Battle of Silva Litana
Battle of Silva Litana | |||||||
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Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
Battle of Silva Litana | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Boii | Roman Republic | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Unknown | Lucius Postumius Albinus † | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Unknown | 25,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown | 24,990 killed |
The Battle of Silva Litana was an
Background
Several
Romans defeat the Senones
In 295 BC the Romans won the
Roman consolidation in Cisalpine Gaul
After defeating a rebellion of the Picentes in 269 BC, the Romans had further consolidated their hold south of Ager Gallicus,[15] planting new colonies at Ariminum and Firmum.[16] The Boii and the Insubres may have clashed with the Romans between 238 – 236 BC,[17] and they again became hostile after 232 BC when Gaius Flaminius (consul 223 BC) passed the Lex Flaminia de Agro Gallico et Piceno viritim dividundo. This legislation caused a further influx of Roman settlers in Ager Gallicus and Ager Picenus and led the Boii and Insubres to fear Roman incursion on their existing lands.[18][19]
Defeat of the Boii and Insubres
With the help of the
Second Punic War
Hannibal had enlisted the cooperation of the
and this revolt would ultimately force both Rome and Hannibal to change their respective war strategies.Strategic consequences of the revolt
Rome had mobilized two consular armies in 218 BC, they planned to send consul
Hannibal had anticipated Rome's intention to attack Spain and Africa, and he may have planned to defeat Scipio in Spain or Gaul before invading Italy, in doing so securing the Carthaginian possessions in Spain and forestalling the planned Roman invasion of Africa.[33] The Carthaginian army had set out of Cartagena probably in late May or early June,[34] and spent almost three months moving from Cartagena to the Pyrenees, including a 43-day campaign conquering Catalonia, but his intention of defeating the Romans in Spain was foiled because the arrival of Scipio to Spain was delayed because of the Gallic revolt.[34][35]
Gauls retire from Mutina
The Roman Senate prioritized the defense of Italy over the planned overseas expeditions, and Praetor Peregrinus Lucius Manlius Vulso marched from Ariminium with 600 Roman Horse, 10,000 allied infantry and 1,000 allied cavalry, all taken from Scipio's army, to aid the besieged Romans at Mutina.[36][37] This army was ambushed by the Gauls twice on the way, losing 1,200 men and six standards, and although they relieved Mutina, the combined Roman army then fell under a loose siege a few miles from Mutina at Tannetum.[36] The Senate now detached one Roman and one allied legion (10,000 men) from the army of Scipio again, and Praetor Urbanus Gaius Atillius Serranus marched to Cisalpine Gaul with this army. As Atillius neared Tannetum, the Gauls retired without battle,[38] and the Romans spent the summer of 218 BC recovering and fortifying Placentia and Cremona.[39] The army of Sepmronius, kept in Rome as a strategic reserve, left Rome in June or July for Sicily.[40] Scipio was forced to raise and train new troops to replace the ones taken from him, [41][42] which delayed his departure for Spain by two-three months. [43] This delay, a direct consequence of the Gallic revolt, indirectly influenced the course of Hannibal's invasion of Italy.
Hannibal’s arrival in Cisalpine Gaul
Hannibal after subduing Catalonia left Hanno with 11,000 soldiers to guard the area, further reduced his army, abandoned his heavy baggage, and focused on reaching Italy quickly, his streamlined army reached the Rhone in three weeks, forced a passage across the river against Gallic resistance only to find Scipio's army stationed four days march to the south of his crossing site– another consequence of Scipio's delayed start from Italy.[44] Hannibal chose not to fight the Romans, [45] but he probably was forced to change his planned route across Alps due to the Roman presence, [46] and his five-week crossing of the Alps using an alternate, more arduous route caused the loss of the majority of his pack animals and 12,000 to 20,000 irreplaceable, battle tested, loyal veteran soldiers, who might have augmented Hannibal's strength in Italy, another indirect consequence of Scipio's delayed arrival in Gaul. [47][48] The Carthaginians found no supplies and reinforcements from the Gauls awaiting them after entering Italy, the Gauls joined the Carthaginians only after Hannibal defeated the Taurini three days after reaching Italy. [49][50] Hannibal wintered in Cisalpine Gaul after his victories in the battle of Ticinus and Trebia, and when he marched south in spring of 217 BC, more than half of his army consisted of Gallic recruits.[51]
Prelude
Consul
Opposing armies
Most male Roman citizens were eligible for military service and would serve as infantry, a better-off minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two
The Gauls
The Gauls were brave, fierce warriors who fought in tribes and clans in massed infantry formation, but lacked the discipline of their Roman and Carthaginian opponents. The Infantry wore no armor, fought naked or stripped to the waist in plaid trousers and a loose cloak, a variety of different size and shaped metal bossed shields made of oak or linden covered with leather [62] and iron slashing swords, both cavalry and Infantry carried spears and javelins for close quarter and ranged combat. [63] Chieftains, Noblemen, and their retainers made up the cavalry, wore helmets and mail, and used thrusting spears and swords.[62]
Battle
Postumius' army invaded Cisalpine Gaul in the spring of 215 BC, and marched through a large forest called Litana by the Gauls towards the Boii strongholds.[64] The Boii had prepared an ambush for the Romans, they cut the trees along the path taken by the Romans in such a way that, unsupported, the trees would remain standing, but if given a slight push they would topple over.[65] The Gauls had somehow managed to conceal their activity from the Romans, or the Roman scouts had failed to detect the Gauls in their vicinity. As the Romans advanced along the road, the Boii secured a perimeter outside their line of advance and pushed over the trees on the outer edges, the trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing several Roman soldiers and horses and destroying their equipment, while most of the soldiers died under the weight of the trees' trunks and branches and the panicked survivors were slaughtered by the Boii waiting outside the forest.[65] A party of Romans tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it, only ten men survived the disaster, and a vast amount of spoils were taken by the Boii.[65] Postumius was killed, his body decapitated and his head taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull covered with gold,[51] which was used as a cup for drinking by the Boii high priest.[65]
Aftermath
The city of Rome was panic stricken after receiving news of this disaster, as Rome was now open to another Gallic invasion from the north as no legions were stationed in Central Italy, Rome itself was guarded by two city legions, Roman preparations against Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae were just being completed, and no soldiers could be spared from these deployment for service elsewhere.[65] The Roman Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.[66] Postumius had been elected Roman consul for the third time and in absentia, since he was in command of the Roman legion in Cisalpine Gaul, and the Republic now needed to elect another consul as his replacement. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the remaining consul-elect for 215 BC, consoled the Senate by emphasizing the importance of defeating Hannibal, with the Gauls being only a secondary priority for the Roman war strategy.[67] The Senate accordingly garrisoned Arretium with a legion under praetor M. Pomponius, and Gaius Terentius Varro, who had survived the Battle of Cannae and was now a proconsul, was stationed at Ager Picenus with the task of raising additional troops and garrisoning the area, and both generals were ordered not to conduct any offensive operations.
The Boii did not attack the Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona in Cisalpine Gaul after their victory, sparing Rome from mobilizing relief forces or abandoning their colonies altogether at a time when they were hard pressed combating Hannibal. The Gauls remained passive until 207 BC, which enabled Placentia and Cremona to meet their annual quota of sending supplies to Rome, even in 209 BC, when eighteen out of the thirty Roman Latin Rights colonies were unable to supply their required quota of money or soldiers, which indicates that the Gauls were not engaged in any hostility in Cisalpine Gaul during 216 – 207 BC.[68]
Strategic importance
The Gallic victory and the subsequent Roman decision to deploy minimal forces to guard Cisalpine Gaul created an unexpected strategic opportunity for Hasdrubal Barca, who had been ordered to march overland to Italy after destroying the Roman forces stationed in Spain by the Carthaginian Senate in 215 BC. [40] Hasdrubal had previously attempted to reinforce Hannibal in Italy in 217 BC, but the defeat of Hasdrubal's navy in the Battle of Ebro River had caused him to abandon this enterprise.[69] Hasdrubal, reinforced by 4,500 soldiers, was occupied with subduing Iberian rebels based near Gades in 216 BC and was unable to leave Spain. Carthage sent an army and fleet under Himilco to guard Spain in 216 BC, which enabled Hasdrubal, in command of an army probably numbering 25,000, to start preparing his expedition to Italy.[70][71]
Hannibal Barca, during 218 – 216 BC, had defeated the Romans in several battles and plundered his way across Central Italy to demonstrate to Rome's Italian allies Roman inability to protect them as part of his strategy, and after winning at Cannae, Hannibal gained several allies in South Italy, which denied Rome a large part of their resources and these defecting cities now supplied the Carthaginians with men and supplies, as Hannibal had planned.[72][73] Hannibal now needed further reinforcements to protect his Italian allies and carry the war to the territory of Rome and her remaining allies.
The Carthaginian Senate had authorized sending 4,000 Numidian cavalry, 40 elephants and 500 talents to Hannibal,[74] Mago Barca, brother of Hannibal then in present Carthage, was authorized to recruit another army containing 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and then sail to Italy to reinforce Hannibal. [1] If Hasdrubal had managed to arrive in north Italy in 215 BC with his army, and then augment his numbers with Ligurian and Gallic recruits, he would have been in a position to attack Central Italy from the north, together with the reinforced army of Hannibal advancing from the south while other Carthaginian armies guarded Hannibal's allies in southern Italy. This would have caught Rome and her remaining allies in a strategic pincer movement. Rome probably would not have been able to survive the impact of Hasdrubal and Mago Barca's armies operating in Italy, [75] but the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca in the Battle of Ibera not only prevented this, but also diverted the army of Mago Barca to Spain[76] and spared Rome this ordeal.[77]
Notes
- ^ Carthage had no bases on the sea coast between the Balearic Islands and Italy, which were dominated by Roman alley Massalia and her colonies,[1] Rome controlled Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily, and thus effectively controlled the coast between Spain and Italy,[22] so a sea voyage would have been more dangerous than a land one. [23] In 218 BC, Rome had mobilized 220 Quinqueremes, while Carthage only had 32 quinqueremes manned in Spain and another 55 in Carthage.[24] The largest fleet Carthage would launch during the war would have 130 quinqueremes, in 212 BC.[25]
- ^ This could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances,[57] or, rarely, even more.[58]
References
- ^ a b c Gabriel 2011, pp. 90.
- ^ Strabo, Geography, V.1.6.
- ^ a b c d Florus, The Epitome of Roman History, Book 1, ch. 13
- ^ Livy, The Rise of Rome, p. 329
- ^ Lane Fox, The Classical World, p. 283
- ^ Livy, The Rise of Rome, p. 330
- ^ Appian, History of Rome, The Gallic Wars, §1
- ^ Pennell 2004, CH9para2.
- ^ Cornell 1995, p. 325
- ^ Liv. 7 26
- ^ Polybius. 2.18
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 4
- ^ a b Polybius, The Histories, 2.19–20
- ISBN 978-0-19-815300-9.
- ISBN 0-19-511876-6.
By the 260s, few, if any, communities in Etruria, Umbria and Picenum possessed any real independence. The Picentes revolted in 269.
- ^ Staveley, ES (1989). "Rome and Italy in the Early Third Century". In Walbank, Frank William (ed.). The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VII: the Hellenistic World: Part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 425.
Certainly, steps designed to consolidate her hold in the north-east followed this incident in quick succession: the foundation in 268 of the Latin colony of Ariminum .... the annexation of the whole Picentine land save for ... Ancona and ... Asculum; the transportation of large numbers of Picentes to the Ager Picentinus on the west coast, and finally in 264 the planting of a second large Latin colony on the coast at Firmum.
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 7-10
- ^ Polybius, The Histories, 2.21.-9
- ^ a b c Goldworthy 2000, p. 139.
- ^ Polybius, Histories 2:25
- ^ Polybius, Histories 2:23–24
- ^ Daly 2002, pp. 13.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, pp. 236.
- ^ Hoyos 2003, pp. 100.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, pp. 31.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, pp. 29.
- ^ Lancel 1998, pp. 64.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, p. 31-32, 51.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 158.
- ^ Gabriel 2011, pp. 107.
- ^ ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
- ^ Daly 2002, p. 11.
- ^ Hoyos 2003, p. 113.
- ^ a b Gabriel 2011, pp. 106.
- ^ Hoyos 2003, pp. 112.
- ^ ISBN 0-304-36642-0
- ^ Lazenby 1978, p. 50.
- ISBN 0-304-36642-0
- ^ Gabriel 2011, p. 50.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2003, pp. 103.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, p. 51.
- ^ Bath 1981, p. 45.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 262.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, pp. 36.
- ^ Bath 1981, p. 46.
- ^ Lancel 1998, pp. 72.
- ^ Hoyos 2003, pp. 106.
- ^ Lancel 1998, p. 71.
- ^ Bath 1981, p. 50.
- ^ Baker 1999, p. 97.
- ^ a b Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 30
- ^ Polybius 3.88.3
- ^ Livy 2006, p. 162.
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 33
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 34
- ^ Gabriel 2011, pp. 165.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 23.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 287.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 48.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 22–25.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 50.
- ^ a b Daly 2002, p. 103.
- ^ Bath 1981, p. 29.
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 35
- ^ a b c d e Livy 2006, p. 163.
- ^ Livy 2006, p. 164.
- ^ Livy 2006, pp. 162–164.
- ^ Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 43
- ISBN 0-304-36642-0
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 250.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 204.
- ^ Gabriel 2011, p. 96.
- ^ Baker 1999, p. 86.
- ^ Baker 1999, p. 43.
- ^ Scullard 1930, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Lazenby 1978, pp. 128.
- ^ Zimmermann 2015, p. 291.
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