Battle of Taejon
Battle of Taejon | |
---|---|
Part of the Taejon, South Korea 36°28′29″N 127°16′22″E / 36.47472°N 127.27278°E | |
Result |
Tactical North Korean victory Strategic UN victory |
Territorial changes |
UN forces establish the Pusan Perimeter |
- 24th Infantry Division
- • 19th Infantry Regiment
- • 21st Infantry Regiment
- • 34th Infantry Regiment
- Unorganized elements
- 3rd Infantry Division
- 4th Infantry Division
- 105th Armored Division
50 tanks
185 missing (POW/KIA)
(in and around Kum River, date 13–16)
463 killed
295 missing (POW/KIA)
(in and around Daejeon, date 16–20)
The Battle of Taejon (16–20 July 1950) was an early battle of the
The entire 24th Division gathered to make a final stand around Taejon, holding a line along the
Although they could not hold the city, the 24th Infantry Division achieved a strategic victory by delaying the North Koreans, providing time for other U.S. divisions to establish a
Background
Outbreak of war
Following the invasion of the
When forces were initially committed, the
The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea to absorb the initial North Korean advances, and disrupt the more numerous North Korean units.[6] The 24th Division effectively delayed the North Korean advance to allow the 7th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and other Eighth Army supporting units to establish a defensive line around Pusan.[6]
Immediately preceding the Battle of Taejon, some of the Bodo League massacres took place around Taejon, where between 3,000 and 7,000 South Korean leftist political prisoners were shot and dumped into mass graves by South Korean troops,[7] partially recorded by a US Army photographer.[8]
Delaying action
On 12 July, the division's commander, Major General William F. Dean, ordered the division's three regiments, the 19th Infantry Regiment, 21st Infantry Regiment, and the 34th Infantry Regiment, to cross the Kum River, destroying all bridges behind them, and to establish defensive positions around Taejon. Taejon was a major South Korean city 100 miles (160 km) south of Seoul and 130 miles (210 km) northwest of Pusan, and was the site of the 24th Infantry Division's headquarters.[14] Dean formed a line with the 34th Infantry and 19th Infantry facing east, and held the heavily battered 21st Infantry in reserve to the southeast.[15]
The Kum River wrapped north and west around the city, providing a defensive line 10 to 15 miles from the outskirts of Taejon, which was surrounded to the south by the
Prelude
U.S. 24th Infantry Division
The 24th Infantry Division's three infantry regiments, which had a wartime strength of 3,000 each, were already below strength on their deployment, and heavy losses in the preceding two weeks had reduced their numbers further. The 21st Infantry had 1,100 men left, having suffered 1,433 casualties.[15] The 34th Infantry had only 2,020 men and the 19th had 2,276 men. Another 2,007 men stood in the 24th Infantry Division artillery formations.[18] These counts placed the division's total strength at 11,400.[11] This was severely reduced from the 15,965 men and 4,773 vehicles that had arrived in Korea at the beginning of the month.[3]
Each of the regiments had only two battalions of infantry as opposed to the normal three.
In addition to casualties, shortages of equipment hampered the 24th Infantry Division's efforts. Losses from earlier fighting reduced artillery support to two battalions.[17] Communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition was limited and large amounts of equipment had been lost or destroyed in previous engagements. Most of the radios available to the division did not work, and batteries, communication wire, and telephones to communicate among units were in short supply, with some company formations having only one radio for one squad.[22]
The division had no tanks: its new M26 Pershing and older M4A3 Sherman tanks were still en route. One of the few weapons that could penetrate the North Korean T-34 tanks, the 3.5-inch M20 "Super Bazookas" firing M28A2 HEAT rocket ammunition, were in short supply.[23] The paucity of radios and wire hampered communication between and among the American units.[24]
North Korean units
North Korean planners intended for three divisions to attack Taejon from three directions, supported by tanks. The
The North Koreans advanced on the town with the 3rd and 4th divisions supported by over 50 T-34 tanks. Each North Korean divisions, normally operating with 20,000 men, was at 60 to 80 percent strength, giving them nearly a two to one numerical superiority over the American forces.[15] The morale of the two divisions was low, owing to repeated air attacks on equipment and overall exhaustion from continuous combat. Political officers promised the divisions they would be able to rest in Taejon after they took the city.[28]
Battles
Battle of the Kum River (13–16 July)
First North Korean attack
On the morning of 14 July, American soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry on the heights 2 miles (3.2 km) above the
In the early afternoon, another attacking force, an estimated 1,000 North Korean troops, crossed the river.[29] The North Koreans captured an outpost of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 34th Infantry with 105-mm howitzers. They turned a captured machine gun on the battalion's HQ battery and began to fire, taking it by surprise. Artillery fire aimed at the battery destroyed communications and vehicles, and inflicted heavy casualties.[31]
Its survivors retreated on foot to the south. Meanwhile, only 250 yards (230 m) away, a battery of the battalion also came under attack by 100 North Korean infantrymen, resulting in similar casualties and retreat. B Battery was attacked by 400 North Koreans, but an advance of South Korean horse cavalry spared the battery from heavy losses, allowing it to make an organized retreat.[32] The 63rd Field Artillery lost all of its guns and 80 of its vehicles, many still intact for North Korean forces to use.[29][33]
Later in the evening, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry counterattacked the positions but was unable to take them back, in the face of machine gun and small arms fire, and was forced to withdraw by nightfall.[29][34] After this failed attempt to retake the equipment, Dean ordered the positions where the captured equipment was located to be destroyed by an airstrike.[35] With the 1st Battalion having taken heavy casualties and the 3rd Battalion forced to move to counter North Korean attacks, the northwest flank of the American line had been beaten back.[36] The North Korean 4th Division began crossing the river, only slightly impeded by US aircraft attacking its boats.[29][37]
Second North Korean attack
Following the initial penetration, the 34th Infantry line moved south to Nonsan.[38] The 19th Infantry moved its 2nd Battalion to fill some of the gaps left by the 34th,[39] reinforced by Republic of Korea Army troops.[38][39] The combined forces observed a large build-up of North Korean troops on the other side of the river. At 03:00 on 16 July, the North Koreans launched a massive barrage of tank, artillery and mortar fire on the 19th Infantry's positions and North Korean troops began to cross the river in boats.[38] The North Korean forces gathered on the west bank and assaulted the positions of 1st Battalion's C and E companies, followed by a second landing against B Company.[40]
North Korean forces pushed against the entire battalion, threatening to overwhelm it. The regimental commander ordered all support troops and officers to the line and they were able to repulse the assault. However, in the melee, North Korean forces infiltrated their rear elements, attacking the reserve forces and blocking supply lines. Stretched thin, the 19th Infantry was unable to hold the line at the Kum River and simultaneously repel the North Korean forces.[41]
That evening, 2nd Battalion was moved to attempt to deal with the North Koreans in the rear but suffered casualties as well, and was unable to break the roadblocks. By 17 July, the 19th Infantry withdrew, and was ordered 25 miles (40 km) southwest to regroup and re-equip. Less than half of 1st Battalion returned, and only two of 2nd Battalion's companies remained intact. All three regiments of the 24th Infantry Division, having each been defeated and overwhelmed, were down to battalion-strength formations.[29][42]
The division's 19th and 34th regiments had engaged the North Korean 3rd Infantry Division and the North Korean 4th Infantry Division
Taejon surrounded
The North Koreans then moved against Taejon city.
At the same time, tanks from the North Korean 105th Armored Division began to enter the city, followed by troops of the 3rd and 4th infantry divisions.[27] There, the North Korean forces deployed, occupying key buildings throughout the city to establish sniper positions. American attacks against these positions later set fire to many of Taejon's wooden buildings.[50] North Korean forces prioritised and attempted to eliminate American gun emplacements, food stores, and ammunition dumps, having received information on the location of these facilities through agents operating in the city.[51]
At Taejon, the battered 24th Infantry Division was ordered to make a stand.[52][53] The 34th Infantry also moved to the city to oppose the North Korean forces, which assaulted it head-on while attempting to flank and cut off retreat from the rear. Dean began ordering elements of the division, including much of his headquarters, to retreat via train to Taegu, although he remained behind.[44] By this time, several M24 Chaffee light tanks had been sent to reinforce the division from A Company of the 78th Tank Battalion.[48][54] Regardless of the additional tanks, on 20 July, North Korean armored units pushed American forces back from Taejon Airfield, several miles northwest of Taejon, overwhelming the last American units defending the Kum River and forcing the remnants of the division into Taejon itself.[55] At this point the city was surrounded and North Korean troops began setting roadblocks along the roads out of the city.[53]
For two days, the 34th Infantry fought the advancing North Koreans in bitter house-to-house fighting. North Korean soldiers continued to infiltrate the city, often disguised as farmers. The remaining elements of the 24th Infantry Division were pushed back block-by-block.
Large columns of North Korean forces began marching on the city from the south roads, reinforcing those that had crossed the river. American forces pulled back after suffering heavy losses, allowing the North Korean 3rd and 4th divisions to move on the city freely from the north, south, and east roads.[56] The 24th Infantry Division repeatedly attempted to establish its defensive lines, and was repeatedly pushed back by the numerically superior North Koreans.[11][53]
Taejon falls
At the end of the day on 20 July, Dean ordered the headquarters of the 34th Infantry to withdraw. His command was reinforced by several more light tanks from the 1st Cavalry Division. As the tanks fought through a North Korean roadblock, Dean, with a small force of soldiers, followed them.[58] At the edge of the city, the final elements of the 34th Infantry, leaving the city in 50 vehicles, were ambushed and many of their vehicles were destroyed by machine guns and mortars, forcing the Americans to retreat on foot.[59]
In the ensuing fight, Dean's jeep made a wrong turn and was separated from the rest of the American forces.[60] Unable to turn back, Dean and his party attempted to retreat to American lines on their own, but 35 days later, alone and lost in the hills, Dean was captured by North Korean forces.[53][61] For most of his incarceration, the North Koreans were not aware of his rank. Dean repeatedly attempted to make the North Koreans kill him for fear of divulging information under torture. North Korean leaders had threatened to harm Dean if he did not cooperate but he was never actually tortured.[62] Eventually his rank was uncovered, but they were unable to gather any intelligence from him.[63]
When the last of the 34th Infantry's defenders left the city, the 21st Infantry, which had been protecting the road to Taegu, also withdrew, leaving Taejon in the hands of the North Korean forces.[64]
Aftermath
By the end of the battle, the casualties of U.S. 24th Infantry Division were counted as follows.
- 354 killed, 156 wounded, 185 missing (POW/KIA) - in and around Kum River, date 13–16
- 463 killed, 325 wounded, 295 missing (POW/KIA) - in and around Daejeon, date 16–20
most of casualties in and around Daejeon, from 16–20 July were from the 34th Infantry Regiment
On 22 July, the 24th Infantry Division was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division. It was put under the command of Major General John H. Church, in the absence of Dean, whose whereabouts were unknown. After three weeks of fighting, the division had suffered almost 30 percent casualties.[70] Historians attribute the substantial tactical losses of the 24th Infantry Division to a lack of training, equipment, and readiness, owing to extended time spent on occupation duty in Japan and without training.[71]
North Korean casualties could not be estimated because of lack of communications between units during the battle, which limited the value of American signals intelligence.[4][64] North Korean armor suffered heavy losses. A total of 15–20 North Korean tanks were destroyed by anti-tank weapons and US aircraft, and North Korean prisoners estimated that 15 76-mm guns, six 122-mm mortars, and 200 artillerymen were lost. Losses among North Korean infantry were heavy, especially in the NK 3rd Division.[72] The NK 3rd division was reported between 60 and 80 percent of its strength at the beginning of the battle and was reduced to 50 percent by its end, with total casualties ranging from 1,250 to 3,300.[73]
By the time the battle ended, the United States had moved enough forces onto the Korean Peninsula to roughly equal the number of attacking North Korean forces.
The first two
See also
References
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 134.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 350.
- ^ a b c Appleman 1998, p. 59.
- ^ a b Varhola 2000, p. 3.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 60.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 52.
- ^ Hanley & Jae-soon 2008.
- ^ Hanley & Hyung-jin 2010.
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 15.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 90.
- ^ a b c d e f g Varhola 2000, p. 4.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 60.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 63.
- ^ Summers 2001, p. 266.
- ^ a b c Fehrenbach 2001, p. 88.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 121.
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 92.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 122.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 125.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 147.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 85.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 123.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 93.
- ^ a b c Fehrenbach 2001, p. 89.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 96.
- ^ a b Millett 2010, p. 186.
- ^ a b c Summers 2001, p. 269.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 134.
- ^ a b c d e f g Millett 2010, p. 191.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 97.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 127.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 128.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 90.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 129.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 91.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 98.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 131.
- ^ a b c Appleman 1998, p. 135.
- ^ a b Millett 2010, p. 187.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 93.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 94.
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 96.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 79.
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 97.
- ^ a b Appleman 1998, p. 143.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 192.
- ^ Malkasian 2001, p. 23.
- ^ a b Summers 2001, p. 268.
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 20.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 99.
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 21.
- ^ Malkasian 2001, p. 24.
- ^ a b c d Millett 2010, p. 193.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 103.
- ^ Summers 2001, p. 267.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 102.
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 7
- ^ Fehrenbach 2001, p. 99.
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 104.
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 84.
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 7.
- ISSN 0024-3019
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 100.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 107.
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 6.
- ^ Catchpole 2001, p. 22.
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 103.
- ^ a b Alexander 2003, p. 105.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 190.
- ^ a b Fehrenbach 2001, p. 101.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 180.
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 179.
- ^ Millett 2010, p. 194.
- ^ Ecker 2004, p. 8.
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-7818-1019-7
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, ISBN 978-0-16-001918-0, archived from the originalon 2 November 2013, retrieved 22 December 2010
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84119-413-4
- Ecker, Richard E. (2004), Battles of the Korean War: A Chronology, with Unit-by-Unit United States Casualty Figures & Medal of Honor Citations, ISBN 978-0-7864-1980-7
- ISBN 978-1-57488-334-3
- Malkasian, Carter (2001), The Korean War, ISBN 978-1-84176-282-1
- Millett, Allan R. (2010), The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North, University Press of Kansas, ISBN 978-0-7006-1709-8
- ISBN 978-0-7351-0209-5
- ISBN 978-1-882810-44-4
Online sources
- Hanley, Charles J.; Jae-soon, Chang (6 December 2008), Children 'executed' in 1950 South Korean killings
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ignored (help) - Hanley, Charles J.; Hyung-jin, Kim (10 July 2010), Korea bloodbath probe ends; US escapes much blame, retrieved 2 August 2010
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