps of Malaya, and had local guides available to provide them with directions.[26]
November 1941
In November 1941, the British became aware of the large scale buildup of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Thailand was seen to be under threat from this build-up as well as Malaya. British strategists had foreseen the possibility of Thailand's Kra isthmus being used by the Japanese to invade Malaya. To counteract this potential threat, plans for a pre-emptive invasion of southern Thailand, named Operation Matador, had been drawn up. By the time the invasion became highly likely the British decided not to use them for political reasons.[27]
Japanese invasion of Malaya
The Malayan campaign began when the
The Japanese were initially resisted by
A replacement for Operation Matador, named
Air war
Background
As a lower-priority theatre, the Allies had comparatively few modern aircraft to challenge the Japanese. In addition the Allies did not consider Japanese aircraft a significant threat. In 1941 the Allies assumed that Japan would only have a few hundred poor quality outdated aircraft. The respected Janes All the World's Aircraft for 1941 indicated that the Japanese only had a cluster of dated foreign and indigenous aircraft. Japanese pilots were also underrated, considered unlikely to make particularly good pilots.[29]
Prior to the invasion on 8 December there were 75 Allied aircraft stationed in northern Malaya and 83 in Singapore. The only fighter squadron in northern Malaya was No 21 Squadron RAAF that was equipped with 12 Brewster Buffalos.[30] The Japanese had at least 459 aircraft available.[31]
Japanese aircraft and units
The Japanese Navy's
The 22nd Air Flotilla included the 22nd (Genzan), Bihoro, and Kanoya Air Groups (or Kōkūtai).[34] They were equipped with 33 Type 96 Mitsubishi G3M1 'Nell' bombers. The Air Flotilla also had 25 Type 96 Mitsubishi A5M4 'Claude' fighters available.[35] The Genzen Air Group was a key participant in the sinking of the British capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malaya on 10 December 1941, losing one aircraft and its crew during the battle. On 22 January 1942, bombers from the Genzan Air Group attacked Kallang Airport in Singapore, and subsequently provided air support for Japanese offensives in Malaya including the landings at Endau.[citation needed]
The Japanese 3rd Air Corps (飛行集団, Hikō Shudan) and three Air Combat Groups (飛行戦隊, Hikō Sentai) of the 5th Air Corps took part in the Malaya Campaign.
Most Japanese pilots of the IJAAS units and at least a quarter of the IJNAS pilots had combat experience against the Chinese and the Soviets. They were all very well trained.[36]
Allied aircraft and units
Prior to the commencement of hostilities the Allies in Malaya and Singapore had four fighter squadrons: 21 and 453 RAAF, 243 RAF, and 488 RNZAF. They were equipped with the Brewster Buffalo, a plane that aviation historian Dan Ford characterized as pathetic.[37][38] Its engine had fuel starvation problems and poor supercharger performance at higher altitudes. Maneuverability was poor and the engine tended to overheat in the tropical climate, spraying oil over the windscreen.[39] In service, some effort was made to improve performance by removing the armour plate, armoured windshields, radios, gun camera, and all other unnecessary equipment, and by replacing the .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns with .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns.[40] The fuselage tanks were filled with a minimum of fuel and run on high-octane aviation petrol where available.[37][38]
The remaining offensive aircraft consisted of four RAF squadrons of Bristol Blenheim MkI and MKIV light bombers (27, 34, 60, 62 Squadrons), two RAAF squadrons (1 and 8) of Lockheed Hudsons, and two RAF squadrons of Vickers Vildebeest biplane torpedo bombers (36 and 100). The Vildebeests were obsolete and due to be replaced by modern Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers. No 36 Squadron had some Fairey Albacore biplanes. There were also two Consolidated Catalina flying boats of 205 Squadron and three Catalinas from the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force at Singapore.[citation needed]
The squadrons were beset by numerous problems including inadequate spare parts and a lack of support staff, airfields that were difficult to defend against air attack with no early warning of impending attacks, a lack of a clear and coherent command structure, a Japanese spy in the Army air liaison staff (Heenan), and antagonism between RAF and RAAF squadrons and personnel. The Japanese through their network of informants knew the strength and disposition of Allied aircraft before they invaded.[39][41]
Many of the pilots lacked adequate training and experience. For example, 20 of the original 169 Buffalos were lost in training accidents during 1941. Those fighter pilots with experience had been trained in methods that were very effective against German and Italian fighters but suicide against the acrobatic Japanese Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar" and Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters. A counter tactic of avoiding dog fights with a 'slash and run' attack was developed by Lieutenant-General Claire Lee Chennault of the Flying Tigers but was too late for the Allied pilots serving in this campaign.[42][43]
Two days before the attack on Malaya, Hudsons of No 1 Squadron RAAF spotted the Japanese invasion fleet but, given uncertainty about the ships' destination and instructions to avoid offensive operations until attacks were made against friendly territory, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief of British Far East Command, did not allow the convoy to be bombed.[44][45]
Air campaign
On the first day, the focus of the Japanese air assault was on the Allied air bases. Mitsubishi Ki-21 Sallys from the 7th Hikodan bombed the airfields at
While contesting the
By 9 December, Japanese fighters were operating out of Singora and Patani, Thailand, and Kota Bharu airfield was in Japanese hands.[31] The Allies tried to attack Singora airfield. The bombers were intercepted on take-off by a Japanese raid which disabled or shot down all but one. The sole surviving bomber, a Bristol Blenheim flown by Arthur Scarf, did manage to bomb Singora.[46] No 62 squadron had been moved from Alor Star to Butterworth, and on 10 December it was moved to Taiping.[citation needed]
On 10 December, No 21 Squadron RAAF was withdrawn from Sungai Petani to Ipoh, where it was joined on 13 December by No 453 Squadron RAAF. No 453 Squadron had been sent to protect Force Z on 10 December, but arrived after the warships were sinking. On 15 December both Squadrons were pulled back to Kuala Lumpur, receiving replacement aircraft for those shot down or destroyed. Within the first week of the campaign the Japanese had established air superiority. On 19 December the bombers were moved to Singapore, with No 62 Squadron being re-equipped with Hudsons.[citation needed]
One pilot—Sergeant Malcolm Neville Read of No. 453 Squadron RAAF—sacrificed himself by ramming his Buffalo into an Oscar of 64th Sentai over Kuala Lumpur on 22 December.[47][48]
Continued Japanese dominance eventually forced both Squadrons back to Singapore on 24 December, where they were merged until more replacement aircraft could be obtained. No 64 Squadron had run out of aircraft and its surviving ground-crew and airmen were shipped to Burma. RAAF No 1 and No 8 squadrons were amalgamated due to aircraft losses. This left the Allied ground troops and shipping completely open to air attack and further weakened the defensive position.[49] The Genzan Air Group sank Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10 December, which also established Japanese naval supremacy.[50] In comparison, the Japanese army enjoyed close air support from the start of the campaign, and sought to capture bases for their air support to operate from.[51]
On 25 December, the
On 3 January 1942, 51 disassembled Hurricane Mk IIBs arrived in Singapore along with 24 pilots (many of whom were veterans of the Battle of Britain) who had been transferred to there with the intention of forming the nucleus of five squadrons.[52] The 151st Maintenance unit assembled the 51 Hurricanes within two days and of these, 21 were ready for operational service within three days. The Hurricanes were fitted with bulky 'Vokes' dust filters under the nose and were armed with 12, rather than eight, machine guns. The additional weight and drag made them slow to climb and unwieldy to maneuver at altitude, although they were more effective bomber killers.[53]
The recently arrived pilots were formed into 232 Squadron. In addition, 488 (NZ) Squadron, a Buffalo squadron, converted to Hurricanes. On 18 January, the two squadrons formed the basis of 226 Group. The following day 453 squadron provided an escort of eight aircraft for five Wirraways and four NEI Glenn Martin bombers, attacking Japanese troops on the Maur River. All the Martins and one of the Wirraways were lost.[54]
No 243 Squadron RAF, equipped with Buffalo fighters, was disbanded on 21 January and 232 Squadron became operational on 22 January, the same day the Genzan Air Group attacked Kallang Airport. 232 Squadron thus had the first losses and victories for the Hurricane in Southeast Asia that day.[55] Most of the bombers were moved to Sumatra midway through January.[citation needed]
Aircraft from 36, 62, and 100 Squadrons unsuccessfully attacked the Japanese invasion fleet at Endau on 26 January, suffering heavy losses. The surviving aircraft were evacuated to Sumatra on 31 January.[56]
In mid-January, the three Sentai of the 5th Air Corps returned to Thailand to participate in the
It is not entirely clear how many Japanese aircraft the Buffalo squadrons shot down, although RAAF pilots alone managed to shoot down at least 20.[59] Eighty were claimed in total, a ratio of kills to losses of just 1.3 to 1. Additionally, most of the Japanese aircraft shot down by the Buffalos were bombers.[39] The Hawker Hurricane, which fought in Singapore alongside the Buffalo from 20 January, also suffered severe losses from ground attack; most were destroyed.[60]
Advance down the Malayan Peninsula
The defeat of Allied troops at the Battle of Jitra by Japanese forces, supported by tanks moving south from Thailand on 11 December 1941 and the rapid advance of the Japanese inland from their Kota Bharu beachhead on the north-east coast of Malaya overwhelmed the northern defences. Without any real naval presence, the British were unable to challenge Japanese naval operations off the Malayan coast, which proved invaluable to the invaders. With virtually no remaining Allied planes, the Japanese also had mastery of the skies, leaving the Allied ground troops and civilian population exposed to air attack.[61]
The Malayan island of Penang was bombed daily by the Japanese from 8 December and abandoned on 17 December. Arms, boats, supplies and a working radio station were left in haste to the Japanese. The evacuation of Europeans from Penang, with local inhabitants being left to the mercy of the Japanese, caused much embarrassment for the British and alienated them from the local population. Historians judge that "the moral collapse of British rule in Southeast Asia came not at Singapore, but at Penang".[62] However, many who were present during the evacuation did not experience it as a scramble. It was a response to an order from British High Command which had come to the conclusion that Penang should be abandoned as it had no tactical or strategic value in the rapidly changing military scheme of things at that time.[63]
On 23 December, Major-General
The 11th Indian Division managed to delay the Japanese advance at Kampar for a few days, in which the Japanese suffered severe casualties in terrain that did not allow them to use their tanks or their air superiority to defeat the British. The 11th Indian Division was forced to retreat when the Japanese landed troops by sea south of the Kampar position. The British retreated to prepared positions at Slim River.[64]
At the Battle of Slim River, in which two Indian brigades were practically annihilated, the Japanese used surprise and tanks to devastating effect in a risky night attack. The success of this attack forced Percival into replacing the 11th Indian Division with the 8th Australian Division.[citation needed], and cleared the route to the city of Kuala Lumpur.
It did not take long for the Japanese army's next objective, the city of Kuala Lumpur, to fall. The Japanese entered and occupied the city unopposed on 11 January 1942. Singapore Island was now less than 200 mi (320 km) away for the invading Japanese army.[65]
Defence of Johor
By mid-January, the Japanese had reached the southern Malayan state of Johore where, on 14 January, they encountered troops from the
As the Japanese attempted to outflank the Australians to the west of Gemas, one of the bloodiest battles of the campaign began on 15 January on the peninsula's West coast near the
Led by Australian
On 20 January, further Japanese landings took place at
Retreat to Singapore
On 31 January, the last organised Allied forces left Malaya, and Allied engineers blew a 70 ft (21 m)-wide hole in the
In less than two months, the Battle for Malaya had ended in comprehensive defeat for the Commonwealth forces and their retreat from the Malay Peninsula to the fortress of Singapore. Nearly 50,000 Commonwealth troops had been captured or killed during the battle. The Japanese Army invaded the island of Singapore on 7 February and completed their conquest of the island on 15 February, capturing 80,000 more prisoners out of the 85,000 allied defenders.[citation needed] The final battle before the surrender was with the Malay Regiment at Bukit Candu on 14 February.
By the end of January, Heenan had been court-martialled for spying for the Japanese and sentenced to death. On 13 February, five days after the invasion of Singapore Island, and with Japanese forces approaching the city centre, he was taken by military police to the waterside and was hastily executed. His body was thrown into the sea.[67][page needed]
Battles of the campaign
- Battle of Kota Bharu (8 December 1941)
Three transports landed some 5,200 troops at Kota Bharu (Malaysia's NE corner). The beaches had been prepared with wire and pillboxes, and were defended with artillery and aircraft. One Japanese transport was sunk, with two damaged. But after heavy fighting the Japanese succeeded in landing most of their troops with about 800 casualties. - Bombing of Singapore (December 1941)
- Operation Krohcol (8 December 1941)
This was an advance by commonwealth forces into Thailand to destroy the main road at "The Ledge". The operation failed due to delays in authorisation by Percival and resistance by Thai police. - Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse (10 December 1941)
The British battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse were sunk by Japanese aircraft after relying on false intelligence as to the location of the landings. They had no air support. This was the first time any capital ships at sea had been sunk by aircraft. - Battle of Jitra (11–13 December 1941)
- Battle of Kampar (1941)
- Battle of Slim River (1942)
- Battle of Gemas (1942)
- Battle of Muar (1942)
- Battle off Endau (1942)
- Battle of Singapore (1942)
See also
- Far East prisoners of war
- Nanshin-ron
- Japanese invasion of Thailand
- Japanese occupation of Malaya
- Japanese order of battle during the Malayan Campaign
- Malaya Command: Order of Battle
Notes
- ^ until 7 January 1942
- ^ from 7 January 1942
- ^ Between Singapore and Malaya, the Japanese captured 300 field guns, 180 mortars/howitzers, 100 anti-aircraft guns, 54 fortress guns, 108 1-pounder guns (likely a typo meant to say 2-pounder[citation needed]), and, on the mainland, another 330 guns of unspecified type. Kevin Blackburn, Karl Hack. "Did Singapore Have to Fall?: Churchill and the Impregnable Fortress". Routledge. 1 November 2003. Page 193 gives a total of 225 25-pounders and 18-pounders for the campaign, but this number excludes 4.5-inch and 3.7-inch howitzers and 75mm field guns, as well as fortress guns. Page 74 gives a total of 226 for British artillery pieces during the siege of Singapore itself, including fortress guns (172 without them).
- ^ 50 armoured vehicles were captured on Malaya and 200 on Singapore, mostly Universal Carriers and armoured cars; includes 23 Mark VI light tanks.
- ^ 1,800 trucks and 13,600 cars and other vehicles were lost to the Japanese on both Singapore and the mainland.[citation needed]
References
- ^ a b c d e Kratoska 2018 pp 299
- ^ Farrell, 2015 [page needed]
- ^ a b Allen (2013) pp. 300-301.
- ^ a b Sandhu 1987, p. 32.
- ^ Allen (2013) pp. 300-301
- ^ a b Farrell, 2015 [page needed]
- ^ JM-54, "Malay Operations Record" p. 11. 612 Army and 187 Navy planes, of which 153 Army and 29 Navy planes were reserve. Retrieved 4/1/2022
- ^ Allen, Louis. Singapore 1941–1942: Revised Edition, Routledge, 2013. p. 169
- ^ Farrell, 2015 [page needed]
- ^ Toland, John. The Rising Sun New York: The Modern Library, 2003. p. 272
- ^ Farrell, 2015 [page needed]
- ^ Farrell, 2015 [page needed]
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- ISBN 978-0141010366.
- ^ Roy, Kaushik (2019). Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941-1942. Open Road Integrated Media.
- ^ Akashi, Yoji (2010). General Yamashita Tomoyuki: Commander of the Twenty-Fifth Army in A Great Betrayal? The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Marshall Cavendish International (Asia) Pte Ltd.
- ^ Farrell, 2015 pp 472–475
- ^ a b c Maechling, Charles. Pearl Harbor: The First Energy War. History Today. Dec. 2000
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External links
- COFEPOW – The Armed Forced – The Campaign in Malaya
- Royal Engineers and the Second World War – the Far East: Royal Engineers Museum
- Australia's War 1939–1945: Battle of Malaya
- Animated History of the Fall of Malaya and Singapore