Battle of Tarakan (1945)
Battle of Tarakan (1945) | |
---|---|
Part of the Tarakan Island, Dutch East Indies | |
Result | Allied victory |
Australia
United States
Netherlands
669+ wounded
252 captured prior to 15 August 1945
The Battle of Tarakan was the first stage in the
Background
Geography
In 1945,
Japanese occupation
Prior to World War II, Tarakan formed part of the
Following the Dutch surrender, Tarakan's 5,000 inhabitants suffered under Japan's occupation policies. The large number of troops stationed on the island caused food shortages and many civilians suffered from malnutrition as a result. The Japanese authorities brought 600 labourers to Tarakan from Java. The Japanese also forced an estimated 300 Javanese women to work as "comfort women" on Tarakan after enticing them to travel with false offers of clerical and clothes-making jobs.[6]
Tarakan's value to the Japanese evaporated with the rapid advance of Allied forces into the area during 1944. The last Japanese oil tanker left Tarakan in July 1944, and heavy Allied air raids later in the year destroyed the island's oil production and storage facilities.[7] Hundreds of Indonesian civilians may have also been killed by these raids.[8] The Allies also laid mines near Tarakan, which, combined with patrols by air and naval units, prevented Japanese merchant vessels and transports from docking at the island.[7]
In line with the island's declining importance, the Japanese garrison on Tarakan was reduced in early 1945. One of the two
Allied plans
The primary objective for the Allied attack on Tarakan (code-named "Oboe One") was to secure and develop the
The 9th Division and 26th Brigade headquarters were responsible for planning the invasion of Tarakan. This work began in early March when both units had arrived at Morotai, and the final plans were completed on 24 April. The planners' work was hampered by poor working conditions and difficulties in communicating with General MacArthur's General Headquarters at Leyte.[12] As part of the planning process each of Tarakan's hills was assigned a code name (for instance "Margy" and "Sykes"); during the Australian Army's campaigns in New Guinea geographic features had been named on an ad hoc basis, and it was hoped that selecting names prior to the battle would improve the precision of subsequent planning and communications.[13]
The Allied plans anticipated that Tarakan would be secured quickly. It was expected that the operation would involve a short fight for the airfield followed by a 'consolidation' phase during which the island's airfield and port would be developed to support Allied operations. The planners did not foresee significant fighting in Tarakan's interior, and no plans were developed for operations in areas other than the landing beaches, Tarakan Town and airfield. The planners did, however, correctly anticipate that the Japanese would make their main stand in an area other than the invasion beach and would not be capable of mounting a large counterattack.[14]
The Allied plans also expected that Tarakan would be transformed into a major base within days of the landing. Under the pre-invasion planning it was intended that a
The Allied planners possessed detailed intelligence on Tarakan and its defenders. This intelligence had been gathered from a variety of sources which included signals intelligence, photographic reconnaissance flights and Dutch colonial officials.[17] Tarakan was the Australian Services Reconnaissance Department's (SRD) first priority from November 1944.[18] Prior to the invasion, I Corps requested that the SRD provide intelligence on Japanese positions in northern and central Tarakan. A five-man strong party landed on the island on the night of 25/26 April and successfully reconnoitered the defences on Tarakan's north coast, though the operative who was assigned to the centre of the island became lost and did not reach this area. The SRD operatives withdrew from Tarakan on the night of 29/30 April and landed on the mainland of Borneo. They were unable to transmit the intelligence they had collected, however, as their radio set malfunctioned. Members of the party eventually landed within the Allied beachhead on Tarakan on 3 May to report to the 26th Brigade, but Whitehead was disappointed with the results of this operation and made no further use of the SRD during the battle.[19]
Prelude
Opposing forces
Allies
The Allied force responsible for capturing Tarakan was centred around the very experienced
The 26th Brigade Group was supported by Allied air and naval units. The air units were drawn from the
The force which landed on Tarakan included nearly a thousand United States and Dutch troops. The U.S. troops included the
Japan
At the time of the Allied landing, the Japanese force on Tarakan numbered 2,200 men drawn from the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy. The largest unit was the 740-man strong 455th Independent Infantry Battalion which was commanded by Major Tadao Tokoi (Japanese: 常井忠雄). 150 Army support troops were also on Tarakan. The Navy's contribution to Tarakan's garrison comprised 980 seamen commanded by Commander Kaoru Kaharu. The main naval unit was the 600-strong 2nd Naval Garrison Force. This naval unit was trained to fight as infantry and operated several coastal defence guns. The 350 Japanese civilian oil workers on Tarakan were also expected to fight in the event of an Allied attack. The Japanese force included about 50 Indonesians serving in a home guard unit. Major Tokoi directed the overall defence of Tarakan, though relations between the Army and Navy were poor.[7]
The Japanese forces were concentrated around Lingkas, Tarakan's main port and the site of the only beaches suitable for landing troops.[25] These defenders had spent the months before the invasion constructing defensive positions and laying mines.[26] These fixed defences were used extensively during the battle, with Japanese tactics being focused on tenaciously defending pre-prepared positions. The Japanese did not conduct any large counter-attacks, and most offensive actions were limited to small parties of raiders which attempted to infiltrate the Australian lines.[27]
Preparatory operations
The Japanese force on Tarakan was warned of the impending invasion in April, before the Allies began their pre-invasion bombardment of the island. The island's commander received a radio signal warning him of imminent attack, and the commander of Tarakan's oil depot was ordered to destroy the oil wells on 15 April. It is possible that this warning may have been issued as a result of a security leak from either the Chinese Republican Army's representative to Australia or MacArthur's headquarters. This did not have any effect on the subsequent battle, however, as the Japanese had been preparing defences to resist invasion for several months and the Japanese were aware of the large Allied force which was being assembled at Morotai to attack Borneo.[26]
Prior to the arrival of the invasion force the Japanese garrison on Tarakan and Borneo was subjected to intensive air and naval attacks from 12 April to 29 April.[28] The RAAF and USAAF also mounted air attacks against Japanese bases in China, French Indochina and the NEI to suppress Japanese air units throughout the region. These attacks destroyed all Japanese aircraft in the Tarakan area.[29] The aerial bombing of Tarakan increased in intensity five days before the landing. These attacks were focused on the areas adjoining the planned landing beaches at Lingkas and sought to neutralise the Japanese defences in these areas. The oil storage tanks at Lingkas were a key objective as it was feared that the oil in these tanks could be ignited and used against Allied troops. These bombardments forced much of Tarakan's civilian population to flee inland.[30] At least 100 civilians were killed or wounded.[1]
The Tarakan attack force was assembled at Morotai during March and April 1945. The 26th Brigade Group was transported from Australia to Morotai by United States Army transports and arrived in mid-April and began to prepare their equipment for an amphibious landing.
Due to the need to clear both the large number of naval mines which had been laid around Tarakan and the extensive beach obstacles at Lingkas, the Allies did not attempt a surprise landing. A group of United States Navy
On 30 April, the 2/4th Commando Squadron and the 57th Battery of the 2/7th Field Regiment were landed on the nearby Sadau Island in order to support the engineers tasked with clearing the obstacles off the invasion beaches. This force rapidly secured the undefended island.[28] The landing on Sadau Island was the first time Australian soldiers had landed on non-Australian territory in the Pacific since late 1941 (Australian participation in the New Guinea Campaign from 1942 onwards was limited to the Australian portion of New Guinea).[26] The only Allied losses in this operation were aboard USS Jenkins, which was damaged when she struck a mine while supporting the landing.[37]
The task of clearing the beach obstacles at Lingkas was assigned to the 2/13th Field Company. These defences comprised rows of barbed wire, wooden posts and steel rails which extended 125 yards from the beach. At 11:00 on 30 April, eight parties of engineers went forward in LVTs and landing craft to clear the obstacles. The engineers were supported by the guns on Sadau Island and Allied warships and aircraft. Operating under Japanese fire the engineers cleared all the obstacles obstructing the landing beaches. While heavy casualties had been expected, the 2/13th completed their task without loss.[38]
Battle
Landing
The main invasion force arrived by sea off Tarakan in the early hours of 1 May. Supported by a heavy air and naval bombardment, the 2/23rd Battalion and the 2/48th Battalion made an
While the infantry were successful in securing a beachhead, the landing was hampered by the poor beach conditions. Many Australian vehicles became bogged in Lingkas Beach's soft mud, and seven LSTs were stranded after their commanders misjudged the ships' beachings. The small amount of solid ground within the beachhead lead to severe congestion and resulted in none of 2/7th Field Regiment's guns being brought into action until the afternoon of the landing.[43] The congestion was made worse by much of the RAAF ground force being landed on 1 May with large numbers of vehicles.[44] The seven LSTs were not refloated until 13 May.[45]
After securing the beachhead, the 26th Brigade Group advanced east into Tarakan Town and north towards the airstrip. The Australians encountered increasingly determined Japanese resistance as they moved inland.[46] The task of capturing Tarakan's airstrip was assigned to the 2/24th Battalion. The Battalion's initial attack on the airstrip on the night of 2 May was delayed when the Japanese set off large explosive charges, and the airstrip was not secured until 5 May.[47] While the capture of the airfield achieved the 26th Brigade Group's main task, the Japanese still held Tarakan's rugged interior.[48]
During the first week of the invasion, 7,000 Indonesian refugees passed into the advancing Australian lines. This was a larger number than had been expected, and the refugees, many of whom were in poor health, overwhelmed the Dutch civil affairs unit. Despite the devastation caused by the Allied bombardment and invasion, most of the civilians welcomed the Australians as liberators.[49] Hundreds of Indonesian civilians later worked as labourers and porters for the Allied force.[50]
General Thomas Blamey, the commander of the Australian Military Forces, made an inspection tour of Tarakan on 8 May. During a meeting with Whitehead, Blamey directed that the 26th Brigade Group should "proceed in a deliberate manner" in clearing the rest of the island now that the main objectives of the invasion had been completed.[51]
Securing the interior
In order to secure the island and protect the airstrip from attack, the 26th Brigade Group was forced to clear the Japanese from Tarakan's heavily forested hills. Approximately 1,700 Japanese troops were dug into positions in the north and centre of the island. These positions were protected by
The 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the NEI company were assigned responsibility for securing the south-eastern portion of Tarakan.
The United States and Australian navies continued to support the invasion once the landing was complete. USN PT boats sank at least a dozen small craft off Tarakan and in rivers on the coast of Borneo between 1 and 10 May. The PT boats carried Netherlands Indies Civil Administration interpreters on most patrols who interrogated natives to gather information on Japanese movements.[58] The Japanese battery at Cape Djoeata on Tarakan's north coast was also knocked out by USS Douglas A. Munro on 23 May.[59]
The Japanese garrison was gradually destroyed, with the survivors abandoning their remaining positions in the hills and withdrawing to the north of the island on 14 June. On this day 112 Chinese and Indonesian labourers left the Japanese-held area with a note from a senior Japanese officer asking that they be well treated.
Construction problems
While the infantry of the 26th Brigade Group fought the Japanese in the hills, the
While the airstrip was finally opened on 28 June,[64] this was too late for it to play any role in supporting the landings in Brunei or Labuan (10 June), or the landings at Balikpapan.[65] However No. 78 Wing RAAF was based on Tarakan from 28 June and flew in support of the Balikpapan operation until the end of the war.[66]
Efforts to restart production at Tarakan's oilfields were delayed by serious damage to the facilities and Japanese holdouts, and they did not become operational until after the war.[67]
Mopping up
Following the end of organised resistance the surviving Japanese on Tarakan split into small parties which headed to the north and east of the island. The 26th Brigade Group's main combat units were allocated sections of Tarakan which they swept for Japanese. Many Japanese attempted to cross the strait separating Tarakan from the mainland but were intercepted by Allied naval patrols.[68] Allied troops also searched for Japanese on Bunyu Island, fifteen miles north-east of Tarakan.[67]
From the first week of July the surviving Japanese became short of food and attempted to return to their old positions in the centre of the island and raid Australian positions in search of food. As their hunger increased more Japanese surrendered. The Australian units continued to patrol in search of Japanese until the end of the war, with several Japanese being killed or surrendering each day.[69] These operations cost the 26th Brigade Group a further 36 casualties between June 21 and August 15.[62] Approximately 300 Japanese soldiers evaded the Allied patrols, and surrendered at the end of the war in mid-August.[46]
Aftermath
The 26th Brigade Group remained on Tarakan as an occupation force until 27 December 1945, though most of its units were disbanded in October. The Brigade's headquarters returned to Australia in early 1946 and was formally disbanded at Brisbane in January 1946.[70]
Tarakan's oilfields were swiftly repaired and brought back into production. Engineers and technicians arrived shortly after the Allied landing and the first oil pump was restored on 27 June. By October the island's oilfields were producing 8,000 barrels per day and providing employment for many Tarakanese civilians.[64]
The Allied units committed to the battle carried out their tasks with "skill and professionalism".[71] In summing up the operation Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that "altogether this was a very well conducted amphibious operation which attained its objectives with minimum loss".[72] The Battle of Tarakan emphasised the importance of combined arms warfare, and especially the need for infantry to cooperate with and be supported by tanks, artillery and engineers during jungle warfare.[47]
Despite Morison's judgement, the 26th Brigade Group's casualties were high in comparison to the other landings in the Borneo campaign. The Brigade suffered more than twice the casualties the 9th Division's other two Brigades suffered during their operations in North Borneo and 23 more fatalities than the 7th Division incurred at Balikpapan.[73] The 26th Brigade Group's higher losses may be attributable to Tarakan's garrison not being able to withdraw as the garrisons in North Borneo and Balikpapan did.[74]
The landing force's achievements were nullified by the fact that the island's airfield could not be brought into action. The faulty intelligence assessment which led the RAAF planners to believe that the airfield could be repaired represented a major failing.[53] Moreover, the RAAF's performance at Tarakan was often poor. This performance may have resulted from the low morale prevalent in many units and the 'Morotai Mutiny' disrupting 1 TAF's leadership.[75]
As with the rest of the Borneo campaign, the Australian operations on Tarakan remain controversial.[76] Debate continues over whether the campaign was a meaningless "sideshow", or whether it was justified in the context of the planned operations to both invade Japan and liberate the rest of the Netherlands East Indies, which were both scheduled to begin in 1946. The Australian official historian Gavin Long's judgement that "the results achieved did not justify the cost of the Tarakan operation"[68] is in accordance with the generally held view on the battle.[46]
Notes
- ^ a b Hastings & Stanley 2016, p. 281.
- ^ a b Rottman 2002, p. 259.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 7.
- ^ Long 1963, pp. 406–408.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 7–9.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 8–9.
- ^ a b c Stanley 1997, p. 9.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 57.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 503.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 406.
- ^ "400 Indische Collectie: NICA Tarakan". Achieven.nl (in Dutch). Retrieved 2 October 2019.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 48–53.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 408.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 54–56.
- ^ Long 1973, p. 447.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 55.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 58.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 58–59.
- ^ Powell 1996, p. 304.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 29–41.
- ^ Long 1973, p. 448.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Wilson 1998, pp. 81–85.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 42.
- ^ Coates 2001, p. 280.
- ^ a b c Stanley 1997, p. 66.
- ^ I Australian Corps 1980, pp. 64–65.
- ^ a b Long 1963, p. 412.
- ^ Stevens 1994, p. 59.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 57–58.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 46–48.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 59.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 61.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 62.
- ^ Morison 2002, pp. 259–262.
- ^ Bulkley 1962, pp. 432–433.
- ^ Gill 1968, p. 622.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 67–69.
- ^ Long 1963, pp. 414–417.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 417.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 81.
- ^ I Australian Corps 1980, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 74–76.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 78.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 114.
- ^ a b c Coulthard-Clark 2001, p. 252.
- ^ a b Coates 2001, p. 282.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 426.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 98.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 133.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 104–105.
- ^ Long 1973, p. 451.
- ^ a b Odgers 1968, p. 461.
- ^ Hopkins 1978, pp. 159–161.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 427.
- ^ Long 1963, pp. 430–434.
- ^ I Australian Corps 1980, p. 52.
- ^ Bulkley 1962, p. 434.
- ^ Morison 2002, p. 262.
- ^ Long 1973, p. 453.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 168.
- ^ a b Johnston 2002, p. 218.
- ^ Odgers 1968, pp. 458–459.
- ^ a b Stanley 1997, p. 175.
- ^ Long 1963, pp. 451–452.
- ^ Odgers 1968, p. 483.
- ^ a b Rottman 2002, p. 261.
- ^ a b Long 1973, p. 452.
- ^ Long 1963, pp. 449–450.
- ^ Stanley 1997, pp. 194–197.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 203.
- ^ Morison 2002, pp. 263.
- ^ Coates 2001, pp. 286, 290.
- ^ Long 1963, p. 452.
- ^ Odgers 1968, pp. 456–457.
- ^ Stanley 1997, p. 1.
See also
References
- ISBN 0-8240-3290-X.
- Bulkley, Robert J. (1962). At Close Quarters. PT Boats in the United States Navy. Washington DC: Naval United States Government Printing Office.
- ISBN 0-19-554119-7.
- Coulthard-Clark, Chris (2001). The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-634-7.
- Gill, G Herman (1968). Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. OCLC 65475.
- Hastings, Tony; Stanley, Peter (2016). "'To capture Tarakan': Was Operation Oboe 1 Unnecessary?". In Dean, Peter J. (ed.). Australia 1944–45. Port Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. pp. 278–297. ISBN 9781107083462.
- ISBN 0-642-99407-2.
- Johnston, Mark (2002). That Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940–46. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-654-1.
- OCLC 1297619.
- ISBN 0-642-99375-0.
- ISBN 025207064X.
- OCLC 1990609.
- Powell, Alan (1996). War by Stealth: Australians and the Allied Intelligence Bureau, 1942–1945. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. ISBN 0-522-84691-2.
- Rottman, Gordon L. (2002). World War II Pacific Island Guide. A Geo-Military Study. Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-31395-4.
- ISBN 1-86448-278-8.
- Stevens, Alan (1994). "The Royal Australian Air Force and Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific Area". In Wahlert, Glenn (ed.). Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942–45. Canberra: Army Doctrine Centre. pp. 30–41. ISBN 9780642226679. Archived from the originalon 2008-08-04.
- Wilson, David (1998). Always First: The RAAF Airfield Construction Squadrons 1942–1974. Sydney: Air Power Studies Centre. ISBN 0-642-26525-9. Archived from the original on 2017-02-19.)
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Further reading
- Coombes, David (2001). Morshead: Hero of Tobruk and El Alamein. Australian Army History Series. ISBN 0-19-551398-3.
- Craven, Wesley; Cate, James, eds. (1953). The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume V. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. OCLC 256469807.
- Ogawa, Itsu (1980) [1957]. "Japanese Monograph No. 26: Borneo Operations (1941–1945)". War in Asia and the Pacific. Vol. 6. The Southern Area (Part I). New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc. ISBN 0-8240-3290-X.
- ISBN 0-11-772821-7.
- ISBN 9780642226679. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2020-03-27.
- Walker, Allan Seymour (1957). The Island Campaigns. Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Vol. Series 5 – Medical. Volume III. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 249848614.