Battle of Río Bueno (1654)

Edit links
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
"Battle of Río Bueno" redirects here. For the 1759 battle, see Battle of Río Bueno (1759).
Battle of Río Bueno
Part of Arauco War
Date11 January 1654
Location
Bueno River
Result Mapuche-Huilliche victory
Belligerents
Spanish Empire

Mapuche-Huilliche

Commanders and leaders
Juan de Salazar
Strength
900 Spanish soldiers[1]
1500 Indian auxiliaries[1]		 3,000 Mapuche-Huilliches[1]
Casualties and losses
About 100 soldiers lost[2]
200 auxiliaries lost[2]		 Few

The battle of Río Bueno (

Fütawillimapu in southern Chile. The battle took place against a background of a long-running enmity between the Cuncos and Spanish, dating back to the destruction of Osorno in 1603. More immediate causes were the killing of Spanish shipwreck survivors
and looting of the cargo by Cuncos, which led to Spanish desires for a punishment, combined with the prospects of lucrative slave raiding.

While Cuncos and

Jesuits made attempts to placate the mood of war, maestre de campo Juan de Salazar eventually convinced Governor of Chile Antonio de Acuña Cabrera to authorise and support his expedition. The battle was fought across the Bueno River where Cuncos and Huilliches repelled Spanish attempts to cross the river, resulting in hundreds of Spanish troops drowned or killed. The battle encouraged the Mapuche uprising of 1655
, in which many Spanish settlements and haciendas were ravaged.

The Battle of Río Bueno along with the subsequent events led to a political crisis among the Spanish in Chile, which involved a risk of civil war. The severity of the crisis led historian Miguel Luis Amunátegui to list it in 1870 among the precursors to the independence of Chile. The Cuncos and Huilliches south of the Bueno River remained de facto independent until the late 18th century.

Background

Renewed Cunco-Spanish conflict

class=notpageimage|
The location of Spanish settlements and forts within the modern boundaries of Chile and Argentina. In red is the land of Cuncos.
Further information:
Slavery of Mapuches and Wreckage of San José

Governor of Chile

Jesuit fathers Diego de Rosales and Juan de Moscoso who argued that the murders were committed by a few Indians and warned the governor that renewing warfare would dissipate the gains obtained at Boroa.[7] Punitive expeditions were finally sent against the Cunco, one from Valdivia and one from Carelmapu.[8][9] Governor of Valdivia Diego González Montero [es] advanced south with his forces but soon found that tribes he expected to join him as allies were indifferent and even misled him with false rumours. His troops ran out of supplies and had to return to Valdivia.[8] While González Montero was away coastal Huilliches killed twelve Spanish and sent their heads to other Mapuche groups of southern Chile "as if they wanted to create a grand uprising" according to historian Diego Barros Arana.[8][9] The Spanish expeditions were meant to meet at the Bueno River but the failure of the expedition from Valdivia prevented this.[8] The expedition from Carelmapu led by Captain Ignacio Carrera Yturgoyen penetrated north to the vicinity of the ruins of Osorno where they were approached by Huilliches who handed over three "caciques", allegedly responsible for the murders.[8] The Spanish and local Huilliches exchanged words telling each other of the benefits of peace.[8] Then, the Spanish of Carelmapu executed the three, hanged them on hooks as a warning, and returned south. Spanish soldiers in Concepción, the "military capital"[10] of Chile, were dissatisfied with the results.[8][9] Barros Arana considers that some may have pushed for war for personal benefit.[9]

Salazar's slave-hunting army

Acuña Cabrera and his brother-in-law

Juan de Salazar began to plan an expedition to the lands of the Cuncos in the spring of 1653.[11] It was thought to be a lucrative slave raiding expedition.[11] Despite a general ban on the slavery of indigenous people by the Spanish Crown, the 1598–1604 Mapuche uprising that ended with the Destruction of the Seven Cities made the King of Spain in 1608 declare slavery legal for those Mapuches caught in war.[12] Mapuches "rebels" were considered Christian apostates and could therefore be enslaved according to the church teachings of the day.[13] In reality these legal changes only formalized Mapuche slavery that was already occurring at the time, with captured Mapuches being treated as property in the way that they were bought and sold among the Spanish.[B] Legalisation made Spanish slave raiding increasingly common in the Arauco War.[12] Mapuche slaves were exported north to places such as La Serena and Lima.[15]

To reinforce the expeditionary army, Acuña Cabrera attempted first to revive a practice of military service for local encomenderos; however, the encomenderos refused to obey the order.[11] Acuña Cabrera ignored this insubordination and proceeded instead to boost the expedition with the purchase of 400 horses in Santiago.[11]

Battle

The Spanish expedition started from the fort of

La Frontera with a force of 900 soldiers and 1500 Indian auxiliaries.[1][11]

The Bueno River as seen from Chile Route 5

The Spanish reached the northern shores of east-to-west flowing Bueno River on 11 January 1654.[11] To cross the river, Salazar ordered the construction of a pontoon bridge.[2] Local Mapuche-Huilliches had been warned in advance of the Spanish advance south, so they concentrated in large numbers on the opposite shore of the river.[2] The Mapuche-Huilliche had brought women and children with them, but they remained hidden in the forest, as did also most of the men, only the ones on horseback revealing themselves to the Spanish.[2] In total, Mapuche-Huilliche forces numbered about 3000 men armed primarily with lances.[1][2]

Some veteran officers expressed their doubts about Salazar's plans, including the stability of the bridge.[2] As the pontoon bridge stood ready, Juan de Salazar sent a first force across.[2] About 200[1] soldiers that had crossed were quickly surrounded and were being routed, so Salazar ordered the other soldiers to speed up their march across the bridge.[2] However, the bridge was not stable enough and at this point broke apart with disastrous consequences for the Spanish.[2] Altogether, the Spanish lost a hundred professional soldiers and 200 auxiliaries in a battle where the actual fighting was very limited.[2] Despite these losses, the surviving Spanish managed to get back north to their bases without harassment from the Mapuche.[2]

Aftermath

On learning of the defeat, governor Acuña Cabrera ordered an investigation into any military misconduct during the campaign.

Juana de Salazar, who was the wife of the governor, arranged for witnesses to justify her brother's actions.[16] The investigation concluded by recommending that Juan de Salazar be granted the command of a larger army to chastise the Cuncos and allow Salazar to "recover his honour".[16]

The planning of a second expedition in the summer of 1655 contributed to unleash a large Mapuche uprising that year.[16][17]

Notes

  1. ^ The city of Valdivia had been reestablished by the Spanish in 1645 following a 1643 Dutch attempt to establish a settlement in the location.[5]
  2. ^ Much like the Spanish, Mapuches had also captured Spanish, often women, trading their ownership among them.[14] Indeed, with the Destruction of the Seven Cities Mapuches are reported to have taken 500 Spanish women captive, holding them as slaves.[14] It was not uncommon for captive Spanish women to have changed owner several times.[14]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f Pinochet et al., 1997, p. 79.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Barros Arana 2000, p. 347.
  3. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 339.
  4. ^ Pinochet et al., 1997, p. 83.
  5. ^ Montt 1972, p. 23.
  6. ^ a b Barros Arana 2000, p. 340.
  7. ^ a b c Barros Arana 2000, p. 341.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h Barros Arana 2000, p. 342.
  9. ^ a b c d Barros Arana 2000, p. 343.
  10. ISBN 956-16-0404-3
    .
  11. ^ a b c d e f Barros Arana 2000, p. 346.
  12. ^ a b Valenzuela Márquez 2009, pp. 231–233
  13. Editorial universitaria
    . p. 21.
  14. ^
    doi:10.15691/07176864.2014.0.94 (inactive 1 November 2024).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link
    )
  15. ^ Valenzuela Márquez 2009, pp. 234–236
  16. ^ a b c Barros Arana 2000, p. 348.
  17. ^ Barros Arana 2000, p. 349.

Bibliography

  • Barros Arana, Diego. "Capítulo XIV". Historia general de Chile (in Spanish). Vol. Tomo cuarto (Digital edition based on the second edition of 2000 ed.). Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes.
  • Montt Pinto, Isabel (1971). Breve Historia de Valdivia (in Spanish). Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre.
    OCLC 1397610. Archived from the original
    on 18 February 2007. Retrieved 23 October 2014.
  • Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto; Villaroel Carmona, Rafael; Lepe Orellana, Jaime; Fuente-Alba Poblete, J. Miguel; Fuenzalida Helms, Eduardo (1997). Historia militar de Chile (in Spanish) (3rd ed.). Biblioteca Militar.
  • Valenzuela Márquez, Jaime (2009). "Esclavos mapuches. Para una historia del secuestro y deportación de indígenas en la colonia". In Gaune, Rafael; Lara, Martín (eds.). Historias de racismo y discriminación en Chile (in Spanish).

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Río_Bueno_(1654)&oldid=1269643826"