Battle of Onjong
40°6′33″N 125°53′47″E / 40.10917°N 125.89639°E
Battle of Onjong | |
---|---|
Part of the Onjong, North Korea | |
Result | Chinese victory |
Han Xianchu
Wen Yuchen (40th Corps)[1]
Kim Jong-oh (6th Div)[2]
Go Geun Hong (10th Rgt)
- 118th Division
- 119th Division
- 120th Division
The Battle of Onjong (
Background
The
In response to the UN advances,
Prelude
Locations and terrain
Forces and strategy
On 24 October the ROK 6th Infantry Division of II Corps advanced westward from Huich'on,
While the ROK were advancing towards the Yalu River, the PVA were also trying to deploy their units for the upcoming First Phase Campaign. As the PVA Commander
Battle
Initial contacts
On the morning of 25 October and with its 3rd Battalion on point, the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment started to advance northwest towards Pukchin. The ROK soon came under fire 8 mi (13 km) to the west of Onjong.[8] The 3rd Battalion dismounted from their vehicles to disperse what they thought would be a small force of KPA,[8] but the two PVA regiments on the high ground immediately began pouring heavy fire onto the ROK left, front and right flanks.[10][14] The 3rd Battalion broke instantly, abandoning most of its vehicles and artillery along the way.[10] About 400 survivors managed to escape the trap and fall back into Onjong.[10]
When the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment learned that the 3rd Battalion was under heavy attack, its 2nd Battalion was moved forward to support the 3rd Battalion while its 1st Battalion was sent back to Onjong.[15] Although the 2nd Battalion was turned back after encountering strong resistances, the ROK managed to capture several Chinese prisoners who revealed that there were nearly 10,000 Chinese soldiers waiting down the road.[8][15] At the same time, the PVA High Command ordered the PVA 120th Division of 40th Corps to join the battle while the rest of the 40th Corps was busy setting up roadblocks around Onjong.[14] With all the roadblocks in place by midnight, the PVA 118th Division and one regiment from the PVA 120th Division attacked Onjong on 26 October at 03:30,[14][15] and the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment was dispersed within 30 minutes.[15] Although Colonel Ham Byung Sun, commander of the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment, managed to rally his troops 5 km (3.1 mi) east of Onjong, the PVA were still able to penetrate the new position within an hour.[16] At this point not a single company of the regiment was left intact, and the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment ceased to be an organized unit.[8][16] Approximately 2,700 men of the 3,100 in the regiment eventually escaped to the Ch'ongch'on River.[17] Two US Army Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) advisors were also captured.[17]
Second ambush
The loss of surprise due to the early start of the First Phase Campaign greatly disappointed Mao.[18] Nevertheless, Mao still urged Peng to destroy the ROK by baiting them with trapped units.[19] At the same time, Major General Yu Jae-hung, commander of ROK II Corps, sent the ROK 19th Infantry Regiment, 6th Infantry Division (under Colonel Park Kwang Hyuk) and the ROK 10th Infantry Regiment, 8th Infantry Division (under Colonel Go Geun Hong) to recapture Onjong and to salvage the lost equipment from the battle.[16] The ROK 7th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Im Pu Taek, was also ordered to retreat south with the ROK 6th Infantry Division.[16] Hoping to draw the rest of ROK II Corps into the open, Peng ordered the PVA 118th Division to swing north and to trap the retreating ROK 7th Infantry Regiment,[20] while the PVA 119th and 120th Divisions would wait to ambush any rescue forces passing through Onjong.[21] On October 27, the PVA 118th Division isolated the ROK 7th Infantry Regiment by cutting the road between Kojang and Onjong,[21] but the ROK 7th Infantry Regiment did not reach the roadblock due to the lack of fuel.[22] Upon realizing that ROK II Corps had not fallen for the deception,[23] Peng ordered the 119th and the 120th Divisions to destroy the ROK 10th and 19th Infantry Regiments.[20] On the night of 28 October, the ambush by the two PVA divisions quickly decimated the advancing ROK regiments at the east of Onjong, and the PVA roadblocks in the rear areas forced the ROK soldiers to abandon all vehicles and artillery in order to escape.[24]
The ROK 7th Infantry Regiment had now become the only surviving formation of the ROK 6th Infantry Division, but it too was ambushed by the PVA 118th Division on 29 October 20 mi (32 km) south of Kojang.[17] The PVA 118th Division was ordered to wait for reinforcements from the 50th Corps,[20] but the 118th Division attacked alone on the night of 29 October to prevent the ROK from escaping.[20] After a two-hour battle, the ROK 7th Infantry Regiment was forced to disperse with its survivors scattered into the hills.[25] About 875 officers and 3,552 other soldiers managed to escape, while Major Harry Fleming of the Korean Military Advisory Group was wounded fifteen times and was later captured by the PVA.[26][27]
Aftermath
With the loss of the ROK 6th Infantry Division and the ROK 10th Infantry Regiment, ROK II Corps was devastated, and effectively ceased to be an organized fighting force.
Although the PVA were unable to exploit the breakthrough in the UN lines, the weakness of ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army's right flank was exposed to the PVA commanders.[35] During the planning of the PVA Second Phase Offensive, Peng would again focus his attention towards ROK II Corps at the Eighth Army's right flank,[35] resulting in a disastrous defeat for the UN forces at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River.[36] To commemorate this battle as China's official entry into the Korean War, 25 October is currently the War to Resist America and Aid Korea Memorial Day in China.[37]
Notes
- Footnotes
- Army.
- Citations
- ^ Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 359.
- ^ a b c d Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 124.
- ^ a b Millett, Allan R. (2009). "Korean War". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 29 December 2008. Retrieved 2009-02-04.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 145.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 150.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, pp. 114, 124.
- ^ Chen 1996, pp. 207–209.
- ^ a b c d e f Appleman 1992, p. 674.
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1992, p. 673.
- ^ a b c d Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 125.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 156.
- ^ a b Roe 2000, p. 160.
- ^ Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 21.
- ^ a b c Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 22.
- ^ a b c d Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 126.
- ^ a b c d Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 127.
- ^ a b c Appleman 1992, p. 675.
- ^ Ryan, Finkelstein & McDevitt 2003, p. 101.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 163.
- ^ a b c d Roe 2000, p. 167.
- ^ a b Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 25.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 130.
- ^ Ryan, Finkelstein & McDevitt 2003, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 129.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 133.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, p. 134.
- ^ Appleman 1992, pp. 675–676.
- ^ Appleman 1992, p. 691.
- ^ a b Appleman 1992, p. 676.
- ^ Appleman 1992, pp. 695, 710.
- ^ Chae, Chung & Yang 2001, pp. 137–142.
- ^ Appleman 1992, p. 712.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 176.
- ^ Ryan, Finkelstein & McDevitt 2003, p. 102.
- ^ a b Roe 2000, p. 234.
- ^ Appleman 1989, p. 74.
- Chinese Academy of Social Science. Archived from the originalon 2011-06-05. Retrieved 2009-11-13.
References
- Appleman, Roy (1992), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, ISBN 0-16-035958-9, archived from the originalon 2013-11-02, retrieved 2009-11-13
- Appleman, Roy (1989), Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, vol. 11, College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, ISBN 978-1-60344-128-5
- Chae, Han Kook; Chung, Suk Kyun; Yang, Yong Cho (2001), Yang, Hee Wan; Lim, Won Hyok; Sims, Thomas Lee; Sims, Laura Marie; Kim, Chong Gu; Millett, Allan R. (eds.), The Korean War, vol. II, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, ISBN 978-0-8032-7795-3
- Chen, Jian (1996), China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, ISBN 978-0-231-10025-0
- Chinese Military Science Academy (2000), History of War to Resist America and Aid Korea (抗美援朝战争史) (in Chinese), vol. II, Beijing: Chinese Military Science Academy Publishing House, ISBN 7-80137-390-1
- Roe, Patrick C. (2000), The Dragon Strikes, Novato, CA: Presidio, ISBN 0-89141-703-6
- Ryan, Mark A.; Finkelstein, David M.; McDevitt, Michael A. (2003), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 0-7656-1087-6