Battle of Pyongtaek
Battle of Pyongtaek | |||||||
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Part of the Korean War | |||||||
Map of the 34th Infantry Regiment's delay action from July 5 to 8 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
North Korea | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
George B. Barth Jay B. Lovless |
Lee Kwon Mu | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
34th Infantry Regiment |
4th Infantry Division
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Strength | |||||||
2,000 | 12,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
33 killed or missing[n 1] and 18 wounded[1] | Unknown |
The Battle of Pyongtaek was the second engagement between
The
Half of the regiment's strength was ordered to retreat from its position before the North Korean force was encountered, leaving the flank open for the remaining force, 1st Battalion at Pyongtaek. The battalion encountered North Korean forces the morning of July 6, and after a brief fight, was unable to repel them effectively. The battalion then mounted a disorganized retreat to Cheonan several miles away, having failed to significantly delay the North Korean forces in their movement south.
Background
Outbreak of war
On the night of June 25, 1950, 10
The
Battle of Osan
From the 24th Infantry Division, one battalion was assigned to be airlifted into Korea via
During that time, the 24th Division's
The 1st Battalion was unprepared for a fight as it was poorly trained and had no tanks or anti-tank guns to fight North Korean armor.[12] Shortages of equipment hampered the entire division's efforts. Shortages in heavy guns reduced artillery support to the entire division.[13] Communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition was largely absent, large amounts of equipment were en route but the division had been under-equipped in Japan. Most of the radios available to the division did not work, and batteries, communication wire, and telephones to communicate among units were in short supply.[14] The division had no tanks: its new M26 Pershing and older M4A3 Sherman tanks had not yet arrived. One of the few weapons that could penetrate the North Korean T-34, high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) ammunition, was in short supply.[15] The paucity of radios and wire hampered communication between and among the American units.[16]
The battalion's new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres, was apparently given faulty intelligence, and he told his command that the Koreans advancing south were poorly trained and equipped.
Battle
Opening moves
A reconnaissance team sent north on the evening of July 5 reported seeing tanks south of Osan. The team attempted to destroy a tank it spotted in the village of Sojong but was unsuccessful; it suffered one killed (Private
Having pushed back Task Force Smith at Osan, the
North Korean attack
Rain and fog were heavy throughout the morning of July 6, and visibility was limited for the emplaced troops.[18] Just after daybreak, 13 North Korean T-34 tanks were spotted stopped at the bridge. Following them were two columns of infantry. The American forces originally believed that they might be survivors of Task Force Smith until they realized the forces were deploying in numbers too great, and began preparing to attack the unsuspecting North Koreans.[26] The battalion's commander ordered mortar fire on the North Korean forces, causing them to disperse as the lead tank began firing on the positions of A Company, on a hill southwest of the road. Mortar fire destroyed a truck, but a round from a North Korean tank stunned the artillery observer and no one took his place in the confusion, ending the American mortar attack.[23][27] North Korean forces immediately began advancing on A Company's position, but the company was not able to return fire effectively, with fewer than half of its soldiers using their weapons. For several minutes only squad and platoon leaders shot back while the rest of the soldiers hid in their foxholes.[28] Within fifteen minutes, B Company was able to return fire effectively, and by this time the North Korean forces had advanced steadily toward 1st Battalion's position.[23] Later examinations found many American soldiers' weapons were assembled incorrectly or were dirty or broken.[25] The Americans had nothing with which to fight the tanks, and were unable to do anything to stop them.[29]
As North Korean soldiers advanced, they began to envelop both A and B Companies, and 30 minutes after the first shots were fired, both companies were ordered to withdraw, one platoon at a time.[30] C Company, kept in reserve during the engagement, retreated without coming in contact with North Korean forces. A Company, under the heaviest attack, attempted a gradual withdrawal which quickly became disorderly, as men ran from the hill, some without weapons and ammunition, being strafed by North Korean machine guns the entire time. Panic quickly overtook many of the men of the battalion, and they started running past the designated rally points, all the way to Pyongtaek. Others, too scared to retreat, remained in their foxholes and were captured by the North Korean forces.[31] One officer attempted to stay behind and search for survivors, before he and three others were allegedly captured and executed by North Korean forces.[26][32] Company commanders gathered what men they could and began moving south, though one-fourth of 1st Battalion was killed, missing or captured immediately after the brief fight. The retreating elements left a trail of equipment behind, littering the road back to Pyongtaek with ammunition, helmets, and rain gear.[26] In the disorderly retreat one platoon from A Company was left behind, and had to retreat through a railway for cover.[33]
American withdrawal
The battalion regrouped at Pyongtaek itself, mostly a mass of disorganized soldiers without leadership.[34] Engineers with the battalion demolished a bridge north of the town before moving south. The remains of A Company then headed for Cheonan, regrouping there with the rest of the 1st and 3rd Battalions which had also withdrawn. Though a few jeeps and trucks were found and commandeered, most of the retreat was carried out on foot. A few scattered artillery shells landed around the retreating force, but North Korean soldiers did not aggressively pursue them.[35] By noon the disorganized remains of the 34th Infantry had outrun all enemy fire and were out of immediate danger.[36]
The soldiers, most of their equipment missing, made no attempt at further delaying actions, and were unable to communicate with other units because their radio equipment had been lost.[37] As they were retreating, an American aircraft accidentally strafed the column, injuring one South Korean soldier moving with them, further demoralizing the soldiers.[29][36] The 34th Infantry Regiment began to set up a new line south of Chonan by nightfall, even though many of its men no longer had equipment to fight with.[11]
Aftermath
General Dean, the divisional commander, was angered by the poor performance of the 34th Infantry Regiment during the battle. He allegedly was upset that the regiment retreated so quickly without attempting to further delay the North Koreans. He considered ordering the regiment back north immediately but did not do so for fear of ambush.
The regiment was forced to regroup at Cheonan and oppose the North Korean forces again, and it suffered heavy casualties before being forced to withdraw after the
References
Notes
- ^ Several of the captured American servicemen were executed by the North Koreans.
Citations
- ^ Korean War: Forgotten 24th and 34th Infantry Regiments
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 1
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 2
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 2
- ^ a b Varhola 2000, p. 3
- United States Army Japan. Archived from the originalon 2010-08-24. Retrieved 2009-11-29.
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 4
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 62
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 72
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 73
- ^ a b c d Fehrenbach 2001, p. 78
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 63
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 92
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 123
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 93
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 89
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 74
- ^ a b c Gugeler 2005, p. 10
- ^ Gugeler 2005, p. 11
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 78
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 79
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 80
- ^ a b c Gugeler 2005, p. 12
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 14
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 64
- ^ a b c Fehrenbach 2001, p. 77
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 81
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 75
- ^ a b c Catchpole 2001, p. 15
- ^ Gugeler 2005, p. 13
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 76
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 65
- ^ Gugeler 2005, p. 15
- ^ Gugeler 2005, p. 16
- ^ Gugeler 2005, p. 17
- ^ a b Gugeler 2005, p. 18
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 66
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 67
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 16
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the originalon 2013-11-02, retrieved 2010-12-22
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84119-413-4
- ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3
- Gugeler, Russell A. (2005), Combat Actions in Korea, University Press of the Pacific, ISBN 978-1-4102-2451-4
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4