Battle of Narva (1700)
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Battle of Narva (1700) | |||||||||
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Part of the Great Northern War | |||||||||
The Battle of Narva (1700). Daniel Stawert, 1713 | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Swedish Empire | Tsardom of Russia | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Narva garrison: 1,800 men, 297 artillery pieces Relief force: 10,500 men, 37 cannons[a] |
37,000 men 195 artillery pieces[b] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
667 killed 1,247 wounded[c] |
8,000–9,000 killed, wounded, or drowned[5][6] | ||||||||
The Battle of Narva (Russian: Битва при Нарве Bitva pri Narve;
Background
During the 17th century,
The new Russian tsar, Peter I, would drastically modernize Russia in the coming years, but the army with which he traveled in 1700 was still poorly drilled. Preparing for war, he decided to form 31 new regiments. At the same time, in the spring of 1700, a revision of the officer corps was made whereby most officers were sent into retirement or to garrison units to serve without pay. A catastrophic shortage of command personnel (up to 70% at the company level) resulted. The vacancies were filled with young Moscow noblemen who had neither the experience of command nor the experience of service in the infantry nor regular military training—their traditional places were elite irregular cavalry or court service. Non-commissioned officers also experienced serious problems—they were not veteran soldiers but were elected from recruits.[21]
Prelude
Russia made
Charles XII, assisted by the
During November, Russian troops surrounded the city of
High command
The Swedish army was commanded personally by Charles XII, assisted by Lieutenant-General Carl Gustav Rehnskiöld[4] and General of the cavalry Otto Vellingk. During the Scanian War in 1675–1679, Vellingk was already a colonel and commanded a cavalry regiment, and Rehnskiöld rose from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel. Both also had the experience of service in foreign armies: Vellingk served for ten years in France, during which he rose to the rank of colonel, and Rehnskiöld participated in the Franco-Dutch War (1688—1697). From 1698 Vellingk was a governor in Ingermanland and at the beginning of the Great Northern War commanded a small corps, sent to help besieged Riga.[27][28]
Peter and Charles Eugène de Croÿ commanded the Russian forces. Peter had left Narva just the day before and was not present during the actual fighting. Trying to explain this act, some historians suggest that he did not expect an immediate attack on his well-fortified and numerically superior force, or he was sure that such an attack would be easily repulsed. It is suggested that Peter wanted to speed up the arrival of reinforcements, address supply issues, and negotiate with Augustus. Some interpretations consider his departure from Narva the night before the battle as cowardly; most of Europe mocked the Tsar for his departure. However, some scholars believe this accusation has little merit, as reportedly, the Tsar had placed himself in physical danger too many times for this departure to be an act of cowardice.[29]
Peter not only left the army on the eve of the battle but also took with him the formal commander-in-chief—
The Russian army near Narva was divided into three main parts (general'stvo), commanded by
The Swedish artillery was commanded by experienced Master-General of the Ordnance Johan Siöblad . He had almost forty years of service in artillery and was an author of the first Swedish Artillery Regulation of 1690. Massie notes the excellent actions of the Swedish artillery in the skirmish at Pyhajoggi Pass, eighteen miles west of Narva. Under the screen of their dragoons, the cannons were quickly deployed and suddenly opened fire on the clusters of Russian cavalry from a close distance. Since the Russians had no artillery at Pyhajoggi, they could not hold this advantageous position and had to retreat.[33]
The formal commander of Russian artillery was
Battle
Preparations
On the afternoon of 29 November [O.S. 18 November] 1700, Charles XII approached the village of Lagena, 7 miles from Narva, and made a final inspection of his army. Charles was not sure if Narva was still holding, so he ordered to give the Swedish recognition signal by cannon shots and then got the same response from the fortress. Earlier, the Sheremetev's cavalry joined the main forces.[35] Thus, the Russian siege camp was warned about the enemy's approach. De Croÿ inspected the army and ordered it to increase vigilance, prepare firearms, and keep half of the army on alert throughout the night. On the morning of the next day, "before sunrise," it was ordered to give soldiers the charges and build the entire army. Among other instructions was the prohibition against opening fire earlier than 20–30 steps to the enemy.[36]
On 19 (OS) or 30 (NS) November 1700[37] (20 November in the Swedish transitional calendar), Charles XII positioned his 10,500 men[38] (another 2,000 men were garrisoned in the city and would take part in the battle at a later stage) opposite the besieging Russian army of about 34,000 to 40,000 troops.[8][14][37][39]
The Swedes approached the Russian army at 10 a.m. and began to prepare for an attack. Charles and his generals examined the Russian position, and the soldiers stored the fascines to overcome the ditches surrounding it. De Croÿ was concerned about the small size of the Swedish army and suspected that this was only the vanguard of the main forces. Sheremetev proposed to lead the army out of the entrenchment in the field and attack the Swedes but was not supported by other generals.[40] De Croÿ decided to leave the army stretched for 4 miles (6.4 km) and sandwiched between two rows of ramparts.[41] The space between the ramparts was uneven: about 1,200 metres (3,900 ft) on the right Russian flank, about 250 metres (820 ft) in the center, and on the left flank – only 60–100 metres (200–330 ft). There were many barracks for soldiers between the ramparts, which made it difficult to maneuver.[42]
In the center of the Russian position was the Goldenhof Hill, fenced on all sides by barracks and sharpened stakes (the chevaux de frise) and adapted to all-around defence.[42] Charles divided his infantry into two parts and directed them to the north and south of the Goldenhof Hill. On the right (southern) flank were 11 "field" battalions under the command of Vellingk. On the left (northern) flank were 10 "field" battalions under the command of Rehnskiöld, including a small column of two battalions under the command of Magnus Stenbock, where Charles was himself.[clarification needed] Grenadiers with fascines marched in the vanguard of the infantry columns. The Swedish cavalry (≈4,300 men) covered the flanks of the infantry and had to prevent Russian attempts to exit the fortifications. The Swedish artillery (37 guns at all), located on a small rise, bombarded the places planned for the attack.[43][38][44]
The exact battle order of the Russian army is unknown – Russian documents are not preserved, and the Swedish data are contradictory. It is known that the "division" (general'stvo) of Trubetskoy was located in the center. It was the weakest part of the three main divisions: there were only two "regular" infantry regiments, and they were even worse drilled than the rest – they were formed as late as August 1700, and in September, Trubetskoy already marched to Narva. Trubetskoy also had four weak regiments of local streltsy from Novgorod and Pskov garrisons and, may be, there were two regular infantry regiments temporarily separated from other divisions.[45][46]
Action
By afternoon, the Swedes had finished their preparations and moved forward at 2 p.m. At that moment, it got colder, the wind changed, and the snowstorm blew directly into the eyes of the Russians.[26]: 686 Some Swedish officers asked to postpone the attack until the end of the storm. Still, Charles saw his opportunity and advanced on the Russian army under cover of the weather.[4][43] The Swedes attacked with two highly dense shock groups, quickly approached the Russian positions, and gave a volley, after which the Russians "fell like grass". At first, the Russians vigorously resisted: "They returned a heavy fire and killed many fine fellows", but within 15 minutes, the Swedes filled the ditches with fascines, broke into the fortifications with cold steel arms, and "a terrible massacre" began.[47]
Acting according to the plan, the Swedes moved south and north along the fortification line, rolling up the Russian defense. They attacked inexperienced Russian regiments and shattered them one by one. There was panic and chaos; Russian soldiers began killing foreign officers, and de Croÿ, with his staff, hurried to surrender. Masses of panicking Russians troops rushed to the only Kamperholm Bridge over the
On the right (northern) flank of the Russians, only two regiments of the future Guards (
Capitulation
After the first clash, the high command of the Russian army lost its morale and decided to capitulate. The Swedes, in turn, were exhausted and could not finish off those parts of the Russians who did not succumb to panic and kept their ground. The right flank of the Russian army capitulated faster on a free exit with weapons and colours, but general Weide on the left flank capitulated later and was already forced to hand over weapons and banners. All the artillery and wagon-trains also fell into the hands of the Swedes.[13][51]
The Swedes and the Russians repaired the Kamperholm Bridge through which capitulated troops crossed to the right bank of the
Results
The Battle of Narva was a terrible defeat for the Russian army. The Swedes captured ten generals and ten colonels, and many Russian regimental officers were killed in battle. The Russian regimental rolls from January 1701 show that the total loss of personnel was about 25% (with a 57–68% loss in the two regular infantry regiments of Trubetskoy's "division"). In Golovin's "division" (excluding the two Guard regiments), only 250 of the 356 officers survived. Weide's "division", however, fared somewhat better. The Russians also suffered heavy losses in armaments, as the Swedes captured 4050 muskets and 173 artillery pieces, including 64 siege cannons. Soon thereafter, the Swedes took an additional 22 mortars from a baggage train near Yam. While the Russians had mostly replenished their small arms by the spring of 1701, the former Golovin and Weide "divisions" still lacked regimental artillery. If Charles had continued the campaign against Russia (as General Vellingk had suggested attacking Novgorod and Pskov[54]), the Russian army very likely would have suffered another defeat.[53]
Memory
Russian memorial
In 1900, 200 years after the battle of Narva, the
Victory monument
On 20 November 2000, the
-
Russian memorial near Narva
Second siege
Four years after the Narva battle, Peter I marched again in a new attempt to capture Narva. Marshal Boris Sheremetev's force of 20,000 captured Tartu on 24 June.[26]: 697 Sheremetev then besieged Narva, where the garrison was under Commandant Major-General Henning Rudolf Horn af Ranzien[26]: 697 and consisted of 3,800 infantry and 1,300 cavalry. The Russians captured Narva on 20 August 1704 and massacred some of its Swedish inhabitants before Peter I stopped them.[26]: 697 Horn, several officers, and a large number of Swedish soldiers were captured, with about 3,200 casualties while the Russians lost up to 3,000 men during the siege and the assault.[57]
References
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- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Jeremy Black (1996), p. 111
- ^ a b Bergman, Lisa (2021-04-21). "Slaget vid Narva". Historiska Media (in Swedish). Retrieved 2024-03-07.
- ^ "Slaget vid Narva". www.tacitus.nu. Retrieved 2024-03-07.
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- ^ a b Christer Kuvaja (2008), p.139
- ^ Lars-Eric Höglund, Åke Sallnäs, Alexander Vespalov (2011). Great Northern War 1700–1721, II.
- ^ Generalstaben (1918–1919). Karl XII på slagfältet.
- ^ "Tacitus.nu, Örjan Martinsson. Russian force". Archived from the original on 2018-08-31. Retrieved 2013-09-07.
- ^ a b c d Boris Grigorjev & Aleksandr Bespalov (2012). Kampen mot övermakten. Baltikums fall 1700–1710. pp. 38
- ^ a b c Ullgren (2008), p.57
- ^ a b Ericson (2003), p. 257
- ^ Cathal J. Nolan (2008). Wars of the Age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715. pp. 313
- ^ Hughes, Lindsey. Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. — New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. pp. 30.
- ^ Olle Larsson, Stormaktens sista krig (2009) Lund, Historiska Media. pp. 99
- ^ a b Peter The Great – Swift
- ^ Massie 1980, p. 323.
- ^ "Sweden Was a Military Giant—Until It Invaded Russia". 8 October 2016. Archived from the original on 31 January 2018. Retrieved 4 February 2018.
- ^ Великанов В.С. К вопросу об офицерском корпусе русской армии накануне и на начальном этапе Великой Северной войны. // Война и оружие: Новые исследования и материалы. Труды Пятой Международной научно-практической конференции, 14–16 мая 2014 года. СПб.: ВИМАИВиВС, 2014. pp. 338–354. Russian officer corps in the beginning of the Great Northern war (English summary) Archived 2018-03-01 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b Frost 2000, p. 228.
- ^ Frost 2000, p. 263.
- ^ Frost (2000), p.229
- ^ "Swedish army at Lagena on 19/29 Nov of 1700 (Inspection of the Royal army the day before Narva battle)". Archived from the original on 2018-03-07. Retrieved 2018-03-06.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-85109-667-1
- ^ "Vellingk, Otto". Archived from the original on 2017-12-22. Retrieved 2018-03-05.
- ^ [1] Archived 2019-08-23 at the Wayback Machine Rehnsköld, Karl Gustaf // Nordisk familjebok
- ^ a b Massie 1980, p. 329.
- ^ Дмитрий Николаевич Бантыш-Каменский (1840). Биографии российских генералиссимусов и генерал-фельдмаршалов: Часть первая. p. 30. Archived from the original on 2023-11-30. Retrieved 2019-07-28.
- ^ Петров 1901, pp. 218–220.
- ^ a b "Великанов В.С. Формирование генералитета русской армии в 1700–09 гг. // Русская военная элита. Сборник материалов научной конференции. — Севастополь: Изд-во «Шико-Севастополь», 2015. С. 97–111". Archived from the original on 2018-03-05. Retrieved 2018-03-05.
- ^ Massie 1980, pp. 688–689.
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- ^ Петров 1901, pp. 223–224.
- ^ a b Frost (2003), pp. 230, 232
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- ^ a b Петров 1901, p. 199.
- ^ a b Massie 1980, p. 332.
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- ^ a b Великанов В.С. К вопросу о состоянии русской армии после нарвского поражения, зима 1700–1701 гг. Archived 2018-03-13 at the Wayback Machine // Война и оружие: Новые исследования и материалы. Труды Седьмой Международной научно-практической конференции, 18–20 мая 2016 года. СПб.: ВИМАИВиВС, 2016. Ч. 2. С. 26–42.
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Further reading
- Snyder, Kerala (2002). The Organ As a Mirror of Its Time: North European Reflections, 1610–2000. Oup USA. ISBN 978-0-19-514415-4.
- Black, Jeremy (1996). Warfare. Renaissance to revolution, 1492–1792. Cambridge Illustrated Atlases. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-47033-1.
- Frost, Robert I (2000). The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe 1558–1721. Longman. ISBN 978-0-582-06429-4.
- Massie, Robert (1980). Peter the Great, His Life and World. Ballantine Books, 928 pages. ISBN 978-0-307-81723-5. Archivedfrom the original on 2023-11-30. Retrieved 2019-07-28.
- Ericson, Lars, ed. (2003). Svenska slagfält (in Swedish). Wahlström & Widstrand. ISBN 91-46-21087-3.
- Ullgren, Peter (2008). Det stora nordiska kriget 1700–1721 [The Great Nordic War] (in Swedish). Stockholm: Prisma. ISBN 978-91-518-5107-5.
- Porfiriev, I.E., ed. (1958). Peter I. Grundläggare av den ryska reguljära arméns och flottans krigskonst (in Swedish). Hörsta förlag.
- Kuvaja, Christer (2008). Karolinska krigare 1660–1721 [Karolinska Warrior 1660–1721] (in Swedish). Schildts Förlags AB, 139 pages. ISBN 978-951-50-1823-6.
- Беспалов, Александр (1998). Северная война. Карл XII и шведская армия. Путь от Копенгагена до Переволочной. 1700–1709 [North War. Charles XII and the Swedish army. The path from Copenhagen to Perevolochna] (in Russian). Moscow: Рейтар. ISBN 5-8067-0002-X. Archivedfrom the original on 2018-03-03. Retrieved 2018-03-03.
- Петров, А. В. (1901). Город Нарва. Его прошлое и достопримечательности в связи с историей упрочения русского господства на Балтийском побережье. 1223–1900 (in Russian). St. Petersburg. ISBN 9785446084876.)
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