Battle of Tabu-dong
Battle of Tabu-dong | |
---|---|
Part of the South Korea 36°02′51″N 128°31′03″E / 36.047433°N 128.517380°E | |
Result | United Nations victory |
Paik Sun-yup
1st Infantry Division
2,000 wounded
The Battle of Tabu-dong was an engagement between
Holding positions north of the crucial city of Taegu, the US 1st Cavalry Division stood at the center and the ROK 1st Division held at the northwest of the Pusan Perimeter defensive line, tasked with keeping the UN headquarters secured from attacks from the KPA. On September 1, the KPA 3rd Division attacked as part of the Great Naktong Offensive.
What followed was a two-week battle around Tabu-dong and
Background
Pusan Perimeter
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the ROK and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA
September push
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible due to the support of the UN naval forces.[12] Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle.[4] Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the KPA were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle.[15] A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN forces in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.[16][17]
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units.[15] The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered.[18] The center attack called for the KPA 3rd, 13th and 1st Divisions to break through the US 1st Cavalry Division and ROK 1st Division to Taegu.[19]
Battle
While four divisions of the KPA
Defending Taegu, the US 1st Cavalry Division had a front of about 35 miles (56 km). Division Commander
Hill 518
Eighth United States Army commander
This planned attack against Hill 518 coincided with the defection of KPA
Complying with Eighth Army's order for a spoiling attack against the KPA northwest of Taegu, Gay ordered the 7th Cavalry to attack on September 2 and seize Hill 518. Hill 518, also called Suam-san, is a large mountain mass 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Waegwan and 2 miles (3.2 km) east of the Naktong River. It curves westward from its peak to its westernmost height, Hill 346, from which the ground drops abruptly to the Naktong River.
On the morning of September 2 the
The next day at 12:00, the newly arrived 3rd Battalion resumed the attack against Hill 518 from the south, as did the 1st Battalion the day before, in a column of companies that resolved itself in the end into a column of squads. Again the attack failed. Other attacks failed on September 4. A KPA forward observer captured on Hill 518 said that 1,200 KPA were dug in on the hill and that they had large numbers of mortars and ammunition to hold out.[26]
North Korean flanking moves
While these attacks were in progress on its right, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, on September 4 attacked and captured Hill 303. The next day it had difficulty in holding the hill against counterattacks.[26] By September 4 it had become clear that the KPA 3rd Division in front of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments was also attacking, and despite continued air strikes, artillery preparations and infantry efforts on Hill 518, it was infiltrating large numbers of its troops to the rear of the attacking US forces.[22] That night large KPA forces came through the gap between the 3rd Battalion on the southern slope of Hill 518 and the 2nd Battalion westward. The KPA turned west and occupied Hill 464 in force. By September 5, Hill 464 to the rear of the 7th Cavalry had more KPA on it than Hill 518 to its front.[26] KPA cut the Waegwan to Tabu-dong road east of the regiment so that its communications with other US units now were only to the west.[25] During the day the 7th Cavalry made a limited withdrawal on Hill 518, giving up on capturing the hill.[26]
On the division right, Tabu-dong was in KPA hands, on the left Waegwan was a
Further US withdrawal
In his withdrawal instructions for the 7th Cavalry,
Heavy rains fell during the night of September 5–6 and mud slowed all wheeled and tracked vehicles in the withdrawal. The 1st Battalion completed its withdrawal without opposition. During its night march west, the 3rd Battalion column was joined several times by groups of KPA soldiers who apparently thought it was one of their own columns moving south. They were made prisoners and taken along in the withdrawal. Nearing Waegwan at dawn, the battalion column was taken under KPA mortar and T-34 tank fire after daybreak and sustained 18 casualties.[29]
The 2nd Battalion disengaged from the KPA and began its withdrawal at 03:00, September 6. The battalion abandoned two of its own tanks, one because of mechanical failure and the other because it was stuck in the mud. The battalion moved to the rear in two main groups: G Company to attack Hill 464 and the rest of the battalion to seize Hill 380, farther south. The KPA quickly discovered that the 2nd Battalion was withdrawing and attacked it. The battalion commander, Major Omar T. Hitchner, and his operations officer, Captain James T. Milam, were killed. In the vicinity of Hills 464 and 380 the battalion discovered at daybreak that it was virtually surrounded by KPA. Nist thought that the entire battalion was lost.[30]
Moving by itself and completely cut off from all other units, G Company, numbering only about 80 men, was hardest hit. At 08:00, nearing the top of Hill 464, it surprised and killed three KPA soldiers. Soon after, KPA automatic weapons and small arms fire struck the company. All day G Company maneuvered around the hill but never gained its crest. At mid-afternoon it received radio orders to withdraw that night. The company left six dead on the hill and, carrying its wounded on improvised litters of ponchos and tree branches, it started down the shale slopes of the mountain in rain and darkness. Halfway down, friendly fire injured Captain Herman L. West, the G Company commander. The company scattered but West reassembled it. Cautioning his men to move quietly and not to fire their weapons, West led his men to the eastern base of Hill 464 where he went into a defensive position for the rest of the night.[30]
South flank
On the division left, meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, on Hill 303 came under heavy attack and the battalion commander wanted to withdraw. The regimental commander, told him he could not do so until the 7th Cavalry had cleared on its withdrawal road. This battalion suffered heavy casualties before it abandoned Hill 303 on the September 6 to the KPA.[30]
While G Company was trying to escape from Hill 464, the rest of the 2nd Battalion was cut off at the eastern base of Hill 380, to the south. Nist organized all the South Korean carriers he could find before dark and loaded them with water, food, and ammunition for the 2nd Battalion, but the carrier party was unable to find the battalion. At dawn on September 7 the men in G Company was discovered and attacked by KPA troops in nearby positions. At this time, West heard what he recognized as fire from American weapons on a knob to his west. There, G Company was reunited with its Weapons Platoon which had become separated from him during the night.[30]
The Weapons Platoon, after becoming separated from the rest of the company, encountered KPA on the trail it was following three times in the night, but in each instance neither side fired, each going on its way. At dawn, the platoon ambushed a group of KPA, killing 13 and capturing three. From the body of a KPA officer the men took a briefcase containing important documents and maps. These showed that Hill 464 was an assembly point for part of the KPA 3rd Division in its advance from Hill 518 toward Taegu.[31]
Later in the day on September 7, Captain Melbourne C. Chandler, acting commander of the 2nd Battalion, received word of G Company's location on Hill 464 from an aerial observer and sent a patrol which guided the company safely to the battalion at the eastern base of Hill 380. The battalion, meanwhile, had received radio orders to withdraw by any route as soon as possible. It moved southwest into the 5th Cavalry sector.[31]
North Korean advance
East of the 2nd Battalion, the KPA attacked the 1st Battalion in its new position on September 7 and overran the battalion aid station, killing four and wounding seven men. That night the 1st Battalion on division orders was attached to the 5th Cavalry Regiment. The rest of the 7th Cavalry Regiment moved to a point near Taegu in division reserve. During the night of September 7–8 the 5th Cavalry Regiment on division orders withdrew still farther below Waegwan to new defensive positions astride the main Seoul-Taegu highway.[31] The KPA 3rd Division was still moving reinforcements across the Naktong.[27] Observers sighted barges loaded with troops and artillery pieces crossing the river 2 miles (3.2 km) north of Waegwan on the evening of the 7th. On the 8th a North Korean communiqué claimed the capture of Waegwan.[31]
The next day the situation grew worse for the 1st Cavalry Division. On its left flank, the KPA 3rd Division forced the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, to withdraw from Hill 345, 3 miles (4.8 km) east of Waegwan. The KPA pressed forward and the 5th Cavalry was immediately locked in hard, seesaw fighting on Hills 203 and 174. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, before it left that sector to rejoin its regiment, finally captured the latter hill after four attacks.[31]
Only with difficulty did the 5th Cavalry Regiment hold Hill 203 on September 12. Between midnight and 04:00 on September 13, the KPA attacked again and took Hill 203 from E Company, Hill 174 from L Company, and Hill 188 from B and F Companies. In an afternoon counterattack the regiment regained Hill 188 on the south side of the highway, but failed against Hills 203 and 174 on the north side. On the 14th, I Company again attacked Hill 174, which had by now changed hands seven times.[31] In this action the company suffered 82 casualties. Even so, the company held only one side of the hill, the KPA held the other, and grenade battles between the two continued for another week.[32] The battalions of the 5th Cavalry Regiment were so low in strength at this time that they were not considered combat effective.[33] This seesaw battle continued in full 8 miles (13 km) northwest of Taegu.[34][35]
North Korean withdrawal
The UN
Aftermath
The KPA 3rd Division was almost completely destroyed in the battles. The division had numbered 7,000 men at the beginning of the offensive on September 1.[18] Only 1,000 to 1,800 men from the division were able to retreat back into North Korea by October. The majority of the division's troops had been killed, captured or deserted.[40] All of KPA II Corps was in a similar state, and the KPA, exhausted at Pusan Perimeter and cut off after Inchon, was on the brink of defeat.[41]
By this time, the US 1st Cavalry Division suffered 770 killed, 2,613 wounded, 62 captured during its time at Pusan Perimeter.[42] This included about 600 casualties, with around 200 killed in action it had already suffered during the Battle of Taegu the previous month. US forces were continually repulsed but able to prevent the KPA from breaking the Pusan Perimeter.[43] The division had numbered 14,703 on September 1, but was in excellent position to attack despite its casualties.[44] South Korean troops casualties at the battle were difficult to predict, but also thought to be heavy.
Sgt.
References
Citations
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 392
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 6
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 138
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 393
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 367
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 149
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 369
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 130
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 139
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 353
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 143
- ^ a b Catchpole 2001, p. 31
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 136
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 135
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 139
- ^ Millett 2000, p. 508
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 181
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 395
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 396
- ^ a b Millett 2000, p. 507
- ^ a b c d Appleman 1998, p. 411
- ^ a b c Catchpole 2001, p. 34
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 412
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 413
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 182
- ^ a b c d e Appleman 1998, p. 414
- ^ a b c Catchpole 2001, p. 35
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 415
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 418
- ^ a b c d Appleman 1998, p. 419
- ^ a b c d e f Appleman 1998, p. 420
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 186
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 421
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 36
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 187
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 568
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 179
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 570
- ^ Bowers, Hammong & MacGarrigle 2005, p. 180
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 603
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 604
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 16
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 14
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 382
- ^ Huston, Luther (May 10, 1955). "BURIAL BIAS PLEA REJECTED AGAIN". New York Times.
- ^ "Truman Sets Arlington Interment For Indian Denied 'White' Burial". New York Times. August 30, 1951.
- ^ "INDIAN HERO'S BURIAL SET FOR WEDNESDAY". New York Times. August 31, 1951.
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the original on 2014-02-07, retrieved 2010-12-22 This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- Bowers, William T.; Hammong, William M.; MacGarrigle, George L. (2005), Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, ISBN 978-1-4102-2467-5
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84119-413-4
- Ecker, Richard E. (2004), Battles of the Korean War: A Chronology, with Unit-by-Unit United States Casualty Figures & Medal of Honor Citations, ISBN 978-0-7864-1980-7
- ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3
- Gugeler, Russell A. (2005), Combat Actions in Korea, University Press of the Pacific, ISBN 978-1-4102-2451-4
- Millett, Allan R. (2000), The Korean War, Volume 1, ISBN 978-0-8032-7794-6
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4