Battle of Radzymin (1920)
Battle of Radzymin | |||||||
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Part of the Polish Legions. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Soviet Russia | Poland | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Vitovt Putna Ivan Smolin |
Jan Rządkowski Józef Haller Franciszek Latinik | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
27th Rifle Division |
10th Infantry Division 11th Infantry Division 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Division[a] | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
15,000 soldiers 91 artillery pieces 390 machine guns[1] |
17,000 soldiers 109 artillery pieces 220 machine guns[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Heavy[3] | ca. 3,040 killed and wounded[4] | ||||||
The Battle of Radzymin (
The first phase of the battle began on August 13 with a frontal assault by the Red Army on the Praga bridgehead. The Russian forces captured Radzymin on August 14 and breached the lines of the 1st Polish Army, which was defending Warsaw from the east. Radzymin changed hands several times in heavy combat. Foreign diplomats, with the exception of the British and Vatican ambassadors, hastily left Warsaw.
The plan for the battle was straightforward for both sides. The Russians wanted to break through the Polish defences to Warsaw, while the Polish aim was to defend the area long enough for a two-pronged counteroffensive from the south, led by
After three days of intense fighting, the
Background
Following the failure of the
Prelude
The defence of Warsaw was organized by the 1st Polish Army under General Franciszek Latinik and by a part of the Northern Front under General
The city was to be surrounded by four lines of defence. The outermost ran some 24 kilometres (15 mi) to the east of Warsaw: to the east of
The second line ran a mile closer to Warsaw, along the lines of partially preserved
The
Battlefield
From the north, Warsaw, which spans the Vistula, was effectively shielded by the Vistula,
The most expedient approach for a large-scale assault on Warsaw was from the east. The terrain was mostly flat; numerous roads converged radially along an arc from the Modlin Fortress to the north (where the Narew flows into the Vistula), to Legionowo, Radzymin, and Mińsk Mazowiecki directly to the east.[16] Meanwhile, the only permanent defences in the area of Radzymin were the incomplete Fort Beniaminów and a line of First World War trenches west of Radzymin, neglected since their construction by Russians and Germans in 1915.[10]
Opposing forces
The first and second lines of Polish defences were manned by regular forces. These included three Polish infantry divisions: the 11th (from the Bug River to
The combat value of Polish units is difficult to assess as they included fresh recruits of the so-called Volunteer Army, veterans of First World War, battle-hardened soldiers who fought in earlier stages of the Polish-Bolshevik War, and civilians with virtually no combat training. Prior to the battle, the 46th Regiment received 700 reinforcements: mostly
The two Russian divisions assaulting Radzymin were battle-hardened Siberian divisions led by experienced front-line commanders.[28] Both divisions were as exhausted as their opponents, whom they had chased all the way from Belarus.[29] However, prior to the battle both divisions received reinforcements from other units, instead of fresh recruits, and were much superior in manpower to other Russian units on the Polish front.[29] Later, in his monograph on the war, Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski remarked that the commanding officer of the 27th Rifle Division had achieved what was unheard of in the Polish Army despite numerous attempts: putting rear echelons and stragglers of his division into front-line service.[30] This was indeed a problem for both armies, as the number of "bayonets and sabres", or soldiers fighting in the first line, was at all times smaller than the number of second echelon troops.[24] On August 15 Polish intelligence reported the strength of the Russian forces as "three to four standard Russian divisions".[7] Even post-war memoirs by General Żeligowski mention "[t]hree Russian infantry divisions, that is 27 battalions, though admittedly understrength, against one of our own",[31] though in fact the Russian forces only had two divisions.[32][33]
Battle
August 13
Both Polish and Russian planners expected an attack on Warsaw—and Radzymin in particular—from the east. Yet the first fights started to the north-east of the Polish capital.[34] Warsaw was to be assaulted from the east by the 16th Red Army. At the same time the 14th Red Army (under Ieronim Uborevich) captured Wyszków and started a fast march westwards,[12] towards Toruń. It was then to cross the lower Vistula and assault Warsaw from the north-west. However, its 21st Rifle Division remained on the south side of the Bug River and headed for Warsaw directly, under orders from Russia's Commissar of War Leon Trotsky.[35] Aided by the Russian 27th Rifle Division, it came into contact with the Polish forces at Radzymin on August 12, and prepared for an assault the following morning.[31]
The Soviet probing attack began at 07:00 hours, but the 21st Rifle Division achieved no breakthrough. After the Soviets had been repelled, the defending 11th Infantry Division received some artillery reinforcements. The artillery commanders wanted to use the church tower of Radzymin as an observation post and to move the batteries forward, closer to the front line.
The retreat was made even more serious by the fact that the
Although the Polish division was defeated, the Russian forces did not pursue.[4] This allowed the Poles to mount a night counterattack. A single machine gun battalion attacked a position behind Radzymin. While ultimately unsuccessful, the battalion forced the Russian troops to remain stationary overnight, giving the Poles badly needed time to regroup and receive reinforcements, which came in the form of a single regiment from the 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Division. Instead of retreating to the third line of defences, the Poles remained outside the town, hoping to retake it the following day.[39]
News of the defeat at Radzymin reached Warsaw the same day,
The gravity of the situation was well understood by the Polish Commander-in-Chief Józef Piłsudski, who remarked that all the battle plans for his counteroffensive were based on the assumption that Warsaw would hold,[34] and suggested to General Tadeusz Rozwadowski that he reinforce the Radzymin area with any forces available, including an "en masse tank attack".[7] Despite this suggestion, out of 49 tanks of the 1st Tank Regiment available in Warsaw at that time, only about six took part in the battle.[42][c] The loss of Radzymin also forced General Władysław Sikorski's 5th Army, fighting north of the Bug River and along the Vistula, to start a counteroffensive from the Modlin Fortress earlier than planned.[34] Rozwadowski and General Maxime Weygand, a member of the French Military Mission to Poland, even suggested that Piłsudski also hasten his preparations for a counteroffensive, but he refused and decided to follow the original plans.[33][f]
The Russians considered the capture of Radzymin a crucial accomplishment. The Polish intelligence intercepted and decrypted a euphoric, but a completely false, report by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the 3rd Army dispatched to Moscow, informing the Russian government that "the brave units of the 3rd Army have captured the town of Radzymin on August 13th, at 23:00 hours. In pursuit of the enemy, they are not further than 15 versts from Praga. (...) The workers of Warsaw can already sense that their liberation is near. The revolution in Warsaw is ripe. Workers demand that the city be handed over to the Red Army without a fight, threatening to prevent armed soldiers from leaving the city [for the front]. The White Poland is dying".[3] The commanding officer of the Russian 3rd Army, Vladimir Lazarevich, informed Tukhachevsky that "Poland is now on fire. Only one more push is needed and the Polish fracas will be over".[36]
To counter the threat of a Russian breakthrough, General Latinik ordered General Jan Rządkowski to assault the town the following day with all available forces. To strengthen the assault, the 11th Infantry Division (under Colonel Bolesław Jaźwiński) was drawn from the reserves and dispatched to join the assault which was scheduled for 05:00 hours the following morning.[43] However, the Polish forces were far from sufficient for the task. Rządkowski argued that he had been promised substantial reinforcements which did not arrive. The battle-hardened Siberian Brigade was at that time tied down in the Modlin Fortress, although the promised cavalry units did arrive—but without their ammunition trains.[44]
August 14
The plans for the Polish assault had to be changed due to unexpected Russian actions. The Polish forces expected heavy opposition from at least two Russian divisions. However, in the morning the Russian 21st Division resumed its advance along the
The success did not last long, as the Russian 27th Rifle Division turned around and arrived at Radzymin just in time for its 81st Brigade to push the exhausted Polish forces back towards the village of Słupno.
In the evening Generals
In the evening the 5th Army, operating north of the Bug and Narew rivers with its base of operations in the Modlin Fortress, started a limited counteroffensive with the aim of lessening the pressure on the Polish forces at Radzymin.[33] Grossly outnumbered, the 5th Army could not break through the Russian lines, and got bogged down in intense fights along the Wkra river.[50] However, although initially unsuccessful, the Polish attack prevented the Soviet 5th, 15th and 16th Armies from reinforcing the two divisions already committed to Radzymin.[33] Only the 4th Red Army, the furthest from the battlefield, operating in the north along the East Prussian border and moving towards Toruń, kept advancing almost unopposed.[33] This, however, did not pose an immediate threat to the defenders of Warsaw, as its advance was finally halted at the outskirts of Włocławek, and it was forced to start a hasty retreat eastwards.[51]
August 15
In the early hours of August 15 the Russian forces resumed their attacks on the Polish lines, intending to break through the second line of defences to the area of Nieporęt and Jabłonna.[46] However, as they bypassed a small forest outside Wólka Radzymińska, they were assaulted from the rear by the 1st Battalion of the 28th Infantry Regiment, which had been concealed there earlier. Simultaneously, the remainder of the 28th Regiment began a badly coordinated and half-hearted attack from Nieporęt. Both Polish assaults were bloodily repelled, with the casualties including Lieutenant Pogonowski who was posthumously awarded the Virtuti Militari medal for his bravery leading the charge, but they did force the Russians to retreat to their initial positions.[46]
When the front-line stabilised, the Polish headquarters threw all its reserves into a counterattack. Beniaminów was reinforced with the 29th Infantry Regiment. The Polish attack began around 05:30, after a 20-minute
At the same time, on the northern flank, the 10th Division was much more successful. Instead of waiting for orders from General Żeligowski, the commanding officer of the 10th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Wiktor Thommée, started a push along the southern bank of the Bugonarew.[46] The 28th and 29th Kaniów Rifles Infantry Regiments managed to reach the village of Mokre, on a small hill overlooking Radzymin and the Białystok-Warsaw road, directly behind the Russian lines. The Russians tried to push the Poles back from that position, but ultimately failed. Their assault on the village of Wiktorów also ended in failure. Soon the Polish positions in Mokre were secured, and further reinforced with the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 28th Regiment.[38]
With the northern flank safely in Polish hands, General Lucjan Żeligowski ordered his Lithuanian-Belarusian Division to complete the encirclement of Radzymin. The division reached a position a few hundred metres from Radzymin by way of the village of Ciemne to the south of the town. Fearing envelopment, the Soviets abandoned the town and withdrew east. A single company from the 30th Kaniów Rifles Regiment entered Radzymin unopposed.[33] The town was completely empty; both the civilians and the Russian soldiers had fled, and one officer remarked that "not a stray dog was left behind in the ruined city".[38]
Aftermath: August 16 and the following days
Although the battle was over and Radzymin was secure, the Soviet forces continued to threaten the Polish northern flank. In the early hours of August 16, the Russians mounted yet another assault on Radzymin, reinforced by several armoured cars and led personally by the commanding officer of the 27th Rifle Division, Vitovt Putna. However, by this time the morale of the 27th Division was already broken, and the assault was easily thwarted by the Polish infantry and the three remaining operational FT tanks. The armoured cars withdrew as soon as the Polish tanks opened fire, and the Russian infantry followed.[52]
Other Russian forces were more successful to the north of the town, where they managed to capture the village of Mokre from the 28th Regiment. The regiment counter-charged the village, but was initially driven off. However, approximately 80 pieces of emplaced Polish artillery laid a 30-minute barrage on the village. It was the greatest concentration of artillery fire in the war up to that point, and had a tremendous effect on the morale of the Russian defenders.[52] After the barrage ended Lieutenant Colonel Wiktor Thommée personally led his forces in a bayonet charge; the regiment re-entered Mokre at noon and the Russians fled.[52]
The entire 13th Red Army stalled because of its defeat at Radzymin.
Result and assessment
The battle was a success for the Poles at both the tactical level (the battle of Radzymin itself) and the strategic level (its role in the battle of Warsaw). After several days of constant fighting for the town of Radzymin and its immediate vicinity, the Russian attack was repelled and the Poles were able to mount a successful counteroffensive, forcing the Russian armies out of Poland and in the end destroying them completely.[54]
However, the conduct of the Polish forces and their commanders at Radzymin in the early part of the battle has been criticized by historians since the 1920s.[3] It was noted by General Lucjan Żeligowski that the importance of the northern approach to Warsaw was poorly understood by the Polish commanders prior to the battle and that the untested and relatively weak 10th Division was chosen for the task of defending Radzymin "out of sheer incompetence".[31] In his memoirs he also heavily criticized the commanding officers of the division, whose "military prowess and punctuality in carrying out orders was little more than irony".[31] Other post-war authors argued[38] that on August 13, when the first Russian forces appeared in front of Radzymin, the 1st Army had more than enough time to reinforce the weak Polish forces there.[38] Instead, it took several days to recapture what could have been held from the start.[38]
Despite the lack of strategic flair in the Polish defence of Radzymin, it was one of the cornerstones of the overall success in the Battle of Warsaw.[55] Although it was Piłsudski's Assault Group that defeated the Russians, the forces at Radzymin and Sikorski's 5th Army were responsible for stopping them at the gates of Warsaw.[3][35] Żeligowski noted in his memoirs that "Warsaw was saved thanks to Polish successes at Mokra, Wólka Radzymińska and Radzymin".[24]
The battle in popular culture and the media
As one of the crucial battles of the war of 1920, the battle for Radzymin has been featured in novels, memoirs and historical monographs. It was also portrayed in the 2011 film Battle of Warsaw 1920, although the battle of Radzymin sequence was shot mostly in Piotrków Trybunalski.[56] Since 1998 a re-enactment of the battle has been held annually on August 15 in Ossów and Radzymin,[57] organized by various re-enactment groups and a local powiat administration.[58]
Notes
- ^ The division was originally called the Lithuanian-Belarusian Division (Polish: Dywizja Litewsko-Białoruska). In the early summer of 1920 it was renamed the 19th Infantry Division, in line with other Polish units of the time. Soon after the battle, General Piłsudski reversed his decision and the division was renamed to its former name. Soon afterwards it was split into two divisions, the 1st and 2nd Lithuanian-Belarusian Divisions.
- ^ The defeat of the 46th Regiment was considered so great that the entire unit was disgraced. After the battle, it was struck from the registers of the Polish Army, and its remnants were incorporated into the 5th Podhale Rifles Infantry Regiment. Even the number of the original regiment was considered disgraced, and thus the post-war Polish Army had 85 infantry regiments numbered from 1 to 86, with the exception of 46th. As described in Odziemkowski (2000), p. 22.
- ^ The use of Polish tanks in the war of 1920 is further discussed in Michał Piwoszczuk's 1935 monograph on the 1st Tank Regiment.
- Cipher Section had managed to break Russian codes and cyphers by 1919.[59]In the crucial months of 1920, it was able to decode most if not all Russian radio messages easily. Discussed in Nowik, pp. 25–26.
Citations
- ^ Najczuk, ¶ "Rosjanie dysponowali..."
- ^ Najczuk, ¶ "W dniu 14 sierpnia w godzinach popołudniowych..."
- ^ a b c d Szczepański (2002), pp. 30–38
- ^ a b c d Odziemkowski (1990), p. 56
- ^ a b Wyszczelski (1999), pp. 235–293
- ^ Najczuk, ¶ "Ogólnie należy stwierdzić, że głównym zadaniem przedmościa..."
- ^ a b c Jędrzejewicz & Cisek, p. 112
- ^ a b c Najczuk, ¶ "Ciągły odwrót wojsk polskich spod Kijowa wymuszał..."
- ^ a b Najczuk, ¶ "Pierwsze natarcie rosyjskie z rana 13 sierpnia..."
- ^ a b c Żeligowski, pp. 72–74
- ^ Odziemkowski (1990), p. 55
- ^ a b Szczepański (1990), p. 17
- ^ Kolatorski, p. 12
- ^ Wandycz, p. 116
- ^ a b Królikowski (2002), pp. 31–36
- ^ a b Sikorski, pp. 109–134
- ^ Manteuffel, p. 370
- ^ Pruszyński & Giedroyć, p. 238
- ^ Królikowski (1991), p. 66
- ^ Skaradziński, p. 156
- ^ Kowalski, pp. 98–112
- ^ a b Tarczyński, pp. 141–142
- ^ a b Najczuk, ¶ "Atak na przedmoście warszawskie podjęło..."
- ^ a b c Pruszyński & Giedroyć, pp. 32–36
- ^ Odziemkowski (2000), p. 21
- ^ Gałęzowski, p. 27
- ^ Odziemkowski (2000), p. 24
- ^ a b Suchcitz, p. 59
- ^ a b Skaradziński, pp. 212–216
- ^ Piłsudski, p. 18
- ^ a b c d e f g h Żeligowski, pp. 89–98, 142–143
- ^ Wyszczelski (2006), pp. 255–259
- ^ a b c d e f g Wyszczelski (2008), pp. 17–22
- ^ a b c d e Wierzbicki, pp. 594–595
- ^ a b Fiddick, pp. 196–219
- ^ a b c d Odziemkowski (2000), p. 22
- ^ Pobóg-Malinowski, p. 453
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Skaradziński, pp. 185–192, 215
- ^ Kolatorski, pp. 54–60
- ^ a b D'Abernon, pp. 83, 144
- ^ Davies, p. 213
- ^ Zamoyski, p. 89
- ^ Wyszczelski (2005), pp. 147–148
- ^ Zamoyski, p. 86
- ^ a b c Królikowski (1991), pp. 17–55
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Odziemkowski (2000), p. 23
- ^ Sikorski, p. 13
- ^ Kolatorski, p. 64
- ^ a b Najczuk, ¶ "Dowództwo na całością sił wydzielonych..."
- ^ a b c d Zamoyski, pp. 86–102
- ^ Piłsudski, pp. 134–137
- ^ a b c d e Odziemkowski (2000), p. 25
- ^ Davis, p. 371
- ^ Wyszczelski (2006), p. 10
- ^ Gieleciński, Izdebski et al., p. 104
- ^ Jaczyński, ¶ "W rolę Radzymina wcielił się Piotrków..."
- ^ PAP, ¶ "Inscenizacją Bitwy Warszawskiej 1920 r..."
- ^ AW & PAP, ¶ "Organizatorami rekonstrukcji było Starostwo Powiatowe..."
- ^ Ścieżyński, p. 19
References
- Articles
- Lt.Col. Ryszard Najczuk (2010-08-16). "Bitwa pod Radzyminem (13–15 VIII 1920 r.)" [Battle of Radzymin (13–15 of August 1920)]. wojsko-polskie.pl (in Polish). Polish Army. Archived from the originalon 2012-04-03. Retrieved 2011-10-29.
- Janusz Odziemkowski (2000). Janusz Kuligowski; Krzysztof Szczypiorski (eds.). "Walki na przedmościu warszawskim i ofensywa znad Wieprza 1920 roku" [Fights for the Warsaw bridgehead and the Wieprz River offensive of 1920] (PDF). Rocznik Mińsko-Mazowiecki (in Polish). 6. ISSN 1232-633X. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2012-04-25. Retrieved 2011-10-24.
- Janusz Szczepański (2002). "Kontrowersje Wokół Bitwy Warszanskiej 1920 Roku" [Controversies surrounding the Battle of Warsaw in 1920]. Mówią Wieki (in Polish) (8): 30–38. Archived from the original on 2011-07-18. Retrieved 2011-10-04.
- Books
- ISBN 0-88355-429-1.
- ISBN 978-0-19-822592-8.
- ISBN 978-0-19-514366-9.
- Thomas C. Fiddick (1990). Russia's retreat from Poland, 1920: from permanent revolution to peaceful coexistence. Vol. 2. Basingstoke: ISBN 978-0-312-03998-1.
- Marek Gałęzowski (2011). Andrzej Dusiewicz (ed.). Bitwa Warszawska 1920 [Battle of Warsaw 1920] (PDF) (in Polish). Warsaw: Nowa Era. p. 39. ISBN 978-83-267-0322-5. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2011-12-08. Retrieved 2011-11-10.
- Marek Gieleciński; Jerzy Izdebski; Zofia Krasicka; Uniwersytet Warszawski. Instytut Historyczny (1996). "Bój o Radzymin" [Battle for Radzymin]. In Józef Ryszard Szaflik; Arkadiusz Kołodziejczyk (eds.). Wieś, chłopi, ruch ludowy, państwo [The Village, The Popular Movements, the State] (in Polish). Warsaw: Warsaw University Press. p. 104.
- ISBN 978-83-88736-92-6.
- Władysław Kolatorski; Jan Wnuk (1995). Bitwa pod Radzyminem w 1920 roku [Battle at Radzymin in 1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Volumen. p. 107. ISBN 83-902669-1-1.
- Tadeusz Kowalski; Janusz Szczepański (1996). Adam Dobroński (ed.). Dzieje 13 pułku piechoty [History of the 13th Infantry Regiment] (in Polish). preface by Adam Koseski. Pułtusk: ISBN 83-906458-1-5.
- Lech Królikowski (1991). Bitwa warszawska 1920 roku; działania wojenne, zachowane pamiątki [Battle of Warsaw of 1920; armed actions, surviving sites] (in Polish). Warsaw: ISBN 83-01-10316-7.
- Lech Królikowski (2002). Twierdza Warszawa [Warsaw Fortress] (in Polish). Warsaw: ISBN 83-11-09356-3.
- Various authors; Tadeusz Manteuffel (1966). Tadeusz Manteuffel; Andrzej Ajnenkiel; Stanisław Arnold (eds.). Historia Polski [History of Poland] (in Polish). Vol. 4. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. p. 525. PB 3944/66.
- Grzegorz Nowik (2004). Zanim złamano Enigmę...; polski radiowywiad podczas wojny z bolszewicką Rosją 1918–1920 [Before Enigma Was Broken: Polish Radio Intelligence during the War with Bolshevik Russia, 1918–1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Rytm. p. 1054. OCLC 6547308. Archived from the originalon 2012-04-30. Retrieved 2011-11-10.
- Janusz Odziemkowski (1990). Bitwa Warszawska 1920 roku [Battle of Warsaw of 1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Mazowiecki Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im Stanisława Herbsta. p. 56.
- ISBN 83-03-03056-6.
- Lt.Col. Michał Piwoszczuk (1964) [1935]. Zarys historii wojennej 1 pułku czołgów [Concise wartime history of the 1st Tank Regiment] (in Polish) (2 ed.). London: Taurus. p. 135. OCLC 27102801.
- Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski (1990). Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski [Modern political history of Poland] (in Polish). Vol. II. Gdańsk: Graf. p. 453.
- Mieczysław Pruszyński; ISBN 83-7066-560-8.
- Władysław Sikorski (1928). Nad Wisłą i Wkrą; studjum z polsko-rosyjskiej wojny 1920 roku [By the Vistula and Wkra Rivers; study on the Polish-Russian war of 1920] (in Polish). Vol. 1. Lwów: Ossolineum. pp. 13, 109–134.
- Bohdan Skaradziński (1993). Polskie lata 1919–1920 [Polish years 1919–1920] (in Polish). Vol. 2. Warsaw: Volumen. pp. 185–192, 215. ISBN 978-83-85218-47-0.
- Andrzej Suchcitz (1993). "Putna, Witold". Generałowie wojny polsko-sowieckiej, 1919–1920 (in Polish). Białystok: Muzeum Wojska w Białymstoku. p. 59.
- Janusz Szczepański (1990). Wojna 1920 roku w powiecie Pułtuskim [War of 1920 in the powiat of Pułtusk] (in Polish). Pułtusk: Stacja Naukowa MOBN w Pułtusku. OL 18742942M.
- Col. Mieczysław Ścieżyński (1928). Radjotelegrafja jako źródło wiadomości o nieprzyjacielu [Radiotelegraphy as a Source of Intelligence on the Enemy] (in Polish). Przemyśl: Dowództwo Okręgu Korpusu X. p. 49.
- Various authors (1996). Marek Tarczyński (ed.). Bitwa warszawska 13–28 VIII 1920; dokumenty operacyjne [Battle of Warsaw of August 13–28th, 1920; operational documents] (in Polish). Vol. 2. Warsaw: Rytm. p. 935. ISBN 83-86678-37-2.
- ISBN 978-0-295-95358-8.
- Andrzej Wierzbicki (1957). Wspomnienia i dokumenty, 1877–1920 [Memories and documents; 1877–1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. pp. 594–595.
- ISBN 83-11-08963-9.
- Lech Wyszczelski (2005). Warszawa 1920 [Warsaw 1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Bellona. pp. 147–148. ISBN 83-11-10227-9.
- Lech Wyszczelski (2006). Operacja warszawska; sierpień 1920 [Warsaw Operation, August 1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Bellona. p. 534. ISBN 83-11-10179-5.
- Lech Wyszczelski (2008). Niemen 1920 [Neman 1920] (in Polish). Warsaw: Bellona. pp. 17–22. ISBN 978-83-11-11324-4.
- ISBN 978-0-00-725786-7.
- ISBN 83-89667-49-5.
- News
- AW; ISSN 2080-6744.
- Grzegorz Jaczyński (2010-07-24). "Bitwa Warszawska 1920 roku – walki o Radzymin w Piotrkowie Trybunalskim" [Battle of Warsaw 1920 – fights for Radzymin in Piotrków Trybunalski]. dobroni.pl (in Polish). Warsaw: Fundacja Wojskowości Polskiej. Archived from the original on 2010-10-30. Retrieved 24 November 2011.
- ISSN 0860-908X.
External links
- Wojciech Zalewski, ed. (2005). "Warszawa (Wołomin) 1920". taktykaistrategia.pl (in Polish). Taktyka i Strategia.
- Renault FT-17 in the Polish service Archived 2018-05-12 at the Wayback Machine
- Władysław Kolatorski. "Bitwa Warszawska" [Battle of Warsaw]. radzymin.pl (in Polish). Urząd Miasta Radzymin. Retrieved 2011-10-06.
- Gallery of historical pictures of the battle Archived 2012-04-25 at the Wayback Machine
- Gallery of stills from the 2011 film featuring the battle
- 1915/1922 staff map of Radzymin and its surroundings