Battle of Moscow
Battle of Moscow | |||||||
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Part of the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||
Soviet anti-aircraft gunners on the roof of the Hotel Moskva | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Germany | Soviet Union | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
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Strength | |||||||
As of 1 October 1941: | As of 1 October 1941: | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
German strategic offensive: (1 October 1941 to 10 January 1942)
German estimated: 174,194 KIA, WIA, MIA (see §7)[14] Soviet estimated: 581,000 killed, missing, wounded and captured.[15] |
Moscow Defense:[16] (30 September 1941 to 5 December 1941)
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The Battle of Moscow was a military campaign that consisted of two periods of strategically significant fighting on a 600 km (370 mi) sector of the
The German Strategic Offensive, named Operation Typhoon, called for two
Initially, the Soviet forces conducted a
Background
On 15 July 1941, German forces captured Smolensk, an important stronghold on the road to Moscow.[19] At this stage, although Moscow was vulnerable, an offensive against the city would have exposed the German flanks. In part to address these risks, and to attempt to secure Ukraine's food and mineral resources, Hitler ordered the attack to turn north and south to eliminate Soviet forces at
Initial German advance (30 September – 10 October)
Plans
For Hitler, the Soviet capital was secondary, and he believed the only way to bring the Soviet Union to its knees was to defeat it economically. He felt this could be accomplished by seizing the economic resources of Ukraine east of Kiev.
With the end of summer, Hitler redirected his attention to Moscow and assigned Army Group Centre to this task. The forces committed to Operation Typhoon included three infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th, and 9th)[24] supported by three Panzer (tank) Groups (the 2nd, 3rd and 4th) and by the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 2. Up to two million German troops were committed to the operation, along with 1,000–2,470 tanks and assault guns and 14,000 guns. German aerial strength, however, had been severely reduced over the summer's campaign; the Luftwaffe had lost 1,603 aircraft and 1,028 had been damaged. Luftflotte 2 had only 549 serviceable machines, including 158 medium and dive-bombers and 172 fighters, available for Operation Typhoon.[25] The attack relied on standard blitzkrieg tactics, using Panzer groups rushing deep into Soviet formations and executing double-pincer movements, pocketing Red Army divisions and destroying them.[26]
Facing the Wehrmacht were three Soviet fronts forming a defensive line based on the cities of Vyazma and Bryansk, which barred the way to Moscow. The armies comprising these fronts had also been involved in heavy fighting. Still, it was a formidable concentration consisting of 1,250,000 men, 1,000 tanks and 7,600 guns. The Soviet Air Force had suffered appalling losses of some 7,500 to 21,200 aircraft.[27][28] Extraordinary industrial achievements had begun to replace these, and at the outset of Typhoon the VVS could muster 936 aircraft, 578 of which were bombers.[29]
Once Soviet resistance along the Vyazma-Bryansk front was eliminated, German forces were to press east, encircling Moscow by outflanking it from the north and south. Continuous fighting had reduced their effectiveness, and logistical difficulties became more acute. General Heinz Guderian, commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, wrote that some of his destroyed tanks had not been replaced, and there were fuel shortages at the start of the operation.[30]
Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk
The German attack went according to plan, with 4th Panzer Group pushing through the middle nearly unopposed and then dividing its mobile forces north to complete the encirclement of Vyazma with 3rd Panzer Group, and other units south to close the ring around Bryansk in conjunction with 2nd Panzer Group. The Soviet defenses, still under construction, were overrun, and spearheads of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups met at Vyazma on 10 October 1941.[31][32] Four Soviet armies (the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and part of the 32nd) were encircled in a large pocket just west of the city.[33]
The encircled Soviet forces continued to fight, and the Wehrmacht had to employ 28 divisions to eliminate them, using troops which could have supported the offensive towards Moscow. The remnants of the Soviet
The weather began to change, hampering both sides. On 7 October, the first snow fell and quickly melted, turning roads and open areas into muddy quagmires, a phenomenon known as rasputitsa in Russia. German armored groups were greatly slowed, allowing Soviet forces to fall back and regroup.[34][35]
Soviet forces were able to counterattack in some cases. For example, the
Other counterattacks further slowed the German offensive. The 2nd Army, which was operating to the north of Guderian's forces with the aim of encircling the Bryansk Front, had come under strong Red Army pressure assisted by air support.[39]
According to German assessments of the initial Soviet defeat, 673,000 soldiers had been captured by the Wehrmacht in both the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets,
However, Red Army resistance had slowed the Wehrmacht. When the Germans arrived within sight of the Mozhaisk line west of Moscow on 10 October, they encountered another defensive barrier manned by new Soviet forces. That same day, Georgy Zhukov, who had been recalled from the
On 15 October, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the Communist Party, the General Staff and various civil government offices from Moscow to Kuibyshev (now
Mozhaisk defense line (13–30 October)
By 13 October 1941, the Wehrmacht had reached the Mozhaisk
Moscow itself was also hastily fortified. According to Zhukov, 250,000 women and teenagers worked building trenches and anti-tank moats around Moscow, moving almost three million cubic meters of earth with no mechanical help. Moscow's factories were hastily converted to military tasks: one automobile factory was turned into a
On 13 October 1941 (15 October, according to other sources),[
In the south, the Second Panzer Army initially advanced towards Tula with relative ease because the Mozhaisk defense line did not extend that far south and no significant concentrations of Soviet troops blocked their advance. However, bad weather, fuel problems, and damaged roads and bridges eventually slowed the German army, and Guderian did not reach the outskirts of Tula until 26 October.[56] The German plan initially called for the rapid capture of Tula, followed by a pincer move around Moscow. The first attack, however, was repelled by the 50th Army and civilian volunteers on 29 October, after a fight within sight of the city. This was followed by the counter-offensive by the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps whose flanks were secured by the 10th Army, 49th Army and 50th Army who attacked from Tula.[57] On 31 October, the German Army high command ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided.[citation needed]
Wehrmacht advance towards Moscow (1 November – 5 December)
Wearing down
By late October, the German forces were worn out, with only a third of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at third- to half-strength, and serious logistics issues preventing the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to surrender to the idea of a long struggle, since the prospect of sending tanks into such a large city without heavy infantry support seemed risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.[58]
To stiffen the resolve of the Red Army and boost civilian morale, Stalin ordered the
From 31 October to 13–15 November, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow. Although Army Group Centre still possessed considerable nominal strength, its fighting capabilities had been vitiated by wear and fatigue. While the Germans were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the east as well as the presence of large reserves, given the tremendous Soviet casualties, they did not expect the Soviets to be able to mount a determined defense.[60] But in comparison to the situation in October, Soviet rifle divisions occupied a much stronger defensive position: a triple defensive ring surrounding the city and some remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most of the Soviet field armies now had a multilayered defense, with at least two rifle divisions in second echelon positions. Artillery support and sapper teams were also concentrated along major roads that German troops were expected to use in their attacks. There were also many Soviet troops still available in reserve armies behind the front. Finally, Soviet troops—and especially officers—were now more experienced and better prepared for the offensive.[58]
By 15 November 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem. The armored Wehrmacht spearheads, consisting of 51 divisions, could now advance, with the goal of encircling Moscow and linking up near the city of Noginsk, east of the capital. To achieve this objective, the German Third and Fourth Panzer Groups needed to concentrate their forces between the Volga Reservoir and Mozhaysk, then proceed past the Soviet 30th Army to Klin and Solnechnogorsk, encircling the capital from the north. In the south, the Second Panzer Army intended to bypass Tula, still held by the Red Army, and advance to Kashira and Kolomna, linking up with the northern pincer at Noginsk. The German 4th Field Army in the centre were to "pin down the troops of the Western Front."[45]: 33, 42–43
Failed pincer
On 15 November 1941, German tank armies began their offensive towards Klin, where no Soviet reserves were available because of Stalin's wish to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk, which had forced the relocation of all available reserve forces further south. Initial German attacks split the front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th.
The Third Panzer Army captured Klin after heavy fighting on 23 November, Solnechnogorsk as well by 24 November and
In the south, near Tula, combat resumed on 18 November 1941, with the Second Panzer Army trying to encircle the city.
On 26 November 1941, the German 2nd Panzer Army under Guderian began advancing towards Kashira, which was a strategic stronghold that lay 120 kilometres southwest of Moscow and 80 kilometres northeast of Tula. Kashira was of paramount importance, considering that it was the headquarters of the Soviet Western Front, one of the three main groups of resistance against the Nazi storm. The Germans were capable of seizing
The Germans were driven back in early December, securing the southern approach to the city.[66] Tula itself held, protected by fortifications and determined defenders mostly from the 50th Army, made of both soldiers and civilians. In the south, the Wehrmacht never got close to the capital. The first stroke of the Western-Front's counter-offensive on the outskirts of Moscow fell upon Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army.
Because of the resistance on both the northern and southern sides of Moscow, on 1 December the Wehrmacht attempted a direct offensive from the west along the Minsk-Moscow highway near the city of Naro-Fominsk. This offensive had limited tank support and was directed against extensive Soviet defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the Soviet 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks staged by the 33rd Army, the German offensive stalled and was driven back four days later in the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive.[58] On the same day, the French-manned 638th Infantry Regiment, the only foreign formation of the Wehrmacht that took part in the advance on Moscow, went into action near the village of Diutkovo.[67] On 2 December, a reconnaissance battalion came to the town of Khimki—some 30 km (19 mi) away from the Kremlin in central Moscow reaching its bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as its railway station. This marked the closest approach of German forces to Moscow.[68][69]
The European Winter of 1941–42 was the coldest of the twentieth century.[70] On 30 November, General Fedor von Bock claimed in a report to Berlin that the temperature was −45 °C (−49 °F).[71] General Erhard Raus, commander of the 6th Panzer Division, kept track of the daily mean temperature in his war diary. It shows a suddenly much colder period during 4–7 December: from −36 to −38 °C (−37 to −38 °F), although the method or reliability of his measurements is not known.[72] Other temperature reports varied widely.[73][74] Zhukov said that November's freezing weather stayed only around −7 to −10 °C (+19 to +14 °F).[75] Official Soviet Meteorological Service records show that at the lowest point, the lowest December temperature reached −28.8 °C (−20 °F).[75] These numbers indicated severely cold conditions, and German troops were freezing with no winter clothing, using equipment that was not designed for such low temperatures. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers.[49] Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell[49] and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use. The same cold weather hit the Soviet troops, but they were better prepared.[74] German clothing was supplemented by Soviet clothing and boots, which were often in better condition than German clothes as the owners had spent much less time at the front. Corpses were thawed out to remove the items; once when 200 bodies were left on the battlefield the "saw commandos" recovered sufficient clothing to outfit every man in a battalion.[76]
The Axis offensive on Moscow stopped. Guderian wrote in his journal that "the offensive on Moscow failed ... We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on 5 December, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."[77]
Some historians have suggested that artificial floods played an important role in defending Moscow.
Soviet counter-offensive
Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves left and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East after learning that Imperial Japan had no plans to invade the USSR in the near future from Richard Sorge.[82] The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December,[49] when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin.[83] Even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men,[73] only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points.[49]
On 5 December 1941, the counteroffensive for "removing the immediate threat to Moscow" started on the Kalinin Front. The South-Western Front and Western Fronts began their offensives the next day. After several days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Solnechnogorsk on 12 December and Klin on 15 December. Guderian's army "beat a hasty retreat towards Venev" and then Sukhinichi. "The threat overhanging Tula was removed".[45]: 44–46, 48–51 [84]
On 8 December, Hitler had signed his
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued in the north. The offensive liberated Kalinin and the Soviets reached Klin on 7 December, overrunning the headquarters of the LVI Panzer Corps outside the city. As the Kalinin Front drove west, a bulge developed around Klin. The Soviet front commander, Konev, attempted to envelop any German forces remaining. Zhukov diverted more forces to the southern end of the bulge, to help Konev trap the 3rd Panzer Army. The Germans pulled their forces out in time. Although the encirclement failed, it unhinged the German defenses. A second attempt was made to outflank Army Group Centre's northern forces, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until March 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on 16 December 1941. A major achievement was the encirclement and destruction of the German XXXV Corps, protecting Guderian's Second Panzer Army's southern flank.[95]
The Luftwaffe was paralysed in the second half of December. The weather, recorded as –42 °C (–44 °F)[
In the centre, Soviet progress was much slower. Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on 26 December, Kaluga on 28 December, and Maloyaroslavets on 2 January, after ten days of violent action. Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on 7 January 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 100–250 km (62–155 mi) from Moscow. Stalin continued to order more offensives in order to trap and destroy Army Group Centre in front of Moscow, but the Red Army was exhausted and overstretched and they failed.[99]
Aftermath
Furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow, Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941, and took personal charge of the Wehrmacht,[93] effectively taking control of all military decisions. Hitler surrounded himself with staff officers with little or no recent combat experience.[100]
The Red Army's winter counter-offensive drove the Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still considered to be threatened, with the front line relatively close. Because of this, the Moscow theater remained a priority for Stalin.[101]
On 5 January 1942, during a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin announced that he was planning a general spring offensive, which would be staged simultaneously near Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and the Crimea. This plan was accepted over Zhukov's objections.[102]
A documentary film, Moscow Strikes Back, (Russian: Разгром немецких войск под Москвой, "Rout of the German Troops near Moscow"), was made during the battle and rapidly released in the Soviet Union. It was taken to America and shown at the Globe in New York in August 1942. The New York Times reviewer commented that "The savagery of that retreat is a spectacle to stun the mind".[103] As well as the Moscow parade and battle scenes, the film included images of German atrocities committed during the occupation, "the naked and slaughtered children stretched out in ghastly rows, the youths dangling limply in the cold from gallows that were rickety, but strong enough".[103]
Legacy
The defense of Moscow became a symbol of Soviet resistance against the invading Axis forces. To commemorate the battle, Moscow was awarded the title of "Hero City" in 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day. A Museum of the Defence of Moscow was created in 1995.[104]
In the Russian capital of Moscow, an annual military parade on Red Square on 7 November was held in honor of the October Revolution Parade and as substitute for the October Revolution celebrations that haven't been celebrated on a national level since 1995. The parade is held to commemorate the historical event as a
The parade commands are always given by a high ranking veteran of the armed forces (usually with a billet of a Colonel) who gives the orders for the march past from the grandstand near the
Casualties
Both German and Soviet casualties during the battle of Moscow have been a subject of debate, as various sources provide somewhat different estimates. Not all historians agree on what should be considered the "Battle of Moscow" in the timeline of World War II. While the start of the battle is usually regarded as the beginning of Operation Typhoon on 30 September 1941 (or sometimes on 2 October 1941), there are two different dates for the end of the offensive.[citation needed] In particular, some sources (such as Erickson[108] and Glantz[109]) exclude the Rzhev offensive from the scope of the battle, considering it as a distinct operation and making the Moscow offensive "stop" on 7 January 1942—thus lowering the number of casualties.
There are also significant differences in figures from various sources. John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, gives a figure of 653,924 Soviet casualties between October 1941 and January 1942.[108] Glantz, in his book When Titans Clashed, gives a figure of 658,279 for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the winter counteroffensive until 7 January 1942.[109] The official Wehrmacht daily casualty reports show 35,757 killed in action, 128,716 wounded, and 9,721 missing in action for the entire Army Group Centre between 1 October 1941 and 10 January 1942.[110] However, this official report does not match unofficial reports from individual battalion and divisional officers and commanders at the front, who record suffering far higher casualties than was officially reported.[111]
On the Russian side, discipline became ferocious. The NKVD blocking groups were ready to shoot anyone retreating without orders.[citation needed] NKVD squads went to field hospitals in search of soldiers with self-inflicted injuries, the so-called 'self shooters' - those who shot themselves in the left hand to escape fighting. A surgeon in a field hospital of the Red Army admitted to amputating the hands of boys who tried this 'self-shooting' idea to escape fighting, to protect them from immediate execution via punishment squad.[112] In the first three months, blocking detachments shot 1,000 penal troops and sent 24,993 to penal battalions. By October 1942, the idea of regular blocking detachments was quietly dropped; by October 1944, the units were officially disbanded.[113][114]
See also
- Panfilov's Twenty-Eight Guardsmen
- German war crimes during the Battle of Moscow
- 8th Guards Motor Rifle Division
- Russian Winter
Footnotes
- ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2012, p. 253.
- ISBN 978-0313395932.
- ISBN 978-1107035126.
- ISBN 978-1139503600.
- ISBN 978-0739417973.
- ^ Glantz (1995), p. 78.
- ^ Liedtke 2016, p. 148.
- ^ a b Bergström 2007 p. 90.
- ^ Williamson 1983, p. 132.
- ^ Both sources use Luftwaffe records. The often quoted figures of 900–1,300 do not correspond with recorded Luftwaffe strength returns. Sources: Prien, J.; Stremmer, G.; Rodeike, P.; Bock, W. Die Jagdfliegerverbande der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945, parts 6/I and II; U.S National Archives, German Orders of Battle, Statistics of Quarter Years.
- ^ a b Bergström 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, 3449. Kindle.
- ^ "РОССИЯ И СССР В ВОЙНАХ XX ВЕКА. Глава V. ВЕЛИКАЯ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННАЯ ВОЙНА". rus-sky.com.
- ^ "1941". Archived from the original on 25 October 2012.
- ^ "ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА --[ Исследования ]-- Мягков М.Ю. Вермахт у ворот Москвы, 1941-1942". militera.lib.ru.
- ^ a b David M. Glantz. When Titans Clashed. pp. 298, 299.
- ^ Shirer, William L. "24, Swedish (Book III)". The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. pp. 275–87.
- ^ Bellamy 2007, p. 243.
- ^ Bellamy 2007, p. 240.
- ^ a b c Alan F. Wilt. "Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941". Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1981), pp. 187–91
- ^ a b c Flitton 1994.
- ISBN 978-0714633756.
- ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 293.
- ^ ISBN 978-83-05-136402.
- ^ Bergstöm 2007, p. 90.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 307–309.
- ^ Hardesty, 1991, p. 61.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p. 118.
- ^ Bergström 2007, pp. 90–91.
- ^ Guderian, p. 307
- ^ Clark Chapter 8,"The Start of the Moscow Offensive", p. 156 (diagram)
- ^ a b c d e Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "Viaz'ma and Briansk", pp. 74 ff.
- ^ a b c Vasilevsky, p. 139.
- ^ Guderian, p. 316.
- ^ Clark, pp. 165–66.
- ^ Guderian, p. 318.
- ^ David M. Glantz. When Titans Clashed. pp. 80, 81.
- ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2012, p. 100.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p. 91.
- ISBN 1-84176-391-8, p. 29.
- ^ Jukes, p. 31.
- ^ Glantz, When Titans Clashed p. 336 n15.
- ^ Smith, Howard K. (1942). Last Train from Berlin. Knopf. pp. 83–91.
- ^ The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970–1979). 2010 The Gale Group, Inc.
- ^ ISBN 978-1781592915.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 10.
- ^ Plocher 1968, p. 231.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p. 93
- ^ a b c d e Jukes, p. 32.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 17.
- ^ Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles p. 50.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 18.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 22.
- ^ Braithwaite, pp. 184–210.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 24.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 329–330.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 23–25.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "To the Gates", pp. 80ff.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 27.
- ^ Klink, pp. 574, 590–92
- ^ a b Zhukov, tome 2, p. 28.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 30.
- ^ Guderian, p. 345.
- ^ Guderian, p. 340.
- ^ Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War.
- ^ Belov, p. 106.
- S2CID 148469794.
- ^ Henry Steele Commager, The Story of the Second World War, p. 144
- ^ Christopher Argyle, Chronology of World War II Day by Day, p. 78
- .
- ^ Chew (1981), p. 34.
- ^ Raus (2009), p. 89.
- ^ a b Glantz, ch.6, subchapter "December counteroffensive", pp. 86ff.
- ^ a b Moss (2005), p. 298.
- ^ a b Chew (1981), p. 33.
- ^ Stahel 2019, p. 317.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 354–55.
- ^ a b c Iskander Kuzeev, "Moscow flood in autumn of 1941", Echo of Moscow, 30 June 2008
- ^ Mikhail Arkhipov, "Flooding north of Moscow Oblast in 1941", Private blog, 2 October 2007
- ^ Igor Kuvyrkov, "Moscow flood in 1941: new data", Moscow Volga channel, 23 February 2015
- ^ Operational overview of military activities on Western Front in year 1941, Central Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, Stock 208 inventory 2511 case 1039, p. 112
- ^ Goldman p. 177
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 37.
- ^ History of the Second World War. Marshall Cavendish". pp. 29–32.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 353–55.
- ^ Guderian, p. 354.
- ^ "Battle of Moscow". WW2DB. Retrieved 28 September 2020.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 360–61.
- OCLC 1132236223.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 363–64.
- ^ Bergström", Christer. Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler Against Stalin. p. 245.
- ^ Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1973–78, entry "Battle of Moscow 1941–42"
- ^ a b Guderian, p. 359.
- ^ "Walther von Brauchitsch | German military officer". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 28 September 2020.
- ^ Glantz and House 1995, pp. 88–90.
- ^ a b Bergstrom 2003, p. 297.
- ^ Bergström 2007, pp. 112–13.
- ^ Bergström 2003, p. 299.
- ^ Glantz and House 1995, pp. 91–97.
- ^ Guderian, p. 365.
- JSTOR 153299.
Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov, who had pressed Stalin on several occasions to alert and reinforce the army, nonetheless recalled the shock of the German attack when he noted that 'neither the defence commissariat, myself, my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov and K.A. Meretskov, nor the General Staff thought the enemy could concentrate such a mass of ... forces and commit them on the first day ...
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 43–44.
- ^ a b T.S. (17 August 1942). "Movie Review: Moscow Strikes Back (1942) 'Moscow Strikes Back,' Front-Line Camera Men's Story of Russian Attack, Is Seen at the Globe". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 March 2015.
- ^ Rodric Braithwaite, "Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War", p. 345.
- ^ For example "Russia re-enacts historic WW2 parade in Moscow". BBC News. 7 November 2019.
- ^ AnydayGuide. "Anniversary of the 1941 October Revolution Day Parade in Russia / November 7, 2016". AnydayGuide. Retrieved 23 October 2016.
- ^ "Russia marks anniversary of 1941 military parade". Archived from the original on 4 February 2019. Retrieved 3 February 2019.
- ^ a b John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, table 12.4
- ^ a b Glantz, Table B
- ^ "Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group, 1941". Archived from the original on 25 October 2012. Retrieved 28 March 2012.
- ISBN 978-0719569265.
- ^ Antony Beevor, "The Second World War". pg. 283
- ISBN 978-5-275-01309-2.
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (2006). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. Yale University Press. p. 132.
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- ISBN 978-0-7432-8110-2.
- Flitton, Dave (director, producer, writer) (1994). The Battle of Russia (television documentary). US: PBS.
- Plocher, Hermann (1968). Luftwaffe versus Russia, 1941. New York: USAF: Historical Division, Arno Press.
- Prokhorov, A. M. (ed.). Большая советская энциклопедия (in Russian). Moscow. or Prokhorov, A. M., ed. (1973–1978). Great Soviet Encyclopedia. New York: Macmillan.
- ISBN 978-0-7867-3970-7.
- Reinhardt, Klaus. Moscow: The Turning Point? The Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941–42. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992. ISBN 0-85496-695-1.
- Sokolovskii, Vasilii Danilovich (1964). Razgrom Nemetsko-Fashistskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi (with map album). Moscow: VoenIzdat. LCCN 65-54443.
- ISBN 978-03742-49526.
- Stahel, David (2015). The Battle for Moscow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107087606.
- ISBN 978-0-14-100348-1.
- Vasilevsky, A. M. (1981). Дело всей жизни (Lifelong cause) (in Russian). Moscow: Progress. ISBN 978-0-7147-1830-9.
- Williamson, Murray (1983). Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press. ISBN 978-1-58566-010-0.
- Ziemke, Earl F. (1987). Moscow to Stalingrad. Center of Military History, United States Army. ISBN 978-0880292948.
- Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2012). The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany's First Great Crisis of World War II. ISBN 978-1-61200-120-3.
- Жуков, Г. К. (2002). Воспоминания и размышления. В 2 т. (in Russian). М. ISBN 978-0-224-61924-0.)
External links
- "Operation Typhoon": Video on YouTube, lecture by David Stahel, author of Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (2013) and The Battle for Moscow (2015); via the official channel of USS Silversides Museum
- Map: Deployment of troops before the battle of Moscow
- Map (detailed): Battle of Moscow 1941. German offensive
- WW2DB: Battle of Moscow