Battle of Oudenarde
Battle of Oudenarde | |||||||
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Part of the Jan van Huchtenburg | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Dutch Republic Great Britain | France | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Duke of Burgundy Duke of Vendôme | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
90,000[1][2] | 80,000[1]-90,000[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3,000-6,000 Casualties | 9,000-14,000 Casualties |
The Battle of Oudenarde, also known as the Battle of Oudenaarde, was a major engagement of the
The engagement itself came about after a series of offensive and defensive manoeuvres between an Allied army under the command of Marlborough and a French army under the command of the Duc de Bourgogne. The two French commanders quarrelled about the direction their army should take, although roughly a month before the battle, the French army moved westwards and captured the Allied-held fortresses of Bruges and Ghent. This proved to be an unexpected and worrying action to Marlborough, who waited until Eugene had joined his army before he decided to undertake any offensive operations. The French moved to attack again, aiming to capture the city of Oudenarde, which would cut off communication and supply routes between Marlborough and England and thus allow for a significant victory over the Grand Alliance. Marlborough managed to figure out the French plan of action, and forced marched his men towards Oudenaarde to defend it from the expected French attack. On 11 July, the two forces met near the city.[3][4][5]
During the engagement, Allied
Background
The War of the Spanish Succession, fought from 1701 to 1714, was a European conflict in the early 18th century, triggered by the death of the childless
As the French army moved closer to the border with the Spanish Netherlands in 1708, the two French commanders began quarrelling over which battle plan they should adopt. Vendôme wished to attack the city of Huy, which could draw Marlborough in pursuit of his forces and weaken the overall allied position. The eventual plan adopted, however (under direct orders from Louis XIV), was to attack Flanders. The French army moved eastward, until they reached the city of Braine-l'Alleud, which was about twenty-five kilometres south of Brussels, and allowed the French to threaten the nearby city of Leuven. Marlborough moved his forces to a few miles south of Leuven, in order to sufficiently protect both cities from a potential French assault. The French army then remained inactive for more than a month, not making any major movements whatsoever. This allowed the much-delayed Eugène to bring his forces across the Rhine and head towards Marlboroughs position. On 5 July, however, the French unexpectedly moved westward, quickly capturing the cities of Bruges and Ghent (although about three hundred British soldiers held out in Ghent for a few days). This unexpected move both demoralised and confounded Marlborough and his army, and he did not make any offensive moves until Eugène along with his army arrived to join him. The French army had control over the entire length of the Scheldt from the French border to the newly taken city of Ghent.[3][5]
Only one Allied fortress remained: the city of Oudenaarde. If the French managed to capture that city, Marlborough's army would be cut off from the coast, causing them to lose communication with England. Marlborough managed to guess the French battle plan, and also correctly guessed the method by which the French army would attempt to take Oudenarde—they would march down the east bank of the Scheldt (closer to Marlborough's troops), while leaving a large covering force between the two opposing armies. The French army set out on 8 July, marching toward the city of Lessines. However, Marlborough made one of the most impressive forced marches in history, capturing the city on 10 July. This forced the French commanders to attempt to simply to wade across the Scheldt and take Oudenaarde from that position. Marlborough again ordered a forced march of his troops. This time, though, he ordered eleven thousand troops to hold the main crossing point across the Scheldt, under the command of his Quartermaster General, William Cadogan. Cadogan's force built five additional pontoon bridges to allow Marlborough to get his eighty-thousand-strong army across the river, until French foragers discovered the allied presence around 9:00 a.m., initiating the battle.[3][5]
Battle
Cadogan, a superb cavalry commander, ordered some
Burgundy, making another mistake, decided to launch an attack (over protests by Vendôme). The French right wing began to attack the Allied positions near Eine, while the left wing (for unknown reasons) remained stationary near Huise. A very strong position was held by the Allied left wing. Twenty-eight cavalry squadrons protected the right flank of Cadogan's infantry, which would receive the attack (which proceeded at about 4:00 p.m.). Burgundy ordered the assault, which landed on Prussian cavalry squadrons under Dubislav Gneomar von Natzmer. Although intense fighting ensued, the attack was dispersed. Then, Vendôme made a dubious tactical decision to personally lead an attack of twelve infantry regiments, fighting hand-to-hand with a half-pike. This meant that while one commander (Burgundy) was in his headquarters with no view of the ongoing battle, the other commander was personally fighting in the field, with no possibility of directing his men. Most historians agree that had the French left wing attacked the weakened Allied right wing, it would have been forced to retreat. Vendôme realized this, asking Burgundy for permission to attack with the left wing. Burgundy sent back a messenger with a message of refusal but the messenger failed to deliver the message. The situation worsened with Vendôme believing that support would arrive for his troops, who were lengthening their line of battle and threatening to envelop the Allied left flank. As French infantry regiments approached, they lengthened the Allied line but too slowly and not great enough in extent to prevent the French from threatening the Allied positions.[3][5][6]
Around this same time, the
Marlborough thus moved his headquarters to the left flank, while Eugène assumed command of the right flank (which still checked the left wing of the French army). While the right wing was under pressure, Marlborough placed eighteen newly arrived
Overkirk had sent his two leading infantry brigades under Major General Coenraad Weck through a gap in the woodlands to strengthen Marlborough’s left,[10] while he himself had made a circumferential move, more to the left, with the rest of his troops.[11] However, Eugene became concerned about the left wing and sent the two field deputies there with orders to attack the French. Arriving there, Sicco van Goslinga discovered an exhausted Overkirk. The old general did not seem to see the urgency of an attack. Unsatisfied, Van Goslinga then rode off to a line of six battalions where he encountered Lieutenant General Bengt Oxenstierna. He too had no intention of attacking, arguing that the terrain was too rugged to pass through and that they were better off waiting for the French. Van Goslinga then decided to take it upon himself to launch the attack and he placed himself at the head of two Swiss battalions which he ordered to advance. Five other Dutch battalions followed and the Prince of Orange placed eight others alongside Van Goslinga in battle order.[12][13] The Deputy and the young Prince marched down the slope with roughly 10,000 infantrymen and crashed into the French infantry, whom they quickly swept aside.[10][14] A French counter-attack by the elite horsemen of the Maison du Roi did little to change the situation.
Our Swiss, [who] were determined to wait for them with the bayonet fixed on the rifle and only shoot at the very last moment were so quiet that I was amazed. ... the hail of musket balls, with which he [the French cavalry] was received, cut down some and routed the rest
At the same time, the Dutch cavalry under the Count of Tilly cut off the French retreat route to Kortrijk.[15] Much of the French army was routed or captured, with lack of daylight preventing the completion of the manoeuvre.[3][5][6] The battle also ended in confusion for the Allies. The darkness caused the Allied right and left wings to mistake each other for the enemy and they began firing at each other. Eugene on the right and the Prince of Orange on the left wing managed, through their intervention, to stop the firing and prevented the army from doing any real damage to itself.[16]
Aftermath
The French army retreated in disorder towards Ghent, with the Duc de Bourgogne and the Duc de Vendome quarreling amongst themselves on who was to blame for the defeat. Only nightfall and a few broken pontoon bridges saved the French army from total annihilation.
The French commanders had made several catastrophic tactical errors during the battle: The entire French left wing (the troops under Burgundy and the large mass north of the Norken) was kept in reserve. They could easily have destroyed the weakened right wing of the Allied army. Had a concerted attack been carried out, with Vendôme attacking with his main body to envelop the Allied right flank and Bourgogne attacked with the left wing (before Overkirk and the rest of Argyll's troops arrived), the French army could have easily won. The decision of Bourgogne to march personally into battle may have provided a welcome boost to French morale, but it denied him for the rest of the battle the opportunity to command his troops, which proved disastrous when the Allies overwhelmed the French via a flanking manoeuvre. The French army had lost about fourteen to fifteen thousand soldiers overall (with about eight thousand of whom becoming prisoners-of-war) and twenty-five artillery guns, while the Allies lost roughly three thousand men.[4][18][19] Bodart gives roughly similar numbers for the French casualties (6,000 killed or wounded and 8,000 captured), but higher numbers for allied ones (6,000 killed or wounded).
On the other hand, the reputation of the Allied commanders were greatly enhanced by the victory. For Marlborough, his eye for choosing the correct ground, his sense of timing and his keen knowledge of the enemy were again amply demonstrated. Eugene's reputation was also enhanced—while Marlborough remained in overall command, Eugene had led the crucial right flank and centre. Once again the Allied commanders had co-operated remarkably well. "Prince Eugene and I," wrote the Duke, "shall never differ about our share of the laurels."[6] The success restored the strategic initiative to the Allies, who now opted to besiege Lille, the strongest fortress in Europe. While the Duke commanded the covering force, Eugene oversaw the siege of the town, which surrendered on 22 October; however, it was not until 10 December that the resolute Boufflers yielded the citadel. Yet for all the difficulties of the winter siege, the campaign of 1708 had been a remarkable success by requiring superior logistical skill and organisation. The Allies retook Brughes and Ghent, and the French were driven out of almost all the Spanish Netherlands: "He who has not seen this", wrote Eugene, "has seen nothing".[4][5]
See also
Notes
- ^ The Habsburgs were rulers of Austria and Hungary in their own right; Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, technically an elected position, had been held by the Habsburgs since 1438.
References
- ^ a b Bodart 1908, p. 154.
- ^ a b Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 301.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-7867-2722-3.
- ^ a b c d e f g Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Chandler 1973, p. 222.
- ^ a b c d e Henderson: Prince Eugen of Savoy, p. 162
- ^ a b Wijn 1959, p. 304.
- ^ a b Van Nimwegen 2020.
- ^ Dhondt 2008, p. 48.
- ^ a b Churchill 1936, p. 810.
- ^ Wijn 1959, p. 306.
- ^ a b Knoop 1867, p. 128—130.
- ^ De Graaf 2021, p. 102―103.
- ^ a b Van Nimwegen 2020, p. 302.
- ^ De Graaf 2021, p. 103.
- ^ Bosscha 1838, p. 810.
- ^ W.H. Davenport Adams, England at War, London, 1886, p. 142, "Night alone saved their army...".
- ^ W.H. Davenport Adams, England at War, London, 1886, p. 144, gives 6,000 French killed and wounded, 9,000 prisoners, 98 colours; the allies 3,000 killed and wounded.
- ^ Oudenarde, Randall Fegley, Magill's Guide to Military History, Vol. 3, ed. John Powell, (Salem Press Inc., 2001), 1163-1164.
Bibliography
- Lynn, John A., The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667–1714 (Longman Publishers: Harlow, England, 1999).
- Scott, Christopher (2008). The Battle of Oudenarde. Leigh-on-Sea, Essex: Partizan Press. ISBN 978-1-85818-570-5.
- ISBN 978-0946771127.
- ISBN 0-554-10672-8.
- Childs, John (2014). General Percy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1474255141.
- Bodart, Gaston (1908). Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon, (1618–1905).
- Van Nimwegen, Olaf (2020). De Veertigjarige Oorlog 1672-1712: de strijd van de Nederlanders tegen de Zonnekoning (The 40 Years War 1672-1712: the Dutch struggle against the Sun King) (in Dutch). Prometheus. ISBN 978-90-446-3871-4.
- Garrison, F.H. (1970). Notes on the history of military medicine. Legare Street Press. ISBN 978-1397937636.
- De Graaf, Ronald (2021). Friso: het tragische leven van Johan Willem Friso [Friso: the tragic life of John William Friso] (in Dutch). Boom. ISBN 978-90-2443-676-7.
- Wijn, J.W. (1959). Het Staatsche Leger: Deel VIII-2 Het tijdperk van de Spaanse Successieoorlog (The Dutch States Army: Part VIII-2 The era of the War of the Spanish Succession) (in Dutch). Martinus Nijhoff.
- Dhondt, Frederik (2008). "De Slag bij Oudenaarde en de Spaanse Successieoorlog" [The Battle of Oundenarde and the War of the Spanish Succession] (PDF). Oudenaarde 1708: Een Stad, Een Koning, Een Veldheer (in Dutch): 25–75.
- Bosscha, Johannes (1838). Neêrlands heldendaden te land, van de vroegste tijden af tot in onze dagen (in Dutch). Suringar.
- Knoop, Willem Jan (1867). Krijgs – en geschiedkundige geschriften. Volume 8 [Military and historical writings. Volume 8] (in Dutch). H. A. M. Roelants.
- Churchill, Winston (1936). Marlborough: His Life and Times. George G. Harrap Co. Ltd London.