Battle of Shaho
Battle of Shaho | |
---|---|
Part of the Mukden on the Sha River, Manchuria | |
Result |
Strategically Inconclusive
Japanese Tactical victory
|
Kuroki Tamemoto
Oku Yasukata
Nozu Michitsura
Umezawa Michiharu
21,125
- 4,099 killed
- 16,398 wounded
- 628 captured
41,351
The Battle of Shaho (
Background
After the
The Japanese forces commanded by
) in the center, and four reserve brigades.The Russian forces had 210,000 men in nine corps (261 battalions), organized into the Western Detachment (General
The Russian battle plan was to block the Japanese advance at the Shaho River south of Mukden by turning the Japanese right flank and counterattacking towards Liaoyang with Stackelberg's Eastern Detachment. Simultaneously, Bilderling Western Division was to move south and to cut off Kuroki's IJA 1st Army.
Battle
The battle began on 5 October 1904, with the Russian Western Detachment moving 25 kilometres (16 mi) south across open terrain within minimal opposition, reaching the banks of the Shli River on 7 October. The Russian Eastern Detachment also moved south through mountainous terrain 36 kilometres (22 mi), reaching the hamlet of Bianyupusa on 8 October. Kuropatkin gambled that Ōyama would perceive that the Western Detachment moving down the plains was the main thrust against Liaoyang, whereas his main strike force was actually the Eastern Detachment moving in the concealment of the hills. The ruse initially worked, and Ōyama was reluctant to accept General Kuroki's assessment of the true situation until a copy of Kuropatkin’s written orders to General Stakelberg were discovered on the body of a Russian officer killed in a skirmish on 9 October.[3]
On 10 October, Ōyama ordered a major Japanese counter-offensive aimed at the center of the Russian line. The Japanese battle plan was to use Kuroki’s IJA 1st Army to pin down Stackelberg’s forces while striking hard against Bilderling’s Western Division with IJA 2nd and IJA 4th Armies in flanking maneuvers before Kuropatkin could bring it up to full strength.[3] The Russians suffered heavy casualties in the east and were pushed back in the west, forcing Kuropatkin to commit part of his reserves into a Central Detachment to fill in the gap created. This Central Detachment was made from the First European Army Corps and Fourth Siberian Army Corps.[2]
The
On 12 October, Ōyama ordered Prince Kan'in Kotohito's IJA 2nd Cavalry Brigade against the Russian left flank.[2] The Russians were forced back on the left flank as well. Russian operations were hampered by Kuropatkin's distrust of his generals, and often dispatched orders directly to their subordinates without informing Stackelberg or Bilderling. He also refused to use the field telephone system, so the orders often took several hours to reach their destination by courier.[3]
On the south bank of the river was a small ridge called Sankaiseki-san ("Three Rock Hill") by the Japanese. Although only 100 feet tall, it commanded a wide view of the plains south of Mukden and was regarded as strategically important by the Russians, who had occupied it on 9 October. On the night of 12 October, the
Also by the morning of 13 October, Stackelberg began to retreat the Eastern Detachment northward after Kuropatkin had refused his request to attack to the west instead.
As Japanese artillery on Sankaisekisan (called "One-Tree Hill" by the Russians) threatened the Russian flank in their retreat, Kuropatkin ordered that it be retaken at all costs. The Russians attacked during the night of 16 October from both ends of the ridge, and had succeeded in taking it by 17 October.[3] Kuropatkin then called off the offensive, and both sides began preparations for the upcoming winter by building fortifications and digging trenches, in some places only a few meters apart.[2]
Aftermath
After two weeks of combat, the battle ended inconclusively strategically. Tactically, the Japanese had advanced 25 kilometers on the road to Mukden, but more importantly had blocked a major Russian counter-offense and effectively ended any hope of relieving the
Despite the failure of the Russian offense, Kuropatkin used his recapture of One-Tree Hill from the Japanese as an excuse to send a telegram to the Tsar proclaiming a Russian victory in the battle. On 25 October, he was rewarded when the Tsar removed Yevgeni Alexeyev from command, and assigned full military command of Russian forces to Kuropatkin.[3]
Despite opportunities created with the opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Kuropatkin was unwilling to carry on regardless of casualties. On the other hand, the Japanese were unable to take advantage of the situation, and the Japanese advance on Mukden was paused, as both sides dug in to prepare for the next confrontation at the Battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai).
Notes
References
- ISBN 0-304-36657-9
- Jukes, Geoffrey (2002). The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Osprey Essential Histories. ISBN 978-1-84176-446-7.
- ISBN 0810849275.
- Nish, Ian (1985). The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. Longman. ISBN 0-582-49114-2