Battle of Pakchon
39°39′32″N 125°35′29″E / 39.65889°N 125.59139°E
Battle of Pakchon | |
---|---|
Part of the Pakchon, North Korea | |
Result | United Nations victory |
North Korea
Zhang Jiecheng[1]
84 wounded
200 wounded
(estimated)
The Battle of Pakchon (5 November 1950), also known as the Battle of Bochuan (
During the night of 4/5 November, the PVA and Korean People's Army (KPA) mounted a full-scale assault on the US 24th Infantry Division, pushing back an American infantry regiment nearly 2 kilometres (1.2 mi). The PVA/KPA force subsequently turned west, advancing between the Taeryong and Chongchon rivers and threatening the rear of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade by cutting the Pakchon–Sinanju road. The following day they attacked an American artillery battery which was guarding a vital concrete bridge near Kujin. The British and Australians then successfully counter-attacked the PVA forces occupying a number of nearby ridgelines during the day but were in turn counter-attacked before being pushed off the high ground during the night. In their first battle with the PVA, the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) captured a well defended hill with only limited offensive support, and held it in the face of heavy counter-attacks before confused command decisions resulted in a disorganised night withdrawal while still in contact. The withdrawal threatened to open the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade's left flank and the Australians were ordered to immediately reposition on the ridge, yet ultimately it was too late to regain the feature in darkness. However, following heavy fighting the pressure on the Australians unexpectedly ceased after midnight, and parties of PVA were observed beginning to withdraw. By early morning the PVA attack had been checked and 3 RAR had redeployed to new positions in the paddy fields around the railway crossing north of Maenjung-dong.
The fighting was costly for both sides. Although the Australians halted the advancing PVA 117th Division and inflicted numerous casualties on them, they also suffered heavy losses. In the aftermath the inexperienced Australian battalion commander—Lieutenant Colonel Floyd Walsh—was relieved of his position by the British brigade commander, having taken over just six days earlier following the death of the previous commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel
Background
Military situation
The
Australia was one of the first nations to commit units to the fighting, playing a small but sometimes significant part in the UN forces, which were initially led by
On 23 September 1950, 3 RAR embarked for Korea, concentrating at Pusan on 28 September. There it joined the British
By the time 3 RAR arrived in the theatre, the KPA had been broken and were in rapid retreat, with MacArthur's forces conducting a successful
The advance continued north with little respite, and on 22 October the Australians fought their first major action at
Prelude
Opposing forces
Following the capture of Chongju the US 21st Infantry Regiment had set off rapidly along the road to
Ultimately Chongju was the furthest north that the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was to penetrate, and on 1 November, while still in divisional reserve, the brigade was ordered to pull back to Pakchon in an attempt to consolidate the western flank.
"In order to capture the enemies at Yongsan-dong and Yongbyong, you must infiltrate boldly, cutting the Yongsan-dong–Pakchon and Yongbyong–Anju roads, prevent the enemies from escaping, [and] surround the enemies..." |
Peng Dehuai's order to the Chinese 39th Army.[2] |
Walker elected to stand north of the Chongchon and Taeryong rivers in response to the PVA offensive, and the following day Coad received new orders to hold the left forward section of the bridgehead over the Chongchon.
Battle
Opening moves, 4/5 November 1950
During the night of 4/5 November 1950, the PVA and KPA mounted a full-scale assault on US 24th Infantry Division.[22] Before dawn, 19 RCT had become heavily engaged,[41] and was pushed back nearly 2 kilometres (1.2 mi). The PVA force turned west to advance between the Taeryong and Chongchon rivers, threatening the rear of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade by cutting the Pakchon–Sinanju road.[22] The previous afternoon a patrol from the Middlesex had clashed with a large PVA patrol 9.6 kilometres (6.0 mi) to the north-east and suffered a number of casualties, yet the main PVA attack did not come until early the next morning.[40][42] Meanwhile, large numbers of refugees continued to move south, causing the British and Australians further concern given the possibility that they might be used by the PVA to cover the infiltration of their positions.[43] At 08:00 on 5 November a group of around 200 PVA attacked C Battery, US 61st Field Artillery Battalion, which was attached to the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade.[32] The American guns had been supporting the brigade from a position beside the road about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Pakchon, and were protecting the vital concrete bridge 1.8 kilometres (1.1 mi) south of the Argyll's battalion headquarters at Kujin.[22]
The PVA established a number of roadblocks in the area before proceeding to assault the American gun line and the nearby bridge.
Meanwhile, to the north, under the command of Captain Howard M. Moore, C Battery, US 61st Field Artillery formed its six 105 mm
In order to open the road the Argylls moved to clear the PVA off the high ground located 500 to 1,000 metres (550 to 1,090 yd) east of the road.
Throughout the morning a United States Air Force (USAF) LT-6G Mosquito light observation aircraft had continued to monitor growing concentrations of PVA in hills to the rear of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, with reports indicating their strength at approximately one division.[47] Determining that the PVA would move to cut the road during the night and believing it dangerous to remain any further forward than required, Coad requested approval for a limited withdrawal.[53] He decided to pull his forward units back across the Taeryong River, before moving south towards the Chongchon River, near Anju.[32] The brigade counter-attacked the PVA forces occupying the nearby ridgelines in order to clear the route south.[37] The plan envisioned the Argylls holding the road open, while 3 RAR recaptured the high ground previously held by A Company, 1 ASHR. The Middlesex would then pass through to clear and occupy the hills east of Maengjung-dong, while the Argylls—as the brigade rearguard—would follow to occupy the right of the new defensive position. The brigade would then adopt a tight defensive perimeter on the hills overlooking the north bank, so as to maintain the bridgehead over the river.[53] Meanwhile, still in position west of Pakchon, the Australians prepared to cross the Taeryong River to regain the lost position, 7.5 kilometres (4.7 mi) to their south. 3 RAR faced a difficult approach after moving beyond the river, with the battalion's route paralleling the disputed ridge which overlooked it 800 metres (870 yd) to the east.[31][48]
3 RAR assaults the ridgeline, 5 November 1950
The Australians crossed the Taeryong at 11:30 and began preparations to assault PVA positions on the ridgeline 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) east of the road to Pakchon and 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) north of Maenjung-dong.
Beginning their advance, the Australians began to suffer casualties;[55] yet they were initially unable to confirm the location of the PVA. However, as they commenced their ascent they were met by heavy small arms fire from the higher ground to the south and east.[53] After a long approach across 500 metres (550 yd) of open paddy field, A Company relieved the beleaguered Argylls.[52] The PVA then forced the two Australian companies to fight hard in order to gain the 50-metre (55 yd) crest.[31] Lacking artillery support, the Australians instead relied on the battalion's integral support weapons,[50] with 3-inch mortars and medium machine-guns in support, as well as four Sherman tanks which provided fire support from a stand-off position near the road.[53] With A and B Companies heavily engaged, Walsh moved D Company—under the command of Major Walter Brown—to attack the hill to the south to reinforce the right flank. A Company succeeded in establishing itself on the first crest, forcing the PVA from the position, while supporting fire from their Bren light machine guns and Vickers medium machine-guns allowed B Company to move up on their right and capture the second crest.[57] Finally at 16:00, after two hours of heavy fighting, the Australians had achieved their objectives against a determined defence.[50] A and B Company prepared for a counter-attack by the PVA.[58] Meanwhile, C Company—under Captain Archer Denness—had remained in reserve on the road with battalion headquarters and Support Company.[31][59]
Although orders for the attack had been hurried and lacking in detail, and the strength of the defenders unknown, the assaulting force had prevailed, securing the ridge with only limited offensive support.[31] During the fighting one of the B Company platoon commanders, Lieutenant Eric Larsen, who had only the week before led the crossing at Kujin, was killed.[53] One of the section commanders, Corporal Jeff Jones, immediately took command of the 5 Platoon assault, moving from section to section across the steep slope to direct their fire, even while under heavy PVA mortar and machine-gun fire. He was awarded the US Silver Star for his actions.[50] The successful assault opened the road south, enabling the Middlesex battalion, brigade headquarters and a number of supporting units to withdraw down the road through the Australians, followed by the Argylls.[31][50] 3 RAR remained behind as a rearguard while the British battalions took up new positions, covering the Chongchon River crossing at Anju.[60] PVA mortars and machine-gun fire continued to fall on 3 RAR, and at 17:00 a round destroyed the A Company headquarters, killing two men and wounding four others, including Chitts who was evacuated by stretcher.[57]
Coad ordered 3 RAR to consolidate its positions and to secure the railway bridge; however, with all his companies committed there were no troops available for the latter task and Walsh chose to ignore the order.[59] Meanwhile, the Middlesex occupied a hill north-east of Maenjung-dong, which was found to be clear except for one minor feature occupied by the PVA, while the Argylls moved south with a platoon of tanks and positioned themselves on a small group of hills, 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) east of Maenjung-dong.[50][61] From here the brigade was able to dominate the Pakchon–Maenjung-dong–Anju road. Meanwhile, as the light began to fade the administrative elements of the formation and the US 61st Field Artillery Battalion were moved south of the Chongchon River amid a bitter wind.[50] The British and Australians stood-to from dusk until nightfall, and after posting sentries the remainder of the brigade began their night routine.[62]
Walsh withdraws from the high ground, 5/6 November 1950
An hour after last light on 5 November the PVA attacked C Company 3 RAR—the forward Australian company occupying positions astride the Pakchon road 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) north of Maenjung-dong—with mortars and machine-guns. Meanwhile, machine-gun fire also fell on Support Company and battalion headquarters, 400 metres (440 yd) to the south.[50] Walsh decided to relocate his headquarters 900 metres (980 yd) further to the rear.[58] The PVa infantry launched a strong attack against C Company assaulting them across the paddy fields in darkness, while simultaneously also falling upon A and B Companies holding the hills they had captured during the afternoon.[62] In the face of the heavy PVA counter-attack Walsh feared the loss of his entire force, and at 20:00 he ordered a general withdrawal, pulling them back off the ridgeline in order to concentrate the battalion on the road, without informing Coad.[62][63] Ordered in the dark and with one company still under attack, a disorganised night withdrawal occurred.[64] The decision proved to be a serious tactical error, for as was to be demonstrated often in the months that followed, the PVA were skilled at moving across the hills to outflank road-bound UN forces who often failed to hold the ridges on either side of the roads only to be confronted by strong concentrations in front and behind them as a result.[32] The withdrawal threatened to open the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade's left flank; recognising the danger this posed, Coad ordered Walsh to immediately reposition his companies on the ridge.[32] Ultimately this proved unachievable.[62]
A Company—now under Lieutenant Lawrence Clark following Chitts' wounding that afternoon—had only just succeeded in breaking contact from the PVA, suffering a number killed and wounded during a confused withdrawal. Meanwhile, B Company had also been forced to fight its way down the hill.[62] Both companies were now well clear of their former positions and would have had a hard time fighting their way back.[63] Ultimately it was too late for the Australians to regain the feature in darkness, and the weight of the PVA attack continued to mount.[32] Only D Company on the southern right flank—which had been left unmolested—was able to regain its previous position on Hill 63.[62][65] Meanwhile, the positions previously occupied by A and B Companies were occupied by the PVA in superior numbers, and the remainder of 3 RAR concentrated at the railway crossing instead. At 22:00 Coad arranged to shell and mortar the relinquished ridge, while a standing patrol from the Middlesex was posted on the south-western side of the Maenjung-dong pass in anticipation of a renewed PVA attack.[62] However, following heavy fighting the pressure on the Australians unexpectedly ceased after midnight, and parties of PVA were observed beginning to withdraw.[60]
By 02:00 the PVA attack had been checked and 3 RAR had redeployed to new positions in the paddy fields around the railway crossing north of Maenjung-dong.
Despite the events of the previous night the Australians still held the road, while D Company continued to occupy the former PVA strongpoint on Hill 63, even if it was isolated from the rest of the battalion.
Aftermath
Casualties
After the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade's initial success, they had in turn been counter-attacked by the PVA before being pushed off the high ground during the night. During the action the brigade lost 12 killed and 70 wounded, the majority of them among the Australians.[73] PVA losses were not known with many of their dead removed from the battlefield,[73] but according to Commander Wu Xinquan of the PVA 39th Army, an infantry company from the PVA 350th Regiment of the 117th Division was badly mauled by the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade during the engagement.[74] Australian forces later estimated that the PVA had suffered 200 killed and another 200 wounded.[73] In their first battle with the PVA, 3 RAR had successfully captured a well defended hill with only limited offensive support, and had held it the face of heavy counter-attacks before confused command decisions resulted in the battalion conducting a disorganised night withdrawal while still in contact.[75] The fighting was costly for both sides and although the Australians had halted the advancing PVA 117th Division and inflicted numerous casualties on them, they had also lost heavily.[32] Nonetheless, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade had succeeding in preventing a PVA break-through at Pakchon, keeping open vital withdrawal routes across the river and securing the UN left flank.[67][76] Suffering significant casualties, the PVA offensive was finally halted the next day due to logistic difficulties.[77] The Royal Australian Regiment and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were later granted the battle honour "Pakchon".[78] The PVA and KPA were temporarily forced to withdraw north,[75] while Walker successfully reinforced the UN positions, holding on the Chongchon Line.[76] The PVA had failed to exploit their initial success, and instead now seemed to adopt a deliberately cautious strategy.[72]
Subsequent operations
On 7 November, the US 24th Infantry Division and 27th British Commonwealth Brigade followed up the PVA withdrawal with a limited probing advance.[72] That morning Australian clearing patrols killed seven PVA soldiers, before 3 RAR prepared to advance with the remainder of the brigade. C Company occupied Hill 74 2.5 kilometres (1.6 mi) to the north-east without opposition, only to discover a KPA company on the reverse slope. The Australians engaged the KPA with machine-gun fire, inflicting heavy losses on the defenders and capturing five before forcing them to withdraw towards Tang-dong harried by artillery and airstrikes. The remainder of the battalion deployed on the right, while the Argylls occupied two hills further north. The brigade's advance had forestalled a planned KPA attack on the night of 7/8 November,[79] while large numbers of PVA dead from the previous fighting were also discovered.[80] On 9 November the advance wheeled to the north-west around Pakchon, with 3 RAR moving forward another 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) to the east, encountering little resistance and taking a number of prisoners in the process.[81] From 11 November the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade advanced slowly north. On 16 November 3 RAR occupied Hill 117, on a bend in the Taeryong River 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) north of Pakchon.[82] Over the following weeks they remained in the Pakchon area, conducting extensive patrolling up to company-size, and clashing with small groups of PVA/KPA.[32] As winter approached the weather became bitterly cold amid snow and strong winds. Unprepared for the extreme conditions the Australians increasingly suffered health problems, particularly among the older members of the battalion. Lacking the training and equipment for operations in ice and snow, maintenance also proved burdensome before additional US cold weather clothing and equipment was issued.[75]
Ferguson ultimately proved to be an able commander. He remained with the battalion after that time.[32] The change of command was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief BCOF, Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson,[71] and Ferguson was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 10 November.[72] He developed a good working relationship with Coad, who held him in high regard, and went on to command 3 RAR during its most demanding period in Korea.[32]
The UN resumed the offensive on 24 November, shortly before the PVA began their own
Notes
Footnotes
Citations
- ^ a b Hu & Ma 1987, p. 5.
- ^ a b c Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 38
- ^ MacDonald 1986, p. 30.
- ^ Dennis et al 2008, pp. 300–302.
- ^ MacDonald 1986, p. 39.
- ^ MacDonald 1986, pp. 39–40.
- ^ Johnston 2003, p. 55.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 706.
- ^ a b Dennis et al 2008, p. 302.
- ^ O'Dowd 2000, p. 3.
- ^ a b Breen 1992, p. 8.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 57.
- ^ Horner 2008, p. 58.
- ^ Horner 2008, pp. 58–61.
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 257.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, p. 67.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 248.
- ^ Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 258.
- ^ a b Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 259.
- ^ a b c Horner 2008, p. 62.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 44.
- ^ a b c d e f Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 260.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 50.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, pp. 55–56.
- ^ Chinese Military Science Academy 2000, p. 90.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2000, p. 196.
- ^ a b Horner 2008, p. 63
- ^ Hu & Ma 1987, p. 5
- ^ a b c Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 280.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 60.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Argent 2002, p. 76.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Horner 2008, p. 64.
- ^ O'Dowd 2000, p. 17
- ^ Breen 1992, p. 9.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, p. 116.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley 1990, pp. 279–280.
- ^ a b Coulthard-Clark 2001, pp. 261–262.
- ^ a b Farrar-Hockley 1990, pp. 280–281.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, p. 110.
- ^ a b Bartlett 1960, p. 39.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 281.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, p. 111.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 261.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, pp. 111–113.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, pp. 261–262.
- ^ a b c d e f Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 282.
- ^ a b c d Appleman 1998, p. 713.
- ^ a b c d Bartlett 1960, p. 40.
- ^ O'Dowd 2000, p. 18.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k O'Neill 1985, p. 62.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley 1990, pp. 282–283
- ^ a b c O'Dowd 2000, p. 19.
- ^ a b c d e Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 283.
- ^ a b c d Bartlett 1960, p. 41.
- ^ a b Gallaway 1999, p. 113.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, p. 114.
- ^ a b Gallaway 1999, p. 115.
- ^ a b O'Dowd 2000, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b O'Dowd 2000, p. 20.
- ^ a b Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 261.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley 1990, pp. 283–284.
- ^ a b c d e f g Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 284.
- ^ a b Argent 2002, p. 77.
- ^ a b c O'Dowd 2000, p. 27.
- ^ a b c O'Dowd 2000, p. 23.
- ^ a b O'Neill 1985, p. 63.
- ^ a b Gallaway 1999, p. 125.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, pp. 122–123.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, pp. 116–120.
- ^ Gallaway 1999, pp. 124–125.
- ^ a b c Farrar-Hockley 1990, p. 285.
- ^ a b c d O'Neill 1985, p. 64.
- ^ a b c Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 262.
- ^ Wu & Wang 1996, p. 107.
- ^ a b c d e Kuring 2004, p. 233.
- ^ a b Bartlett 1960, p. 42.
- ^ Roe 2000, p. 176.
- ^ Rodger 2003, p. 373.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 65.
- ^ Argent 2002, p. 84.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 66.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 67.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2000, p. 203.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 56.
- ^ O'Neill 1985, p. 80.
References
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- Argent, Alf (2002). "The Next Leader: Bruce Ferguson". The Fight Leaders: Australian Battlefield Leadership: Green, Hassett and Ferguson 3 RAR – Korea. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military Historical Publications. pp. 72–113. ISBN 1-876439-56-4.
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- Johnston, William (2003). A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea. Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-1008-4.
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Further reading
- Forbes, Cameron (2010). The Korean War: Australia in the Giants' Playground. Sydney, New South Wales: Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-405040-01-3.
- ISBN 978-1-74110-807-1.
- Pears, Maurie (2007). Battlefield Korea: The Korean Battle Honours of the Royal Australian Regiment, 1950–1953. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military History Publications. ISBN 9780980379600.