Battle of Tinian
Battle of Tinian | |||||||
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Part of the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign of the Pacific Theater (World War II) | |||||||
An LVT churns through the surf bound for beaches of Tinian | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States | Japan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
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Strength | |||||||
40,000 | 9,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Ashore:
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2,600 civilian dead |
The Battle of Tinian was part of the
At
Major General
Background
Strategy
After
The Joint Chiefs of Staff envisaged the Marianas as a naval base,[5] but another rationale for the capture of the Mariana Islands emerged with the development of the long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber.[6] From the Mariana Islands, the B-29s could reach all the most significant industrial targets in Japan, and they could be supported by sea.[7] The air staff planners began incorporating the Mariana Islands into their long-range plans in September 1943.[5] The Combined Chiefs endorsed this at the Cairo Conference in December, along with a two-pronged offensive, with the Central Pacific drive in conjunction with one along the north coast of New Guinea.[8] In response, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, produced a campaign plan called Operation Granite, which tentatively scheduled the capture of Mariana Islands of Saipan, Tinian and Guam for November 1944 as the culmination of the Central Pacific campaign.[9]
By February 1944, there was consideration of advancing the Operation Granite timetable by bypassing
Tinian was considered a target from the outset.
Geography
Along with the other Mariana Islands, Tinian was claimed for Spain by
Most of the island was encircled by jagged limestone cliffs that ranged from 6 to 100 feet (1.8 to 30.5 m) high. There were only a few beaches, which the Americans designated by colors.[20] The best beaches were around Sunharon Bay in the southeast: Blue Beach, 1 mile (1.6 km) south of Tinian Town, was 600 yards (550 m) long; Green Beach One, located between the two piers at Tinian Town, was also 600 yards (550 m) long; Green Beach Two, at the southern end of Tinian Town, was 400 yards (370 m) long; Red Beach One and Two were north of the piers, with a combined width of 825 yards (754 m); and Orange Beach, 1⁄2 mile (0.80 km) north of Red Beach One, was 340 yards (310 m) long.[21]
There were two beaches on the east coast at Asiga Bay: the 355-yard (325 m) Yellow Beach One and the 200-yard (180 m) Yellow Beach Two. These were flanked by cliffs and subject to heavy surf when there was an easterly wind. There were also two small beaches on the northwest coast: the 65-to-75-yard (59 to 69 m) White Beach One and the 200-yard (180 m) White Beach Two. Their small size of the White and Yellow beaches made them unattractive: a division normally required a landing beach 1,000 yards (910 m) long.[21]
There was little seasonal variation in temperature, which ranged from an average of 76 °F (24 °C) in January to 80 °F (27 °C) in June, but the average humidity in those months was 78 and 84 percent, respectively. Fair weather prevailed during the dry season from November to March, but the wet season from November to March was characterized by frequent rains and occasional typhoons. Sunharon Bay was little more than an anchorage, and was unusable in rough weather.[19]
According to a 1 January 1944 census, Tinian had a population of 18,000 Japanese civilians, most of whom worked in the sugar cane industry, and 26 ethnic
Opposing forces and plans
Japanese
The senior Japanese officer on Tinian was
The Imperial Japanese Army force defending the island was the 50th Infantry Regiment, commanded by
The main Imperial Japanese Navy force on Tinian was the 56th Naval Guard Force (Keibitai), under the command of Captain Goichi Oie. He accepted Ogata as the commander on Tinian, but to avoid embarrassment, he did not inform his subordinates that their orders came from an Army officer.[29] His force of 1,400 troops and 600 laborers was equipped with three 6-inch and ten 140 mm coast defence guns, and ten 120mm and four 76.2 mm general purpose guns, twenty-four 25 mm and six 7 cm antiaircraft guns, and three 12 cm duel-purpose guns. Along with airfield construction crews, flight technicians and staff, there were about 4,000 sailors of various units on Tinian.[23][30] Most of the naval personnel had some training as infantry.[25] In addition, there were three civilian defence organizations of little military value, the Civilian Militia, the Home Guard Organization, and Youth Organization, and about sixty comfort women, none of whom survived the battle.[29]
After Saipan had fallen on 9 July, the prospects for the garrison of Tinian were grim.[31] Ogata expected that Tinian would be the next target, and on 25 June he issued a operational order that announced: "the enemy on Saipan... can be expected to be planning a landing on Tinian. The area of that landing is estimated to be either Tinian Harbor or Asiga (northeast coast) Harbor."[28] He adhered to the Japanese doctrine of defense against amphibious attacks at the water's edge.[32] Each of the sector commanders was ordered to "be prepared to destroy the enemy at the beach, but be prepared to shift two-thirds of the force elsewhere."[33]
Ogata was aided by the geography of Tinian, which limited the possible landing sites. He positioned the 3rd Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, most of the heavy weapons of the 56th Naval Guard Force, around Sunharon Bay beaches. The Northern Sector around Asiga Bay was covered by the 2nd Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment. He did not expect anything more than a raid on the beaches in the west, so this was assigned to the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment. The rest of the 1st Battalion was dug in around Mount Lasso. The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment formed a mobile counterattack force, along with the tanks and a mobile artillery contingent of twelve 75 mm mountain guns. The reserve was positioned to so to quickly reach either the Sunharon Bay or Asiga bay, depending on where the Americans made their main effort.[32][34]
United States
The American forces were part of
For the Tinian operation, the V Amphibious Corps had the
The V Amphibious Corps had the support of Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper's XXIV Corps Artillery with its two battalions of 155 mm guns and two battalions of 155 mm howitzers.[40] For the Tinian operation, Harper also had command of the four battalions of the 27th Infantry Division Artillery and five Marine Corps 105 mm howitzer battalions, two each from the two marine divisions and one from the V Amphibious Corps, for a total of thirteen battalions. The rest of the 27th Infantry Division, except for the 105th Infantry, was in reserve, but on four hours' notice to embark for Tinian.[41]
American intelligence about Tinian and the Japanese defenses there was excellent.
The intelligence reports revealed that the best landing beaches were around Sanharon Bay, but they were also the most heavily defended. The staff of the 4th Marine Division, particularly the plans officer, Lieutenant Colonel
Turner noted that the Sanharon Bay beaches had good gradients and inland approaches, that there was a protected harbor for small craft, and facilities for unloading supplies. Whereas the northern beaches were too small to land and support a force of the size contemplated, and were exposed to the weather, so if it turned bad the movement of supplies from Saipan could be obstructed or halted. An advance from north to south would likely take longer than one from east to west, and while artillery support from Saipan would be available in the early stages, unfavorable weather could prevent it being moved to Tinian to cover the advance once it moved further south.[46][47]
In view of these objections, Schmidt ordered a reconnaissance of the Yellow and White Beaches. On the night of 10/11 July, Companies A and B of Captain James L. Jones's V Amphibious Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion and Underwater Demolition Teams 5 and 7 set out in the high-speed transports USS Gilmer and Stringham. They were launched in rubber boats and paddled to within 500 yards (460 m) of the shore, then swam the rest of the way. The underwater demolition teams investigated the offshore reefs while the marines swam ashore and studied the beaches. Yellow Beach 1 was found to be strung with a double apron wire obstacle, with cliffs to the south that were 20 to 25 feet (6.1 to 7.6 m) high and unscalable without ladders or cargo nets.[49][50][51]
A strong current was encountered by the groups sent to reconnoitre the White Beaches, and the rubber boats wound up too far north. Consequently, the reconnaissance of White Beach 1 was carried out by the group intended to land on White Beach 2, and that of White Beach 2 had to be carried out the following night. They found that although White Beach 1 was only 60 yards (55 m) long, the cliffs for 150 yards (140 m) on either side were only 6 to 10 feet (1.8 to 3.0 m) high with small breaks, and could be negotiated by infantry without ladders or nets. Only the central 70 yards (64 m) of White Beach 2 could be reached by amphibian vehicles. Both White Beaches had gentle grades and it was possible for LCVPs to land on the reef 50 yards (46 m) from the beach and for infantry to wade ashore from there.[49][50][52]
With this information in hand, a conference was held on board Turner's flagship, the
Battle
Bombardment
Artillery bombardment of Tinian commenced on 20 June when Battery B of the 531st Field Artillery Battalion began shelling targets on Tinian with its 155 mm "Long Tom" guns. In the days leading up to the landing, the XXIV Corps Artillery used 24,536 rounds on 1,509
The US
The bombardment lifted for three periods of 40 to 60 minutes to allow for
On J-Day, 24 July, a
While covering the feint, the Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott were hit by the Japanese three 6-inch guns, which were concealed in caves 3,500 yards (3,200 m) southwest of the Tinian Town pier. Colorado was hit twenty-two times, killing 43 men and wounding 198. Norman Scott was hit six times, killing the captain, Commander Seymore Owens, along with 18 of his men, and wounding 47. The Colorado, cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Remey silenced the battery, but did not destroy it; this was accomplished on 28 July by the Tennessee, with 70 14-inch and 150 5-inch rounds.[65]
Landing
The majority of the ships for the assault of Tinian were loaded at
Marine divisions had two battalions of
The marines left their packs behind on Saipan and landed with
Captain Paul J. Halloran, the NTLF Construction Officer, designed a landing ramp that could be carried by an LVT. This creation was named a "Doodlebug". The Doodlebugs allowed vehicles to scale the low cliffs around the White Beaches. The Doodlebug drove up to the cliff face, firmly attached hooks to the cliff tops and then backed away from under the ramps, leaving them in place, with the other end falling into the water. The ramp crews checked that the ramps were firmly anchored and then the Doodlebugs drove over them to the top of the cliffs. The ramps were strong enough to hold the weight of a 35-short-ton (32 t) medium tank. Ten were built, of which six were used in the assault, carried to Tinian by Ashland.[72][66]
Cates assigned the
Two
All three assault battalions were ashore by 08:20, and DUKWs carrying the artillery began landing on White Beach 2 at 13:15. The 23rd Marines began landing at 14:00 and the 2nd Marine Division's 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, followed at 17:00. The planned
Counterattack
Ogata immediately attempted to organised a counterattack, in keeping with Japanese doctrine at the time of repulsing the attack on the beach. The 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, was already in the vicinity of the American beachhead, and was able to probe the hastily-positioned defenses for weaknesses. The 2nd Battalion in the Asiga Bay area was not far away, but could not move until dark, when American aircraft were not in the sky. Captain Isumi's mobile counterattack force was ordered forward from its assembly position in the Marpo area. He moved along the side of the roads, where trees offered concealment from the air, and was only spotted from the air once. Ogata kept the 3rd Battalion in place at Tinian Town in case the Americans made a follow-up landing there. Naval troops approached the beachhead from the Ushi Point airfield.[78]
At around 02:00 on 25 July, a force of about 600 Japanese sailors encountered the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, on the left of the American beachhead, and charged into machine gun, mortar, rifle and 37 mm antitank gun canister shot fire. A furious fight ensued, in which Company A was reduced to just 30 men, but by 07:00 476 Japanese lay dead.[79][80]
In the center of the American line another attack developed at the boundary between the 24th and 25th Marines. About 200 Japanese soldiers broke through the lines of Company K, 25th Marines, and divided into two groups. One group attacked Battery D,
On the right, the 23rd Marines were attacked by five or six Japanese tanks, accompanied by infantry of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 50th Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment. The moonless night was lit up by Navy
Drive south
The nighttime actions had depleted the 4th Marine Division's ammunition, so Cates delayed attacking on 25 July until 10:00 to allow time to replenish. In the meantime, the rest of the 2nd Marine Division began landing.
The following day, the 25th Marines captured the steeper and more imposing Mount Lasso without opposition, as the Japanese had pulled out during the night. The advance had now begun to outrun the range of the artillery on Saipan, so the 105 mm howitzer battalions of the 10th and 14th Marines displaced to Tinian on 26 and 27 July and rejoined their divisions.[87][86] The marines pressed forward on 27 and 28 July against sporadic Japanese resistance.[88]
Weather breaks
The weather abruptly worsened on the afternoon of 28 July.[89] A typhoon in the Philippine Sea caused heavy swells.[88] At 18:00 all unloading ceased. USS LST-340 ran aground on the reef, and efforts to refloat her were unsuccessful. On 13 August, she was pulled off the reef and towed to Tanapag Harbor, where she was beached. A control craft, LCC-25473, was washed up on the reef at White Beach 1, but was salvaged the following day. The pontoon causeways were damaged on the night of 29 July. The one at White Beach 1 broached and the one at White Beach 2 broke in two. The White Beach 1 causeway was restored to service on 31 July, only to broach again.[90][91]
With the Ushi Point airfield in American hands, the 121st Naval Construction Battalion commenced its repair on 27 July, filling in the bomb and shell craters. By that evening, an airstrip 2,500 feet (760 m) long and 150 feet (46 m) wide was ready for use, and it was fully restored to its 4,700-foot (1,400 m) length the next day.
The rough seas precluded unloading to all but DUKWs.[88] These were the preferred transport for supplies, as they did not damage the roads like the LVTs did. In some places engineers constructed parallel roads for LVTs.[66] One important task for the DUKWs was hauling ammunition from the ammunition ships SS Rockland Victory, which arrived off Tinian on 26 July, and MS Sea Witch, which arrived the following day. The DUKWs also had to haul 600 to 800 drums of fuel each day from the floating barges. A gasoline shortage was averted by the capture of Japanese stocks.[95]
On 30 July the 24th Marines occupied Tinian Town and the 25th Marines overran airfield no. 4.[96] The land mines were cleared away, and LCTs began landing on Green Beach. The water off the south pier was not deep enough to allow LSTs to dock there, so pontoon causeways were brought from White Beach 1 and Saipan, allowing the first LST to dock on 4 August. The beach between the two piers was cleared of land mines by 5 August, and was resurfaced with coral, allowing up to fifteen LCMs to beach there simultaneously. The harbor had not been mined, but there were sunken wrecks, which the UDTs demolished.[97]
Tinian taken
Japanese remnants made a final stand in the caves and ravines of a limestone ridge on the south portion of the island,[98] where the terrain rose in a brush and rock strewn plateau 5,000 yards (4,600 m) long and 2,000 yards (1,800 m) wide. On the evening of 30 July, Schmidt ordered his divisions to occupy the coastline between Lalo and Mapo Points, and annihilate the remaining Japanese forces.[99] The next morning, the battleships USS Tennessee and California and cruisers USS Louisville, Montpelier and Birmingham unleashed 615 short tons (558 t) of shells on the plateau, and aircraft dropped 69 short tons (63 t) of bombs.[100][101] As they advanced, the marines encountered civilians and Japanese soldiers waving white cloths. The latter had to be approached with care, as sometimes one of their number might decide to suicide and take Americans with him.[102]
The rugged terrain hampered the tanks but the flamethrower tanks of Company D, 4th Tank Battalion, were adept at burning sections of undergrowth where Japanese soldiers tried to hide.[100] As the 23rd Marines approached the plateau, they came under intense small arms fire from a small village and the cliff face. The accompanying tanks of Company C, 4th Tank Battalion, were engaged by a concealed Japanese 47 mm antitank gun, which scored six hits on one tank. Although penetrated, the tank remained operational and was able to back away. It used smoke to mark the suspected location of the gun for rockets and naval and tank gunfire. The advance resumed, only to have another tank hit by the same gun. Although also penetrated, it too remained operational, and this time the target was spotted, and engaged by tanks that destroyed the gun and machine-gunned twenty Japanese crewmen who tried to escape.[103][104]
Meanwhile, the 8th Marines made their way onto the plateau, where vegetation covered caves and fissures where Japanese riflemen and machine gunners lurked. While the vegetation concealed them from observation by the Americans, it also restricted their own fields of view. There was one winding road to the top, but it was mined. Engineers removed the mines, allowing tanks to proceed up the road and destroy Japanese positions, while the accompanying infantry battled their way through the brush. At 16:50, Company A reached the top. Five minutes later they were joined by a platoon from Company C. Company E, following up the road, was attacked by between 75 and 100 Japanese, who were eventually repelled. It then made it way to the top. Company G followed, reaching the top at 18:45, which was sunset. During the night, the Japanese attempted to cut the Americans on the summit off. They captured some vehicles, but were unsuccessful. At 05:15 the marines' positions were attacked by more than 600 Japanese soldiers and sailors. An hour later, the 8th Marines had 74 casualties and 200 Japanese were dead. The rest withdrew to the woods and cliffs in the southwest of the island.[105][106]
Lolo Point was reached at 18:00, and 55 minutes later, Schmidt declared that organized resistance had ended, and the island was secure.[107] Nonetheless, that night, the 6th Marines were attacked by a poorly-coordinated force of about 150 Japanese soldiers and sailors. The following morning 124 Japanese dead were counted, many of whom had died by their own hand. According to Japanese prisoners, Ogata was among the fallen, but his body was never identified.[108]
Casualties
In his report on the Tinian operation, Turner reported the 2nd Marine Division's losses in the period from 24 July to 9 August as 104 killed, 654 wounded and 3 missing, a total of 761. The 4th Marine Division lost 182 killed, 844 wounded and 20 missing, a total of 1,046. Four men of the XXIV Corps Artillery were wounded, and there were 4 killed, 13 wounded and 1 missing among the V Amphibious Corps troops, for a total of 290 killed, 1,515 wounded and 24 missing, giving a grand total of 1,829 casualties.[109][110] Another 63 sailors and marines were killed and 177 wounded aboard ships.[111][64] The dead included two men who were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for using their bodies to protect their comrades from hand grenades: Private Joseph W. Ozbourn and Private First Class Robert L. Wilson.[112] By 10 August, Japanese casualties included 404 taken prisoner and 5,745 dead that were buried by the Americans.[109]
Analysis
Smith considered Tinian "the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific war."[113] It differed from most in that it the proximity of Saipan allowed it to be carried out as a shore-to-shore operation rather than a ship-to-shore one, and fire support was available from land-based artillery.[114] The operation was much less difficult than Saipan; the nearest base was just 5 miles (8.0 km) away, not over a thousand; the garrison was smaller; the ratio of attackers to defenders was greater; the terrain was less formidable; intelligence was more accurate; and the preliminary naval and aerial bombardment more protracted.[115]
The Battle of Tinian offered a rare example of a force that expected to be attacked still being taken by surprise.[116] "Our singular success at Tinian", Smith later wrote, "lay in the boldness of the landing."[117] The Americans had accurate intelligence, assembled from multiple sources, and knew that the Japanese would not be waiting for them on the White Beaches. At Saipan, aerial photography had been restricted in fear that the Japanese would be alerted and the element of surprise would be lost; Tinian demonstrated that this was not the case.[118]
American commanders gambled on good weather, but when the weather eventually broke, the American logistical system still held. DUKWs were still able to operate when landing craft could not, and Hill recommended that DUKWs replace LCVPs on the Navy's
For their part, the Japanese incurred high casualties in fruitless counterattacks that were defeated by American firepower. They managed to move undetected at night, and were able to withdraw from contact with little loss whenever they wished to do so. Heavier American casualties might have been inflicted by a passive defense, taking advantage of their skill with camouflage, use of terrain, and emplacement of weapons.[119]
Aftermath
Mopping up
On 6 August, Brigadier General Merrit A. Edson, the deputy commander of the 2nd Marine Division, assumed tactical responsibility as commander of Ground Forces Tinian. The 8th Marines assumed responsibility for the whole 2nd Marine Division's sector two days later, allowing the rest of the division could return to Saipan for rest and reorganization. On 10 August it took over the 4th Marine Division's sector as well, so it could return to Hawaii.
The 8th Marines patroled the island, mopping up Japanese holdouts. On 25 October, the 8th Marines joined the rest of the 2nd Marine Division on Saipan, leaving the 1st Battalion behind on Tinian. It continued mopping up patrols until 1 January 1945, when it too departed for Saipan. Between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945, the 8th Marines lost another 38 killed and 125 wounded; 542 Japanese soldiers were killed.
The garrison on Aguiguan Island off the southwest cape of Tinian, commanded by Second Lieutenant Kinichi Yamada, held out until the end of the war, surrendering to Rear Admiral Marshall R. Greer on the United States Coast Guard Cutter USCG 83525 on 4 September 1945. The entire garrison of 67 troops, along with 172 Japanese and 128 Korean civilians, were interned on Tinian.[127][128] The last holdout on Tinian, Murata Susumu, was captured in 1953 and repatriated to Japan.[129][130]
Military government
There were 16,029 civilians on Tinian on 15 April 1944, of whom 1,658, mostly women, children and the elderly, were evacuated to Japan before the American invasion.[131][132] An estimated 2,610 civilians died in the battle.[133] Journalist Robert Sherrod noted that most died as result of the fighting; the Americans made great use of artillery, aerial and naval bombardment, and civilians often sheltered with soldiers. Some died from disease, dehydration or malnutrition.[134] Some were murdered by Japanese soldiers.[135] In one instance Japanese soldiers tied 40 to 50 civilians together and threw a grenade at them.[136] There were instances of mass suicide, most notably by jumping off the 120-foot (37 m) "Suicide Cliff" between Mapo and Lalo Points.[137] Children were thrown off the cliff by their parents, and some civilians were pushed off the cliff by Japanese soldiers.[108] A captured Japanese soldier claimed that a thousand loyal citizens had allowed the military to blow them up in caves.[138]
Only 2,468 civilians had been accounted for by 1 August, but within three days that number had increased to 8,491.
The military government was unprepared to care for the large number of civilians, and there were critical shortages of relief supplies of all kinds.[141] Seabees supervised the erection of tarpaulin shelters. These were gradually replaced by huts made from corrugated iron and timber salvaged from around the island. The internees also salvaged food supplies, and cultivated gardens. When firewood started to become scarce, Seabees made them improvised diesel stoves.[142]
In late 1945, Spruance, who had succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians. This was completed by late 1946.[143]
Base development
Responsibility the transformation of Tinian into a base for Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers was assigned to the 6th Naval Construction Brigade, under Halloran's command. For this work his brigade had the 29th and 30th Naval Construction Regiments; a third regiment, the 49th Naval Construction Regiment, arrived in March 1945.[144] Two air bases were constructed: North Field and West Field. These were on the site of the existing Japanese fields at Ushi Point and Gurguan Point respectively, but they had to be lengthened to 8,500 feet (2,600 m) and widened to 500 feet (150 m) to handle the B-29s. This task would have been easier if the plateau had been more than 7,000 feet (2,100 m) wide. As it was, large amounts of fill were required.[145]
When work was completed on 5 May 1945, North Field had four parallel 8,500-foot (2,600 m) runways, with 8 miles (13 km) of
Initially, fuel had to be supplied in drums. Later,
North Field became operational in February 1945 and West Field the following month.
Notes
- ^ Crowl 1960, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Crowl 1960, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Hayes 1982, p. 280.
- ^ Aandahl, Franklin & Slany 1958, p. 549.
- ^ a b Cate 1953, pp. 17–19.
- ^ Crowl 1960, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Cate 1953, p. 547.
- ^ Franklin & Gerber 1961, p. 780.
- ^ Crowl 1960, pp. 12–13.
- ^ Hayes 1982, pp. 555–560.
- ^ a b c d Crowl 1960, p. 271.
- ^ Morison 1953, p. 353.
- ^ a b Schmidt 1944, p. 2.
- ^ a b Prefer 2012, p. 37.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 5.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, pp. 7–8.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 2.
- ^ Morison 1953, pp. 149–151.
- ^ a b c Hoffman 1951, pp. 4–7.
- ^ a b Rottman 2002, p. 380.
- ^ a b Dyer 1969, pp. 952–954.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, p. 31.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, pp. 7–9.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 156.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 359.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 125.
- ^ Prefer 2012, p. 23.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 12.
- ^ a b Prefer 2012, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Prefer 2012, p. 20.
- ^ Morison 1953, p. 358.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, pp. 12–16.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 14.
- ^ Prefer 2012, pp. 21–23.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 239.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 365.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 20.
- ^ Prefer 2012, pp. 23–24.
- ^ a b Prefer 2012, p. 57.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 241–242.
- ^ Crowl 1960, pp. 276–277.
- ^ Moore 1998, p. 81.
- ^ "H-032-1 Operation Forager and the Battle of Philippine Sea". Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved 17 March 2024.
- ^ Moore 1998, p. 82.
- ^ Crowl 1960, p. 279.
- ^ a b Crowl 1960, p. 272.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, pp. 20–21, 161–162.
- ^ Smith 1989, p. 206.
- ^ a b c Crowl 1960, pp. 272–274.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 22.
- ^ Jones 1944, Annex E.
- ^ Jones 1944, Annexes C and D.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 23.
- ^ Dyer 1969, pp. 956–957.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 24.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 361.
- ^ Raines 2000, p. 251.
- ^ Bosworth 1944, Air Officer's Report.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 364.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 362.
- ^ a b c Morison 1953, pp. 359–360.
- ^ Olsen & Mortensen 1950, pp. 690–691.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, p. 76.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 378.
- ^ Morison 1953, pp. 361–362.
- ^ a b c d e f Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 371.
- ^ a b c Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 372.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 25.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 373.
- ^ Morison 1953, p. 362.
- ^ a b Crowl 1960, p. 275.
- ^ "The Doodlebug". Naval History and Heritage Command, U.S. Navy Seabee Museum. Retrieved 21 March 2024.
- ^ a b Morison 1953, pp. 362–363.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 381–383.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 384–385.
- ^ Morison 1953, pp. 363–364.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 383–384.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 62.
- ^ a b c Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 389–391.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 63.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 64–65.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 69–71.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 394–395.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 74–75.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, pp. 71–74.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 398–399.
- ^ a b c Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 402.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, p. 81.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 92.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 403.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 398.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 93.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 403–404.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 94–98.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 423–424.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, p. 85.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 408–409.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 102.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 411.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 107.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 104–105.
- ^ Harwood 1994, p. 24.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 107–109.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 412–413.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 119.
- ^ a b Turner 1944, p. 79.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, p. 150.
- ^ Turner 1944, p. 266.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 98, 117.
- ^ Smith 1989, p. 201.
- ^ a b Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 426–427.
- ^ Morison 1953, p. 370.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 424.
- ^ Smith 1989, p. 203.
- ^ Moore 1998, p. 86.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, p. 428.
- ^ Hoffman 1951, pp. 120–121.
- ^ a b Hoffman 1951, p. 140.
- ^ Richard 1957, p. 535.
- ^ Richard 1957, p. 539.
- ^ Shaw, Nalty & Turnbladh 1994, pp. 422–423.
- ^ Prefer 2012, p. 157.
- ^ Melson 1996, p. 32.
- ^ Richard 1957, pp. 21–22.
- ^ "September Daily Chronology of Coast Guard History (Entry for September 4)". U.S. Coast Guard Historian's Office. Retrieved 31 March 2024.
- ^ "Japanese Holdouts: Registry". Pacific Wreck Database. Retrieved 23 March 2024.
- ^ Petty 2009, p. 40.
- ^ Astroth 2019, p. 165.
- ^ a b Richard 1957, p. 553.
- ^ Astroth 2019, pp. 166–168.
- ^ Astroth 2019, pp. 127–131.
- ^ Astroth 2019, pp. 132–139.
- ^ Smith 1989, p. 211.
- ^ Astroth 2019, pp. 85, 91.
- ^ Astroth 2019, p. 88.
- ^ Harwood 1994, p. 31.
- ^ Richard 1957, p. 537.
- ^ Astroth 2019, pp. 153–155.
- ^ Astroth 2019, p. 172.
- ^ Rottman & Gerrard 2004, p. 89.
- ^ Cate 1953, p. 166.
- ^ Taylor et al. 1953, pp. 519–525.
- ^ Taylor et al. 1953, pp. 614–617.
- ^ Taylor et al. 1953, pp. 713–725.
References
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External links
- Media related to Battle of Tinian at Wikimedia Commons
- Battle for the Mariana Islands on YouTube
- Battle of Tinian 1944 / Part 1 - The Perfect Amphibious Operation on YouTube
- Battle of Tinian 1944 / Part 2 – Swift and Easy Victory on YouTube
- Tinian North Field National Historic Landmark Virtual tour.